New Jersey troops in the Gettysburg campaign from June 5 to July 31, 1863, Part 10

Author: Toombs, Samuel, 1844-1889
Publication date: 1888
Publisher: Orange, N.J., The Evening Mail Publishing House
Number of Pages: 458


USA > New Jersey > New Jersey troops in the Gettysburg campaign from June 5 to July 31, 1863 > Part 10


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IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.


erly, and the most commanding position along its course is the Peach Orchard at the junction of a cross road with the Emmetsburg road. From the Peach Orchard running easterly, the high ground continues for a short distance and then ends abruptly at a rocky depression known as the Devil's Den, between which and the Round Top, there is a defile or gorge through which runs a small stream known as Plum Run. Gen- eral Sickles had previously informed Meade of the nature of the ground in his front and solicited permis- sion to make the change, requesting that a staff officer be sent with him to examine the position. General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, made a reconnoissance of the entire line, extending his tour to the summit of Little Round Top, and returned to General Meade, whom he requested to personally examine the left of the line before approving of Sickles' proposed advance. Gen- eral Meade had in the mean time called a council of corps commanders at his headquarters near Zeigler's Grove, and was awaiting the presence of Sickles in obedience to the call. Sickles, not hearing anything from General Hunt, gave the order to Birney to advance to the new ground, and ordered Humphreys to take position on the Emmetsburg road connecting with Birney at the Peach Orchard. He then started for Meade's headquarters, but before he had time to dismount the sound of Clark's guns announced to the assembled corps commanders that the "ball had opened." Meade then accompanied Sickles to the threatened point of attack, and while he did not


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approve of the movement, saw there was no time to make a change, as Sickles expressed himself willing to do.


The change of front General Birney was directed to make brought his division along the left arm of the angle extending from the high ground above the Devil's Den to the Peach Orchard, at the intersection of a cross-road with the Emmetsburg road, General Ward's brigade being on the left of the line, De Tro- briand in the centre, and Graham on the right. Ward's left regiment, the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth New York, was the extreme left of the line and was placed on the high ground west and north of the Devil's Den. This exposed flank was protected only by Smith's (Fourth New York) battery of rifled guns, which commanded the gorge, with the Fourth Maine Regiment still farther to the left at the base of Little Round Top, supporting it. On the right of Smith's battery was a thin belt of woods, and into the open ground (a wheat-field) beyond it Winslow's battery of light twelve-pounders was placed. Graham's line was formed along the Emmetsburg road, its left being at the Peach Orchard and refused so as to form an angle at this point. De Trobriand formed across the extreme point of the wheat-field to make connection with Ward and Graham, and in position to reinforce either, as cir- cumstances might require. Humphreys advanced his division to the Emmetsburg road, leaving only Bur- ling's brigade in support, which was soon after sent to reinforce Birney's weak line. By this movement a


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IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.


wide gap was made between the left of the Second Corps and Humphreys' right, which Gibbons filled by sending forward two regiments of his division.


The position of the Third Corps was now complete, and it was strengthened by the batteries of Bigelow, Phillips, Hart and Clark (" B" First New Jersey), in the open ground north of the cross-road and in rear of the Peach Orchard, and protected by a slight intrench- ment dug along the road which gave to it the name of the "sunken road." Ames' battery occupied the Peach orchard, supported by the Third Maine and Third Michigan Regiments, which formed in front of the Orchard facing south, while Randolph's, Seeley's and Turnbull's batteries were placed along the Emmets- burg road fronting west. Sickles had been directed to call upon Sykes for a division of the Fifth Corps, and Hancock also ordered a division of the Second Corps to respond to any call for aid.


Meade and his corps commanders expected an attack by Lee at some point in the line at an early hour, and his desire to anticipate such a move was his reason for his order directing the Twelfth and Fifth Corps to charge the enemy's left on the arrival of the Sixth Corps. That movement appears to have been aban- doned by the adverse reports of Generals Slocum and Warren, and Meade therefore changed his plans to an offensive movement by his left, which he was not, how. ever, permitted to make. Lee's delay in attacking the Federal position was a source of astonishment to the Union army and incomprehensible to Meade, who had


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been expecting an advance against the Union right as more likely than at any other point, and the continued silence of the Confederate leader gave rise to a number of conjectures as to his possible intentions.


