USA > Massachusetts > Commonwealth history of Massachusetts, colony, province and state, volume 5 > Part 54
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Under the surface, while intervention seemed remote, lay a sense of community of interest with the Allies, growing stronger as the war progressed. Ties of blood and language could not be forgotten; and the old friendship and affection for France for its aid in the Revolution was remembered and revived, particularly in Massachusetts which is so rich in mem- ories of our French ally. Intelligent and liberty-loving Amer- icans came to feel more and more that our ideals and inter- ests were at one with the French and the British, who were fighting the age-old battle against tyranny and military oli- garchy; and that the safety of the world and the freedom of its people were dependent on the success of the Allies. Few felt any doubt as to the ultimate outcome, after the German failure of immediate victory; and few were idealistic enough to counsel that this country should intervene on sentimental grounds. But the seed was being sown.
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Then, during the summer and fall of 1916, the eyes of the people were turned toward a possible conflict with Mexico, along whose frontier all of the small military force of this country was for a time mobilized. In November, came the presidential election; President Wilson was reelected upon the campaign slogan, "He kept us out of war." To the American people it seemed that the issue of peace was settled.
SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH GERMANY (JANUARY-APRIL, 1917)
The sudden turn of events early in 1917 was therefore entirely unexpected by the American people. On February 1, Germany notified our government of its decision to sink with- out warning all ships, neutral or belligerent, encountered in North Atlantic waters adjacent to Europe. February 3, Presi- dent Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany. Senti- ment in the country was divided at the start, but Massachu- setts was almost unanimous in approval of the President's action. Senator Lodge, in Washington, made an eloquent speech supporting the President. The Massachusetts Legis- lature (February 9) went on record unanimously to the same effect; and the press of the State without exception denounced the German action in no uncertain terms.
At the outset it seemed as if Germany must recede; but, as the days passed, news of unrestricted sinking of neutral ships continued, and it became obvious that Germany had decided to take the risk of drawing the United States into the war, believing either that America would not fight, or that our participation would be so slow and ineffective that the war would be over before we could become an important factor.
The issue of peace or war was not completely decided for two months. Meanwhile, as a Boston paper put it, "The ad- ministration was talking about peace, thinking about war, doing nothing intelligent to promote the one and nothing ade- quate to prepare against the other." Debates and arguments succeeded each other in Washington. February 26, the steamer Laconia was sunk without warning; and the President asked for and received power to use armed forces to protect Amer- ican merchantmen. A Senate filibuster (by "six wilful men") denied him further power. Worse than that, it caused the
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failure of all of the deficiency appropriations which were de- signed to make possible the replacement of Army equipment worn out in the service on the Mexican Border.
DECLARATION OF WAR (1917)
President Wilson was reinaugurated March 4, 1917, and in his address spoke of armed neutrality "which may mean war." It was not till April 2, after a month of inactivity and mark- ing time by the administration, that Congress was reassembled and the President delivered a great message requesting a dec- laration of war. The intercepted Zimmerman note in which Germany proposed an alliance with Mexico, the detention of United States consuls in Germany, the insults to the American flag in Belgium, and the unrestricted sinking of ships, all served to fan the flame of popular resentment.
The delay of the administration, while exasperating, per- haps had the effect of unifying and crystallizing the sentiment of the whole country, and its acceptance of the necessity and justice of intervention. After a great speech by Senator Lodge and with the support of every Massachusetts Congressman, war was declared April 5, 1917; an appropriation of $3,400,- 000,000 was voted, and an army of one million men was authorized.
PREPARATIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS (FEBRUARY-MARCH, 1917)
The administration in Washington had at last spoken. What of Massachusetts? February 9, six days after the rup- ture of relations and two months before the declaration of war, Governor McCall, at the immediate suggestion of James J. Storrow and of Charles F. Weed, named a committee of one hundred citizens to be known as the Massachusetts Com- mittee on Public Safety and sent out a call for a meeting of this committee to be held February 14. In his opening ad- dress at this meeting, Governor McCall cleared the issue: "I did not appoint the committee with the idea that war was probable. I am expressing no opinion upon that point, but I think we will all agree that war is at least possible ; and as it is possible, it behooves us to do what we can to get the Com-
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monwealth of Massachusetts where it may, as it always has in time of national crises, respond very quickly to any call from the Nation." The committee was organized by the elec- tion of James J. Storrow as chairman, C. F. Weed as vice- chairman. It designated an executive committee with broad powers : Henry B. Endicott, Walton A. Green, Benjamin Joy, James J. Phelan, A. C. Ratshesky, and Adjutant-General Pear- son ex-officio. February 15, Henry B. Endicott of Dedham was elected executive chairman and manager; and thereafter and until the close of the war he rendered a service which entitles him to rank high upon the rolls of the great and patriotic citizens of this State.
The Committee on Public Safety so organized was the first established in the United States, and the example was in large measure followed in many parts of the country. The first ac- tivity of the committee was to make a general study of the whole situation. Subcommittees were promptly organized to conduct an industrial survey of the State's resources; to ad- vise with the legislature; to aid and cooperate with the mili- tary authorities in recruiting and equipping the National Guard, so that it might be ready to respond to the call when it should come; and to provide for the organization and equipment of a substitute force to take the place of the National Guard when it should have gone into Federal serv- ice. As a preliminary to its work, the Finance Committee, under the chairmanship of William A. Gaston, raised by public subscription a fund of over a hundred thousand dollars to be expended solely within the discretion of the Executive Com- mittee.
PRELIMINARY ARMING AND EQUIPPING OF STATE TROOPS
(1916-1917)
The Committee on Public Safety decided that its first duty was to assist in equipping the military organizations of the State. Prior to 1917, the military establishment of the country had been small in numbers and was run on the basis of almost parsimonious economy. During the fall of 1916, the Regular Army was increased from 125,000 to 200,000 men. Almost all of the armed forces of the United States were assembled on the Mexican border for four months in 1916. As a result,
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RECRUITING
all of the government surplus stock of military equipment had been exhausted; no uniforms or shoes or camp equipment or ordnance were available for new troops. The War Depart- ment submitted deficiency estimates to replace this equipment, but the appropriation was lost in the Senate filibuster, and President Wilson declined to exercise his power to execute contracts pending the reassembling of Congress. The surplus supplies on hand in Massachusetts had been exhausted in re- fitting the men who returned from Texas, and there was no equipment anywhere in sight for the new regiment of field artillery then forming, or for an increase of strength to raise the National Guard from peace to war footing. March 16, Adjutant-General Pearson resigned and Brigadier General E. Leroy Sweetser, the senior National Guard officer, was re- quested by Governor McCall to take over the duties of adju- tant-general.
Wallace B. Donham and Benjamin Joy were sent to Wash- ington by the Committee on Public Safety to assist the efforts being made by the State to obtain supplies from the Federal Government. The question of equipment was solved, so far as this State was concerned, by an arrangement with the War Department whereby the Federal authorities would order the necessary equipment conforming to Army standards, pro- vided the State would agree to reimburse the government. On March 19, Governor McCall asked the legislature to ap- propriate the sum of a million dollars; and a resolve passed both branches, was engrossed and signed by the governor in the record-breaking time of two hours and twenty-five min- utes, authorizing the credit of $1,000,000 as requested, $750,- 000 to be used for the purchase of equipment for the National Guard raised to war strength. The State was not called upon to pay this money, for by an act of April 5 Congress pro- vided sufficient funds; but the equipment ordered was deliv- ered, and the troops of Massachusetts were thus made ready for service.
RECRUITING AND GUARD DUTY (FEBRUARY-JUNE, 1917)
Some companies of the National Guard had been called into Federal service as early as February 20 for guard duty at
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bridges, tunnels and other important points. The Second and Ninth Infantry on March 25, and next day the Sixth Infantry were called into Federal service to do guard duty, most of which was at or near home stations. The status of the re- maining troops did not change; and the organizations recruited and trained assiduously in their armories, making ready to respond to the call to arms which was expected at any moment.
