USA > California > San Francisco County > San Francisco > San Francisco, a history of the Pacific coast metropolis, Volume II > Part 67
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That energetic efforts will be required to provide accommodations for the ship- ping which will make San Francisco its objective when the Panama Canal is com- pleted was generally assumed, and the authorized bond issue of $9,000,000 was for that purpose. During the early part of 1912 representatives of numerous foreign steamship companies visited the City to inquire into the situation, and to arrange for facilities. Opinion respecting the nature of the changes that would be effected by the opening of the new water way varied greatly, but in well informed circles it was believed that the effort would be to make San Francisco a great assembling port for cargoes destined for the Orient. This was also the view entertained by representatives of one of the leading Japanese trans-Pacific steamship lines who ex- pressed the belief that San Francisco would become the leading distributing port on the Pacific, and attain an importance which would rival that of New York on
Increased Shipping Accommoda- tions to Meet Demand of Canal Commerce
931
SAN FRANCISCO
the Atlantic side of the continent. The passage of an act by congress exempting coastwise shipping from the payment of canal tolls was regarded as contributory to that result, as well as promoting the interests of California producers seeking cheap transportation for their products to the Atlantic sea board. In October num- erous rumors were in circulation that the Pacific Mail Steamship Company as a re- sult of the canal legislation would dispose of their ships plying in the Oriental trade to a foreign steamship company, a German line being mentioned in that connection. During the progress of the discussion of the canal regulation act threats to that effect were made by the manager of the company. In the event of their being con- summated there would be regret over the transference of the great line under the American flag to foreign ownership, but the transfer would probably have no ad- verse effect upon the destinies of the port which would not be more than offset by the great advantage to be derived from a genuine competition with the overland railroads which would be made feasible by the free use of the canal by American coastwise ships.
The growth of the business of the port after the Nineties while not spectacular indicates that the Harbor Commission, and the citizen's committee in planning for its future have not overrated its needs, and that facilities on a greatly enlarged scale will be required to accommodate the shipping which will be attracted to San Francisco when it becomes the distributing point for Pacific coast products, and the place of assemblage of Oriental cargoes. The same rate of expansion observed since 1900 would, if maintained, make it necessary to considerably anticipate the programme of providing facilities for 13,000,000 tonnage by 1927. In 1900 the total tonnage entered in San Francisco was 2,855,386; in 1906 it had increased to 3,664,649 and in 1911 it was 6,135,275 tons. The chief part of this expansion was in the domestic trade, the foreign only increasing from 1,369,136 in 1900, to 1,615,017 tons in 1911. The unevenness of growth exhibited by these figures is partly due to the fact that the tonnage statistics treat trade which was formerly foreign as trade with non-contiguous territory. This commerce has shown a steady advancement since 1900 and promised a still greater expansion due to the develop- ment of the resources of the Hawaiian and Philippine groups. The growth of the trade with Alaska was greatly impeded during the period by the ill advised action of congress which failed to enact laws calculated to promote the development of the vast resources of the territory and made no effort to restrain the tendency of the federal bureaus to put obstacles in the way of those who are disposed to engage in enterprises which would result in attracting a population which would exploit the possibilities of its soil and mines. What these are may be inferred from the statements made on the floor of the house of representatives that from the time of its acquisition in 1867 up to 1911 the value of Alaskan products aggregated $446,- 640,984. The two greatest items in this amount were gold $195,916,520 and fishery products $147,953,077. Nearly $75,000,000 worth of furs have been derived from the territory during the interval. In addition to gold the territory abounds in other minerals, but their extraction has been hindered by restrictive and unpractical legis- lation. A resort to methods which would lead to the development of these resources will greatly add to the trade of San Francisco with Alaskan ports, and tend to the promotion of futher enterprises by its capitalists who are already largely interested in Alaskan fisheries, gold mining and in other important undertakings. The pros- pects of trade with the other non-contiguous territory of the United States in the
Growth of Commerce of the Port
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SAN FRANCISCO
Pacific were still more important. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1911, the ex- ports to Hawaii reached $16,081,938. The trade of the Philippines with the main- land aggregated over $30,000,000 during the first eight months of the fiscal year 1911-12 as against less than $14,000,000 in the corresponding months of 1909, and much of this growing commerce moved through the port of San Francisco.
