USA > New Jersey > Monmouth County > History of Monmouth county, New Jersey > Part 31
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2 Washington wrote to the American Congress as follows : " HEADQUARTERS, NEAR CORYEL'S, " June 22. 1778.
" SIR,-I have the honour to inform you that I am now in Jersey, and that the troops are passing the river at Cor- yel's, and are mostly over. As soon as we have cleaned the arms and can get matters in train, we propose moving towards Princeton, in order to avail ourselves of any fav- orable occasions that may present themselves of attacking or annoying the enemy.
" I have the honour to be, ete ..
".G. W."
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MONMOUTH COUNTY IN THE REVOLUTION.
Tavern. half-past four, June 26th," he (Lafay- character."2 When it was found by General Lee that the army was really and vigorously pressing the British, he had made an appeal to ette) -aid: " I have consulted the general officers of the detachment, and the general opinion seems to be that I should march in the night | Lafayette, in which he said: " It is my fortune near them. so as to attack the rear-guard on the and my honor that I place in your hands ; you are too generons to cause the loss of either."$ And the result proved that he had not miseal- culated the generosity of the gallant French- man. march. Your excellency knows that by the direct road you are only three miles farther from Monmouth than we are in this place. Some prisoners have been made, and deserters come in amazing fast. . . . I believe a happy On the evening of June 26th the main body of the American army advanced from Kingston, leaving their baggage behind, to enable them to -upport the advanced corps with promptness. Early in the morning of the 27th they reached Cranbury, where they were delayed several hours by a heavy rain and the oppressive heat which succeeded. Later in the day they ad- vanced to a point within three miles of English- town, and five miles from the British army ; and there Washington made his headquarters for the night. blow would have the happiest effect." At five o'clock in the same day he dispatched : " Gen- eral Forman is firmly of the opinion that we may overtake the enemy. It is highly pleas- ant to be followed and countenanced by the army; that if we stop the enemy, and meet with some advantage, they may push it with vigor. I have no doubt but if we overtake them, we posse -- a very happy chance." Again, he di- patched from " Ice Town,1 26th June, 1778, at a quarter after seven," and, having made refer- ence to a previously-expressed purpose to go to that place for provisions, he said: " When I got there, I was sorry to hear that Mr. Hamilton, who had been riding all the night, had not been able to find anybody who could give him cer- tain intelligence ; but, by a party who came back. I hear the enemy are in motion, and their rear about one mile off the place they had oceu- pied last night, which is seven or eight miles from here. I immediately put Generals Max- well's and Wayne's brigade- in motion, and I will fall lower down with General Scott's and Jack-on's regiment, and some militia. 1 should be very happy if we could attack them before they halt. . . . If I cannot overtake them, we! could lay at some distance, and attack them to- morrow morning. . . . If we are at a convenient distance from you, I have nothing to fear in striking a blow, if opportunity is offered." The British left was now threatened by General Dickinson's force of nearly eight hundred men, while Morgan, with his light infantry, was on the right flank. During the battle which en- " If you behere it, or if it is beliered necessary or useful to the good of the service and the honor of General Lee to send him down with a couple of thousand men, or any greater force, I will cheerfully obey and serre him, not only out of 2 This was not italicized in the original dispatch. duty, but out of what I owe that gentleman's
During the day (the 27th) the advance corps had been strengthened by two additional brig- ades (as suggested by Lafayette), and General Lee assumed command .- his whole force then numbering abont five thousand men. The of- ficial reports of General Washington show that Lee positively declined the command of this advance corps, until its large increase made it certain that it was to hold the position of honor, and to be pushed on the enemy. Lafayette was first assigned to the command after a heated discussion, in council of war, as to the propriety of attacking Clinton's army at all : and General Lee, when that assignment was made with his concurrence, said that he was "well pleased to be freed from all responsibility for a plan which he was sure would fail,"-a statement which later events made important.
1 The place which Lafayette calls Ice Town was prob- ably Hightstown, he mistaking the sound of the name.
3 Lafayette says in his memoirs : " This tone succeeded better,"-referring to Lee's change of opinion and claim to the command of the advanced corps. The letter of June 26th, above quoted from, shows how Lafayette responded In the appeal.