In March, 1917, the Guard showed a strength of 9,171 men. Recruiting began with a rush to add the 6,000 or more men needed to fill its regiments to full war strength, and the men necessary were speedily obtained; but the War Department refused to allow National Guard organizations to be raised to war strength until the Regular Army had recruited itself. Hence the Guard was forced to establish waiting lists in each organization of men who trained without pay and without equipment, wearing a special button, authorized by act of legislature, bearing the legend "Ready and Willing."
As soon as the War Department authorized the increase to war strength, the men already on the rolls were mustered in; and by the thirtieth of June the strength of the Massachu- setts National Guard was 502 officers and 15,749 enlisted men.
GOVERNOR MCCALL OFFERS STATE TROOPS (APRIL, 18, 1917)
So far did the equipment and enlistment of the Massachu- setts military forces progress, that on April 18 Governor Mc- Call in person went to Washington, with a military adviser, and formally and officially tendered to the Secretary of War the National Guard of the State at war strength and com- pletely equipped for immediate field service. He further of- fered to raise the additional organizations necessary to com- plete an infantry division. Secretary Baker declined the offer, saying frankly that he could not accept it without calling out the troops of other States and that he had no supplies to give them. He made the same answer when the governor requested that Massachusetts troops be mobilized and called into service, saying that in that case he would have to arm the troops of other States with broomsticks, a process which would give aid and comfort to the enemy.
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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
THE STATE GUARD (1917-1919)
When it became evident that the existing State forces were to go into Federal service, the necessity of making provision for another force to take its place was apparent. The Com- mittee on Public Safety prepared and filed in the legislature a bill providing for the organization of a force to be known as the Home Guard. The legislature enacted the law on April 5. Acting under its provisions, the governor appointed a board of which Butler Ames, a former West Pointer and an ex- Congressman, was appointed chairman. This board at once organized and began to raise the new force from men who were exempt from the draft; or who, because of age or other reason, were unable to serve in the active forces. The Guard consisted of three brigades of 11 regiments, and when the National Guard was ordered into Federal service on July 25, the Home Guard (or, as it was later called, the State Guard) was a force of 9,000 men ready to take its place.
This State Guard was equipped by the State at a cost of $357,000. It performed five days of camp duty during 1918, and units were called into active duty in several temporary emergencies. It was commanded by Butler Ames, holding the State rank of major general. This force continued in existence until the reorganization of the National Guard in 1919-1920, and was the force which was mobilized in Boston at the time of the Boston police strike in September, 1919.
ACTIVITIES OF COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY (1917)
The Committee on Public Safety was active in every direc- tion where information, coordination of effort, or active assis- tance were necessary better to prepare the State. John H. Stevens, George H. Lyman, and J. Frank O'Hare were added to the Executive Committee This committee established ef- fective 'machinery for coordinating the work of the various charitable and aid societies, so as to prevent waste and dupli- cation of effort. It organized the press and supervised pub- licity. A special committee was formed to investigate and counteract German propaganda.
An example of its efficiency was the organization of the New England Sawmill Unit. The British reported a pressing need
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for timber for military purposes, while no adequately organ- ized lumbering units existed to cut the timber which was available in England and Scotland. On April 16, a suggestion was received from England that it would welcome our help in this respect; and William A. Gaston, James J. Storrow, and James J. Phelan, acting for the committee, raised within a month $130,000, procured 350 men, and purchased 10 porta- ble sawmills. The whole organization set sail, June 15, 1917, constructed and operated a modern lumbering plant in Scot- land, and astonished the British by their efficiency and their record of output. The sawmill units were a free gift from the people of New England to the British government. Lord Lovat, in charge of British lumber interests, said : "It was the best sporting event which has come to my attention during the war."