In a statement issued by the Federal Bureau of Commerce in July, 1912, San Francisco was rated among the ports of the United States as fifth in imports and eleventh in exports, the former having increased from $39,000,000 to $56,000,000 and the latter from $38,000,000 to $44,000,000 during the period 1900-1911. These figures are divested of a great deal of their comparative value by the conversion of what was formerly foreign into domestic territory. If combined with the ship- ments to non-contiguous American territory they would show an increase which would more nearly harmonize with the statistics quoted exhibiting the development of the shipping industry of the port which, despite the obstacles in the way of the extension of the over sea trade by Americans, makes a better relative showing than the other ports of the United States. Regarding the policy or impolicy of the American shipping and tariff laws of the United States there was considerable diver- sity of opinion in San Francisco toward the close of 1912. California for many years had been pronouncedly in favor of a protective tariff, and had through its instrumentality developed an enormous horticultural industry. The theory of those who advocated protection was that by building up large and prosperous manufac- turing communities in the East a profitable market would be afforded for the pro- ducts of California orchards and vineyards. The tariff in the view of these oper- ated as a differential in favor of the domestic producer in California who could not hope to compete with the foreigner who had cheap sea freights to the American At- lantic seaboard in addition to cheap labor at home. The subordination of the pro- tective idea by Roosevelt and later by Taft to other governmental policies tended to weaken the devotion of Californians to protection, and was rapidly creating a sentiment in favor of maritime expansion which found expression in the advocacy of free ships, the theory being that the development of foreign ocean commerce would benefit the City more than it could hope to be benefited by the retention of the pro- tective tariff. The probability of the success of the democratic party at the polls in November, and expected free trade legislation in that event contributed largely to this feeling. There were pessimists, however, who predicted a recrudescence of previous experiences, growing out of tariff, for revenue experiments made by the United States, and who looked forward to a depression similar to that which fol- lowed the election of Grover Cleveland in 1892. It was argued in opposition to this view that conditions had greatly changed since that date, and that the manu- facturing industries of the United States which were comparatively weak at that time had become strong, and were able to cope with any competition that they might be called upon to encounter. But this view was supplemented by the admission that in order to successfully compete under a non-protective system the less power- ful manufacturing industries would have to reduce wages to a parity with those of foreign countries, and that the larger concerns would imitate their course. There was great confusion of thought on this subject nationally and locally, and the destruction of "big business" was advocated by people who believed that the rising prices of products were due to the growth of great producing and distributing or- ganizations, a belief diligently promoted by demagogues who a few years earlier
Relation of Port to National Revenge and Other Policies
East Court-L. C. Mulgardt
Study of Court of Four Seasons-Henry Bacon
Horticultural Building-Bakewell & Brown
ACCEPTED DESIGNS OF PANAMA-PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITION BUILDINGS
933
SAN FRANCISCO
had attributed to low prices the calamitous depression of the years between 1892 and 1897.
