USA > Illinois > The story of the Fifty-fifth regiment Illinois volunteer infantry in the civil war, 1861-1865 > Part 7
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
place indicating preparation to meet an attack. All the numerous and usual means at hand for testing the approach of a hostile army seem to have been in a state of "innocuous desuetude." So this day which preceded one of the greatest battles of modern times, passed in contentment. As its hours slipped into eternity they were fully utilized by the Confederates in deploying two lines of battle between Owl and Lick Creeks, with reserves close at hand, almost within cannon shot of the Federal camps. After having methodi- cally completed these fateful preparations, the day being too far spent to proceed with the assault, all the Major-Generals of the rebel army met in council under the trees within less than two miles of General Sherman's headquarters. Indeed, when looking at the serene dispatches of Saturday, one is led to the conclusion that the Federal army was there for sanitary purposes, and the country roundabout Pittsburgh Landing was a health resort.
Lest these statements seem extravagant, a few quotations are made from such dispatches, all of which may be found in Volume X, parts I and II, of the Official Records of the Rebellion, and were written less than twenty-four hours before the death-grapple commenced. General Grant, in writing to General Halleck, says: "I have scarcely the faintest idea that an attack (general one) will be made upon us;" and again :- "General Nelson's division has arrived. The other two of General Buell's column will arrive tomorrow or next day. It is my present intention to send them to Hamburgh, some four miles above Pittsburgh, when they get here. From that point to Corinth the road is good and a junction can be formed at almost any point. Colonel Mc- Pherson has gone with an escort today to examine the ground about Hamburgh, and lay out the position of the camps, if advisable to occupy the place." In another dispatch he says: "The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different points east." This reassuring statement is followed by the further assertion in the same dispatch, that "the number of the enemy at Corinth and within supporting dis- tance of it cannot be far from 80,000." On the same day and at a time when every man of the rebel army was within six
-
.
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THE GENERAL'S DELUSION.
miles of Shiloh church, and most of them nearer, General Grant dispatched from Savannah to General Buell as follows: "I will be here to meet you tomorrow. The enemy at and near Corinth are probably from 60,000 to 80,000." General Ammen, who commanded the first of Buell's brigades to arrive at Savannah, states in his diary of events filed with his official report, the following as occurring on Saturday: "About three P. M. General Grant and General Nelson came to my tent. General Grant declined to dismount, as he had an engagement. In answer to my remark that our troops were not fatigued and could march to Pittsburgh Landing if nec- essary, General Grant said: "You cannot march through the swamps. Make the troops comfortable. I will send boats for you Monday. There will be no fight at Pittsburgh Landing; we will have to go to Corinth, where the rebels are fortified."
It should be stated in extenuation of the delusion of General Grant, however, that he received from the ex- treme front, and from his trusted subordinate, General Sher- man, on the same day the following words: "All is quiet along our line now. We are in the act of exchanging cavalry, according to your order. The enemy has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regiments of infantry and one battery about two miles out." This latter statement is now known to be an under estimate of the enemy "about two miles out " of more than forty thousand. That the cavalry was being exchanged "according to order," is a sufficient statement that the "eyes of the army" were closed by official action. In another dispatch of same date General Sherman said: "I have no doubt that nothing will occur today more than picket firing."
While these placid remarks were passing to and fro, and almost at the precise hour, Generals Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg, Hardee, Polk and Breckenridge were discussing the plans of the impending battle within one and one-half miles of General Sherman's own tent. To their right and left, eight hundred yards apart, stretched two compact lines of battle, with reserves close in rear. At that conference, as is now well known, General Beauregard suggested a retreat to
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
Corinth, because in his opinion the Confederate movement of three days had been too slow to render a surprise possible. His reasoning was based upon sound military principles, and was in accordance with all human probabilities. He did not know the sublime indifference the inspiration of genius some- times has for practical facts. Can any inference be drawn from the above consistent with vigilance on the part of the Union commanders? Was not the terrible onslaught, born of the desperation of Albert Sidney Johnston, a "surprise" in the broadest military sense? Can there be any doubt but that when General Sherman came to write his report of the battle of Shiloh, and said, "about eight o'clock A. M. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to our left and front in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy de- signed a determined attack on our whole camp," he desig- nated the precise moment when first he appreciated the magnitude of the occasion? Is it not clear from his own "words, that as he sat upon his horse on the point of bluff in front of the Fifty-third Ohio, where his orderly was shot be- side him, and looked over across "Shiloh branch," that he then came down from the clouds of speculation and his great genius condescended to notice the practical fact that a great battle had commenced? But it was too late to make com- bined and well-ordered movements. It was too late to use generalship. It was too late to send any words of advice or encouragement to Stuart's detached brigade two miles away, and General Sherman turned to his men close at hand to do such duty as the lack of forethought left possible.
