USA > Illinois > The story of the Fifty-fifth regiment Illinois volunteer infantry in the civil war, 1861-1865 > Part 9
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Notwithstanding General Sherman speaks explicitly of the purpose of Stuart's brigade being so located, it was not in point of fact situated to defend the crossing of Lick creek at all, but was encamped upon a tributary to that stream and more than half a mile away from the crossing. Between lay the highest ridge upon the Shiloh battle-field, with a frowning bluff overlooking Stuart's color line, and rendering all parts of such camp untenable. Then, to defend Lick creek crossing, this brigade must move more than half a mile to the left and front, crossing terrible ridges and ravines, and thereby leave a full mile of space between its right and the left of Prentiss. It is a matter of supererogation to add that no troops at the front had sufficient previous notice to go anywhere in advance, to defend anything. Ordinary human means of knowledge were not used, and inspiration does not appear to have supervened.
To defend the left flank of the army and the ground in its vicinity, it was absolutely necessary to get out from under the great bluffs over- looking its camps, as was done eventually. The camp of the Fifty-fifth
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Illinois was just north of a tributary which enters Lick creek about one-half mile away. It was bordering upon the road running to Ham- burgh, and about one-fourth of a mile from where such road crosses the small creek referred to. These facts have been verified by a recent personal examination of the ground.
Here, if at all, would be the proper place to discuss whether the Federal army was surprised at Shiloh. I do not purpose to add greatly to the voluminous literature on that topic. I have, however, a decided opinion. In this opinion I am sustained by an overwhelming weight of authority. I am sustained by the definite conclusion and capable thought of thousands who were present and now survive. In recently visiting the field, with near two hundred of those survivors, I did not hear one dissenting voice. That opinion, briefly stated, is that all preliminaries necessary to prepare a great army to repel the attack of another were wanting; that there was an entire lack of preparation, of concerted and necessary action, which betokened absolute ignorance of the presence of a hostile army; that the commanding officers are entitled to no credit beyond good conduct on the field after the battle commenced; that in all the essentials of a surprise it was a success for the Confederates. I deliberately state, that since war became a science, one great army never approached another with its presence so entirely unknown. It was em- phatically a soldiers' fight, well put in the expression that the rebels out- generaled us, but that we out-coloneled them. On these points the authorities are too numerous to quote, and a general reference is made to the reports and histories covering that period.
Nothing herein is intended to detract from the great fame of Generals Grant and Sherman, who did enough afterward to merit the gratitude of humanity. Their reputation is too well established to need any fantastic distortion of facts about this battle.
The latter calls it a necessary test of manhood. Granted, but yet it is a great pity that the Northern troops did not enter upon this "test of manhood " with sufficient preparation to destroy the rebel army and gain an overwhelming victory. It is a pity that, as this great historical page was unfolding, the first glimmer of its bloody import should thrust itself upon General Sherman only at eight o'clock on the morning of the battle. Then, as he says in his report, he became convinced for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack. If not admitted to be true, it would seem like a romance when we state that fully twenty thou- sand Confederates rested for thirty-six hours within less than four miles of General Sherman's headquarters. The simple truth is, that at this stage of the war generals were in process of education as well as privates.
Gladden's brigade of Withers' division had first been taken from Bragg's line and used to extend Hardee's right, as the widening space toward Lick creek made it necessary. Jackson's and Chalmers' brigades, of the same division, had been placed en echelon to the right and rear of Gladden. In this formation, the attack was pushed upon Prentiss, and
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finally both Chalmers and Jackson participated, though not seriously, in the breaking of that general's line.
Meanwhile, the regiments of Stuart's brigade had at the first alarm formed upon their respective color lines. Colonel Stuart states, in his report, that at half-past seven in the forenoon, he received word from General Prentiss that the enemy were in his front in force, and that in a short time he discovered the Pelican flag advancing in rear of Prentiss' headquarters. Then he despatched his adjutant to inform General Hurlbut that Prentiss' left was turned. Stuart also states that, within fifteen minutes, Hurlbut sent one regiment (the Forty-first Illinois, as he remembers,) and a battery, which took position immediately by the Seventy-first Ohio headquarters. He expected Hurlbut's division would be up quickly. He further states that subsequently, and before any attack was made upon his brigade, such regiment and battery had departed without firing a gun. I do not find in the report of General Hurlbut, or that of any of his subordinates, or of the Forty-first Illinois, anything confirming this.
