USA > Illinois > The story of the Fifty-fifth regiment Illinois volunteer infantry in the civil war, 1861-1865 > Part 8
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
noissance in that direction would have failed in developing the designs of the emeny, from the fact that they were not on that portion of the field. The first aggressive movements of the rebels were all to the right and in front of Generals Prentiss and Sherman, where, as has been already shown, they had been manœuvreing with their whole army for two days. To the front of Stuart would be directly south. Corinth was southwest, and the high range of country, with all roads leading to the rebel stronghold, were in the same direction, and from that quarter marched the assailants. When the attack did finally come upon Stuart, it was not because he was in the track of its first design, but because upon the discovery of this extension of the Union left, two brigades were disjointed from the rebel right, and sent east « full three-quarters of a mile for the purpose of meeting and defeating, what was then supposed by the Confederate com- mander, to be an attempt to flank him on his right.
The determination of Colonel Stuart to hold the extreme left at all hazards reflects the highest credit upon him, and places him in the front rank of the subordinate commanders who fought on that field. It may be that in the light of sub- sequent events the tactics used to accomplish his noble purpose were somewhat faulty, but they were necessarily tentative, and the efforts of an inexperienced officer who had not one word of advice from his superiors, who were edu- cated in the art of war. From any stand-point his methods do not suffer when compared with most of the movements of other commanders upon that tumultuous field. The chief merit was in fighting, and fighting desperately; that, Colonel Stuart determined to do, and out of his resolution grew an isolated conflict which probably saved the battle, and pos- sibly the unity of the nation. Nothing in this statement is intended to belittle the importance of other points or the valor shown in maintaining them, but all would have been unavailing had Stuart faltered in his purpose, or the Fifty- fifth Illinois and the Fifty-fourth Ohio failed in the execution of that purpose.
In the cotemporaneous letters and diaries gathered for the purposes of this work, statements are sometimes found
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FIFTY-FIFTH OHIO VINDICATED.
reflecting upon the conduct of some portion of the Fifty- fourth Ohio. They are generally to the effect that compar- atively few of them remained until the time of the final retreat of the Fifty-fifth from the main position, where the terrific conflict occurred on Sunday. It is certain that every survivor of the latter regiment will rejoice in the statement that upon the fullest examination these insinuations are found to be entirely unjust. It should be remembered that the Fifty-fourth was the smallest regiment in the brigade, and that before the supreme hour came it lost some inevitably by straggling, as did the Fifty-fifth. Turning again to the report under consideration, it is found clearly stated that four com- panies, or two-fifths of the Fifty-fourth, were removed from the line of battle by an order, and were performing special duty farther to the left at the time of the retreat, and did not rejoin the line until the final rally at the landing. Under existing circumstances the Fifty-fourth must have had less than three hundred men remaining in line of battle after such detachment, and a "butcher's bill" of one hundred and fifty-four killed and wounded, largely from the men remain- ing at the ravine, clearly entitles that regiment to an honor- able place in the annals of that fearful Sunday's conflict. The removal of four companies from the short line of twenty was injudicious and unnecessary, and grew out of the inordi- nate fear of cavalry on the part of the lieutenant-colonel of the Fifty-fifth, whose impracticable adherence to European tradition reached the climax of absurdity in forming a hollow square to repel the same imaginary foc. The major spoken of in Colonel Stuart's report, who commanded this excursion to the left, will readily be recalled as Major Fisher, the active, efficient and good-looking young officer who seemed to be the chief executive of the Fifty-fourth. He yet survives, a leading and respected citizen of Denver, Colorado, and his hospitality to his former comrades of the Fifty-fifth has been generously tested during a visit in search of material for this volume.
