USA > Illinois > The story of the Fifty-fifth regiment Illinois volunteer infantry in the civil war, 1861-1865 > Part 10
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By the report of Lieutenant Gwin, commanding the gunboat Tyler, it appears that the first shot was fired at ten minutes before three o'clock. Colonel Wheeler, of the Nineteenth Alabama, already cited, in speaking of the dislodgement of Stuart's men, says it was about three o'clock in the afternoon. After Hurlbut received word from Stuart at three in the afternoon, he began to draw back, which movement exposed Prentiss and Wallace, and was followed by the surrender of about twenty-two hundred men, including Prentiss. The latter says in his report, his surrender occurred at half-past five in the afternoon. That grand old fighter, Col. W. T. Shaw, of the Fourteenth Iowa, who was captured on this portion of the field, says that he surrendered at a quarter before six o'clock. Notwithstanding that the flamboyant assertions of General McClernand gave color to the idea that General Prentiss surrendered much earlier in the day, it is now settled beyond controversy that such event occurred about the time mentioned. All Confederate reports agree with this.
The troops engaged against Stuart participated and partly brought about this surrender which, as before stated, occurred between five and six o'clock in the afternoon. The distance from where they fought the Fifty-fifth Illinois to the point of surrender, was just about one mile to the right and rear. Certainly not more than two and a half hours were con- sumed in making that distance, when practically unopposed. The reports of Withers-and subordinates all concur in the general idea that the next operation they engaged in was the capture of Prentiss, and that no great time elapsed after Stuart was driven from his position.
THE NEWBERRY LIBRARY CHICACO
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
Without designing to make this a sketch of personal adventure, I will state my own judgment on this point, and my reasons therefor. I was the first time wounded upon the opposite or north side of the ravine, just as the retreat of the Fifty-fifth had commenced. The line of their retreat obliqued considerably to what had been our right or inland from the river, while I, more from accident than design, pursued a course through the ravine toward the landing, and struck the river at the place where the gunboats first commenced firing.
Somewhat contrary to the generally received opinion, this was fully three-quarters of a mile up stream from the landing, and not at the mouth of the large ravine about one-fourth of a mile in that direction. To reach this point the distance traveled was just about three-quarters of a mile. This agrees with Colonel Thoms' map, and has been verified by recent inspection. I had not been lying on the bank of the river five minutes when the first shot was fired from the gunboat, and I heard the order given for that purpose. Making all allowance for my disabled condition and subsequent wounds, and also considering the help I obtained, I could not have been more than half an hour in reaching that point. I took considerable interest in getting away.
The time when the first shot was fired from the gunboats, as before stated, is definitely settled as occurring ten minutes before three o'clock. In fact, it was the falling back of Stuart that made it safe for the gun- boats to open, and placed Chalmers' command within reach of its shells. All this furnishes conclusive proof of what is known personally to every one of Stuart's brigade present and now living, viz: that the line just at the rear of their camp, and along this ravine, was not abandoned until after two o'clock.
I have thus tried, in the light of reports lately made public, and in unison with the knowledge of all survivors, confirmed by recent personal examination, to do justice to the Fifty-fifth Illinois as to facts not gener- ally appearing in the literature of this great battle. To do all this, that regiment suffered a terrible baptism of fire. Its loss exceeded that of any other regiment engaged in the battle of Shiloh, except the Ninth Illinois. The best authority on this point is undoubtedly the table given in the tenth volume of the Rebellion Records, as published by congress. It is made up from a full examination of all available documents. It differs in giving a very few more killed and wounded than the report of General Sherman, dated April 9th. The latter, within forty-eight hours after the battle, and half that time having been occupied by an advance towards Monterey, could not have gathered material for a report of absolute correctness. The table referred to gives the loss of the Fifty- fifth Illinois as fifty-one killed and one hundred ninety-seven wounded, being a total of two hundred forty-eight, exclusive of missing.
For performing the deeds and suffering the loss herein described, this brigade gets this, and only this, beggarly mention in the report of its division conunander: " My second brigade, Colonel Stuart, was detached near two miles from my headquarters. He had to fight his own battle on
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A SECTION OF A BATTLE.
