The history of Wyoming from the earliest known discoveries, Part 43

Author: Coutant, Charles Griffin, b. 1840
Publication date: 1899
Publisher: Laramie, Chaplin, Spafford & Mathison
Number of Pages: 790


USA > Wyoming > The history of Wyoming from the earliest known discoveries > Part 43


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speedy renewal of war, when by withdrawing our forces we will be far less prepared for it than now. These treaties perhaps answered the purpose (though I think they are al- ways unwise and wrong) so long as the Indians continued to occupy the greater portion of their own country and the war only involved small encroachments by whites on its borders. Hitherto the process of dispossessing the Indian of his lands, although equally certain, was far slower and far less alarming. Today we are at one grasp seizing the whole region of country occupied by the Indians and plung- ing them without warning into suffering and starvation. Treaties such as we have made with them in times past will no longer answer the purpose. I have presented my views on this subject and suggested what seems to me the proper course to be pursued so fully and so often to the War De- partment, and have so frequently urged the matter upon the attention of the government, that it seems unnecessary and hardly consistent with official propriety that I should reiterate them in this manner. I only do so now because the telegram from the General-in-Chief, which you inclose to me, seems to indicate dissatisfaction that so many troops are employed in the Indian country. Either a large force must for a time be kept there, or we must furnish in- sufficient protection to our citizens in that region.


"It is hoped that during the present season the expedi- tions now marching against the Indians will be able to in- flict such damage upon them that they will prefer to under- go much wrong and suffering rather than again break out in hostilities. This is a cruel process, but the only one which under the present system seems to be in my power. I will withdraw and muster out of service all the troops I pos- sibly can from day to day, and by the close of this season I will endeavor to reduce to much less force the troops serv- ing on the plains. It is proper for the government, however, to realize that owing to the changed condition of affairs on the plains, arising from the rapid development of the min- ing regions and the great emigration to and rapid settlement of the new Territories, a much larger force will for a long time be required in that region than we have heretofore con- sidered necessary. The remote stations of these troops and the necessity of hauling in wagons from the Missouri River all supplies needed for them, renders the protection re- quired and demanded by the mail service, the emigration, and the remote settlements an expensive undertaking, the propriety of which must be determined by the government


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itself. The military commander ordered to furnish such protection has only to carry out his orders in the best and most economical manner. I trust I have no purpose except to perform my duty in this matter and in this manner. I have assigned Major-General Dodge, a well known and most efficient and careful officer, to the command of all opera- tions in the Indian country west and south of the Missouri River, with orders to reduce forces and expenditures as rapidly as it is possible to do so. His subordinate command- ers are men entirely familiar with Indians and Indian country.


"In conclusion, I desire, if it be consistent with the public interests, to be informed upon two questions, in order that I may act with more full understanding of the purposes of the government: First. Is it designed that such military pressure be kept upon the Indians that small parties of adventurers prospecting the mountains and plains in every direction, and in the most remote and uninhabited regions of the country, will be unmolested by Indians, whatever such parties may do or wherever they may go? I need not say that protection of so general and universal a character will require a large military force, which will be mainly needed to protect the Indians, by watching these white men and preventing them from committing acts for which the Indians will assuredly retaliate. Is the commander of this department responsible for hostile acts of Indians against such parties? Second. In case treaties of peace, such as have been usual, are made with the Indians by the proper officers of the Indian Department, and the troops withdrawn from the Indian country in accordance with such treaty, is the army commander to be held responsible if the Indians violate the treaty and renew the war? In short, is the army to be made responsible for every murder or outrage committed on the great plains by Indians or white men, who are officially at peace according to the rec- ords in the office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs? When there is divided action, as is the case now in the man- agement of Indian affairs, there should be divided responsi- bility. Army commanders are very willing to be held re- sponsible for military operations under their immediate command, but they are not willing and ought not to be held responsible for breaches of treaties made by other depart- ments of the government which they did not approve, yet to terms of which they are obliged to conform. If these questions, which are respectfully asked, can be answered


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without official impropriety, the question of troops needed in the Indian country and attendant expenses can be easily settled."