In treating of the disgraceful conduct of the Seventy-first Ohio, Colonel Stuart, like General Sherman, is diplomatic, saying that he "could not find them, and had no intimation
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
where they had gone," and the like. They "had gone," as Colonel Stuart well knew, pell-mell to the landing, without having received or delivered one well sustained volley, and in that wild race to a place of safety, it is doubtful if any agile youth in the ranks out-footed their middle-aged and plethoric colonel. Several Ohio regiments of Sherman's division misbehaved, and it was probably good policy that led to a tender treatment of their short-comings, and left to future opportunity and discipline the chances of vindication. Time brought about that result in regard to the Fifty-third and Fifty-seventh Ohio, and later to the Seventy-first-all under different commanders. Colonel Rodney Mason of the Seventy-first belonged to one of the first families of Ohio, and had been Adjutant-General of that state. General Sher- man is, "even unto this day," zealous to apologize for him, though General Grant, in his memoirs, names him as a "con- stitutional coward." In any event, the men were not so much to blame as was the generalship which placed them, raw recruits as they were, within the reach of a sudden attack, without notice and without even a connected line to give the sense of security, so essential to new troops. All strictures upon the conduct of the Seventy-first Ohio should make reverent exception, of Lieutenant-Colonel Kyle, who was shot while attempting to stem the wild wave of fugitives; and its Company K should also be honored for its conduct on the skirmish line, where it lost near one-half its men, around the groups of log buildings at the left of the quarters of the Fifty-fifth. It is further a duty, as well as a pleasure, to give full credit to its adjutant, Hart, who with seventeen men of his regiment, remained through all, and to the rosy- cheeked, bright-eyed boy, named B. F. Inyartt, who sought a place in the ranks of Company I, and passed through the battle unscathed.
In his description of the movements of the first day, Colonel Stuart refers to certain events which took place near the landing, and gives to the lieutenant-colonel of the Fifty- fifth sole credit for rallying from the debris of the field a line of three thousand men. Such a statement is so extravagant as to be beyond the domain of absurdity, and the source of
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SHERMAN'S REPORT.
it is easily traced. No student of Shiloh will assert that General Grant had over fifteen thousand organized troops in line at the landing, and the statement that Lieutenant-Colonel Malinborg controlled one-fifth of that number requires con- tradiction only because such a statement was made officially. The lieutenant-colonel of the Fifty-fifth was simply entitled to the credit of being one of the brave men who staid by his colors, but evidences of his skill and his power over other men are entirely lacking.
No regimental reports were made for either the Fifty-fifth or the Fifty-fourth, though it would seem the brigade report, toward its close, was intended to apply especially to the for- mer. It is proper to state also that the names mentioned as "meriting notice especially," while deserving of all the credit given them, were only a small portion of a number equally meritorious. It is not often that the adjutant of a regiment fights in the ranks with a musket, as did the adjutant of the Fifty-fifth, and it is still more rare that creditable action on his part escapes notice in the reports. The superb conduct and the terrible wound of the sergeant-major, too, causes a regret that a small portion of the report was not devoted to the good conduct of the "field and staff." But this yearning for the praise of deserving comrades must be suppressed, lest it include nearly the whole regiment. From the general credit given to the officers, two are excluded as disgraceful exceptions. These were Captain Joseph Clay of Company G, and Second-Lieutenant Jonas L. Buck of Compay E. Both were given subsequent opportunities, and both again failed, and were accordingly cashiered.
In the very elaborate report of General Sherman, who commanded the Fifth division, to which Stuart's Second brigade nominally belonged, is found the following meagre allusion to the latter :
My Second brigade, Colonel Stuart, was detached near two miles from my headquarters. He had to fight his own battle on Sunday, as the enemy interposed between him and Prentiss early in the day. Colonel Stuart was severely wounded, and yet reported for duty on Monday morning, but was compelled to leave during the day, when the command devolved upon Colonel T. Kilby Smith, Fifty-fourth Ohio, who was always in the thickest of the fight, and led the brigade handsomely.
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
The above is all the official recognition at the hands of the division commander received by the Fifty-fifth, except here and there an allusion to its existence. A few general phrases only, which lead up to a compliment for Colonels Stuart and Smith. Not one word of commendation for the two regi- ments which fought on the ground where they fired their first volley until after two o'clock in the afternoon, and for hours after the two brigades in his presence had gone to pieces. No inference can be drawn as to whether the Fifty-fifth fought well or ill, or why it lost more men than either of the brigades which he put into action and commanded in person.