THE COMMONWEALTH DEFENSE ACT (1917)
The legislative department of the committee, under the chairmanship of W. Rodman Peabody, after study of legal and legislative precedents produced a piece of legislation, the Commonwealth Defense Act (May 25, 1917), which is with- out precedent in the history of the State and was the first law of its kind enacted by any State in the Union. This act placed almost supreme military powers, for the duration of the war, in the hands of the governor. It gave him the right of seizure of property and broad powers over the production, use and distribution of food. It authorized courts to refuse bail in cases menacing the public safety, authorized the suspension of certain laws relating to labor and to the appointment of civil officers, and in other respects greatly extended the power of the executive civil officers. Drastic as it was and contrary to the precedents of State constitutional legislation, the law was accepted by all sane and patriotic people as a necessary war emergency measure. The Federal legal authorities endorsed it, form and substance, and recommended it to other States as an excellent example of legislation, a recommendation that was widely followed. As soon as it went into effect, the governor delegated much of his authority to the Committee on Public Safety. Thus during the first three months of a status of war, Massa-
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FEDERAL PREPARATIONS
chusetts did its utmost to prepare itself for the great task ahead. Its machinery was set up, its men were ready and waiting; and Massachusetts, true to the traditions of other wars, was again in the vanguard of the nation.
FEDERAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR (APRIL-JULY 1917)
But the war was not a war of the States or of any one of them. If Massachusetts alone had been fighting it, her troops might have been in France and in the battle line many months before they were dispatched. Upon the Federal government devolved the responsibility of carrying out the great under- taking. After the President signed the declaration of war (April 6), the various Federal agencies began to move; but at the start it was hard to tell in what direction. The na- tion was facing the greatest problem of organization in its history, and found no precedents to guide it.
The Council of National Defense, consisting of six Cabinet officers and certain advisory members from industry, finance and labor, had been constituted in 1916, and at once entered into action. The council organized the Munitions Board for the manufacture and purchase of military supplies; and later the War Industries Board, which oversaw the whole industrial situation. The Federal Shipping Board began to plan for the construction of a vast flotilla of cargo ships, its activities being somewhat delayed by lengthy arguments as to the re- spective merits of ships of wood, of concrete, or of steel.
The administration and operation of the railroads of the country were taken over by the government. The Federal Reserve Board was given large financial powers. Many Massa- chusetts manufacturers, engineers and professional men were called to service with one or other of these boards, and gave devotedly of their time and skill to building up the vast ma- chine, which functioned efficiently as the months progressed.
The Navy, with problems of personnel and supply much simpler than those of the Army, mobilized immediately. Admiral Sims with his staff sailed for England, followed by the American destroyer squadrons. The Naval Reserve was at once called to duty. In Massachusetts orders came to the Naval Militia, a part of the organized volunteer militia of the State, on the evening of April 6. Next day, at 11 A. M.
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the Naval Brigade marched into the Charlestown Navy Yard. Its whole force, consisting of 85 officers and 912 men, was immediately enrolled in the U. S. Navy and assigned at once to the battleships Kearsarge and Nebraska, serving with credit during the war.
The first local act of war was the confiscation of interned enemy ships. On the morning of April 6, the six German ships which had been lying in Boston harbor since 1914 were seized-three of them, the Kronprinzessin Cecilie, the Amerika, and the Cincinnati, being of large tonnage. After the damages inflicted by the German crews had been repaired, these ships, renamed the Mt. Vernon, America and Coving- ton, were put into transport service and carried thousands of our troops to France in 1918.