It is true that General Hurlbut at once promptly advanced his whole division, until met by the fugitives of Prentiss' division. He was at least three-quarters of a mile to the right and rear of the Fifty-fifth Illinois. While his division was well fought and handled, as the very able report of its commander shows, it in no sense supported Stuart's brigade, or protected its flank from any direct attack. It appears also that the Ninth and Twelfth Illinois, of Wallace's division, were sent to the left and front, with a view to supporting Stuart. Before reaching any such position, they were met by the debris of Prentiss' broken line, and the Confed- erates following them, and were involved in a bloody conflict, in which they did their whole duty. While it is not clear just where they fought, it is certain they never got within half a mile of Stuart. The first line of battle formed by this brigade was with its right resting opposite the left of the camp of the Fifty-fifth Illinois. The Seventy-first Ohio was upon the right, with the Fifty-fifth Illinois the centre and the Fifty-fourth Ohio upon the left. From this point two companies each of the Fifty-fifth and Fifty-fourth were sent as skirmishers across the creek in their front.
Several changes in position occurred, not all of which are remem- bered, and which had no significance. Great uncertainty prevailed as to the precise direction the attack would come from, and these changes of position were doubtless intended to establish a line parallel to that of the expected attack, or with a view to defensibility. As an incident of this portion of the battle, it may be mentioned that the skirmishers of the Fifty-fifth Illinois fired into one of Chalmers' regiments as it was forin- ing. It was the Fifty-second Tennessee, and was so stampeded that, with the exception of two companies, it took no further part in the battle. It is a strange coincidence that the Seventy-first Ohio, commanded by that globule of adipose pomposity, Col. Rodney Mason, was upon the same portion of the field stampeded in the same way, not even one com- pany remaining to participate further in the battle.
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The skirmishers were unable to prevent the planting of a hostile battery upon the high bluff across the small creek. This was Gage's battery, highly complimented by its brigade commander. At this time the position of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, with the Fifty-fourth Ohio upon its left, was from eighty to one hundred and sixty rods to the left, and slightly to the rear of the camp of the Fifty-fifth Illinois. The regiment had not as yet been engaged seriously. The fire it was subjected to came from the battery before mentioned. It would seem that Colonel Stuart, for some reason, here expected the attack to come from the south-east, or up the road from the crossing of the creek. A change of front thereupon was attempted, during which the Fifty-fifth Illinois broke and ran in the most inextricable confusion.
In looking over the ground since, I am astonished at the direction this "skedaddle" took. It was nearly to the right, and comparatively little toward the rear. Its course crossed a considerable ravine, and passed over about one hundred rods of ground, when the regiment halted, as if by impulse, a promiscuous, disorganized mass of men. It was then deliberately formed into line by its officers. From that day till "Johnnie came marching home," anything like a panic never affected this regi- ment, and this one in no sense impaired its efficiency in the conflict which followed.
According to my recollection, it was about this time that the Seventy- first Ohio broke for the rear and disappeared, as an organization, from the battle. Strange to say, a recent denial of this appears in print. I propose to state the simple fact, known to every survivor of the Fifty- fifth Illinois, that that regiment disgracefully ran away, led by many of its officers. Although this is tenderly glossed over by General Sherman, and excuse attempted by its colonel, time has not dimmed my recollec- tion as to it. I do not propose that the laurels shall be taken from the graves of our comrades and placed at the feet of a regiment that ran away and left them to their fate. It will be hard to convince the surviv- ors of the glorious old Fifty-fifth, who felt and heard the whistle of innumerable rebel bullets down the ravine from the right, where the Seventy-first ought to have been, that that regiment was doing its duty. Months after, six companies of the same regiment were disgracefully surrendered by the same colonel, at Clarksville, Tennessee, for which he and eleven or twelve line officers were dismissed, with proper contumely. It is needless to add that these remarks do not apply to the brave Lieu- tenant-Colonel Kyle, who lost his life in trying to rally his regiment, nor to its adjutant and the seventeen men who staid and fought with the Fifty-fifth. A word of praise may be also well bestowed upon a beard- less, rosy-checked boy, named B. F. Innyartt, who fought in the ranks of Company I after his regiment had fled to the landing.