A natural result of this sin of omission is that the general histories of the war are nearly silent as to the desperate strug- gle on the extreme left flank at Shiloh. In point of fact, that bloody episode was one of the most notable and heroic of the war, and entitles all concerned to a conspicuous place in the line of patriots who have faced death in the various exigencies of national tribulation.
Early impressed by this hiatus in the reports and histories resulting from official disregard, and actuated by a natural desire that justice should be done, much time and study has been devoted to unravelling the details of the disorderly tumult at Shiloh. In pursuit of such purpose, nearly every thing written, both official and unofficial, has been examined. Two visits have been made to the field for the purpose of acquiring information by personal examination. Some humorist has remarked that Shiloh is the best contested bat- tle since the war. In this wordy discussion the writer has not been altogether silent, but has taken part wherever and when- ever the vindication of the Fifty-fifth Illinois and the Fifty- fourth Ohio seemed to make it necessary. One of the results of effort in that direction was an essay, called at the time, "A Section of a Battle," and read at the first reunion of the Fifty- fifth, on October 31st, 1884. It was designed to be a history of the operations of Stuart's brigade during its defence of the extreme left flank in the first day's battle. It bears the impress of some feeling, and is in form somewhat controver- sial; but all writings that get beyond glittering generalities on this subject are, and must be, controversial. The more
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A SECTION OF A BATTLE.
recent study devoted to the topic, and many days since spent upon the field, confirm every position taken in that essay. Although it has now no claim to be called new, after much hesitation it has seemed best to make it a part of this narra- tion. Its use in this connection materially lightens the sum of gratuitous labor necessary to the work in hand, of itself no small matter. There is pith also in the suggestion of a literary friend, "that an attempt to re-write it might hammer some of the temper out of it." It should be remembered that out of the confusion and surprise of Shiloh comes the chief glory of the Fifty-fifth. It fought so well and suffered so much, without the aid of generalship and the rules of mil- itary science, that to do it anything like justice full reference must be had to the lack of those needful and useful elements of a battle. It is not proper that this opportunity pass without making the vindication of Stuart's brigade full, so that his- torians in the future need not, as they have in the past, lack material to do simple justice. "A Section of a Battle" is therefore again presented, to be followed by such further observations as seem needful for elaboration :
A SECTION OF A BATTLE.
It is perfectly well settled how the battle of Shiloh came to be fought. The grand strategy of that campaign is no historical secret. The maps of the country made it plain that the proper place to attack the rebel line in the west was in the centre, obviously by the navigable channels of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. To General Halleck belongs the credit of first grasping this idea -- at least, of first announcing it. It is hardly to be imagined that so simple a problem escaped the thoughts of the great embryo captains, Grant and Sherman, of the same department. The first effort in pursuance of this line of attack had been extremely rich in results, embracing the occupation and capture of Forts Henry, Donelson, Nashville, Columbus, Bowling Green, with intervening and contiguous territory.
The next step in this sweep of grand strategy culminated in the battle of Shiloh. . In the new line assumed, after the fall of Donelson, Corinth became a point of the first moment. The rebel centre being broken, and its wings without connection, concentration at that point followed. The natural way to reach this was by continuing up the Tennessee river, so that all the advantages of water navigation, safe communication and naval protection could be secured. Pittsburgh Landing was selected, apparently without much consideration, because it was convenient; because the ground was high; and again, because its ridges led into the
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
interior and furnished good camping grounds. Its selection, fortunate or unfortunate, was the act of General C. F. Smith, then in command.
While General Grant's army was lying scattered over these ridges, waiting for the arrival of General Buell, preparatory to an advance on Corinth, the rebel leaders concluded to attack that portion of the army already at Pittsburgh Landing. Thus simple were the steps which led to this great battle.