It will be seen that General Pope grasped the situation and presented it in a nut shell, but unfortunately the Presi- dent, the Cabinet, and all those in authority, were unwilling to hear the truth and adopt a wise policy. There were con- ditions which an honest and prudent government should have recognized, but instead matters were allowed to drift on. We had been dealing with the savages of the west since the close of the Revolution. The subject had been discussed in every session of Congress, and yet it remained for General John Pope to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth on the Indian question. The government of the United States had been prosperous, developed commerce, manu- facturing, mining, carried through successfully a gigantic civil war, extended its territory from the Mississippi to the- Pacific Ocean, and in 1865 had secured for itself the respect of mankind the world over, and yet we had utterly failed to produce a statesman who could solve the Indian ques- tion. It is true it was no easy matter, for we had taken up. the policy in vogue in Colonial days and carried it on down to the year of which I am writing. The massacres of New England and the Middle States had been repeated on the western border and continued year after year as that bor- der land was extended toward the setting sun. The govern- ment invited the people to occupy the rich lands acquired by the Louisiana purchase in 1803 and those secured by the annexation of Texas in 1845 and also those ceded to us by Mexico in 1848, and yet in all these were savage and warlike tribes who refused to be considered citizens or subjects of the United States. Thomas Jefferson, whom his followers and admirers, even down to the present day, claim was the ablest of our Revolutionary fathers, failed to point out a wise and humane Indian policy. In fact, the Indian ques- tion has ever remained the one stumbling block in the path of American statesmen. Emigrants settled in the west because they accepted in good faith the invitation extended


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to them by the government, and they were entitled to pro- tection. In effect, the United States bargained, sold and transferred homes to these people and was therefore legally and morally bound to protect its title. Too often were these pioneers left by the government to protect themselves. There was only one party to blame, and this was neither the Indian nor the emigrant, but the great and proud govern- ment of the United States, and coming generations will not fail to place the responsibility where it belongs. The policy of that government was to exterminate the Indians, and these tribes would have been wiped out in 1865 had it not been that someone in Washington discovered that the plans of Generals Pope, Dodge, Curtis, Connor and others would cost millions of dollars. The civil war was over and the spasm of economy suddenly seized the powers that be and troops were no longer to be kept in the field, for retrench- ment was the cry of the politicians. Let no one be deceived; there was to be no change in the Indian policy. The gov- ernment was simply to neglect the settlers of the west and permit them to be murdered and scalped by the now thor- oughly enraged savages. In Wyoming, the conditions were these: General Connor had just started for the Powder River country when General Dodge received his orders from General Pope. These were dated St. Louis, August 1st, and I make one short extract which tells the whole story:


"Whatever the results of these expeditions, I wish you on their completion to return at once to a simple arrange- men for the defense of the overland routes to Santa Fe and to California so far as these routes lie within the territory under your jurisdiction. Of course you will be able by this means to muster out of service a force in the aggregate equal to the whole forces composing the several expeditions now in progress."


General Dodge was a good soldier, and the proof of this was that he had learned to obey, but he wrote a letter to General Pope in which he said he did not fully understand the order in regard to mustering out of troops and reducing expenses. He said he had pushed forward reinforcements to this department and incurred great labor as well as ex-


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pense, and now he was asked to muster these regiments out. He thought it would have been better had this action been taken before the troops were sent to the Indian coun- try. He pointed out that there were 15,000 savages in open hostility in the north of his department and 10,000 in the south, and his judgment was that more troops should be on the plains instead of less. He submitted to the government for consideration that the country west must either be abandoned to the Indians or the war issue presented must be met. If the latter policy was to be adopted, he asked if it were not better to use the force and means in readiness and make quick work of it, than to weaken the army and drag along from year to year at a largely increased cost of blood and treasure. Nothing immediately came of this letter and the work of reducing the army in the field went on.