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HISTORY OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY.
sued, Morgan lay with his corps of riflemen three miles south of Monmouth Court-House, at Richmond's Mills,1 awaiting orders, only kept from participation in the engagement by failure to receive the instructions which he promptly sent for as soon as he heard the roar of the opening conflict.
nerve and energy. The supply of provisions was scanty, but the army was eager in the pur- suit. It felt the onward spur when the force which had so long kept it on the defensive crossed the Delaware in full retreat from the theatre of the conflicts of the fall of 1777. Washington neither underrated nor despised his enemy, but giving credit for courage and wisdom equal to his own, measured the forces that were struck back as best he could.
The division commanded by Major-General Charles Lee in the battle of the 28th of June was composed (according to the statement of to meet in conflict, and, as usual, struck or
General Wayue) of the following-named troops, besides the flanking detachments of Dickinson The military issue between Clinton and Wash- ington was in some respects unequal. Clinton must get to New York. Ile had nothing to hope from a battle, more than to gain a clear path to Sandy Hook. His heavy baggage-train restricted his operations to the repulse of an at- tack, and rendered any protracted pursuit, even of broken columns, a fruitless strain upon his command. But for Washington to have shrunk been prompt to meet on reasonable terms, would have accredited the British forces with that in- vincibility which Lee affirmed of it, woukl have sacrificed the impetus which the offensive have made every subsequent issue of the war more hopeless or uncertain. It would have canceled the memory of Trenton and Princeton. It would have stultitied the movement which made Germantown a pledge that the American and Morgan : " In front, Colonel Butler with two hundred men ; Colonel Jackson, with an equal number ; Scott's own brigade, with a part of Woodford's, six hundred, with two pieces of artillery ; General Varnum appeared about the same number, with two pieces of artillery ; my own detachment was about one thousand, with two pieces of artillery ; General Scott's detachment, fourteen hundred, with two pieces | back from that retreating army, which he had of artillery ; General Maxwell's was one thou-, sand and two pieces of artillery; in all, five thousand, with twelve pieces of artillery, exclu- sive of the militia." General Lee claimed that this was a loose statement, and that his force i position imparted to his command, and would did not exceed four thousand one hundred men ; but the force which Grayson took to the front was nearly eight hundred men, and although temporarily detached from Scott's and Varnum's brigades, it should enter the aggre-
gate, and be counted as if not detached. The i commander-in-chief was ready at all times to entire force which Lee had at his disposal on ; seize opportunity and to do real fighting.
the evening of the 27th and morning of the 28th considerably exceeded five thousand men,
The situation of the British army-occupying including the corps of Dickinson and Morgan, ; the village and vicinity of Monmouth ' Court- though he took no steps to communicate with | House during the two days and nights preceding these two leaders until after aroused to action by Washington's stern censure. General Lafay- ette accompanied Lee with his consent as a vol- unteer. the memorable Sabbath when the opposing hosts joined in battle-has already been noticed. It held a strong position, with its "right extending about a mile and a half beyond the Monmouth The total numerical strength of the American Court-House, in the parting of the roads leading army was more than equal to that of the Brit- ish, and although fresh from the squalid can- tomments of Valley Forge, it was not wanting in to Shrewsbury and Middletown, and its left along the road from Allentown to Monmouth, about three miles west of the court-house." This position, well protected on the right and I Now ealled Shumar's Mills, the pond or reservoir of which has been named Morgan Lake, in honor of the bold leader who unwillingly kept bis station there during the battle of Monmouth. left, and partially in front, by low grounds and woods, was regarded by Washington as "too strong to be assailed with any pro-pect of sue-
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MONMOUTH COUNTY IN THE REVOLUTION.
