USA > Wyoming > The history of Wyoming from the earliest known discoveries > Part 38
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over the roadways on the ice. They took everything they could from the burning station and houses and beat a rapid retreat across the river. At the first sign of their leaving, the stage driver and teamsters put their animals to their utmost speed and ran into the fort, the Captain arriving in time to give the Indians a few parting shots with his artil- lery as the last of them ran across the river. The shots rico- cheted along the ice, and caused the Indians to drop some of their plunder, though doing no further damage.
Colonel Thomas Moonlight of the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry, who had been made commander of the district of Colorado, seemed a misfit in his position. About the 1st of February, he proclaimed martial law in his district, for the purpose, as he explained, of enabling him to raise men and horses to go out and open the Overland road. This proclamation he sent to all commanders in the district, with a request that they press into the service both horses and men.
On February 4th, nine soldiers and five citizens were attacked at Mud Springs, a station on the Overland one hundred and five miles east of Fort Laramie. Colonel Col- lins, of the Eleventh Ohio, stationed at Fort Laramie, tele- graphed Lieutenant Ellsworth, who, with his command, was at Camp Mitchell, to proceed in all haste to Mud Springs. The force moved promptly and made the distance of fifty- five miles in twelve hours. Colonel Collins at once put him- self at the head of one hundred and twenty men of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry and Company D of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry. The force traveled all night and reached Camp Mitchell during the forenoon of the next day, and Mud Springs the day following. The Indians had run off fifteen horses belonging to citizens, one mule and three horses be- longing to the government, also several hundred head of cattle, the property of Creighton and Hoel. On the morn- ing of the 6th the Indians returned to the station to renew the attack, but seemed greatly surprised at the increased number of soldiers present. They had evidently come to take the place. They approached the station by a ravine
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which permitted them to come within seventy-five yards without being seen, from which point they would discharge arrows at an angle of about forty-five degrees, making a curve and descending on the soldiers at about the same angle. Colonel Collins, finding that quite a number of his men were wounded by this unseen foe, sent two parties out to dislodge the savages, one on foot to drive them out of the ravine and another on horseback to cut them off. The In- dians now left their position and the white men took posses- sion, and from that time on had no further trouble. The fight lasted about four hours. Colonel Collins had seven of his men wounded, three of them seriously. The Indians lost a large number of warriors. Colonel Collins reported that there were white men or Mexicans among the Indians and that they had plenty of ammunition. During the fight Colonel Collins telegraphed Major Thomas L. Mackey, com- manding at Fort Laramie, to send down a field piece, and directly after the message was sent the Indians cut the telegraph wire. About an hour after the hostiles disap- peared, a strong force was sent out to repair the line. The break was found about a mile west of the station and the damage repaired, but soon after it was cut again and just at dark another party was sent out and found the wire gone and two telegraph poles destroyed. It being important to keep up communication with Fort Laramie, wire was taken from poles east of the station and the break repaired. Dur- ing the night of the 6th the station was fortified and Colonel Collins prepared his troops to take the offensive. In the morning no Indians were to be seen. Leaving Captain Fouts in command of the station, Colonel Collins went out with a strong force to develop the whereabouts of the Indi- ans. They found plenty of trails and everything pointed to their probable location at some springs on Rush Creek, ten miles distant. Before daylight on the morning of the 8th, Lieutenant W. H. Brown of the Eleventh Ohio arrived from Fort Laramie with the howitzer, having made the hundred and five miles in thirty-four hours. This Lieutenant is the same man I have mentioned in connection with the Whisky