The next sensation was the order of General Connor to his commanders in regard to not receiving overtures of peace or submission from the Indians, which has been given in the last chapter. Somehow these instructions of General Connor reached the newspapers, the President and the Cab- inet. The Indian worshipers of the east were horrified. Politicians, who are quick to find out which way the wind blows, paced up and down the earth and denounced Connor as an inhuman monster. The vox populi, which always has and always will control the army, was as usual success- ful, for we find General Pope telegraphing to Dodge, de- nouncing Connor's instructions as atrocious and demanding his removal instantly. "If any such orders as Connor's are carried out, it will be disgraceful to the government and will cost him his commission, if not worse." He also threat- ened him with a court-martial. General Dodge, who was not under the influence of politicians, was fairly dazed with this outburst from Pope, but he soon began to see that the wind had set in from another quarter, for he received a sec- ond dispatch from General Pope which showed clearly that the storm had burst on Connor's head: "General Connor is ignoring the quartermaster and commissaries and violating law and regulations in making contracts himself and forcing


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officers to pay public money on them. Stop all this business at once and order all officers to conform to law and regula- tions."


To the first telegram, General Dodge replied: "I have. seen no instructions of Connor's. I see in his orders to his. troops that he instructs them that they must follow a trail wherever they find it until the Indians are caught; and also instructs them that they must not be guilty of any outrage- of any kind on women or children. I do not see how I can relieve him, as he is now far north of Laramie, and I know of no one whom I could put in command. I fear it will be difficult to get dispatches through to him, but will at any rate try it."


To the second dispatch he said that he had never heard of Connor's letting any contracts with officers on the plains. Pope's two orders were sent to Fort Laramie and there forwarded by special messenger into the Powder River country, while Dodge waited with many misgivings the re- sult of the delivery of these dispatches. The messenger at last found Connor, but not until August 20th, and that sol- dier, ever mindful of his duty to his superiors, sent the fol- lowing dignified reply: "I have the honor to acknowledge. the two telegrams of the 11th instant from Major General John Pope in reference to instructions to column command- ers and contracts in Utah. The general's and your own instructions will be implicitly obeyed."


On August 12th, we find Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, telegraphing as follows to General Grant, who chanced to be at Detroit. "The President is much concerned about the Indian expedition. The Secretary of the Treasury declares his inability to meet an expenditure so large and unexpected, and not sanctioned by the government. Have you any information to relieve the President's anxiety or to satisfy him as to the object and design of the expedition? Who planned it? Whether Sherman has reduced it any, and its probable results. Please answer speedily, and state. when you expect to return to Washington." General Grant replied that the expedition had been planned under Gene-


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ral Pope's direction and that he was not posted as to the necessity of it. He promised to go to St. Louis and look into the matter, but in the meantime thought that all extraor- dinary requisitions should be disapproved. Dodge was now sent by General Pope to straighten out matters on the plains, and that officer on his arrival at Council Bluffs tele- graphed Pope: "I get off today and will straighten matters on the plains It seems to me all the rascals in the west are combined to swindle Government. My staff officers at Fort Leavenworth roport great amount of swindling there and in Kansas. It is done by stealing government stock and in every conceivable way. I have picked up over 100 stolen horses and mules here, and there appears to be a fearful or- ganization extending clear to Denver and to Missouri. They entice men to desert, sell the government property, and then assist them in getting out of the country."


All this time Connor and his army were in the wilds of the future Wyoming, totally unconscious of the schemes of politicians or the worry of generals who were courting political favor.


It will now be necessary to return to the telegraph line and stage road and ascertain what is transpiring on these two highways. The incidents have been reported up to the latter days of July. The emigrant trains had been numerous all the season and the Indians, as has been shown, were not disposed to permit anybody to go through the country with- out paying dearly for the privilege. It is difficult to say whether the savages caused more trouble on the Sweetwater or on the Laramie Plains route. Sometimes a train would be attacked at three or four different points going from Laramie to the head of the Sweetwater, and things were no better between Virginia Dale and Bridger Pass. Along the mail line, Fort Halleck was in about the center of the disturbances. The Eleventh Kansas Cavalry were almost the only troops on that line during July, but the enlist- ed men had made up their minds to insist upon their dis- ebarge,and this interfered with their fighting Indians. Lieu-