RAISING THE AMERICAN ARMY (1917-1918)
When war was declared, although authorization was granted for the raising of an army of one million men, it is doubtful whether the administration in Washington contem- plated sending a great army of combat troops to France. Shortly after the declaration, an allied mission headed by Viviani, Prime Minister of France, and Balfour, representa- tive of the British Ministry, came to this country and laid be- fore the administration the exact situation of the Allies. The collapse of Russia was already becoming a probability; the Italians had not been successful; the man power of the French and of the British had been greatly depleted; and the courage and resistance of the peoples, especially the French, were falling very low. Without a strong and speedy rein- forcement of combatant troops, the issue of the war was at least doubtful and the allied success in jeopardy. Marshal Joffre, who came with the mission, on April 30 urged the President to "send an army now." It has been considered probable by eminent authorities that had we been able to put an army of 500,000 men in the field immediately, the war would have ended in 1917; but equipment, supplies, system and plans were absolutely lacking.
The War Department in the early stages was in a con- dition of confusion and indecision. At first the administration was left to the officers of the Regular Army, men without
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business experience and often without business ability. Ber- nard M. Baruch, the chairman of the War Industries Board, describes the situation: "We had seven buying bureaus in the War Department alone. These, embarking overnight on a vast purchasing program, were competing all over the country with each other, with the Navy, Shipping Board, Allies, Red Cross, and a host of other agencies. Prices soared, scarcities developed everywhere, confusion, irritation, congestion and amazing inefficiency marked the situation at every aspect." Finally the business side of the War Depart- ment was taken over by the Council of National Defense and its subcommittees.
OFFICERS' TRAINING SCHOOLS (1917-1918)
It was foreseen that the million men authorized by Con- gress was only a part of the force that the United States would need if it were to be an effective factor on the battle- field. Trained officers to instruct the vast army of men com- ing from civil life without previous military knowledge were essential. There were not a third enough officers for even the army of a million. Hence after great delay training camps for officers were established at many points in the country, and a selected group of applicants were given a strenuous three months of training, being commissioned ac- cording to their merits from the grade of major down, but mostly as first and second lieutenants. A camp was located in Plattsburg, New York, and a quota of 2,500 men was fixed for New England, more than half of whom were Massa- chusetts men, college graduates and undergraduates, enlisted men from the National Guard, and others of special qualifi- cation. Many Massachusetts men who were outside the quota were sent to other training camps in various parts of the country. These camps opened on May 15. Harvard University and other institutions offered the use of their buildings and grounds for the accommodation of training schools.
ENACTMENT OF THE DRAFT (1917-1918)
Although an army of a million men was authorized by Congress, the total enrollment in Regular Army and National
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Guard by May 1st was less than 400,000 men. Recruiting for the Army was not easy, and few States had increased their State troops to war strength. It was obvious that to accomplish the vast augmentation of military forces which the situation made necessary there must be found some better and quicker method of increase beyond the voluntary offer- ing of individual men.
The national government therefore decided to put into force the principle of universal service and to draft the man power of the nation. The liability of all male citizens to military service is a basic principle of Massachusetts and of the na- tion; but previous attempts at its application were not en- couraging as precedents. The annual muster of all men be- tween the ages of seventeen and forty-five, the so-called militia, had died out more than a hundred years before. A system of mild universal service in peace, although often urged by advocates of military preparedness, did not meet with approval by the people. The draft had been tried with very unsatisfactory results in the Civil War. Nevertheless, the crisis of 1917 demanded sacrifices and services from the whole country.
Hence a bill was presented to Congress and was enacted on May 18, 1917, adopting the principle of universal service and setting up the machinery for enrollment. Under this bill the President fixed June 5, 18 days after the bill had become law, for the registration of all men in the nation be- tween the ages of twenty-one and thirty. In that short period a great administrative machine of extraordinary efficiency was created, under rules prescribed from Washington but ad- ministered by the local authorities in each State and county of the nation. In Massachusetts, the governor and all the local executives in counties, cities and towns gave their en- tire cooperation; and on the day appointed between dawn and dark 362,825 citizens of the Commonwealth registered, in accordance with the law and the President's proclamation.
THE DRAFT SYSTEM (1917-1918)
Thereafter local draft boards were constituted to work out and make operative the principle of selective service, and to pass upon the claims for exemption and on the physical fitness
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