Sunday, as the enemy interposed between him and General Prentiss early in the day." Then follows a mention of Colonels Stuart and Smith, and the statement that he has not yet received the report of Colonel Stuart, and therefore forbears to mention names. All his elaborate remarks are devoted to the other brigades and regiments of his division and he does not even name the glorious old Fifty-fifth. So far as he is concerned, it had no existence, except that it is named in the table of killed and wounded. Had it not in fact existed, I opine the history of the battle of Shiloh would have been different, and the galaxy of stars possibly less.
In order to estimate the full measure of glory due to this regiment, it becomes necessary to compare the price of blood which it paid, with that of others who paid less but gathered more.
Sherman's division consisted of twelve regiments of infantry, four batteries and two battalions of cavalry, yet the Fifty-fifth Illinois lost about one-sixth of the killed and wounded of that division. The Fifty- fifth Illinois lost more than five-eighths of the killed, and more than one- half the wounded of its own brigade. The Fifty-fifth Illinois lost five- sixths as inany killed and nearly as many wounded as the whole of Hildebrand's brigade. If we eliminate from the loss of that brigade the loss of the Seventy-seventh Ohio on April 8th, which is included in Sherman's report as losses at Shiloh, then the Fifty-fifth Illinois lost more than the whole brigade. Such loss, on the Sth of April referred to, was in a reconnoissance, wherein the Seventy-seventh Ohio inadvertently got in the way of and was run over by Forrest's cavalry -an awful warning to infantry regiments to keep out of the way of cavalry.
The Fifty-fifth Illinois lost two-fifths more killed and about as many wounded as Buckland's brigade of the same division. These last two brigades formed to the right and left of Shiloh church, at the very key point of the position, and were under the personal observation and com- mand of General Sherman, and at his hands gets pages of praise, apology or mild censure. Most of these regiments lost fewer killed than some companies of the Fifty-fifth, and few of them many more, except the Seventy-seventh Ohio. The Fifty-fifth Illinois lost about one-thirtieth of the total killed and wounded of Grant's entire army, engaged both days, which army consisted of over seventy regiments of infantry, more than twenty batteries, and several thousand cavalry. Prentiss' division com- prised ten large regiments of infantry, two batteries and eight companies of cavalry; yet the Fifty-fifth Illinois lost about one-fourth as many killed and wounded as this whole division, which occupied a position of especial importance.
Lew Wallace brought upon the field, the second day of the battle, about sixty-five hundred men, who go "thundering down the ages" in gorgeous rhetoric; yet the Fifty-fifth Illinois lost twenty-five per cent. more killed and only twenty per cent. less wounded than that whole division.
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
General Buell brought to battle on the second day, according to dif- ferent authorities, from twenty to twenty-five thousand men. It has been strenuously claimed, in certain quarters, that they saved the battle from utter defeat, and waded through seas of blood. Their literature is lurid with flaming diction. The smallest private in the rear rank on the extreme left often gets, at the hands of his superior, more praise than the entire Fifty-fifth Illinois; yet the latter regiment lost more than one- fifth as many killed, and one-ninth as many wounded, as this great body, nearly fifty times larger than itself. It is not insinuated but that they did their duty; but their fighting was child's play compared with that of the first day, and very few of its large regiments lost as many as the average company of the Fifty-fifth Illinois.
It is only common justice to claim for the Fifty-fifth Illinois and Fifty-fourth Ohio that, hid away in the deep woods and among the rugged ravines on the extreme left flank at Shiloh, they performed decds of magnificent valor that entitled them to conspicuous mention.
In view of these facts, is it any wonder that we are disposed to mur- mur at the parsimony of General Sherman's praise? Is it unreasonable that we claim a place in the history we helped make? May we not, cven at this late date, place garlands upon the graves of our comrades? If those whose spurs we helped win, and whose stars we helped fix, fail to write for us, may we not pen our own culogy? Our dead comrades lie in unnamed graves; others go halting and crippled through life; others still are bowed and suffering from disease. Thank God, it was given us to do. Few could have done as well, none better. Men must bleed and die, widows and orphans wecp, and mothers mourn, to save nations.