cess." The general direction of the British line who were present, and who afterwards testified before the court-martial which was convened for the trial of General Lee. The official ro- ports of Washington, Clinton and other general officers who took part in the engagement are su ambiguous and imperfect as to localities that some explanation is necessary for a clear under- standing of the narrative. The distinctions of the changing positions of the troops, especially as the right and left of Clinton's line were to- versed when he assumed the offensive, and the statement of American officers that "Morgan was on the left " did not become true until they commenced their retreat. Thus, though Diel :- inson threatened the British left on the morning of the battle, his demonstration was npon their right when, later in the forenoon, they changed front to assume the offensive. while thus encamped, and when it> march began on the following morning, was northeasterly, exposing its left and centre to an attack from the American troops, whose offensive advance was from a northwesterly direction. It there- fore became important for General Clinton to change his position and gain the Middletown road to the sea as quickly as possible, especially . "right " and " left" are greatly confused through as a march of only ten or twelve miles would place him upon strong defensive ground, beyond danger of successful pursuit. Lieutenant-Gen- eral Knyphansen was under orders to move at daylight on the following morning. The single road which was available for the proposed march passed almost immediately into a series of bluffs, where a baggage-train would be greatly exposed to attack from skirmishing parties, and General Clinton undertook the protection of its rear by his own division of selected troops.
The main body of the American army was! about three miles beyond Englishtown and less, gible in the narrative, and need an explana- than seven miles from the camps of the British | tion, which is here given, having especial refer- centre. The advance division, under command ence to the account of the battle, which follows farther on. Three ravines or morasses, as they of General Lee, was about two and a half miles west-northwest from Monmouth Court-House, were indiscriminately termed, were mentioned the headquarters of that general being on a hill i by American officers in their accounts of the near Wemrock Creek. The detachments under | battle. Only two of these are mentioned by Morgan and Dickinson respectively were already ( Sir Henry Clinton in his report a- intervening on the alert, ready to attack the British Hanks between his advance from the Middletown road when that army should break camp and move and the main army of the Americans. The out on the road towards Middletown.
No general engagement in the Revolutionary War has been so vaguely and unintelligibly described, as to localities and the movements of the opposing forces, as the battle of Monmonth.1 The country had not been reconnoitred, and very blind statements were made, even by officers
1 This, as well as much that precedes and follows rela- tive to the situation and movements preliminary to the Monmonth battle,-including the events of the forenoon of June 28th, and down to the time when Lee's retreating forces joined the main army, near the obl Tennent parson- age,-is largely from Carrington's " Battles of the Amer- ican Revolution." The narrative of the general engage- ment which followed in the afternoon of that bloody day, is taken from Marshall, Custis, Lossing, Thatcher and other standard accounts, and also to a great extent from the reports of Washington and his subordinate officers, and from other official documents having reference to the battle.
The terms "ravine" and " morass" are extremely confusing and almost unintelli-
ravine or morass behind which Washington formed the divisjons of Greene and Stirling, to cover the retreat of Lee's brigades, is about a half mile southeasterly from the old Tennent Meeting-house and about two and a half miles from Englishtown. The skirmish which oc- curred early in the morning, and which led General Dickinson to believe that the British army had not left Monmonth, but was advane- ing in force towards the hill, took place on the high ground just east of this " west ravine" or morass. It was simply a demonstration by the enemy's light troops to beat back the militia and conceal the withdrawal of the main army of Clinton. On this same high ground were located the hedge fenee, the orchard and the parsonage, near which the principal engagement was fought.
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HISTORY OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY.
A second ravine or morass, called the middle distributed beyond this narrow belt as far north as Briar Hill, to the Middletown road, on the edge of which Colonel Grayson halted his command, nearly parallel with the road on which the British column was marching. The summit between the Amboy road and the mid- dle ravine was mostly in woods, with open ground near and just northwest of the court- house, where Butler drove back the Queen's Rangers. To the left of the British line, after it faced west to return the offensive, was an- other piece of woods out of which the dragoons advanced, and from which a strong column emerged for an advance towards the court- house to turn the American right and ent off Grayson, Scott, Jack-on, Maxwell and Oswald, when they retired behind the eastern ravine and reached the summit. Until within six or seven years-if not until the present time -- the middle ravine remained covered with tangled under-brush and briars, as was mentioned by ravine, crossed the road nearly a mile farther east, and on the high ground on the east side of this ravine the British troops remained a few hours after the battle. Thi- high ground extended still farther castward, blending with the so-called " heights of Monmonth " (just west and southwest of the village of Freehold), and then dipping towards the low plain, about a mile wide and three miles long, ju-t east of the Amboy road, running from the court- house nearly north. This plain or valley, where Clinton first formed his line of attack, was al-o marshy, near a little pond and along a small rivulet,1 the latter extending from near the court-house, northeasterly, past Briar Hill, the low ground bordering it being the eastern ravine or morass, which was crossed and re- crossed by Wayne, Varnum, Jackson, Scott, Grayson, and Oswald's artillery, and behind which they retired when the British line ad- vaneed in force. Just west of the Amboy road, officers who passed through it during the bat- and nearly parallel with it, " so as to cover both tle. The present road to Englishtown runs roads," is the high, wooded ground where Lee proposed to re-form his line, and from which, in fact, the divisions had advanced into the plain without definite orders or due regard to their mutual dependence and relations.