While these uncertainties concerning the result of political events were disturb- ing the public mind, and were held accountable for the failure of the City to ad- vance by leaps and bounds there was no statistical evidence to support any other assumption than that it was growing healthily. A report made by the Chamber of Commerce on the 1st of September, 1912, was filled with information calculated to contradict any assertion that there was business dullness. It gave the aggregate receipts of custom duties received at the San Francisco custom house during the year 1911 at $6,673,355. The exports of merchandise out of San Francisco by sea to foreign countries, the Atlantic states, and non-contiguous territory were valued at $78,693,282, having increased from $64,918,505 in 1905 to that amount. The gain after the disaster synchronized with the work of rehabilitation, increasing from year to year. In 1907 the valuation of exports was $46,571,790; in 1909 it had increased to $57,221,596; in 1910 it rose to $65,008,518, and in 1911 the figures were $78,693,282. The imports also showed a large gain rising from $44,249,211 in 1905 to $56,075,324 in 1911. A trade summary, combining the value of all exports of merchandise and treasure by sea, and all imports of merchandise and treasure at San Francisco, shows an increase from $105,995,450 in 1908 to $155,- 250,038 in 1911. These figures do not include the exports of merchandise, com- modities and supplies by United States army transports which aggregate nearly a million dollars a year. The latter are not embraced in any of the trade statistics of the port although they are constantly growing in importance, the government hav- ing made San Francisco its chief supply depot, providing itself with docks for the accommodation of the transport service on the water front of its great reservation which during the period after the Spanish-American war was made one of the chief military posts in the United States. The tonnage movement in the year 1911 according to the statistics of the Chamber of Commerce as represented by departures was 8,344,549 of which 2,121,541 tons was foreign and 6,223,008 coastwise. The gradual passage of the sailing vessel is reflected in the fact that only 680,101 tons of this aggregate was sail, the remaining 7,664,448 being steam.
In 1905 the bank clearings of San Francisco aggregated $1,834,549,788 in 1911 they were $2,427,075,543. In 1907 owing to the large amount of insurance received, and the activity in building there was an abnormal exhibit of clearings figures, the amount being $2,133,882,625, but in the ensuing year owing to depression produced by the monetary troubles of 1907 they dropped to $1,757,151,850; after that date they rose steadily until they reached the above stated amount in 1911. In 1907 California for the first time in its history suspended specie payments. Queerly enough, considering the past attitude of the people towards paper money, when the resolution was reached by the clearing house to emit certificates to tide over what appeared to be a menacing monetary situation, there was absolutely no objection made to the movement, which was extra legal. The old time prejudice against pa- per money still survived, but it gave way to the clearly perceived necessity of act- ing in harmony with the larger Eastern financial centers. Nobody objected to re- ceiving the novel paper money; the emergency which called for its issuance soon passed away and the certificates were called in and redeemed.
The operations of the saving banks of San Francisco during the first two or three years following the fire disclosed some of the evil results of the disaster. On
Volume of Business Transacted in San Francisco
Bank Clearings and Monetary Troubles
934
SAN FRANCISCO
Great Increase of Bank Resources
December 30, 1905, the deposits in those institutions aggregated $169,538,244.13; in 1908 they had decreased to $134,454,584, but after that year they increased steadily, reaching $168,744,339 on November 10, 1911, the number of depositors being reported at 244,691. The bank examiner's report showed a still greater ex- pansion of the business of the commercial banks, and some important changes after 1905. Prior to that date the leading banks of the City were state institutions, but after April, 1906, there was a disposition to come under the operation of the Na- tional Banking laws, and the resources of national banks which amounted to $61,- 008,181 in 1905, mounted to $229,003,000 on June 14, 1912. Their deposits during this period increased from $22,463,816 to $149,082,000. In 1905 resources of the state banks were $131,409,473, and on January 7, 1911, they were only $57,380,- 449, while the deposits which reached $80,874,847 in the first named year had de- clined to $35,175,904 on the later date. The net gain in the banking resources of the City was nearly $94,000,000 during the six years following the fire and the increase in deposits reached $81,000,000. This marvelous showing induced the financial editor of one of the local papers to institute a comparison between the banking power of the City of San Francisco and that of other parts of the Union. In it he called attention to the fact that the combined resources of three San Fran- cisco banks: The Bank of California, Wells Fargo Nevada National bank and the Anglo and London Paris National bank aggregated $144,697,107, an amount greater than the total resources of the banks of thirty states enumerated by him. He also showed that in banking power San Francisco stood fifth in the list of cities of the United States, ranking ahead of St. Louis, which was credited with $220,976,278 resources in 1912 as against $229,003,469 of the Pacific coast metropolis.
