History of Monmouth county, New Jersey, Part 32

Author: Ellis, Franklin, 1828-1885; Swan, Norma Lippincott. [from old catalog]
Publication date: 1885
Publisher: Philadelphia, R. T. Peck & co.
Number of Pages: 1148


USA > New Jersey > Monmouth County > History of Monmouth county, New Jersey > Part 32


Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).


Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53 | Part 54 | Part 55 | Part 56 | Part 57 | Part 58 | Part 59 | Part 60 | Part 61 | Part 62 | Part 63 | Part 64 | Part 65 | Part 66 | Part 67 | Part 68 | Part 69 | Part 70 | Part 71 | Part 72 | Part 73 | Part 74 | Part 75 | Part 76 | Part 77 | Part 78 | Part 79 | Part 80 | Part 81 | Part 82 | Part 83 | Part 84 | Part 85 | Part 86 | Part 87 | Part 88 | Part 89 | Part 90 | Part 91 | Part 92 | Part 93 | Part 94 | Part 95 | Part 96 | Part 97 | Part 98 | Part 99 | Part 100 | Part 101 | Part 102 | Part 103 | Part 104 | Part 105 | Part 106 | Part 107 | Part 108 | Part 109 | Part 110 | Part 111 | Part 112 | Part 113 | Part 114 | Part 115 | Part 116 | Part 117 | Part 118 | Part 119 | Part 120 | Part 121 | Part 122 | Part 123 | Part 124 | Part 125 | Part 126 | Part 127 | Part 128 | Part 129 | Part 130 | Part 131 | Part 132 | Part 133 | Part 134 | Part 135 | Part 136 | Part 137 | Part 138 | Part 139 | Part 140 | Part 141 | Part 142 | Part 143 | Part 144 | Part 145 | Part 146 | Part 147 | Part 148


" I could perceive," continued Wayne, " that the enemy were moving from us in very great disorder and confusion. In about ten or fifteen minutes the enemy made a halt and appeared to be forming in some order. This intelligence I sent by one of my volunteer aids to General Lee, and requested that the troops might be pushed on. It was General Lee's orders that I should advance with Colonel Butler's detach- ment and Colonel Jackson's detachment. Upon advancing, the enemy took up their line of march and began to move on. I crossed the morass about three-quarters of a mile cast [northeast] of the court-house, near to the edge of a road leading to Middletown, near the road where the enemy were marching upon. The whole of the enemy then in view halted. I front of the troops, upon a little eminence, to have a view of their position and of their movements. Our troops were advancing and had arrived at the edge of a morass, rather east of the court-house." The morass here men-


1 The notice sent by Dickinson when he encountered the British flanking-party between seven and eight o'clock, and supposed them to be the advance of the British army.


173


MONMOUTH COUNTY IN THE REVOLUTION.


tioned is the low ground along the little stream that runs northeastwardly from near the gas- works. Wayne's account thus far includes most of the movements of the morning to the


that I must stay until the last, and fall in the rear. I ordered my brigade to the ground I understood I was to march by, and found my- self to be before General Wayne and General time when, as before mentioned, the troops of Scott, and halted my brigade to fall in the rear. Lee's command had ranged themselves in an


. . . Came back to my former position ; waited irregular line reaching beyond the eastern mo- a considerable time before General Wayne and ra-s to the vicinity of Briar Hill, where Col- General Scott got past me ; then I marched in onel Butler, hokling an advanced position, was the rear. There were three pretty large halts before I got up within a mile of the Court- House. The Marquis de Lafayette informed me that it was General Lee's wish that we should keep to the woods as much as possible ; that as I had a small party of militia horse, he desired I should keep these horse1 pretty well out upon my right. It was thereabout that I heard some firing of cannon and small-arms." This firing was that of the British horsemen's charge on Butler and a few shots from the enemy's artillery. "We had not advanced above two hundred yards," said General Wayne, -referring to the movement of his troops just at that time when Butler repelled the charge,- of artillery upon us. They inclined first to suddenly and briskly attacked by the British light horse, whom he successfully repulsed. "The enemy," said Wayne, "then advanced their horse, -about three hundred,-and about two hundred foot to cover them. The horse then made a full charge on Colonel Butler's de- tachment, and seemed determined upon gaining their right flank, in order to throw themselves in between us and our main body, which had halted at the morass. He broke their horse by a well-directed fire, which ran the horse among their foot, broke them and carried them off likewise." This, the third skirmish of the day, occurred at about half-past ten o'clock in the forenoon (as stated by Captain Stewart, of the : " before they began to open three or four pieces artillery, in the subsequent trial of Lee), and while the troops were moving from the woods our right, in order to gain a piece of high near the Amboy road to the plain beyond the ground to the right of where I lay, nearly in east ravine, under the general direction of front of the court-house." I sent off Major General Wayne.