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Gap affair. His artillery reached Mud Springs just in time to be of service. The command proceeded to Rush Creek, but discovered that the Indians had crossed the river and were in the hills beyond. The camp indicated that a large body of Indians had made their headquarters in that sec- tion and that they were the ones committing the depreda- tions. The camp extended for several miles and there was evidence that over one hundred beef cattle had been slaugh- tered, and besides, there were oyster, meat and fruit cans, as well as flour sacks, indications of the spoilations of trains and stations on the Overland. Pressing forward on the fresh trail, they soon came in sight of more than two thous- and warriors on the opposite side of the river. Colonel Col- lins now ordered an examination of the ice to see if it would bear the troops, but the savages saved them the trouble of crossing, as it was noticed that they were already approach- ing the south side from two points some distance above and below. A position was chosen on the higher ground, a cor- ral formed of the train, sharpshooters pushed forward and rifle pits dug. Every soldier worked with a will, knowing that they must expect to meet a foe who outnumbered them nearly twenty to one. Colonel Collins was an experienced Indian fighter and he made the best disposition possible of his small force, realizing that his troops were too weak in number to charge or scatter. He therefore placed them in a compact body and depended on their coolness, courage and marksmanship. On came the Indians with more than their usual boldness, but their advance columns on the right and left were met by a deadly fire from the trained veterans of the plains. Finding that death awaited them in the front, the Indians fell back and crept forward under the hillocks and ridges which surrounded the position occupied by the white men. The soldiers were on the alert, and whenever a savage exposed himself to fire upon the troops he was picked off by the crack shots in the command. There was one position which afforded the Indians a secure place from which to fire on the veterans. This was a knoll about 400 yards distant, behind which a dozen or more warriors were
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securely hidden. Colonel Collins resolved to dislodge the troublesome savages, and for this purpose made a detail of sixteen men chosen from Company D, Seventh Iowa Cav. alry, and the First Battalion of the Eleventh Ohio Volun- teer Cavalry. Lieutenant Patton was given command of this detachment and was ordered to charge at a gallop, re- volvers in hand, to clear out the Indians from behind the knoll. It was a gallant movement and a fierce charge. The concealed foe was routed and shot down as they ran. Some two hundred Indians, occupying a position beyond the con- tested point, dashed forward to save their comrades from destruction, and then followed a hand-to-hand fight with the advancing savages. The soldiers having accomplished their object strictly obeyed orders and returned to the posi- tion occupied by the main body. In this affair, Lieutenant Patton lost two men, John A. Harris of the Seventh Iowa and William H. Hartshorn of the Eleventh Ohio. This charge discouraged the Indians and they began to fall back behind the hills, and most of them retired to the north side of the river. The command of Colonel Collins camped on the battlefield and strengthened their position during the night. At sunrise the next morning, 400 mounted warriors recrossed the river and again renewed the attack, but their fire was delivered at long range and did no damage, and they finally retired across the river and rapidly followed the main body of Indians, who had gone north. At 2 o'clock that afternoon, the 9th, Colonel Collins left his camp and moved up the Platte a distance of fifteen miles. At that point the command was divided, part under Lieutenant Brown going on to Camp Mitchell, then to Fort Laramie. These two places had been left with insufficient garrisons. Colonel Collins, with the remainder of the command, in- tending to go to Mud Springs. Both divisions moved out promptly on the morning of the 10th. The weather was extremely cold and the troops suffered severely. When we consider the large number of Indians engaged in this affair and their thorough equipment and defiant attitude, and then compare the small force under Colonel Collins, the bravery
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of the men and the skill of the officers must be admitted. Not less than 150 Indians were killed. Colonel Collins lost all told two killed, sixteen wounded and ten badly frost- bitten, making a total of twenty-eight killed and disabled. There were two facts which, if taken together, will explain the failure on the part of the Indians and the success of the white men. The Indians had possessed themselves of a large number of improved arms and had an abundance of fixed ammunition, but having no experience in the use of these arms, they failed to do execution, invariably firing over the heads of the troops. The soldiers, on the contrary, obeyed orders, fought systematically and made every shot tell. Here is an illustration of the advantage of the trained soldier over the ignorant savage in the use of firearms. These commands both returned to Fort Laramie on Febru- ary 14th. Colonel Collins in his official report explains the condition of the Indians that spring, and having had experience on the plains, that portion of his report is ap- pended, which throws light on the Indian situation.