The banking business of San Francisco after the fire showed a disposition to abandon its old center on California and Sansome streets. This was particularly true of the savings institutions which sought to get nearer to their patrons, and of the trust companies. Some years before the disaster the Hibernia Savings and Loan Society pioneered this movement by locating itself in a handsome granite struc- ture at the junction of Jones, McAllister and Market streets. This action was fol- lowed later by several other concerns which favored Market street, adding many substantial and beautiful structures to that thoroughfare. The commercial banks while they have spread out somewhat in their effort to follow the southward trend of business, still adhere to California and to Sansome streets, and this determination may be considered permanent as the government has decided to locate its sub- treasury on the corner of Sansome and Pine streets where an ample site has been secured. Plans for a handsome building, for which an appropriation had been made by congress, were nearly completed in the fall of 1912, and construction was about to begin. The sub-treasury had some time earlier taken the important step of clear- ing through the San Francisco clearing house, thus greatly facilitating its finan- cial operations, and at the same time conveniencing the business interests of the City. The tendency of banking concerns to house themselves in substantial and commodi- ous buildings was very manifest in San Francisco after the fire, and the City could boast in consequence numerous edifices architecturally and in other respects on a par with those of any other city in the Union. The more important institutions of this character devote the whole of the structures occupied by them to their own busi- ness, which is indicated by the nature of the construction; some, however, had elected to erect tall, modern structures the upper parts of which were devoted to offices.
Banking Center and New Sub- Treasury Building
Central Motif, Main Tower-Carrere & Hastings Fine Arts Building-B. R. Maybeck Festival Hall-Robert D. Farquhar Niche in Court of Four Seasons-Henry Bacon ACCEPTED DESIGNS OF PANAMA-PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITION BUILDINGS
935
SAN FRANCISCO
Of office buildings there were in September, 1912, by actual enumeration 266, varying in height from seventeen to six and seven stories. A computation approxi- mately correct gave the number of rooms for office use provided by these buildings at about 20,000. At one period it was feared that the erection of office buildings was proceeding too rapidly, and in 1911 a warning note was sounded, but since that date many new ones were added to those already built, and numerous others were projected. The most of these buildings were well constructed and provided with all the modern conveniences. Especial attention in most instances was paid by the architects to providing effective entrances which were made spacious and lavishly decorated with marbles and bronzes. The architectural importance of these structures may be inferred from the fact that at least two scores of them are im- posing enough to impress themselves on the minds of the people, their names adver- tising their location to all residents. The stranger who found his way to San Francisco during the period of rehabilitation did not fail to note these remarkable evidences of confidence in the future, and their number and complete modernity contributed more than anything else to the opinion usually expressed that the fire had enabled San Francisco to take rank as the most thoroughly up-to-date city in America.
The expenditure of great sums was required to bring the City to the condition described. It has been related that building operations before the fire were on a large and growing scale. In 1900 they only amounted to $6,390,705, but in the year before the disaster they had increased to $20,111,861. In 1906 this amount was swollen to $39,254,467. In 1907 it rose to $50,499,499; in 1908 it was $35,- 128,549; in 1909, $30,411,196; in 1910, $22,873,942, and in 1911, $24,495,168. The assessed valuation of all property in the City in 1905 was $524,230,946; in 1911, it was $545,057,401. In the first named year the tax rate was $1.164 for city and county purposes, and .698 for state purposes. Between 1905 and 1911 an amend- ment to the constitution was adopted, which made an important change in the tax- ation method of the state by separating the sources of revenue of the state, and of its political subdivisions, reserving to the former the taxation of the gross rev- enues of transportation and other corporations, while the cities and counties re- tained the right of taxing real estate and personal property, and of imposing licenses. This change resulted in the necessity of increasing the rate in the City and County of San Francisco to $2.00 on the $100 of valuation, which was on a 60 per cent. basis. This increase was rendered necessary by the growing budget of the City which expanded rapidly after 1906 owing to a variety of causes, not least among them being the desire to secure conveniences and public improvements of various sorts, the cost of which was reflected in a growing bonded indebtedness which amounted on January 2, 1912, to $19,835,100, having increased to that amount from $3,865,600 in 1908. Since that date the issuance of $8,500,000 bonds for the purpose of creating a civic center, and' erecting a new city hall was au- thorized by the people at the polls, and there was a prospective further increase of many millions for the purpose of acquiring a municipal water system.