At the head of the Manasquan, near . Mon- mouth Court-House, there was formerly marshy ground, where the small tributaries of the stream gathered their waters, and on the north side of Monmouth village Geblard's Branch was bordered by marshy ground. The small stream, or drainage, west of Briar Hill, and sometimes called Briar Creek, had across it and the marshy ground bordering it, at the time of There was difficulty in obtaining guides,2 and repeated halts ensued on that account. the battle, a bridge and causeway. A small fork of the Manalapan Brook flowed north- , General Maxwell said he advanced along a easterly from the AAllentown road, and along its morass from the meeting-house, but crossed the side- was the swampy ground which protected the British camp on the night preceding the battle.
The low plain below the slope from the court- house and the Amboy road was quite open for at least a quarter of a mile, with woods well
considerably north of the ancient road, and there are now no traces of two old paths, which were particularly mentioned by witnesses on the Lee trial. The fact that all the com- manders made reference to the " west ravine," or or morass, indicates clearly that the bridge over it was a common crossing ; and although one division marched to the left from the old meeting-house, while other troop- took the sharp turn to the right at the fork>, the two divisions took two I routes for the double purpose of extending their front to prevent flank attacks in a general ad- vance, and also to gain room for the movement.
hill finally occupied by General Stirling. The small creek emptying into a pond fills the con- ditions of his statement. He was informed that there was a second road to the north, lead- ing to Englishtown by Craig's Mill, and fears were expressed that the British would seek to
1 The same which erosses the road a few rods north- wardlly from the gas-works of the village of Freehold.
2 David Forman (father of Dr. Samuel Forman, of Free- hold) and Peter Wikoff acted as guides to the eom- mander-in-chief in his operations in Monmouth County.
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MONMOUTH COUNTY IN THE REVOLUTION.
gain the American rear by means of that road, but they did not attempt it, and the entire re- treat was finally made over the causeways at the middle and west morasse -.
General Dickinson, with his force of about eight hundred men, held a position on the right and two and a half miles in advance of English- town. He was posted there to watch the Brit- ich closely and instantly report the forward movement of their force. Di-covering indica- tions that they were about to move forward, he sent a messenger to communicate the intelligence to Washington and Lee. This was done at a little before five o'clock in the morning. About two and a half hours later, Dickinson encoun- tered a small flanking-party of the enemy, and became engaged in a sharp skirmish with them, erroneously supposing that the British had turned back after setting out on the march, and that the force with which he was skirmishing was their advance-guard. This was the first skirmish of the day. It took place on a rise of ground a little east of the west ravine, or morass, behind which, in the afternoon of that memorable day, Washington formed the two divisions of Groene and Stirling to check the British advance.
At about three o'clock in the morning, Colo- nel Grayson had received orders "to put Scott's and Varnum's brigades in readiness to march, and to give notice when they are ready." He moved with his command to Englishtown, and there, having reported to General Lee, " was ordered to advance and halt three miles from the enemy, and send repeated intelligence of their movements." He marched as directed,
and, " at a distance of two and a half miles from Englishtown, was ordered to march slow ; shortly afterwards, to advance." Under the-e orders he moved rapidly to the causeway over the west ravine. As he approached he saw fir-
The great conflict of the 28th of June, 1778, ing, and a party of militia retreating from the wa- preceded, or, more properly, opened, in the enemy. The militia referred to were the forces of General Dickinson, who was retir- morning of that day, by a series of skirmishe- which took place at several points at the west, " ing before what he supposed to be the advance- northwest and northeast of the village of Freehold : one of them at least being in full view of the old court-house of Monmouth, and not more than four hundred yard- from it,-the location, as nearly as can now be determined, being on and immediately around the spot, which has, on that account, been selected as the site of the monument commemorating the battle.