Biles to desire our troops that were in view, and in front of the morass, to advance. Our artillery [Oswald's] began to answer theirs from about a half a mile in the rear of Butler's de- tachment. . . . Wayne's messenger carried orders from the general to Colonel Grayson, to hold his ground, as the enemy was retiring- which Wayne at that time fully believed to be the case. On receipt of that order, Grayson


At the time when Butler repulsed the charge of the British horsemen near the Middletown road, a mile northeast of the court-house, as above described, Colonel Grayson was in ad- vance, with an orchard at his left ; Jackson about a hundred yards in his rear ; then Scott, somewhat detached from the other commands ; and Maxwell's force on the edge of the eastern morass. The last-named officer gave the follow- | " hallooed to Jackson to come and form upon ing account of the movements of his brigade the hill [Briar Hill] upon his left," but Jackson disregarded the request, because he had no and right of Jackson. Maxwell, who was then during the morning, from the time when he marched from his camp of the previous night, artillery. Scott was then a little to the rear at Englishtown, until he reached the position above named, which was near the northeast end of the present town of Freehold.


"Received orders after five o'clock (A.M.) to put my brigade in readiness to march imme- diately. Ordered the brigade to be ready to march ; went and waited on General Lee. Ile seemed surprised I was not marched, and [said ?]


1 This party of horsemen marched under Lafayette through the village of Monmouth Court-House and to the open lands east of it, as before mentioned.


2 From this description by " Mad Anthony " it appears most likely that he was at that time occupying the ground where the Freehold and New York Railroad station and freight houses now stand.


174


HISTORY OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY.


farther to the rear, expected Scott to move to the right, join on Wayne's troops, and let him [Maxwell] into the line. Wayne meanwhile held the regiments of Wesson, Stewart and Liv- ingston to the left of Varnum, to cover Butler, with whom he advanced still further into the open ground, and also to cover Oswald's artil lery, which had drawn two additional guns from Varnum's brigade, and was exchanging shots with the enemy's artillery.


Until this time Sir Henry Clinton had ex- peeted to be able to take off his trains in safety, and pursue his retreat to Middletown Heights without being compelled to risk a general en- gagement. But now that Lee's entire force was crowding close upon his rear and flank, at a time when Knyphausen's column was en- tering upon part of the route which was exceed- ingly perilous for the safety of the miles of wagon-trains which that column was guarding, and which he (Clinton) believed the movement of the American force to be especially directed against, he promptly resolved to turn and give battle ; and the course thus quickly adopted was as promptly acted upon. His artillery pieces were placed in position and opened fire on the Americans, and by half-past eleven o'clock his rear division-the elite of the British army-had been halted in its retreat to Middle- town, and formed with an oblique front to the rear, in a fine facing towards the west, and ex- tending from Briar Hill, on its right, nearly to a little ravine-then much deeper and more clearly defined than now -- which crossed the main street of the village below the site of the old Academy building. This line was strength- ened and supported by the rest of Clinton's own division and by as many of Knyphausen's troops as coukl be spared from guarding the trains. The troops ordered back from Knyp- hausen's own division were the Seventeenth Light Dragoons.


Although General Lee, when afterwards placed on trial by court-martial, said that he in- tended to fight Clinton, and that the retreat be- fore the advancing British was commenced without his orders, it was well known that he believed the British veterans to be invincible, -" the finest troops in the world," -- and that


his division could not successfully resist their advance, even had he wished to do so, which has been rendered improbable (to say the least) by testimony obtained many years afterwards. Whatever may have been his feelings and in- tentions, it is sure that when the British com- mander-in-chief wheeled his rear division and prepared to advance on the American line, the brigades of Lee's command began to retreat, all the subordinate commanders believing that they were doing so under Lee's order-, as it still seems probable that they were.


Wayne's first knowledge that a retreat was in- tended was received from his aid-de-camp, Major Biles, whom he had sent out with orders for the troops that were in view, and in front of the morass, to advance. " Major Biles re- turned and informed me [Wayne] that the troops were ordered to repass the morass, and they were then retiring over it. I galloped up to the Marquis de Lafayette, who was in the rear of Livingston's or Stewart's regiment, who said he was ordered to recross the morass,1 and formi near the court-house, from that to the woods. I again sent to General Lee, asking that troops might be brought up. Major Biles or Major Fishbourne returned and informed me that the troops had been ordered to retire from the court-house, and that they were then retiring. About the same time one of General Lee's aids told me that it was not General Lee's intention to attack them in front, but that he intended to take them, and was preparing a detachment to throw upon their left. I then crossed the ravine myself, and went with Gen- eral Scott to the comt-house. .