In the closing months of 1912 the water question was still undetermined. A proposition had been submitted to the people during the last days of the McCarthy administration to purchase the Spring Valley system for the sum of $35,000,000. The measure failed to receive the requisite two-thirds vote owing to the opposi- tion of McCarthy who declared that the sum demanded was too high, and that
Numerous Modern Office Buildings
Property Valuation, Changes in Taxation Methods and Bonded Indebtedness
Efforts to Secure & Municipal Water System
936
SAN FRANCISCO
he intended to compel the corporation to accept an amount nearer to the true value of its system. His motives were suspected, but he wielded sufficient influence to defeat the proposition. Later the United States circuit court in dealing with one of the numerous suits brought by the Spring Valley corporation, on the ground that the rates fixed by the supervisors for the supply of water were confiscatory, after an extended investigation appraised the value of the system at a lower figure than the company had offered to sell but made a distinction between a valuation of the property for rate making and that for selling purposes. Meanwhile the McCarthy administration went out of office and was succeeded by that headed by James Rolph, who had associated with him a board of supervisors all of whom, with one exception, were pledged to carrying out his announced policies. One of these was the acquisition of a water supply for the City. With that end in view the super- visors elected in 1911 on assuming office in January, 1912, began to study the water question in its new aspects. Although the tender of the Spring Valley Com- pany had been rejected at the polls, steps had been taken in pursuance of a prior authorization to bring a supply of water from the Tuolomne river. This project embraced two separate plans, one of which was the impounding of the waters that discharged into Lake Eleanor, and the other contemplated the damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley, the latter lying within the Yosemite Forest reserve. The proposition to dam Hetch Hetchy valley, which possesses great scenic beauty, was promptly antagonized by all the outdoor life enthusiasts who succeeded in placing obstacles in the way of utilizing it for the purpose of creating a water sup- ply for domestic purposes, and the government authorities in Washington showed an inclination to recede from permits it had granted, and exhibited an utter disre- gard of any claims that the City might have to the use of the water.
The City at an election in 1910 had authorized the issuance of $45,000,000 of bonds for the development of the Lake Eleanor, Tuolomne system, and land for right of way and reservoir sites had been purchased but the desire to acquire the Spring Valley property had not been abandoned. An Eastern expert named Free- man was engaged to look into the situation and in the beginning of September he made a report which virtually suggested the necessity of going on with both pro- jects at once. It had been recognized before Freeman made his recommendations that Spring Valley occupied a dominating position by reason of its possession of all the available water sites on the peninsula. The possibility of developing one not included in the Spring Valley holdings was indicated by Freeman, but the fact that the engineers of the corporation had considered and rejected it for several reasons, included among them being the menace it would constitute to a populous part of the City below the proposed dam, caused the suggestion to be lightly re- garded. Freeman had previously expressed doubts respecting the ability of the Spring Valley Company to develop any such quantity of water as was claimed could be developed from one of their principal sources of supply, but nevertheless recom- mended the acquisition of the property, and coupled his recommendation with argu- ments showing the necessity of simultaneously proceeding with operations in con- nection with the Tuolomne scheme. This report was followed by the opening of negotiations between the City and the Spring Valley Company, and in the early part of September, 1912, the community was surprised to learn that it demanded $38,500,000 for its property exclusive of the Lake Merced tract, embracing 2,300 acres within the city limits. As the value of the latter was variously estimated
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