General Lee was not idle, however, but time, which was of so much value to him, was being ruthlessly wasted. After the abandonment of the plan whereby Ewell was to attack the Federal right, he had formed a plan of attack on the left of Meade's army, Ewell to assault the right at the sound of Longstreet's guns while Hill was to make a vigorous demonstration on the centre. Ewell had expressed the belief that he could successfully assault the right as soon as Long- street should break through the Union left. No time seems to have been fixed upon for the beginning of this movement, and every hour's delay only strengthened the Union line. General Lee informed Longstreet of his proposed attack, but that officer attempted to dis- suade him from it. A long time seems to have been spent in controversy, and finally Longstreet plead for more time until McLaws' division, which had been on picket should arrive.


Lee had abandoned the " offensive-defensive " plan of operations, and to the objections of both Longstreet and Hood to the proposed movement said: "The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him he will whip us." * Lee was sanguine of success. His troops had been victorious the day before, and they, as well as himself were filled with a belief in their invincibility.


* Hood in his letter to Longstreet.


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IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.


Three-quarters of an hour were lost waiting for the arrival of McLaws, and when at last he reported, a further delay of several hours occurred in the march of the troops. This was occasioned by the instructions of General Lee which called for the masking of the move- ment from the Federals, the design being to fall suddenly and impetuously on the left flank of the Union army, which Lee supposed rested on the Emmetsburg road.


One incident was in Lee's favor. The Union cavalry which should have been placed on Sickles' left, had by a misunderstanding been ordered elsewhere, and there was nothing apparently to prevent a surprise move- ment but the skirmish line of the Third Corps. The situation seemed favorable for a repetition of " Stone- wall " Jackson's flank movement by which the Eleventh Corps was put to flight at Chancellorsville ; but there was an important obstacle to its success, which Long- street made a wide detour to overcome. This obstacle was the Signal Station on Little Round Top. The officer in charge discerned the marching column of the enemy, and at once notified General Sickles and Gen- eral Meade of the fact. General Meade sent General Warren, of his staff, to the Signal Station, and Sickles ordered Birney to develop the enemy's right with the result as previously described. There was no chance now for a surprise.


Longstreet observed the signal station on Round Top, and knowing that the movement could no longer be concealed, formed his troops for the assault.


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Hood's division was placed on the right in the fol- lowing order :


Laws' brigade, supported by Benning, on the right ; Robertson, with Anderson's brigade in his rear, on the left.


McLaws' division formed on the left of Hood, Ker- shaw's brigade in front and Semmes' brigade in rear of Kershaw, constituting his right; Barksdale, sup- ported by Wofford, the left.


Hood's division was to attack first, by crossing the Emmetsburg road and advancing along the line, taking the left of the Union line in flank and rear. As soon as that was accomplished, McLaws was to deploy across the road in two lines of battle and drive the Federals from the Peach Orchard. These instructions were not carried out in the manner designed, and the battle was fought on a plan which developed itself.


General Hood, on whom devolved the opening of the fight, had received word from his scouts who had ascended Round Top, of the defenceless condition of Little Round Top, and the apparent ease with which the Federal army could be attacked in rear by passing completely around the larger mountain, and he vainly sought to secure a modification of the order, and to be permitted to move to the south of Round Top for that purpose. Three separate requests were sent to Lee, and finally Longstreet went to Hood and repeated the order of General Lee, which was to be strictly obeyed.


Birney's infantry line was a weak one, but his front


201


IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.


at the angle was well covered with artillery while Smith's battery to the extreme left had a commanding position. Birney having discovered the position of the rebel column, at two o'clock ordered Clark's bat- tery (" B" First New Jersey) to open upon them, and after the firing of a few rounds they disappeared. About three o'clock a rebel battery opened fire on Clark's position, from the Emmetsburg road, about one thousand four hundred yards to the front, and the fire was effectively replied to, the battery soon ceasing to annoy them. The enemy, however, were massing their artillery under cover of which the infantry attack was to be made. The batteries of Reilley and Latham covered the front of Laws' and Robertson's brigades, and further to the left thirteen batteries were placed along the front of Seminary Ridge, their fire converging at the Peach Orchard and enfilading Sickles' line in both directions. At half-past three the columns of Hood were seen passing along Birney's front to the left. The whole artillery line on Seminary Ridge opened upon Birney's posi- tion, their fire taking Graham's brigade and Hum- phreys' division - then advancing to their new line on the Emmetsburg road-in flank. The Confederate infantry preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, advanced to the Federal position. The artillery which accompanied the rebel line opened fire vigorously upon Smith's battery near the Devil's Den which replied effectively.