It was at this point that word was sent in by the skirmishers that cavalry were approaching from the direction of the creek crossing. Here for probably the first as well as the last time during the rebellion, a hollow square was formed in actual battle. It was shortly reduced, and
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line of battle deliberately formed. An examination of the reports, recently made accessible through the publications of congress, shows this to have been caused by a detachment of cavalry commanded by Captain Clanton, and sent in that direction to discover the extent of the Union line on that flank. During the contest which followed, they went far to our left and rear, but took no great part in the combat, though they watered their horses in the Tennessee river.
As the regiment was formed in line of battle, after reducing the square, just to its rear was a deep, rugged ravine-not less than fifty feet deep- the southern edge of which became the line of battle during the terrible conflict which followed, and to reach which only a few steps were necessary. Referring again to a recent visit, I find this position to be from fifty to sixty rods to the rear, and a little east of north from the camping ground of our regiment. It was here that the Fifty-fifth Illinois and Fifty-fourth Ohio made such a glorious stand. It was here that the two regiments fought and struggled with a tenacity never excelled on that battle-field. It was here that for more than two hours the rebel right was held in bloody conflict, and the whole Union left flank protected.
I assert positively that not a foot of ground was yielded from the south edge of this ravine until after two o'clock on Sunday. All movements of our brigade, up to this point, had been tactical, either in anticipation of an attack from an uncertain direction, or in search of a proper position. All other stands or conflicts, sometimes spoken of, were of little conse- quence. At this time the regiment, outside of its skirmishers, had not lost ten men. . Nothing but its camps were yielded, and that was neces- sary, from the nature of the ground. No defensible position farther to the front existed then or now. The bluffs upon the opposite side of the . creek made all parts of our camp, or any extension of that line, abso- lutely indefensible. By accident or design, the position we assumed was emphatically the best at hand, and had our flanks been protected, we could have held it for two whole days.
It now becomes important to inquire how many men the regiment had in line at this, the supreme moment of its existence. William Preston Johnston, in his able work, showing far more research upon this topic than any Northern one, gives to the Fifty-fifth Illinois six hundred and fifty-seven men for duty. Adjutant Nourse says six hundred and fifty. Both are substantially correct, according to the rolls of the regiment. This, however, is not the correct number of fighting men gathered upon the edge of this rugged ravine. From this must be eliminated all stragglers and runaways -- unfortunately quite numerous; all musicians; all heretofore killed or wounded; camp details; wagoners, etc. Captain J. T. McAuley, then sergeant-major, and who made a morning report that day, says the regiment had in line just five hundred and twelve men. That number was at the time somehow impressed upon my mind, and has not been effaced by the events of more than twenty years. While 1 cannot trace the source of my knowledge the fact remains clear. It is 7
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therefore safe to assert, that at this juncture but few more than five hundred of the Fifty-fifth Illinois stood ready with flashing eyes and beating hearts to engage in the impending contest with overwhelming numbers.
Colonel Stuart iterates and reiterates in his report that he had here but eight hundred men of his brigade present. These were the men, barring the few already injured, who shed the blood and are entitled to the glory of this isolated conflict. These were the few men gathered from happy homes in Illinois who, without experience or experienced officers, without the guiding star of a brigadier or major-general, without a single piece of artillery, with only stern patriotism and forty rounds, met the great wave of secession, and for hours withstood it upon this historic ravine. When they left it, one-half their number were dead or bleeding upon its rugged border.