Through the endless discussion since the war certain his- torical conclusions have been definitely arrived at. Chief among them are these: that the great surprise of the war in a military sense occurred then and there; that a Confederate army of over forty thousand men, moving in three days' time less than twenty miles, compelled the opposing army to ac- cept battle upon terms dictated by them and strictly upon the defensive; that the shock of battle was so unexpected by the Federals that every separate and separated organization of it was compelled to fight according to circumstances and
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POSITION OF UNION TROOPS.
not according to design; that the battle of the first day was without combination or head, so far as the Union army was concerned, and soon degenerated into a melee wherein almost every regiment of it was flanked at some time during the conflict. On these points the verdict of history is as well settled as it is that Generals Grant and Sherman atoned for it by living and learning, and subsequently becoming trusted and successful leaders, and, under Providence, saviors of human liberty.
The exact condition of the Union front when attacked on Sunday morning involves the entire question of due diligence to meet it, and an explicit statement of facts is herein in- serted, because of its great value historically. Moreover, these facts nowhere appear in the reports, and the leading participants in the battle, who have since become its chief historians, either mislead or fail to answer inquiry in that direction. Without claiming credit for or describing the minute personal work necessary for the ascertainment of the details, such details are given with the assurance that they are correct. Upon the extreme right was McDowell's bri- gade. Next to the left, but a quarter of a mile distant, and across a heavy ravine, was Buckland's brigade with its left resting at Shiloh church. Hildebrand's brigade then came, with its right at the church, but its left regiment, the Fifty- third Ohio, detached across a ravine, two hundred yards away. The troops so far mentioned belonged to Sherman's division, and his headquarters were close in the rear. To the left and front, about one-half mile away, were located the seven raw regiments of Prentiss' embryo division, all having recently received their arms-one having got its ammunition only the night before, and one having none at all when the battle commenced. The interval to the right of Prentiss was in point of fact enlarged at the opening of the engagement by the advance of Prentiss about one quarter of a mile to meet the Confederate assault, and the space almost immedi- ately assumed still more dangerous proportions through the cowardly conduct of the commanding officer of the Fifty- third Ohio, who ordered a retreat. To the left rear and forming the extreme flank in that quarter, were encamped
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
Stuart's three regiments, at a distance of more than three quarters of a mile from Prentiss. By Stuart's movement to the left and the departure of the Seventy-first Ohio from his right, the interval last described was increased to one full mile.
A route touching these various positions would be circui- tous and much longer than a direct line from Owl to Lick Creek. Less than one-half of it was occupied. It was an imaginary line, like the equator. It was not a formation of troops separated by occasional spaces. It was a space with bodies of troops located at uncertain and distant intervals upon it. It is unnecessary to describe the exact location of the troops in the rear, which embraced all the experienced men in the army, for not one organization reached the front line, but picked up the fight in a desultory manner as the Confederates pursued Sherman and Prentiss to the rear of their camps. The flanks of the army, as a whole, could not have been better protected than they were by the waters and 'marshes of creeks. The flanks of its different sections could not have been more exposed than they were by the nature of the ground and lack of continuity. Every unoccupied space became an immediate point of danger, through which the rebel hosts poured, and flanked each separate body of Federal troops. The attack came so suddenly and unexpectedly that the gaps could not be filled from the rear. A compact, con- nected line of Confederates, followed by a second eight hun- dred yards in the rear, met a disintegrated Federal line, and the natural consequences followed. Herein is found the substance and shadow of the "surprise" at Shiloh.
Why the Fifty-fifth Illinois and the Fifty-fourth Ohio bore such a heavy burden on that occasion grows out of the facts above stated. A recital of them, therefore, becomes neces- sary, in order that this work may be historically correct and fairly just. Enough has been written to indicate the conclu- sions of the author, and assuredly enough has been quoted to justify such conclusions.