"This party of Indians has rarely been equaled in size. It is usually difficult for large numbers to remain long to- gether for lack of subsistence, but in this case their stolen stock and plundered stores furnished them abundant sup- plies. The party was made up of all the Cheyennes, Ogalal- las and Brule Sioux south of the Platte, together with prob- ably a few Kiowas, Arapahoes, and perhaps some straggling Apaches and Comanches. It numbered from 800 to 1,000 lodges and from 2,000 to 3,000 warriors. The last-named bands are most likely on and south of the Arkansas River for the winter, but many come up to depredate on the main and South Platte when grass comes. The party we met has no doubt gone north to the Powder River country, to join the hostile Indians there, and may be expected to continue their depredations along the North Platte till severely pun- ished. Their probable route from where we left them will be through the sand hills to L'Eau-qui-court, then across the heads of White River and South Fork of the Cheyenne to Powder River. Small parties may remain, but the main body
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will go there to secure their families and recruit their stock until spring. They are well armed and mounted; have many rifled muskets and plenty of ammunition, including minie cartridges with ounce balls; are full of venom and bent on revenge for the loss of their people south. So soon as they reach the Indians north they will excite and perhaps compel them to be hostile. The posts on the Platte, especially Deer Creek and Platte Bridge, which are within 100 miles of Powder River, will be in immediate danger. More troops should be sent out here immediately to hold the posts in the sub district, and when spring opens important expeditions should be organized to penetrate the center of their country.
"Having been nearly three years in this service and be- ing about to leave it, I venture to add a word as to the policy to be pursued. I beg to repeat the suggestions which I have heretofore made, that the permanent cure for the hostilities of the northern Indians is to go into the heart of their buf- falo country and build and hold forts till the trouble is over. A hasty expedition, however successful, is only a temporary lesson, whereas the presence of troops in force in the coun- try where the Indians are compelled to live and subsist would soon oblige them to sue for peace and accept such terms as the government may think proper to impose. The Black Hills, Big Horn Mountains, Yellowstone country, are all rich in minerals, but this wealth cannot be made available while hostile bands of Indians are roaming over the country. If these Indians could be induced to remove north to the Main Missouri and remain there, it would open up an immense region for mining and agriculture which cannot now be reached. They would be in a fine buffalo country, and out of the way of collisions with whites, which are always liable to occur if they are near together. It would also separate them from the southern Indians, and prevent the plotting and combining which now exists be- tween them. There are two points I would respectfully in- dicate as suitable locations for the posts spoken of, one about the head of the Little Missouri of the Mandans near. the Three Buttes, and the other on some proper place on Powder River. An expedition starting from the Missouri near Fort Pierre and following the old traders' trail west of the forks of the Cheyenne, thence to the head of the Little Missouri of the Mandans, thence to Powder River, would be joined at some proper post by another from Fort Lara-
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mie, and if in sufficient force it could hardly fail to accom- plish its object."
General Robert B. Mitchell of the District of Nebraska notified General Dodge on the 9th that the telegraph poles on the route between Julesburg and Fort Laramie were destroyed for a distance of fifteen miles, and on the Denver route from Julesburg ten miles of the line were destroyed and that poles to reconstruct the telegraph had to be hauled from one hundred and thirty to one hundred and forty-five miles. At this time there was no communication by tele- graph or stage from the east with either Fort Laramie or Denver. On the 10th General Dodge issued an order to the commanders of Fort Riley and Fort Kearney to halt all trains going west at those points and to organize the persons accompanying them into companies for the protection of their trains. Each company was to have a captain, who would be clothed with authority for the handling of the force under him. Insubordination on the part of any person accompanying the train was to be reported at the first mili- tary post reached, the commander of which was authorized to arrest and punish such persons.
General Connor telegraphed from Camp Douglas the same day that the Indians, though driven from the road only two days before, had returned in increased numbers, and further stated that the troops were insufficient to con- tend with them; the probabilities were that communication by stage and telegraph would not be resumed for some time. This referred to the Indians on the North Platte and the route from Denver across the Laramie Plains. The outlook was certainly discouraging, but there were good command- ers and brave soldiers at work repairing the telegraph line and guarding the mail coaches as well as emigrants and government trains. On the 11th General Dodge sent orders to Colonel Moonlight at Denver to push out and meet Colo- nel Livingston, who was trying to open the road, and on the same day he ordered the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry and a detachment in charge of howitzers to proceed from Fort Riley to join Colonel Livingstone on the Overland road in
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Nebraska. These troops carried with them forty days' ra- tions. The Overland mail company became clamorous for protection. The stock on the line had been run off and the stations burned. General Dodge, seeing the situation, sent the company word that he was prepared to protect the mails and would do so, and in a few days there was a large num- ber of troops on the road from Fort Leavenworth, Fort Riley and Omaha. Colonel Moonlight was ordered to throw all his available force on the stage line between Denver and Julesburg, to repair the telegraph, open communication and hold it open.