A word here may not be out of place as to the character of the combat. It was, beyond controversy, among the bloodiest in history. In all the sanguinary battles of our late war, it was for those who staid at the front, one of the most terrific. The Count of Paris in his very able history of the rebellion quotes General Sherman as saying that it was " the most terrible that he had witnessed during his career." Badeau, in his "Life of General Grant," speaks of certain portions of this battle by referring to them as embracing several hours of as desperate fighting as ever was seen on this continent. He again remarks that "it was the severest fight of the war west of the Alleghanies, and in proportion to the numbers engaged equalled any contest during the rebellion." He quotes Sherman as saying that he never saw such terrible fighting afterwards, and Grant compared Shiloh only to the "Wilderness." All Confederate writers, and there are some able ones, agree in giving to this contest a desperate character seldom equalled. An examination of the losses, placing them to the proper credit, fully bears out this statement. The weight of authority shows that, exclusive of General Lew Wallace's division, General Grant had at the landing and upon the field from thirty-two thousand to thirty-three thousand men on the first day. Eliminate over three thousand cavalry, who lost in killed and wounded only twenty-four men, and who for various reasons not discreditable to them were of little if any use; count out also runaway regiments, stragglers, musicians, camp details, camp sick, wagoners, etc., who contributed nothing to the loss of this conflict; and it will be found that not over twenty-four thousand men did the fighting and suffered the loss on the first day. This number lost, in killed and wounded alone, nearly eight thousand. Allowing one thousand for the loss in the second day's fight, it will be found that the killed and wounded in the first day's battle almost doubles the ratio of the "butcher's bill" at Gettysburg. These same men, with little thought that they were making history at such a rate, suffered in one day's battle a per cent. of loss in killed and wounded almost or quite equal to that of our army during the entire Atlanta campaign.
It is not the purpose of this article to give any general history of the battle of Shiloh. That has been a fruitful subject for many able pens. For obvious reasons it has been, and bids fair to be, a theme of acri- monious discussion. Aside from the controversy growing out of the manner of the commencement, the ending, and the results of this battle, it was a series of detached conflicts, involving many changes and great confusion, all difficult to describe.
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A SECTION OF A BATTLE.
It is the distinct purpose of this paper to give an account of the operations of the Fifty-fifth Illinois Infantry, as connected with the first day's contest. I have always felt, in common with my fellow soldiers, that justice has never been done to this regiment for what it did and suffered on that occasion. No effort will be used to make this a chronicle of personal anecdote or adventure. It might in that case be more graphic, but it would be of less value as history.
There will be no cavil against the statement that the Fifty-fifth Illinois was one of the best regiments among the many good ones that went from Illinois to participate in our great struggle. It gathered from our farms, shops, offices and school-houses as fine fibre of blood, muscle and brain as ever was laid upon the altar of any country. It is also true, beyond controversy, that its career is among the bloodiest. In all that in warlike parlance goes to make "glory," it reaped a rich harvest. Its blood watered the soil of many states. This much is claimed for and will be readily conceded to the Fifty-fifth Illinois. Yet its literature was all through the war, and is now, of the slightest, both in quantity and quality. Its fame was never properly recorded. It had no one to blow its trumpet. Somehow it never got its name inscribed upon monuments. No newspaper correspondent wrote up its events with common justice, let alone the rhetorical exaggerations so often used.
In looking back through the years that have intervened, I can assign some, at least, of the reasons for this great injustice. It was a regiment organized in Chicago from many fragments, from different localities. It did not represent any particular location or nationality. It was not the pride or pet of contiguous territory. Its mourners were not concentrated. It was the silent tear in many hamlets that paid tribute to its dead. Another, and perhaps main reason, was the character of its first field officers. These officers were for many reasons, not wise selections; especially so with reference to perpetuating the fame of, and creating a literature for the regiment. Social causes before the war, and personal habits, temper and temperament during the war, sufficiently account for this to all who are acquainted with the facts. Since the parties referred to are now dead and the fame of the regiment to its survivors is above all things sacred, elaboration of details on this topic is not desirable. So, from these causes, and others I do not choose to mention, the history of the Fifty-fifth Illinois remains practically unwritten. Its record is preserved for the most part, if at all, within the now aging memories of its survivors. The highest duty of this and other reunions should be to rescue from oblivion the glorious deeds of this grand old regiment. I hope I may be able to state and to prove the important part it performed in withstanding the tremendous sweep of the Confederate army at Pittsburgh Landing. This is especially appropriate since its division commander, General Sherman, first left it off two miles, detached from his division-left it during the battle, without artillery, without his orders, and apparently without a thought, and left it in his report, with a mere allusion never after corrected or elaborated.