In all herein written, I accord to the Fifty-fourth Ohio its share of praise. Their living stood with ours, shoulder to shoulder, in battle. The rich warm blood ran out from their ranks and mingled with ours, and the same earth drank it up. The same stars at the same hour shone upon the faces of our dead and their dead. The same breeze that wafted the white soul of an Illinois.boy to its Maker, down the line a little way kissed the pallid lips of the Ohio hero. We shall be glad to meet them on entth. We hope to meet them in heaven.
The foregoing covers the most important as well as the most sanguinary part performed by the Fifty-fifth in the bat- tle of Shiloh. During the retreat across the ravine, the south side of which had been occupied up to that time, the loss was beyond expression frightful. Among others, the writer fell grievously wounded, upon the brow of the opposite hill. a fact not important to the issues then pending, but of some importance at this juncture, inasmuch as the events which for some months followed must be related without the aid of personal recollection; and since the work in hand requires a
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MOVEMENTS FOR POSITION.
minuteness of detail not at all necessary in general histories, this is felt to be a serious disadvantage.
The contest on the south side of the ravine, as has been stated and since fully verified, lasted until some minutes after two o'clock in the afternoon. At that time every regi- ment which formed the front line in the morning had been for some hours from one to three miles in rear of their camps, where they first essayed a stand. In estimating the impor- tance of this, too much weight cannot be given to the fact heretofore mentioned, that upon this ground the rebel right wing was vigorously striving to perform its part in the grand left wheel contemplated in their order of battle. That they were delayed in the execution of that design until after two o'clock, is an episode of national importance, and there is no danger of overpraise of the two regiments accountable for it. Among the myths clinging to the literature of Shiloh is an occasional mention of the different positions occupied by Stuart before the real battle along the ravine to the left rear of his camps. These are some times spoken of as though he had been driven repeatedly. Such, however, was not the case. It is true that the brigade was kept moving vaguely from place to place, as suited the bewildered notions of its commander, but such movements were not the result of pres- sure from the enemy, and not one volley was fired during their progress. No attempt was made to defend the camps, and not one position was assumed which covered or protected them. The idea seemed to be that there was great danger of being flanked on the left, and the first movement of the bri- gade placed it entirely east of the line of its encampments. This is exactly in contrast to the course pursued by Generals Prentiss and Sherman, who at first established their lines in front of their respective camps, and retreated through them, and lost them very early because they were driven by force of circumstances.
After Stuart's brigade formed in the ridiculous position along the border of Locust Creek, and directly under the bluff en the opposite side, several changes took place, all according to order and not under fire. Such changes of loca- tion all tended toward the rear and slightly to the left of the
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
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first one assumed, but covered only a small space of ground, and were fully commanded by the high bluffs close at hand. Finally the line of battle stretched along in the edge of the timber just in rear of the open field to the left of the camp of the Fifty-fifth, that regiment being then about five hun- dred yards due east of its quarters. Up to this point all formations had faced due south, but here an attempt was made to change front so that the line of battle would face southeast, or directly down the Hamburgh road, toward the crossing of Locust Creek. This, fortunately, failed, owing to the absurd tactics used. A left half-wheel by company was ordered, which of course broke each regiment into ten fragments, and utterly destroyed the continuity of the line. Meanwhile the skirmishers had become warmly engaged, and the bullets of the rebels began to whistle over the heads of the men forming in their rear. As soon as the change of front referred to had fairly commenced, the companies began to crowd and overlap each other. The men, though courageous, were wrought into a state of nervous intensity, and in a moment all were taken off their feet and a wild stampede followed. At this crisis, the conduct of Colonel Stuart was magnificent. He spurred his horse beyond the vortex of the disorder which surrounded him, and, like a chief of ten thou- sand, faced the throng of excited and disorganized men, and with eyes flashing, and voice ringing through the woods like a trumpet, commanded them to halt. The incubus of Euro- pean tradition was forgotten in the emergency at hand, and his superb magnetism impressed itself upon the multitude instantly. If Stuart had then died, he would have been can- onized in the hearts of his men. Suddenly the men stopped, and seemed to realize the impending disgrace. The officers proceeded at once to reform their companies on any ground and place them afterwards in line of battle. Fortunately no aggressive movement of the enemy interfered with this, and the men regained their poise, ready and anxious to do their duty. More than this, they felt and vigorously expressed an intense spirit of determination to atone for what had just happened. The distance of this flight was not over two hun- dred yards, to the right and rear, and brought the regiment
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FANTASTIC TACTICS.