On the 13th, Colonel Moonlight telegraphed to General Dodge from Denver that he was expected to protect points on the Overland while he was destitute of troops and he was without blankets, clothing, transportation, and had not a dollar in money. He made a strong appeal for men and means and ended his telegram by saying that the Indians were desperate. On the 14th, Colonel Livingston, who was operating on the Overland, telegraphed to Colonel Moonlight for assistance and urged that officer to clear the line between Denver and Julesburg. On the 15th, General Dodge tele- graphed that 50,000 rations were on the way to Julesburg for the use of troops on the march. He also telegraphed Colonel Moonlight the same day, "If the citizens of Colorado will not aid you, put the troops that are guarding towns and settlements on our lines of communication and let towns and settlements take care of themselves." Every officer in the department was putting forth his best efforts to beat back the Indians and open the lines of communica- tion. General Dodge was pushing forward ammunition, arms, supplies and additional horses to take the place of those killed or disabled. At this time the following troops were along the Overland. The station where each force was located is given. Companies A, E, F, H, I, and K, First Nebraska Cavalry Veteran Volunteers, near Cottonwood Springs, Nebraska Territory; Company C, First Nebraska Cavalry Veteran Volunteers, Fort Kearney, Nebraska Territory; Company G, First Nebraska Cavalry Veteran
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Volunteers, Plum Creek Nebraska Territory; Companies A, B, C, F, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, near Cottonwood Springs, Nebraska Territory; Company E, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, Columbus, Nebraska Territory; Companies A and C, First Battalion Nebraska Veteran Cavalry, near Cottonwood Springs; Company B, First Battalion Nebraska Veteran Cavalry, Dakota City; Company D, First Battalion Nebraska Veteran Cavalry, Omaha City, Nebraska Terri- tory; Companies A, D, I, L, Eleventh Ohio Cavalry Volun- teers, Fort Laramie; Company H, Eleventh Ohio Cavalry Volunteers, Camp Mitchell (near Scott's Bluffs); Company C, Eleventh Ohio Cavalry Volunteers, Fremont's Orchard, Colorado Territory; Companies B and F, Eleventh Ohio Cavalry Volunteers, Camp Collins.
General Dodge telegraphed from St. Louis on the 23rd to General Mitchell at Omaha, who was about to start for Fort Laramie, "As you go up the valley, telegraph and keep me posted. Where is Powder River, and how far from Julesburg? One of my engineers has gone with the Six- teenth Kansas for the purpose of getting posts and stage stations together. Let stage company have corn if you can spare it. We must keep stages running. Troops should be on the way from Denver to make route secure to Julesburg. At any rate, don't let stages stop for want of escort. Also telegraph me any point that you may find where stores or forage are needed." Colonel Moonlight on the same date telegraphed General Dodge that he had sent out two com- panies of militia to operate on the line between Denver and Julesburg. On the 24th, General Mitchell telegraphed to headquarters from Fremont, Nebraska, that the posts along the Overland were all weak and asked for re-inforcements. Major Mackey telegraphed on the same day from Fort Laramie that he was expecting trouble from the Indians at that point.