After viewing the ground about the court-house, sent off one off my aids to General Lee to request him that the troops might again be returned to the place they had left. At this time the enemy did not appear to be above two thousand, about a mile distant in front, moving on to gain the hill before mentioned. A fire was kept np by cannon between us and the enemy at this time. Major Fishbourne returned and informed me that the troops were still retreating, and that


1 At or near where now stands the farm-house belonging to the Schanck estate, and occupied by Mr. Edward Hance.


175


MONMOUTH COUNTY IN THE REVOLUTION.


General Lee would see me himself. After- quis that he was directed by General Lee to gain the enemy's left flank. In this time there was a cannonading from both parties, but princi- wards I perceived the enemy begin to move rapidly in column towards the court-house. I again sent Major Lenox and Major Fishbourne . pally on the part of the enemy. The Marquis to General Lee, requesting him at least to halt 'did not gain the enemy's left flank ; as I sup- the troops to cover General Scott, and that the i posed, it was occasioned by a retreat that had enemy were advancing ; and also sent an order been ordered to the village, I presume by Gen- eral Lee, as he was present, and did not contra- (liet it." to Colonel Butler to fall back, as he was in danger of being surrounded and taken."


The first disposition of the troops of Lee's command on the ground between the eastern morass and Briar Hill had been made without any general order from Lee, each subordinate commander taking his position and deploying his men according to his own ideas. Colonel Oswall maintained his artillery in position un- coming to meet me. He told me our troops , til his ammunition was exhausted, and then


With reference to the position and retirement of General Scott's command, General Maxwell said: " I did expect that General Scott would have moved to the right, as there was a vacancy between him and the other troops ; but while I was riding up to him I saw his troops turn about and form in column, and General Scott were retreating on the right, and we must get out of that place; that he desired his cannon to go along with me, as there was only one place to get over that morass [the one northeast of the


Schanek farm-house], and he would get out of ; was done over the heads of Butler's advanced that if he could. Iordered my brigade to march back."


Colonel Jackson, in describing how he retired from his advanced position near Briar Hill, said : " I asked Lieutenant-Colonel Smith if he did not think it best for me to cross the morass, and post myself on the height that crowned it. He asked if I had any orders ! I answered no. He made reply, 'For God's sake don't move without you have orders !' I desired him, or he offered, to go and see if there was any person to give me orders; he returned in a few minutes, and told me there was no person there. I told him I'll risk it, and cross the morass."


General David Forman said, " I rode forward to discover the number and situation of the en- emy shortly after the enemy's horse had charged Colonel Butler's detachment; then rode in quest of General Lee and offered to take a de- tachment, and by taking a road upon our left, to double their right flank. General Lee's an- swer was, ' I know my business.' A few minutes afterwards I saw the Marquis de La- fayette direet Colonel Livingston's and Colonel Stewart's regiments to march towards the enemy's left, and I was informed by the Mar-


retired behind the morass, to the high grounds now included in the Schanck farm. There he met General Lee, who ordered him, upon ob- taining ammunition, to continue firing, and this


detachment, and with great danger of doing injury to them. At this time General Lee sent orders to General Wayne to move toward the right, nearer to the court-house, where the enemy was threatening a movement. The reg- iments of Livingston and Stewart, in Wayne's brigade, were the first to move under these or- ders from Lee. Grayson and Scott, seeing the movement of these regiments, considered it as a general retreat, and that opinion was confirmed by the evident pressure of the British towards the court-house, while their centre and right emerged from the woods into the open ground, thus threatening to sever the American line, already- weakened in the centre, and to cut off the regiments which were on the left toward Briar Hill. Grayson, Scott, Jackson and Var- num recrossed the morass, as has already been shown, and, with Maxwell, entered the woods upon the hill west of the Amboy road. There they received orders from General Lee to re- form the line in the woods on the high ground, with the right resting on the village. General Lee stated that he had supposed that the houses around the eourt-house were of stone, but when he found that they were of wood, and that the village was open (that is, that the


176


HISTORY OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY.


houses were scattering), he decided to fall back before the British advance, which was then ap- pearing in the edge of the woods less than a mile distant, and was variously estimated by the American officers at from fifteen hundred to twenty-five hundred men.