Saturday night of April 5th came, and brought with it no sense of danger. Stuart's brigade, sharing in the delusion common to all, retired to rest unmindful of the harvest of
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STUART'S REPORT.
death to be reaped on the morrow. The few hours of une- ventful sleep which followed bring us face to face with the actual details of the great battle of Shiloh. A description of the part performed therein by the Fifty-fifth Illinois may properly be introduced by the report of Colonel Stuart, its brigade commander:
HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, FIFTH DIVISION, CAMP SHILOH, April 10, 1862.
SIR:
I have the honor to submit a report of the part taken by Second Brigade of General Sherman's division in the engagement of the 6th and 7th instant:
The brigade, composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Malmborg ; the Fifty-fourth Ohio, Col. T. Kilby Smith. and the Seventy-first Ohio, Col. R. Mason, occupied the extreme left of the advance, General Prentiss' division on my right and front. In obedience to General Sherman's orders I kept a company at and in the vicinity of the Ford of Lick Creek, on the Hamburgh road, and another on and in the vicinity of the Back road (coming in on the hills opposite and southeast of the encampment), as picket guards, and on his order on Saturday, sent six companies out on the Hamburgh road, with a squadron of cavalry sent forward by General McClernand, to reconnoitre beyond Hamburgh. The disposition of my pickets was reported to and approved by General Sherman.
At 7.30 o'clock on Sunday morning I received a verbal message from General Prentiss that the enemy were in his front in force. Soon after my pickets sent in word that a force, with artillery, were advancing on the Back road. In a very short time I discovered the Pelican flag ad- vancing in the rear of General Prentiss' headquarters. I dispatched my adjutant (Loomis, of the Fifty-fourth Ohio,) to General Hurlbut, who occu- pied with his division the rear in the center, to inform him that General Prentiss' left was turned, and to ask him to advance his forces. The reply was that he would advance immediately. Within fifteen minutes General Hurlbut sent forward a battery, which took position on the road immediately by Colonel Mason's (Seventy-first) headquarters. A regi- ment (the Forty-first Illinois, as I remember,) formed in line on the right of this battery.
Observing these dispositions, and expecting that the remainder of General Hurlbut's division would be up quickly, I established my line of battle accordingly, with the right of the Seventy-first Ohio resting oppo- site the eastern extremity of the camp of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, the Fifty- fifth regiment next, on the left, and the Fifty-fourth beyond, facing the south. I had two companies of the Fifty-fifth Illinois and two companies of the Fifty-fourth Ohio detached as skirmishers on the hills opposite and
FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
across the creek or ravine where the enemy was endeavoring to plant a battery, covered by a much larger force of skirmishers.
From a convenient position on the brow of the bank north of the creek, with my glass I could observe all their movements. Having suc- ceeded in planting their battery in a commanding position they opened a fire of shell upon us, under cover of which the infantry advanced upon us diagonally from the left of Prentiss' division, and also from the right of their battery. I hastened in person to the battery I had left half an hour before in front of Colonel Mason's tent, to order them farther east, in front of my headquarters, where they would have had a splendid fire as well upon the enemy's battery as upon the advancing infantry. The battery had left without firing a gun, and the battalion on its right had disappeared.
For above a quarter of a mile to my right no soldier could be seen, unless fugitives, making their way to the rear. A large body of the enemy's troops were advancing due north toward Mason's camp, and I saw that the position of my brigade was inevitably flanked by an over- whelming and unopposed force.
Hastening back to my brigade, I found the enemy rapidly advancing on its front. The Seventy-first Ohio had fallen back, under the shelling of the enemy's guns, to some position (as I am informed by Colonel Mason) about 150 yards in the rear, and re-formed on a ridge of ground very defensible for infantry, but I could not find them, and had no intimation as to where they had gone. Before I could change position the Fifty-fifth Illinois and the Fifty-fourth Ohio were engaged, but as soon as possible I withdrew them to a position on the brow of a hill, and formed a line which, extended, would intersect my first line diagonally from northwest to southeast.