Ward's line was a very thin one and the left


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extremely weak. There was but one regiment to resist the whole of Laws' rebel brigade-the Fourth Maine-and Hood having disregarded Lee's orders -- either because he was surprised at finding a line of battle extending from the Peach Orchard to the base of Little Round Top to oppose him, or believing the latter to be the key to the whole battle-field and easily taken, as his scouts had reported it defence- less-directed Laws to bear to the right, and Rob- ertson noting the movement also bore in the same direction, and fell with crushing force upon Ward's line at its weakest point. Sickles at once called upon Sykes for the division which had been ordered to his support.


When Humphreys moved forward to the Emmets- burg road, as directed by General Sickles, Carr's brigade was in the advance, followed by Brewster, Burling's brigade being in the rear. The severe artillery fire upon the fated Peach Orchard was then in progress. Seeley's battery which had been ordered to take position on the right of a log house on the Emmetsburg road, was transferred to the left of the building and its fire soon silenced the guns in its front. Turnbull's battery from the artillery reserve took the place vacated by Seeley. In the alignment of Carr's brigade, the Eleventh New Jersey Regiment was brought to the Emmetsburg road, its right rest- ing on the Smith, or Essex house, and extending nearly parallel with the road and about twenty paces to the east of it. In the rear of the Smith house was


BREV. MAJOR A. JUDSON CLARK, Captain Com'd'e Battery B. 1st N. J. Artillery. (From a War-time l'hetegraph - 182 )


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IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.


an apple orchard, and to the left or south of it, a small peach orchard .* The Eleventh Regiment was the extreme left of the brigade and joined the troops of the First Division.


Soon after Humphreys had disposed his line to meet the expected attack of the enemy, he sent Bur- ling's brigade to the support of Birney, as already stated. This brigade moved down to the rear of the right of Birney's division, where it was massed in a piece of woods south of the Trostle house, and on the margin of the road leading to the Peach Orchard. General Birney ordered Burling out of the woods into an open field and immediately on unmasking, the enemy opened a terrific cannonade on his left flank. For half an hour the brigade was exposed to a severe storm of shot and shell, when, at the solici- tation of his regimental commanders, he moved the brigade back about one hundred yards where they could have the protection of a slight rise in the ground. This movement, under the heavy fire of the enemy, was made in perfect order, but it attracted the attention of Captain Poland of General Sickles' staff, who not understanding it rode furiously up to Burling and demanded to know by whose orders he had moved his brigade. " By my own," replied Bur-


* This fact has given rise to the belief that the position of the Regi- ment was in Sherfey's Peach Orchard which was some distance further to the left, and at the junction of a cross-road which runs from the Taneytown to the Emmetsburg road .- Marbaker, Historian Eleventh Regiment.


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ling. " Take your command back to the position you left, sir," was Poland's excited reply, and Burling at once started to obey, but just at that moment an order was received from General Birney to detach two regi- ments to go to the support of General Graham. The Second New Hampshire and the Seventh New Jersey, Colonel Louis R. Francine, were detailed for that purpose. The Second New Hampshire was ordered to the support of Ames' battery in the Peach Orchard, and in taking position its right wing fronted the Emmetsburg road, and its left the cross-road in rear of the orchard, thus forming an acute angle. The Seventh New Jersey was ordered to the support of the remaining batteries, and took position to the rear of Clark's battery ("B" First New Jersey). It had been at this place only a short time when the terrific and deafening cannonade, which preceded the advance of the enemy, began. The fire from the rebel batteries was sharp and effective. Many of the shells burst directly over the regiment and several men were killed and wounded as they lay in the ranks. Trying as the ordeal was the men of the Seventh bore it bravely. Unable to engage the enemy they courageously submitted to the dreadful down-pour of missiles which broke upon them and from which their position permitted of no escape.


The Fifth New Jersey Regiment, Colonel William J. Sewell, was next detailed. Reporting to General Humphreys the Fifth was ordered to relieve the Sixty- third Pennsylvania, on picket duty on the Emmetsburg


BURLING


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7NJ


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ORCHARD


CLARK PHILLIP


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DEVIL'S DEN.