On the 17th, the Secretary of War announced that the Territory of Utah and that part of Nebraska lying west of the twenty-seventh degree of longitude had been added to the military department of Missouri. The War Department -(28)
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evidently desired to fight the Indians on the east side of the mountains without taking the trouble to transmit orders to San Francisco. This was certainly good policy, but the war with these Indian tribes had been in progress for years and the savages were far from being subdued. The condi- tions at the time this change was made were nearly as bad as could be and there was no hope of its growing better in the near future. The small number of troops in the field against the Indians was to be made still smaller by the end of the term of service of the First Battalion of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry and some other troops. Taken altogether, the government was not holding its own with the Indians. General Connor had one hope, and that was that the gov- ernment would be able to send reinforcements. He left Camp Douglas and went to Fort Bridger, where he arrived February 18th, and we find him telegraphing to the De- partment of the Missouri that Colonel Collins, the com- mander at Fort Laramie, had promised to keep express run- ning over the broken part of the telegraph line until the break could be repaired. The cunning savages had torn down the line and in some instances had carried away the wire for long distances. Before leaving Fort Bridger, Gen- eral Connor relieved Major John M. O'Neill, the commander of the post, at his own request and ordered him to report at Camp Douglas. Major O'Neill belonged to the Second California Cavalry and his administration of affairs at Fort Bridger gave satisfaction. Captain Albert Brown of the same regiment was ordered to take command of Fort Bridger.
General Dodge had listened attentively to the advice of all his commanders in the field and finally made up his mind to adopt General Connor's method of dealing with bad Indians. All agreed that hostiles were in great force in the Powder River country, that is scouts reported that there were from 1,500 to 2,000 lodges and that each of these lodges contained from six to eight warriors. Powder River was used as a safe retreat and a place to keep their women and children as well as the old men of the tribe.
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From that locality forays were made down to the Overland road, striking it at any point west of Fort Kearney and east of South Pass, likewise a watch was kept for parties who traveled the Bozeman road. These freebooters adopted business methods in their murdering and thieving and man- aged to make it pay. They were so numerous that they were enabled to keep representatives of the various tribes forming the combination on the line of travel nearly all the time. Winter feed for ponies was good in the hills along the Powder River and having great numbers of these animals, each fresh band of warriors starting out could be well mounted. The run down stock, after each foray, was turned out to graze and grow fat on the nutritious grasses. These wild men of the plains and mountains had made rapid strides in the arts of war since they had become acquainted with the white man. They would pay any price for modern arms and ammunition or take any risk in the attempt to steal them. They had always been fond of bright blankets and of late had shown a disposition to pos- sess themselves of the modern tent of the soldier. They took naturally to war and prided themselves on being the descendents of a race of eminent warriors from the earliest known period of their traditions. Father De Smet had dis- covered that these red men were God's creatures but he never succeeded in making a trapper or a soldier believe it. Both of the latter class regarded the Indian as a red devil, whom it was at least good policy to kill.
General Dodge made up his mind that a winter cam- paign in the Powder River country would be striking at the root of the evil which afflicted the Overland route and to this end he hurried forward a large cavalry force. Brig- adier General Robert B. Mitchell was to have command of the expedition and it was to go by way of Fort Laramie. This officer was impatient to win glory in the Powder River country and he chafed over the delays of making ready for the campaign and when it was reported by reli- able scouts that the snows were deep and that it was im- possible for the expedition to start he telegraphed General
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Dodge that if that officer would furnish the cavalry he would reach the Powder River country in spite of the snow or bad roads. In reply to this, General Dodge telegraphed, "All you can do is to work the troops up toward Julesburg and Laramie as fast as you can, and, as soon as ready, if Indians are north of Laramie, leave everything there but what you want, and then make a quick dash at them, using pack mules from Laramie. You can strike them with 1,500 or 2,000 well mounted men. Subsistence and forage enough have been forwarded. Keep scouts out all the time so as to keep posted." The date of the above dispatch was the 28th of February. The next we hear of General Mitchell is a dispatch from Fort Kearney dated March 6th, saying that a large number of friendly Indians at Fort Laramie are in a starving condition and asking what he should do with them, adding that the Indians say they dare not leave their camp to hunt or provide for themselves because of the threats of hostiles. The answer to this comes on the same day, to feed the Indians condemned and damaged rations and form them into companies and use them as scouts. A second dispatch from Mitchell to General Dodge on the same day says, "Mrs. Morton, lately brought from the Indians on Powder River, says the Indians are high up on the North Fork of Powder River, where they intend to leave their fam- ilies for the summer for the purpose of making war on the Platte. She says the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Brule and Ogalalla Sioux, and Minneconjous are banded together and determined to make war to the knife. This woman was captured at Plum Creek in August last."
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