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tenant Colonel Plumb, who commanded the regiment, did all in his power to punish the savages, but his best efforts fell far short of accomplishing anything decisive. It was finally agreed that this regiment should be relieved by Stagg's brigade, but this body of troops was long on the road and the Eleventh Kansas were not relieved until in August. During June and July, it was estimated that fully seventy-five men, women and children were killed by Indi- ans between Big Laramie and Bridger Pass Stations and more than 1,000 head of stock were run off at the same time. On the line between Julesburg and Denver many persons were killed. The boasted superiority of the white soldiers was not apparent that season. for the savages kept the rec- ord more than even. On August 11th, the Sixth West Vir- ginia and the Twenty-first New York were ordered to the mail line, the former to Fort Laramie and the latter between Collins and Sulphur Springs, but the order was changed and later both were sent to Fort Laramie. The Twenty- first New York was camped some time at Julesburg. On August 14th, the Indians made a raid on Big Laramie Sta- tion and ran off a lot of horses and mules. They were pur- sued by troops, but the stock was not recovered. On the 16th, the stage company re-distributed their stock on the line between Fort Collins and Bridger Pass and for a time it looked as if the Indians would permit it to remain there, but on August 25th, 400 Indians appeared again on the line at Willow Springs but it was soon discovered by the soldiers that they were headed for the Powder River country, having heard that General Connor's forces were in that section. Shortly after, Indians were seen going north from all points and all were in haste. Runners had come down to recall the marauding bands, and for a time the mail line was left in peace.


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CHAPTER XXXVI.


BLOODY YEAR ON THE PLAINS-[CONTINUED].


TROOPS OPERATING AGAINST SAVAGES-DIVIDED INTO SMALL DETACH - MENTS-REDMEN HAVE THINGS THEIR OWN WAY-INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE INDIAN QUESTION-THE POWDER RIVER CAMPAIGN DIS- CUSSED AND DETERMINED BY GENERALS POPE, DODGE AND CONNOR -GENERAL CONNOR ISSUES HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO COLONEL COLE AND MAKES KNOWN HIS PLAN OF CAMPAIGN-DEPARTURE OF THE EXPEDITION-CAPTAIN GEORGE F. PRICE LEFT IN COMMAND AT FORT LARAMIE-POPE ABOLISHES THE DISTRICT OF THE PLAINS- ASSIGNS CONNOR TO THE DISTRICT OF UTAH-GENERAL F. WHEA- TON ASSIGNED TO THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA WITH HEADQUARTERS AT FORT LARAMIE-INDIAN DEPREDATIONS ON THE TELEGRAPH AND MAIL LINE AFTER GENERAL CONNOR'S DEPARTURE FOR POWDER RIVER.


The operations against Indians by the government had reached large proportions by the 1st of July, 1865. A con- siderable column of troops was operating south of the Ar- kansas. Another force on the north side of that river and still another on the Smoky Hill and Republican. Besides those mentioned there were troops in Colorado, and a still larger force in Nebraska. In what is now Wyoming and the two Dakotas there was even a greater number than the com- bined armies employed in Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado. The various tribes of the mountains and plains had little difficulty in holding their own against the troops in the field. The war had developed great leaders among the sav- ages. These chieftains had secured by their peculiar meth- ods of attacking trains, stage coaches and stations along the mail routes, a large number of arms and a corresponding amount of ammunition. By making war a trade and their chief business in life, they had succeeded to an extent that surprised even themselves. With great forethought they had planned to keep their families in the wilderness, away from danger, so that they could operate against the whites


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without being annoyed by the care of the helpless ones. They carried on, what would be termed among white men, a gorilla warfare and it was impossible for the government to successfully operate against them for the reason that they refused to be brought to battle. It is useless to deny that they were a source of much annoyance to the government. They knew the country thoroughly and managed to fight the troops sent against them on battle fields chosen by them- selves. The laws of civilized warfare were unknown to them and consequently they took advantage of every cir- cumstance that would permit of the capture of emigrant trains containing men, women, children and merchandise. The men were killed and scalped, the women were carried into a captivity that was worse than death, the children were sometimes killed but oftener carried to their villages in the mountains to be brought up as savages. Emigrants too often ventured across the plains badly armed or in such small numbers as to be an easy prey to war parties. To add to the difficulties there was too often bad judgment used by military commanders who had charge of the war against Indians. Plans of campaigns were made and carried out which fell far short of reaching the desired end. The offi- cers in the east who had the management of campaigns against western Indians, as a rule, little understood the more modern Indian. The savage was continuously un- derated, that is his ability to conduct war. The fact that the hostiles in some respects had made rapid strides in the arts of war seemed to be entirely unknown to those who managed our armies. Five or ten men were expected to guard a stage station that was certain to be attacked by ten or twenty times their number, and the same thing ap- plied to guards furnished to trains and mail coaches. The soldiers, as a matter of course, were continually getting the worst of it. Regiments sent on this service melted away. Not only were our soldiers killed, but the savages were en- couraged to keep up the war because they were successful. A few of the officers understood the situation, and recom- mended the employment of a large force to hunt down the