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LITTLE ROTOP


Position of 5. 6. 7. 8. 11. NJ Regt3 CLARK'S BATTERY JULY 2. 1853.


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road. Colonel Burling was now left with but three regiments of his brigade.


The fighting on Ward's front to the left had been furiously kept up. The men of Robertson's brigade threw themselves upon the Federal line, and sought to envelop it by turning the left, the batteries of Smith and Winslow opened upon them, at first with case-shot, as they came nearer with shell, and when within three hundred yards with grape and canister. The infantry reserved their fire until the enemy were but two hundred yards away, when they poured a terrific volley into them checking their advance and throwing them into great disorder. Between the opposing lines was a stone fence and both sides waged a sharp contest for its possession. The battle was a frightful one. It seemed as though both Confederates and Federals were determined to fight until death before giving way. For more than an hour the lines alternately advanced and retreated, but Robertson, in his eager- ness to interpose between Ward's left and the gorge, so extended his lines as to expose his flank to the fire of De Trobriand's brigade who was on the right of Ward. So deadly was the fire from this unexpected quarter that the left of Robertson's line was thrown back, and in order to avert disaster Robertson summoned up the rest of his brigade to meet De Trobriand's fire, which relieved Ward from the enormous pressure upon him and he promptly advanced and recovered the ground which he had lost.


Anderson's brigade at this juncture of affairs moved


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IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.


down to the attack on De Trobriand, but he was also repulsed with heavy loss. Benning's brigade came in to Anderson's assistance and the fighting was renewed with great desperation on both sides.


Laws' brigade, General Hood accompanying it, with two regiments of Robertson's brigade moved directly across the gorge and attempted to scale the rocky sides of Little Round Top. Ward had no troops to prevent the movement, and there was nothing apparently to prevent the capture of this important position.


General Warren had not been long on Little Round Top before he saw the great importance of this summit to the Union army. As he saw the movement of Hood toward it he directed the signal officers to keep on waving their flags while he went for troops to defend it, and galloping out to the road he saw Barnes' divi- sion of the Fifth Corps moving to Sickles' assistance. These reinforcements should have been at Sickles' line an hour before, but they were in time to save Round Top. At the urgent request of Warren, General Sykes detached Vincent's brigade, and detailed Hazlett's bat- tery to accompany them. Warren returned to his post and looked upon the frightful scene below. The inces- sant roar of artillery and musketry ; the rapid move- ment of troops-now blue, now gray-as they emerge from the shelter of woods and rocks, or plunge reck- lessly into each other's ranks; the yells, the shouts, the cheers which arise above the sound of musketry-all these are seen and heard, but to Warren, who sees the


14


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enemy moving up the steep sides of the hill he occu- pies, the terrible conflict below becomes painful, as he anxiously awaits the arrival of Vincent. Noticing a body of troops on the road he once more starts for help, and at his urgent solicitation Colonel O'Rorke, of the One Hundred and Fortieth New York Regiment, follows him on a double-quick. During Warren's absence Vincent emerges on the spur of Little Round Top, and before him is spread a panorama of exceed- ing beauty and, just at that moment, of terrible grand- eur, but he has no time to devote to its contempla- tion. As he posts his regiments along the rocky sum- mit, Laws' enthusiastic Alabamians and Texans are pushing their way up the slope. Vincent's men are soon in position, the Sixteenth Michigan on the right, Forty-fourth New York and Eighty-third Pennsylvania in the centre, and the Twentieth Maine, Colonel Cham- berlain, on the left. The enemy advance inspired by the sanguine words of their impulsive leader, and attack Vincent's centre. The rebels stumble and fall over the rocks and stones which impede their advance, but they push on, sheltering themselves as best they can from the close fire of Vincent's men. Unable to scale the obstructions in front, Hood extends his left to outflank the Sixteenth Michigan, which makes a gallant resistance but is being overpowered. Just at this moment, O'Rorke, with his brave New Yorkers, arrives on a run, and without any attempt at formation, they rush madly, bravely, desperately upon the enemy, and check their movement, capturing many prisoners as


CAPT. AMBROSE M. MATTHEWS, Co. 1, 13th Regt. N. J. Vols., Inf. (From a Recent Photograph.)