It here becomes necessary to a proper appreciation of this section of the battle, that we ascertain what portion of the Confederate army was opposed to the eight hundred of Stuart's brigade gathered at this point. Every history concedes that all of Chalmers' brigade grappled with us. It consisted of the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Mississippi, the Fifty-second Tennessee, and Gage's batterv -in all, two thousand thirty- nine men. It now appears that Jackson's brigade was also engaged against Stuart's two regiments. This brigade embraced the Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Alabama, Second Texas, and Girady's battery-in all two thousand two hundred and eight men. If this be true, then these two regiments of Stuart's, without support or artillery, withstood for more than two hours, upon the borders of this ravine, the assaults of four thousand two hundred and forty-seven men and two ' batteries, less the trifling loss they had already incurred in the assault upon Prentiss.
Up to a recent date all writers on the battle of Shiloh, following the hiatus in Sherman's report, made but little mention of Stuart's brigade, speaking of it in general terms as opposed to Chalmers' brigade. The isolated character of the contest on this portion of the field -a part of a great battle made up of detached contests-affords some excuse for this cursory but unjust method of treatment. In view of recent congressional and other publications, it now becomes plain that in addition to Chal- mers' brigade, Jackson's brigade was engaged in the attack upon Stuart.
Probably the most elaborate and complete history of the battle of Shiloh yet written is found in Colonel Roman's " Life of General Beaure- gard," upon whose staff he served, and from his pages I quote in proof of the above. On page 289, Vol. I., he says that " General Johnston on the right led Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades back across the ravine, three-quarters of a mile to the right, until the right of Chalmers rested on Lick Creek bottom, Jackson forming on his left, where they were halted about half an hour until the position of Stuart's brigade could be ascertained." Upon page 292, same volume, it was stated that it was scarcely ten o'clock when Stuart's skirmish line was reached,
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Jackson opening the conflict under General Johnston's personal order. Speaking of the principal conflict along the ravine, he describes the ground very accurately, and says Stuart had at that time but eight hundred men, and that he maintained a creditable resistance against greatly superior numbers. He adds in a note that Stuart was without artillery, and as to infantry was greatly outnumbered. On the following page, in speaking of the position of Confederate troops at that time, the author says that on the extremne right, three-quarters of a mile from other troops, Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades of Withers' division were carrying on the attack against Stuart. Upon page 295, in speaking of a Inter phase of the battle, he says that these two brigades had been gradually forcing back Stuart's two regiments, sweeping with their right the Tennessee bottom, until about three o'clock Chalmers' brigade was struck by the shells of the gunboat Tyler. This not only sustains the assertion that Stuart's two regiments fought two whole brigades, but shows that such contest was kept up till shortly before three o'clock, as will be further cominented upon hereafter.
An examination of the reports of Withers, Chalmers, Jackson, and their subordinates, shows conclusively that these two brigades acted together and were engaged against Stuart's two regiments. All of these reports agree that, after Prentiss' left was driven back, the two brigades in question were together taken from three-fourths of a mile to one mile to their right and our left. The slightest knowledge of the incidents of the battle shows that no troops were there for them to attack, other than Stuart's brigade. If Jackson was not so engaged, his action is totally unaccounted for. Neither of these brigade commanders or their subor- dinates speak of artillery being opposed to them in this portion of the battle. This is the strongest of negative testimony, because Stuart had no artillery from first to last-a fact hardly existing as to any other brigade. General Jackson, commanding one brigade, says that after the contest with Prentiss, and after the removal of perhaps half a mile to the right, he took position on the left of General Chalmers, a camp of the enemy, just opposite his centre. Prentiss' camps had before that time been captured, and this camp opposite his centre was to the rebel right half a mile. No camps other than Stuart's were ever there. Colonel Wheeler, commanding the Nineteenth Alabama, of Jackson's brigade, says that after losing a few men in the attack upon the left of Prentiss, they were marched about a mile to the right, where they were engaged the remainder of the day; that General Johnston ordered the regiment with his own lips to charge the camp of the Fifty-ninth Illinois. Now, the Fifty-ninth Illinois was not engaged in the battle of Shiloh at all. The camp of no Illinois regiment, other than the Fifty-fifth, was within a mile of that place. This was a mile or so to the left of Prentiss, and where there were no camps of any regiments other than Stuart's brigade. Hence the conclusion is irresistible that the camp he calls the Fifty-ninth Illinois was that of the Fifty-fifth Illinois. He might easily mistake the number of the regiment, or any misprint might account for