At this point I had not to exceed 800 men of the Fifty-fifth Illinois and the Fifty-fourth Ohio. I saw nothing more of the Seventy-first Regiment through the fight. The enemy's force of five regiments of infantry and a battery of four guns, which had been moving on our right flank, were here brought to a stand, and formed a line of battle. A body of cavalry sent off on our then right toward our rear, to harass or cut off our retreat. A part of the force which had attacked our first front was disposed with a view of flanking us on our present left. Against this latter force (moving through a ravine, which had its mouth just below and in the rear of our extreme left) I sent a detachment of four companies of Zouaves, Fifty-fourth Ohio, under Major Fisher, by whom they were held in check during the fight. This engagement opened, the enemy's line and ours being established at a distance of about fifteen yards apart. At this point we fought, and held them for upwards of two hours. The enemy's lines were within the edge of a grove, pretty well defended by trees; the space between us was an open, level and smooth fleld. The disposition of their forces was made delib- erately, and occupied fully fifteen minutes after we came upon the ground.
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STUART'S REPORT.
· Inadequate as I knew my force to be, I was encouraged to fight it and hold my position, first with the object of detaining the enemy's forces from advancing toward the river, and secondly because I received a message from General McArthur, who appeared in person somewhere in my vicinity, to hold my position, and that he would support me on my right.
I could not find the Seventy-first Ohio Regiment, and had less than Soo men under my command. During the action we observed a battery planted southeast of us, in a commanding position, to enfilade our line. It was, however, employed with little beyond threatening effect, the firing being too high. We had received no support on our right, as promised by General McArthur, We had emptied the cartridge-boxes of the killed and wounded, and our ammunition was exhausted. Our fire was so slackened from this cause and our losses that I was appre- hensive of a forward movement by the enemy, who could easily have overwhelmed us and thrown us into ruinous confusion. With the advice of Colonel Smith, of the Fifty-fourth Ohio, and Lieutenant-Colonel Malmborg, commanding the Fifty-fifth Illinois, I gave the order to fall back through the ravine and re-form on a hill to our right. I led the remnant of my brigade in good order to the point selected. When we reached it the enemy had advanced on our left with their battery and were on a commanding position within 600 yards. They opened a fire of shell upon us, which compelled me to move on still farther, sheltering the command as well as possible by ravines and circuitous paths, till we reached a cavalry camp, where the brigade was re-formed. On our way we were joined by a small remnant of the Seventy-first, under command of Adjutant Hart, of that regiment (some 17 or 18 men). Finding I was beyond the line of the enemy, after consultation I ordered the brigade to march to the rear, toward the landing, in preference to sending for ammunition, which I apprehended would not reach us. Within a quarter of a mile of the batteries the brigade was halted by an officer of General Grant's staff, who stated that ammunition was being sent back, and ordered that every fragment of regiments moving toward the landing should be stopped.
Suffering from a wound I had received in my shoulder before the termination of our fight, I turned the command over to Col. T. Kilby Smith, of the Fifty-fourth Ohio, the next in rank, and proceeded to the landing to learn the extent of my injury. Colonel Smith left the com- mand to Lieutenant-Colonel Malmborg temporarily, while he returned to find and unite with the brigade the left wing of his regiment, which had become detached from us in their defense of our left flank, under Major Fisher.
Meanwhile General Grant, passing, ordered Colonel Malmborg to form a line near the batteries. Major Fisher soon came in with his men and joined the line. Through Colonel Malmborg's efforts a line of over 3.000 men was formed, composed of remnants of regiments moving towards the landing. Major Andrews, of the Seventy-first, here came 6
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FIFTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.
up with a portion of the left wing of his regiment, about 150 men, whom he had led to the bank of the Tennessee, where he hailed the gun-boats, informing them of the approach of the enemy. So much of the brigade were in the last engagement near the batteries.
On Monday morning the brigade took the field, under the command of Colonel Smith. Its conduct was under the observation of the general himself. I was not able to do more than to make an effort to excite the enthusiasm of the men and lead them to the field when they were ordered forward into action. I turned the command over to Colonel Smith soon after. The experience of Sunday left me under no apprehension as to the fate of the brigade, if coolness, deliberation, and personal bravery could save it from loss or disgrace. Colonel Smith, from the beginning to the end of the engagement on Sunday, was constantly at his post, rallying, encouraging, and fighting his men under incessant fire, regard- less of personal safety.
I was under great obligations to Lieutenant-Colonel Malmborg, whose military education and experience were of every importance to me. Comprehending at a glance the purpose and object of every movement of the enemy, he was able to advise me promptly and intelligently as to the disposition of my men. He was cool, observant, discreet, and brave, and of infinite service to me. Adjt. Charles Loomis, of the Fifty-fourth, who was my only aid, discharged his duties with the utmost promptness and gallantry. He was intelligent, brave, and is a very meritorious officer.