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IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.


trophies for their gallant charge. Hazlett, by the most extraordinary exertions has succeeded in placing his battery on the summit of Little Round Top. Dragging the heavy guns by hand, skillfully surmounting the numerous obstacles in the shape of huge bowlders and fallen trees, which were met with at every step, his plucky artillerymen performed a service as remarkable as it was glorious. Training his guns upon the enemy below, he began a cannonade against the forces so fiercely attacking Ward, and as the sound of his guns was heard, a cheer went up along the Union line, and all knew that Little Round Top was safe.


The battle which raged between the contesting forces on Little Round Top, and Benning, Anderson and Robertson's rebel brigades with the troops of Ward and De Trobriand, was of the most desperate nature. The two Federal brigades supported by Smith's and Winslow's batteries resisted stubbornly, but their posi- tion became more and more perilous. Smith leaving three of his guns, went to the rear and opened that section ' of his battery, firing obliquely through the gully. The rebels were everywhere. They were strongly disposed behind the natural defenses of rocks and ridges and kept up an incessant musketry and artillery fire. The Sixth New Jersey Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Gilkyson, commanding, was sent to Ward's support, and at the same time the Fortieth New York, Colonel Egan of De Trobriand's brigade. Proceeding on a double-quick to the most exposed point in Ward's line, the Sixth New Jersey


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took an advanced position in the gully and near the Devil's Den, where they engaged the enemy. The Eighth New Jersey was ordered in to the right of Ward's brigade, probably by General Birney's direct order, as Colonel Burling did not know what disposi- tion had been made of it, and the One Hundred and Fifteenth Pennsylvania Regiment took position to the left of the Eighth in like manner, thus closing a gap which existed in the line between Ward and De Trobriand. Colonel Burling's command had thus been broken up and put into action at different parts of the line, over an extent of territory reaching from the Rogers house on the Emmetsburg road, to the Devil's Den, a distance of fully one mile.


The engagement had now become general along Birney's entire front. Kershaw's brigade of McLaws' division followed by Semmes' brigade had engaged De Trobriand's line and finally attacked the apex of the angle at the Peach Orchard. Tilton's and Sweitzer's brigades of Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps moved in to the relief of De Trobriand's worn out and exhausted men, whose ranks had been fearfully thinned, and met Kershaw's attack with great vigor, but they were finally driven back, thus imperiling the entire position.


The Sixth New Jersey and the Fortieth New York, who had pushed down to the support of Ward's left, " fighting like tigers," were exposed to a galling fire. For two hours the Sixth fought the enemy in the rocky gorge, protecting themselves by the huge


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IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.


bowlders and ledges of rock, which are to be found everywhere at this point, and only retired from the field when ordered by General Ward to rejoin its brigade. The losses of the Sixth Regiment during the battle were as follows :


FIELD AND STAFF.


Wounded-Major Theodore W. Baker.


COMPANY A.


Wounded - Second Lieutenant Hart W. Bodine, Corporal Smith Applegate, Corporal Thomas V. Dougherty (killed June 18, 1864, near Petersburg, Va.), Thomas Shields, William K. Morris, William Walton.


Missing-Samuel Applegate, David L. Compton.


COMPANY B.


Wounded - Corporal Charles B. Yearkes (died August 20, 1863), Andrew Holland (died July 26, 1864, of wounds received in Wilderness).


COMPANY C.


Wounded-Corporal Frederick Boorman, John Fin- erty, Henry Herman.


Missing-Austin A. Skinner, Martin Williams.


COMPANY D.


Wounded - Sergeant William D. Smith, Sergeant Eli H. Baily, Daniel P. Bendalow.


Missing-Sergeant Edgar Hudson (supposed dead), Samuel English.


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NEW JERSEY TROOPS


COMPANY E.


Wounded-Second Lieutenant Levi E. Ayres, First Sergeant George W. Jackson, Sergeant Charles G. P. Goforth (died September 1, 1864), William Hartman, Edward Johnson.


COMPANY F.


Wounded - Sergeant Adam Sheppard, Samuel B. Matlack, Charles Horstman.


COMPANY G.


Wounded-William E. Eastlack.


COMPANY H.


Wounded-Corporal Stephen Hull, Ambrose Kizer, Peter Wean (died July II).


COMPANY I.


Wounded-Sergeant John E. Loeb, Henry Hessel. Missing-William D. Jacobs, James W. Lewis.


COMPANY K.


Killed-Corporal Benjamin F. Reeves.




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