almost to the exact spot where it fought so bravely a short time after. During this unpremeditated movement a few scattering bullets took effect, and among others, Captain Wright received his first wound. As yet the regiment had not fired a volley, though it appears that some of the men fired individual shots. Word was shortly sent in from the skirmish line that cavalry was crossing at the ford of Locust Creek, and European ideas came to the front again, and hol- low squares were formed, probably for the only time on the field of battle during the rebellion. It seems providential that no advance on the part of the enemy occurred until these tactical monstrosities were reduced, otherwise the lau- rels of the Fifty-fifth Illinois and Fifty-fourth Ohio would have withered in the infamy of a wild race to the rear, with the Seventy-first Ohio. That the two regiments did endure without disintegration and fatal panic these fantastic and erratic evolutions, perhaps entitles them, from a military point of view, to the highest credit ever earned by them. A few steps to the rear was the rugged ravine, the best position on that portion of the field, where shortly afterward a con- flict took place, vital to the safety of the whole army.
Allusion has been made to the fact that Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades were entirely detached from the Confed- crate army, and moved east for the sole purpose of meeting Stuart's brigade. As this is somewhat peculiar, and closely involved in the events germain to the purpose of this narra- tive, a more detailed account of why and how such singular movement happened, may not be uninteresting. Knowledge of this has been obtained after long effort, and is here for the first time given to the public. As has been repeatedly stated, Stuart's brigade formed the extreme left of the Fed- cral army, being about three-quarters of a mile to the left and rear of Prentiss. The rebel attack faced northeast, and first struck the last mentioned general's command, and then turned north; and had the Confederates followed General Prentiss' line of retreat, they would have passed to the right of Stuart and more than half a mile away. In other words, had the battle proceeded as the first assault indicated, this brigade would have been outside its scope. Early Sunday
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
morning General Bragg, while directing movements near Shiloh church, dispatched Captain Lockett, with three or four cavalrymen, toward the Union left, to find the extreme flank in that quarter. This officer,-subsequently an engineer of note in the rebel army, and still living, passed from point to point along the bluffs south of Locust Creek, and being careful to attract no attention, and there being no outposts to discover him, overlooked the camps along his route at -leisure. He reached the high point of bluff near at hand, just in time to see Stuart's brigade falling into line, in conse- quence of the long roll then sounding the alarm. He watched the formation of these troops until they marched down the road castward, toward the crossing of Locust Creek, and knowing this movement to be far beyond the Confederate right flank, came to the reasonable conclusion that it was intended as a flank attack upon their army. He hastily dis- patched a courier to the Confederate commander, but becom- ing impatient, and deeming the danger serious, followed himself immediately. Upon receiving such report from Cap- tain Lockett, Albert Sidney Johnston instantly withdrew Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades from the pursuit of Prentiss and filed them to the rear, across the head-waters of Locust Creek, to the high ground beyond. From thence he led them in person due east, to operate against Stuart's brigade, which he believed was attempting to flank his army. After placing them in position overlooking the camps, and ordering the attack to proceed, he returned toward the right, to meet his death a few hours later, at the hands of Hurlbut's men, about one-half mile away from the Fifty-fifth. It is needless to add that the aimless movements of Stuart's brigade were never intended for any such aggression.