guard of the British main body. Colonel Gray- son crossed the causeway and bridge with one of his regiments and one piece of Oswald's artil- lery, and on ascending the hill beyond, the Brit- ish skirmishing party at once retreated. Gen- eral Lov arrived on the ground soon after, and was told by Dickinson that the British were returning from the court-house. Concerning this, there was much difference of opinion among the officer- present, as no reconnoissance in force had been made to ascertain the truth, but General Lee remained firm in his opinion (which proved to be correct) that the British army was on its way towards Middletown, and that it was merely a light covering party that had skirmished with Dickinson and caused him to fall back.
To this point, the high ground east of the west ravine. where the first skirmish of the day had been opened by General Dickinson, the other troops of Lee's command came up successively and were halted. Soon afterwards Lee sent Colonels Butler and Jackson forward, each with two hundred men, and then followed in por-on, to reconnoitre the British position. As soon as General Lafayette arrived at the west ravine the troops crossed, and soon after nine o'clock the whole division advanced towards the court-house, it having then been definitely ascertained that the British left wing had left the Altentown road and was on the march towards Middletown, and so the oppor- tunity for striking it on the left flank while it was so greatly extended had been lost.
The second fight of the day (amounting only to a slight skirmish) was made by Colonel But- ler against a detachment of the Queen's Ran- gers, who were found a short distance northwest of the court-house, on the ground which now forms the Monument Park. Butler, under or-
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HISTORY OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY.
ders from General Anthony Wayne, attacked them and drove them past the court-house through the little village that then clustered about it. General Lafayette also, with some of the light horsemen of Maxwell's brigade, passed beyond the court-house to the cast to reconnoi tre, and found that the rear-guard of the Brit- ish army was then "a mile in advance." 1s soon as the Queen's Rangers had been driven through the village, Wayne sent Colonel But- ler across the east ravine, or morass (northerly from the present gas-works of Freehold), where he placed his detachment, with two artillery pieces, on a small eminence in the plain, the other brigades of Lee's command coming up. following the general lead of those in advance, until they formed an irregular line, extending | detachment and Colonel Jackson's detachment, to Briar Hill.
The movement of the troops of General Lee's command up to this time, including the skirmish at the court-honse, were thus detailed by General Wayne: Early in the morning he " received orders to prepare and march [from Englishtown ]. Having marched about a mile with a detachment there was a halt made in front. Half an hour after received a message by one of General Lee's aids to leave my de- tachment and come to the front and take com- mand of the troops in front ; that it was a po-t of honor. When I arrived there I found about six hundred rank and file, with two pieces of artillery, from Scott's and Woodford's brigades, and General Varuum's brigade drawn up, Scott's advanced up a morass, the other in the rear of it.
" Upon notice that the enemy were advane- ing from the court-house,1 General Lee directed that the troops be formed so as to cover two roads that were in the woods, where the troops had advanced and formed. Colonel Butler, with his detachment, and Colonel Jackson, with his detachment, were ordered to the front. Colonel Butler formed the advance-guard and marched on. The troops took up again the advanced a piece [meaning a short distance] in line of march and followed him. When we'
arrived near the edge of some open ground in view of the court-house we observed a body of the enemy's horse drawn up on the northwest side, between us and the court-house. General Lee ordered the troops to halt, and by wheeling them to the right they were reduced to a proper front to the enemy's horse, though then under cover of the woods. General Lee and myself were advancing to reconoitre the enemy. In advancing a piece forward, General Lee re- ceived some message which stopped him. I went on to a place where I had a fair prospect, from my glass, of the enemy. Their horse seemed so much advanced from the foot that I could hardly perceive the movement of the foot, which induced me to send for Colonel Butler's in order to drive their horse back. I then de tached part of Butler's people, who drove the horse into the village." This affair was the second skirmish of the day (as before men- tioned), in which Butler attacked the Queen's Rangers and drove them beyond the court- house to the cast, Lafayette following imme- diately after with some of Maxwell's light horse.
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