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savages and conquer a peace, but this plan was objected to because war on such a scale meant the expenditure of millions of dollars. Then we had in the eastern country a peace party, that is a class who were opposed to killing Indians. They considered and argued that a great Chris- tian government was in poor business when it sent men to the plains to butcher Indians. We heard a great deal about robbing Indians of their lands and driving them from their homes. They claimed that when white people were killed by the natives it was a misfortune, but that the poor, untutored savage could not be blamed; that the duty of the government was to civilize and Christianize these red men, but under no circumstances was it justifiable to kill them. When pressed closely they always ended up with the argu- ment that white people had no right in the Indian country and if they were killed it was their own fault. These men were the impracticables; they refused to see that as soci- ety and civilization existed and had existed since the land- ing of the May Flower, the Indian must give way to a force that was as irresistable as the power which placed the sun in the heavens. Colonists who settled Cape Cod and all New England wrested the land from the native tribes. The Jamestown Colony did the same thing, and so the conquest went on until all the land east of the Missouri was acquired. There was but a single exception and that was the Schuyl- kill settlement of Pennsylvania. William Penn bought his land with cheap trinkets, and for this he was called honest and a Christian in his dealings though he paid not a tenth of the price per acre that was afterwards paid by the gov- ernment to the wild tribes for the lands beyond the Missouri.


Up to midsummer 1865, Generals Pope, Dodge and Con- nor were of one mind in regard to methods to be employed in bringing the hostiles to terms. Connor had said that the soldiers must hunt them down like wolves before any attempt should be made to form a treaty. This, in his judg- ment, was the only way to secure lasting peace. He wanted the government to reward good Indians, but to punish bad ones with a heavy hand. General Pope, as I have shown in


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a previous chapter, argued somewhat the same way and instructed the generals under him to follow out this method of warfare in the campaigns against the Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes and some other tribes. Not only did he approve of the plans submitted to him by General Dodge (these were Connor's) but he urged the campaign pushed forward without delay. On July 28th General Connor issued his in- structions to Colonel Cole, who was to have command of the right column of the army invading the Powder River country. The troops which were to compose this column were the Second Missouri Light Artillery, equipped as cav- alry, 797 officers and men; Twelfth Missouri Cavalry, 311 officers and men; total 1,108; one section of three-inch rifle guns and a train of 140 six-mule wagons. The mules fur- nished were unbroken and the drivers were equally as bad as the mules. The route was by way of Columbus, then up the north bank of the Loup, thence to the Niobrara River and up that stream to the head waters of Wounded Knee Creek, from thence down the valley to White Earth River, where they struck the old trail of the American Fur Com- pany, used by General Harney in 1855. This trail was fol- lowed to the South Fork of Cheyenne River when a north- west course was taken which led to Belle Fourche River. The expedition followed up this stream to White Wood Creek and from thence directly west to Pine Creek, where it was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry, who was in charge of the center column of invasion, and his command consisted of 700 cavalry, which had left Fort Laramie on August 2nd, passing through the Black Hills. The left column was commanded by Colo- nel J. H. Kidd, Sixth Michigan Cavalry, and composed of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, ninety officers and men; Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, ninety officers and men; Sixth Michigan Cav- alry, 200 officers and men, and Pawnee Scouts, ninety-five officers and men, total 475. The west column was com- manded by Capt. Albert Brown, Second California Cavalry, composed of Second California Cavalry, 116 officers and men and Omaha Scouts, 84 officers and men, total 200. Each




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