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it, but that the name of the State from which it came is misstated, is not reasonable. The camp of no regiment, other than those of Stuart, or those already captured, could have been reached nearer than one mile to their left and front. As a further proof that these two brigades were acting in unison, I cite Colonel Moore, of the Second Texas, Jackson's brigade, who states that they were moved to the right and took position in the front line of battle on the left of Chalmers' brigade. Further on he speaks of the space between Jackson's right and Chalmers' left as being only sufficient for three companies, which he filled, and of advanc- ing to the aid of the Mississippians. Every report will show that these two brigades co-operated, and were connected together in this portion of the conflict. In further support of my assertion, I appeal to the knowl- edge of every man of the Fifty-fifth Illinois who was present, and who escaped, for proof of the fact that more than one battery was engaged against us. Their own observation will show that the Confederate line was too extensive to be composed of only one brigade. Chalmers had but one battery, the other must have belonged to Jackson's command.
I now restate the proposition that Stuart's two remaining regiments, without artillery, engaged the whole of Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades, consisting of nine full regiments and two batteries, or four thousand two hundred and forty-seven men, exclusive of Clanton's cavalry, and assert that such proposition is proved. Most Northern accounts either fail to state how long this overwhelming force was held in check upon this ravine, or intimate that Stuart's brigade fell back about noon. Even William Preston Johnston, in most particulars so accurate, by his text infers, and by his map shows, Stuart's brigade much further to the rear at noon. The position shown in the inap was never occupied by this brigade. On the contrary, not one foot of ground was yielded from this position, just in rear of the Hamburgh road and close by their camps, until between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. This was more than six hours after Prentiss' division and the three brigades with General Sherman were repeatedly driven from their positions, and were far to the rear of their first line.
Using every means of knowledge within my power-my own recol- lection, aided by that of every one present with whom I have come in contact, and inferences drawn from various reports, I conclude that the real and supreme conflict upon the edge of the ravine, so frequently alluded to, commenced about or a little before noon. Its deadly char- acter was seldom equalled during the late war, and never again experienced by the Fifty-fifth Illinois. No one will deny but that this regiment did its duty everywhere-that its aggregate losses during the war, in proportion to its numbers, were among the largest. Yet upon this one spot, inside of three hours' time, it lost about one-half its total casualties for the war.
When we take into account that this conflict was in direct opposition to the Confederate plan of turning the Union left; when we consider that no other body of troops, great or small, was between this point and the
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most direct route to the landing; when defeat of Stuart turned the whole Federal left; when the evident fact is stated that no other portion of the Federal left was nearer than three-fourths of a mile, or what is more probable, a full mile, of the river, the great importance of Stuart's stout resistance becomes apparent.
In proof of the assertion that the Fifty-fifth Illinois did not yield the point in question until between two and three o'clock, I cite the report of Colonel Stuart, which received no criticism or modification at the hands of General Sherman. Such report states explicitly that the conflict lasted at this position upward of two hours. General Hurlbut states in his report that, at about three o'clock, Colonel Stuart sent him word that he was driven in. A half hour would be ample, and almost an unreasonable time to use in sending such word to Hurlbut, especially when his retreat was in the same direction. Various Confederate reports state that at the close of this conflict they were greatly exhausted and out of ammunition. I: is known to every survivor of the Fifty-fifth that our ammunition was all expended at the time of leaving the ravine, and the cartridges of the dead and wounded were used. This fact is also stated in Colonel Stuart's report. Certainly, two hours or more were needed to expend this much "villainous saltpetre." General Chalmers, speaking of this portion of the conflict, and alluding to the retreat of our men, says: "About this time the gunboats from the river began to throw their shells among us."
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