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
To properly characterize the relation of the Fifty-fifth Illinois to the battle of Shiloh, an allusion to the physical features of the field becomes necessary. It is embraced within the borders of Lick creek on the south, and Snake creek on the north, which enter the Tennessee river on nearly parallel lines about four miles apart, and from the general direc- tion of southwest. Inland or up stream, a short distance from the mouth of Snake creek, enters into it from the side of the battle-field Owl creek, which from that point becomes the limit of the field upon the right flank. The general scope of the battle-field is the high plateau between these creeks. This plateau, or ridge, is cut up by innumerable ravines and small creeks, at times dry, tributary to the larger creeks or the river. Those emptying into Lick creek and the river below the mouth of that creek are terribly deep and rugged, but quickly terminate toward their upper end and blend into the general level of the centre of the battle- field.
The general sweep of the rebel line of attack was down this plateau, with a line of battle reaching from Owl creek on their left to Lick creek on their right. The Confederate tactics seem to have been to first attack and break the centre at and to the left of Shiloh church, then make a general left wheel, somewhat en echelon, turn the Federal left, drive the army away from the river, and capture the landing and as much of the army as possible. It was in pursuance of this plan, so successfully begun by early breaking through Prentiss and Sherman, and fully set forth in the reports of Chalmers, Jackson and Withers, that the rebel right encountered the stubborn resistance of the Fifty-fifth Illinois and the Fifty-fourth Ohio.
It may be worth mentioning that the first Confederate scheme was to attack and turn the Federal left by crossing Lick creek from Hamburgh. This plan was abandoned upon General Chalmers' report of April 2d that the crossings of Lick creek were not practicable, except by cavalry. This prevented Stuart's brigade from being the main and first point of attack. What in that case the result would have been, belongs to the domain of speculation. Taking into account what the Fifty-fifth Illinois and the Fifty-fourth Ohio did when attacked, no law of probabilities is violated by stating that they would have done much better work than did Hildebrand's or Buckland's brigades. In the light of experience it is a curious commentary upon the generalship of this battle to state that more than one good road was left without pickets, and unguarded all the way from Corinth to Hamburgh.
The rebel formation for attack was in three lines. The front was. commanded by General Hardee, the next by General Bragg, and the third by General Polk, with reserves under General Breckenridge. It was generally reported and believed among us after the battle that our brigade was opposed to General Hardee's men. This was not so. At the time of the rebel advance for attack it was found that Hardee's line was not long enough to fill in the space between Lick and Owl creeks, and as this space began to widen Withers' division of Bragg's corps was
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A SECTION OF A BATTLE.
used to extend the rebel right, which ultimately came in contact with the Federal extreme left.
The Second brigade of the Fifth (Sherman's) division was composed of the Seventy-first and Fifty-fourth Ohio and Fifty-fifth Illinois. It was commanded by Col. David Stuart of the Fifty-fifth Illinois. It formed the extreme left flank of the Federal army, being to the left and somewhat in the rear of General Prentiss' line-especially so with reference to the direction of the attack, which was oblique to the Federal line,
The arrangement of the whole Federal army has been properly characterized by able writers as "loose." This was particularly true of Stuart's brigade, which was some two miles to the left of the balance of the Fifth division and its commander --- the Sixth, or Prentiss' division, intervening. There was a wide interval between Prentiss and Stuart, and no troops between the latter and the river, somewhat more than half a mile away. As expressed by General Sherman, "It was the extreme left guarding the ford over Lick creek." It seems to have been so placed before the arrival of other troops, and when General Sherman was covering the whole front. Why, after the arrival of other divisions, they were not extended to cover this point, and Stuart's brigade changed to connect with its division, belongs to the grand aggregation of official stupidity going to make the strategy and tactics of this campaign. As one writer forcibly expresses it, "this brigade was doubly let alone, both by the commander of the army and its division commander." Referring to the general location of the army, the Count of Paris, after comment- ing upon the natural strength of the position, says that "the Federals had not yet learned to avail themselves of the natural advantages of the position." Also. that they were posted at hazard, and not disposed so as to enable them to support each other, etc. Speaking of Stuart's brigade, he says it was entirely isolated upon the borders of Lick creek.
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