The force of Lee at that time disposable for attaek or resistance, if properly in hand, was not less than three thousand men, besides Gray- son's detachment. Wayne, during the hour and a half that elapsed while he was in the this time by his orders ;? and the left wing only plain, had sent three times to urge General Lee saved its connection with the main body of the to advance with the troops, and, as he stated, division by a march through the woods, leaving refrained from pressing the attack, under in- their artillery to the charge of Colonel Oswald, structions, constantly expecting that Lee would | who, with his few men, brought off teu pieces, carry the left wing around the right of the though he took only two into action at first. British column, to cut it off from the main It was at this time, or perhaps a little earlier, body of the army. Lee himself afterwards that a messenger from Colonel Morgan, "having stated that such was his purpose, and also that sought in vain for General Lee," came to when he notified General Washington, who had General Wayne for instructions. Morgan was seut an aid to learn the situation of affairs,1


) Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, acting adjutant-general of Washington's staff, who was with General Lee, said : " Within view of Monmouth court-house there was a halt for an hour, in which interval General Lee reconnoitred the enemy, who put on the appearance of retiring from the court-house somewhat precipitately and in disorder. When they had retreated about a mile, on the Middletown road, they halted, and formed on high ground. General Lee observed that if the hody now in view were all or near all that were left to cover the retreat of the main body, instead of pushing their rear, he would have them all prisoners. lle marched his main body to gain the enemy's rear, leaving General Wayne with two or three pieces of artillery to amse the enemy in front, but not to push them, lest his project should be frustrated. After coming into the plain, about a mile below the court-house, I observed the head of General Lee's column filing to the right toward the court-house. A cannonading had now taken place between us and the enemy. When I came in the rear of Seott's detachment I perceived a very great interval between that and the front of Maxwell's brigade. I'pon General Max- well seeing me, he asked if I had any orders from General Lee. I told him I had not. . . . General Scott came up about this time and observed that our troops were going off the field toward the court-house. lle asked me whether it was the case. ] told him I knew nothing of it if it was so. During this time all the columns except Maxwell's were moving to the right. After having seen several battalions pass [repass] the ravine, I returned to the point where General Maxwell was, and found General Scott and Max- well standing together. General Maxwell again asked me if I had any orders, I told him I had not. . . . I rode to- ward the [east] ravine to find General Lee, but finding the


that he was confident of success, he supposed the British rear-guard did not exceed fifteen hundred men. His estimate was probably nearly correct, and the plan a good one at that time, for his whole division was then pressing to the front, eager to engage the enemy; but at noon the case was different, for Clinton had fully realized the weakness of the pursuit, and had gained time to turn it into failure. Lee's entire division was then in retreat, quickened at


posted, as before mentioned, at Richmond's Mills, nearly three miles in a southerly direc- tion from Monmouth Court-House, and having heard the sound of the firing in front, was anxious for orders to march his riflemen to the scene of conflict; but Wayne simply told his messenger that he (the messenger) could see the condition of things for himself and report the facts to General Morgan. "The enemy," said he, "are advancing, and Colonel Morgan should govern himself accordingly." General Lee (through Major Mercer of his staff) had pre- viously expressed displeasure at Wayne's having ordered Colonel Scott to a position on the left, and this probably was the reason why Wayne now declined to give the desired orders to Morgan, who, in consequence, was deprived of the opportunity of advancing to take a place in


enemy were pushing that way, thought best to return and come round the ravine, and found General Lee about a quarter of a mile this [west] side of the court-house. He said ' you see our situation, but I am determined to make the best of a bad bargain.' . . . Upon asking several officers, who appeared to command the battalions, why they left the ground, they said it was by General Lee's and the Marquis de Lafayette's orders."


2 At about the time the retreat began Colonel Stewart, of Wayne's brigade, asked General Lee where he should take his men. General Lee replied, " Take them to any place to save their lives,"-pointing to an orchard in front.


177


MONMOUTH COUNTY IN THE REVOLUTION.


the line, and so remained at his post through the long hours of that blazing afternoon, hear- ing the dull roar of the distant battle, but taking no part in it.1


The British forces, having completed their formation in the woods to the northeast of the court-house, emerged from their cover and advanced steadily, in good order and with solid ranks, towards the village. Wayne, under direction of Lafayette, had placed two regiments -Stewart's and Livingston's-to resist their advance, but it was useless for this small force to attempt to impede their advance, and the regiments joined the retreat, the details of which, with reference to the several brigades and regi- ments, it is unnecessary here to narrate. "The troops," said Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, of Washington's staff, "in a very easy, moderate way, continued their march until they had passed the ravine in front of Carr's house." This has reference to what has before been mentioned as the "middle ravine," or morass. It has gener- ally been supposed that the retreat of Lee's division to the main body under Washington was a disorderly one,-almost a panic,-but this is a very erroneous idea. There was certainly some confusion, occasioned by a lack of proper direction of their movements, but there was nothing in the nature of a panic. No com- mander knew why he was retreating, only that such was understood to be the orders, and be- cause he saw others retreating ; but no troops could have rallied more promptly than they did when they felt the presence of Washington. Credit was due to General Lee for his self- possession and for his evident purpose to bring