To some it may seem singular that the main line of Stuart's brigade was not engaged until near noon. The operations just described principally account for it, and the Confederate reports fully explain the details. Captain Lockett returned to the Confederate commander with his information about cight o'clock. Chalmers and Jackson had just been brought from the rear, and were involved in a pell-mell pursuit of Prentiss. They were halted and withdrawn, as before stated,
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THE RETREAT.
and took a course which led them over two miles of very rough ground, and with their artillery they moved cautiously, as was prudent under the circumstances. They reached the high ground opposite Stuart's camps at about ten or half-past ten o'clock. Here a long halt ensued, to await the result of Captain Clanton's cavalry reconnoissance. Upon the first advance the Federal skirmishers were found, who made such stout resistance that all the rebel reports refer to it as a serious conflict, during which one of their regiments stam- peded from the field. After the falling back of the skirm- ishers, Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades were transferred to the north side of Locust Creek, and deployed in battle order. All the ground taken was first explored by skirmishers-a discreet but slow process. It was talked of at the time, and perhaps it was true, that the hollow square exhibition induced extra caution, it being so ridiculous that it was looked upon as a ruse to induce an attack. It was certainly calculated to deceive any one who was inclined to apply the rules of com- mon sense to practical warfare. All this, taken in connection with the raw condition of the attacking force, sufficiently accounts for the passing time.
Shortly before the final departure from the place of con- flict, and after hundreds of men had been killed and wounded, an order was conveyed along the Fifty-fifth to cease firing, about face, and retreat. The command was obeyed, and the whole line turned to the rear. After taking a few steps a countermanding order was given, and every man turned back up the hill and resumed his deadly employment, with perfect deliberation. This short episode amounted to scarcely an interruption, and is alluded to because it reflects the highest credit upon these young soldiers, who were now for the first time under fire.
Finally a positive command was given to fall back, and the Fifty-fifth and Fifty-fourth, at almost precisely a quarter past two o'clock in the afternoon, turned away from the foc. McArthur's brigade, which had attempted to reach Stuart early in the day, but had become engaged a half mile away, had been driven from its position more than two hours before. The Forty-first and Forty-second Illinois, two of Hurlbut's
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
regiments, which had taken almost the exact ground aban- doned by McArthur, had just given way under the fierce assaults of two of Breckenridge's brigades, which had to be encouraged to their work by the dashing Kentuckian himself, the governor of Tennessee, and the Confederate commander- in-chief-the last of whom was killed. Farther to the right the regiments of Prentiss and Sherman had long been far to the rear, and thus, when the order came at the time named, Stuart's few men were the last ones to leave the ground as- sumed for defence at the opening of the battle.
There were no precautions used to cover such retreat, and the alleged skill acquired in European schools and in the Mexican war did not assert itself in this the hour of need. Stuart's fragments, consisting of less than five hundred men, turned to the rear and made a rush for the opposite side of the ravine. This was a gorge about one hundred feet deep, and as many yards across. The ravine on the right, and the woods and gullies in front, were swarming with Confederates ready to make a dash as soon as the deadly fire of the Fed- erals ceased. Almost instantly the ground left was occupied by swarms of exultant and yelling rebels, who now, without danger to themselves, poured a shower of bullets down upon and among the fugitives. Major Whitfield of the Ninth Mississippi, who commanded the rebel skirmishers in that quarter, said in a recent conversation with the writer, "We were right on top of you." "It was like shooting into a flock of sheep." "I never saw such cruel work during the war." To the torment of Chalmers' and Jackson's infantry was added the grape and canister of two rebel batteries close at hand. So through this valley of death went the less than "six hundred," leaving bleeding victims at every step, and up the opposite side the merciless fire was a veritable cyclone.
The course of retreat inclined inland toward the centre of the battle-field, and a few hundred yards placed the men in comparative safety, for the rebels did not at once advance beyond the position they had just attained. Their reports are replete with tales of complete exhaustion, fearful losses, and want of ammunition at this juncture, and indeed they had paid a fearful tribute to the ferocious fighting of Stuart's
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AMMUNITION EXHAUSTED.
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