It is my duty to make special mention of Adjutant Hart, of the Seventy-first Regiment, who, having lost his own regiment, sought a place in the ranks of the Fifty-fifth, and with 17 men of that regiment fought there bravely from first to last. Every captain in the Fifty-fifth did his duty, with one disgraceful exception, and he is under arrest. The same is true of the lieutenants, with one exception, and he also is arrested.
The following named officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates are reported to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Malmborg as meriting notice especially: « Captain Wright, Co. F, who was wounded; Captain Heffernan, Co. H; Captain Chandler, Co. D; Captain Slattery, Co. I; Second-Lieutenant E. C. Lawrence, Co. B, who was wounded; Second- Lieutenant Hodges, Co. C, killed; Second-Lieutenant J. R. Roberts, Co. D; First-Lieutenant Weldon, Co. H, badly wounded; Second-Lieutenant Aagesen, Co. H, badly wounded; First-Lieutenant Crooker, Co. I, badly wounded: Sergeant Glass. Co. A; Corporal Williamson, Co. A, wounded; Corporal Simpson, Co. A, wounded; Corporal Erickson, Co. A; Private Hebb, Co. A; Sergeant Elliot, Co. B, badly wounded; Sergeant Hunting- ton, Co. B, badly wounded; Corporal Payne, Co. B; Private Sullivan, Co. B; Private Bradford, Co. B; First-Sergeant Partch, Co. C, badly wounded; Sergeant Curtiss, Co. C; Corporal Shultz, Co. C, badly wounded; Corporal Oliver, Co. C; Private Mahan, Co. C. badly wounded; Private Kettleson, .
Co. C, badly wounded; Sergeant Smith, Co. D, badly wounded; Corporal
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STUART'S REPORT CRITICISED.
Harrell, Co. D, badly wounded; Private Burk, Co. D, badly wounded; Private Rodenbaugh, Co. D, badly wounded; Sergeant Porter, Co. E, badly wounded; Sergeant Short, Co. E; Corporal Campbell, Co. E; Corporal Merrill, Co. E; Private Arndt, Co. E; Private Boltinghouse, Co. E; Sergeant George Sanford, Co. F, wounded-dead; First-Sergeant Shreves, Co. F, wounded; Corporal Haney, Co. F, wounded; Corporal Ferguson, Co. F, wounded; Private Bone, Co. F, wounded; Private Keffer, Co. F, wounded; Corporal Davis, Co. G, wounded; Corporal Newell, Co. G, wounded; Private Hawk, Co, G, wounded; Private Mix, Co. G, wounded; Sergeant McCready, Co. H; Sergeant De Wolf, Co. H, killed; Sergeant Crouch, Co. H, killed; Corporal Richardson, Co. H, wounded; Corporal Healey, Co. H, wounded; Private Adams, Co. H; Private Beers, Co. H, wounded; Sergeant E. T. Slattery, Co. I, badly wounded; Sergeant Armstrong, Co. I, wounded; Corporal Lynn, Co. I, wounded; Corporal Lull, Co. I, wounded; Private Peters, Co. I, wounded; Private Kimberk, Co. I, wounded; Sergeant Kendrick, Co. K, wounded; Corporal Hanthorn, Co. K, wounded; Corporal Rouse, Co. K, wounded.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. STUART, Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade.
Capt. J. H. Hammond,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
The above report, as was every thing said or written by. Colonel Stuart, is brilliant and forcible. No fault can be found with its diction. Like a large share of the literature which purports to be official, belonging to that conflict, it fails to state or explain a great deal which took place. No relation could have been full and explicit without amounting to a serious arraignment of superiors. The report of Colonel Stuart does not pretend to detail minutely the movements of the Fifty-fifth, and, being a brigade report, perhaps should not do so. An official document emanating from the regi- mental commander should have attended to that. It is need- less to add that no such narrative exists. At the outset the foregoing takes the form of an argument to show due dili- gence in guard, picket and patrol duty in watching the front. This would not have been at all necessary had there not been doubts on the subject. That Colonel Stuart or any of his subordinates were derelict in this particular, and that such short-coming had any influence on the battle, has never been alleged. The first attack did not come from toward Ham- burgh, nor upon the front of the second brigade. Any recon-
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