1 A night or two before the Monmouth battle, Morgan, contrary to the express orders of Washington (personally given ) "not to fire a single shot, or bring on any skirmish- ing with the enemy," disobeyed both. For this he was placed in arrest. The next day after this disregard of orders and subsequent fright, occasioned by a reprimand from the chief, he was released and restored to favor. No doubt this occurrence was the cause of his remaining at his post. fearing to move up without positive orders, much as he desired to take part in the engagement.


Late in the afternoon orders reached him to move up at once, and these orders he promptly obeyed ; but being obliged to take a circuitous route, he did not arrive on the field till night, after the battle was over.


the men away in safety, whatever may be said of his failure to fight, as Washington had ex- pected him to do. The troops who had marched and countermarched under blind guidance and conflicting orders-or no orders at all-during seven or eight hours of extreme heat were fall- ing by the roadside, worn out with fatigue and fainting with thirst, with no stimulus of hope to bear them up, and it cannot be denied that the retreat from Briar Hill to the old meeting- house was a victory of courage, manhood and endurance over every possible discouragement that could befall a brave and steadfast army in earnest pursuit of a retiring adversary. Regi- ment after regiment, brigade after brigade, has- tened to cross the western morass, and to the credit of Lee it is to be recorded that he was among the last to pass the causeway. At this point the broken detachments met the main army. Some went to its rear to rest and rally for a fresh advance, while some turned their faces again to the enemy and fought until their pursuers retired from the field. Colonel Ogden said that he asked General Maxwell to halt his command and face the enemy, and that he did so promptly, rallying his meu without difficulty. It seems clear that the division of General Lee was saved by the self-possession of its officers and the wonderful endurance of the rank and file, produced in a great degree by their hard- ships during the preceding winter at Valley Forge.


The noise of the desultory conflict in the vicinity of the court-house during the fore- noon had been heard by Washington, and it had aroused him to his full fighting energy. The return of his aid-de-camp with the assurance that General Lee had overtaken the British army, and expected to cut off the division form- ing their rear-guard, was received as a vindi- cation of his previous judgment and a presage of success. lle hurried forward the advance of the main body under his immediate com- mand, and the troops dropped every incum- brance to the celerity of their march to the front. At the old Tennent Meeting-house Greene took the right and Lord Stirling led the left directly towards the high ground, where he subsequently took his strong position.


12


178


HISTORY OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY.


The vanguard, under the immediate command | he should bring up the main army to their of Washington, approached the causeway at the support. It was an occasion such as tests the abilities of a great leader and proves the stead-


western morass, when repeated interruptions of his progress began to warn him that disaster fastness of soldiers. was impending, and that the troops of the Con-


Like lightning the whole career of General ('harles Lee flashed through the mind of Wash- ington, awakening vague and painful suspi- cions and more painful apprehensions, arousing the chief to a sense of the danger which threat- ened the army. At this crisis his action was prompt. Colonels Harrison and Fitzgerald were dispatched to ascertain the exact situation of affairs. They met Major Ogden, who told them with strong expletives that Lee and his troops were " flying from a shadow." Officer after officer, detachment after detachment, came over the causeway and bridge, all alike ambiguous in their replies or ignorant of the cause of their retreat. Generals and colonels came in with their broken commands, all know- ing that they were retreating, but no one able to say more than thatsuch were the orders, and that just behind them was " the whole British army." Washington hastened towards the bridge and met Wayne, Varnum, Oswald, Stewart, Ram- ; scy and Livingston. Upon them he imposed the duty of meeting the British columns, and, leading the way in person, placed them in posi- tion on the high ground bordering the west morass. On the left, in the edge of the woods, he posted Ramsey and Stewart, with two pieces of artillery, and with the solemn charge that he depended on them to stop the pursuit. On the right, in the rear of an orchard, and cov- ered by a thick hedge-row, he posted Wayne, Varnum and Livingston ; and four of Oswald's guns were placed there under the directions of General Knox, chief of artillery. Maxwell and other commanders, as they arrived, were ordered to the rear to re-form their columns, and Lafayette was intrusted with the formation of a second line until he could give the halted troops a position which they might hold while




Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.