USA > New Jersey > New Jersey troops in the Gettysburg campaign from June 5 to July 31, 1863 > Part 6
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myriads of fireflies, whose brilliant scintillations only rendered the shallowness of their illuminating power more conspicuous by the failure to penetrate the intense blackness in which they sparkled so continu- ously.
" Just here it is in place to remark that at that period of the war the veterans in the ranks had learned to scent danger far more keenly than those high in authority. They seemed to know intuitively when danger lurked about them and were better able to discriminate between useless and necessary toil and hardship. Their keen intelligence and sharpened instincts plainly satisfied these tired and worn-out soldiers that the task given them to do was utterly useless, and therefore no amount of threats or sugges- tive warnings had any stimulating effect upon them. Nothing could move them to tax their exhausted energies. We all knew before we began our labors that Lee's army was not contemplating any movement against Rappahannock Station, and it was no surprise that work on the pits ceased at daylight, when we were called into camp. We already knew that Lee was in the Valley.
"The entire day of the 14th was spent in camp and at 9 o'clock at night marching orders were received. To the squad of men who had spent the whole of the previous night on fatigue duty, the prospect of an all-night march was not pleasant to contemplate. However we joined the columns and with the rest of the corps moved up the railroad in the direction of
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Manassas Junction. The aggravating halts to cross sloughs and brooks in single file, the hurrying to close the gaps thus made in the line, the roughness of the road, cut in many places through the thick scrub growth, beside the railroad bed, caused the weary hours of the night to slip rapidly by, and the early morning sun caught the column but ten or twelve miles on the road and more thoroughly worn out, than a twenty-mile march by daylight would have caused. We were at least eight hours in making this distance. Halting, stumbling over stumps and into ruts and mudholes, dozing as we walked in the ranks, and awakening by bumping against the knap- sack of the man ahead.
"As daylight appeared and the sun rose, and the column still trudged on with no apparent intention of halting, the dusty, exhausted ranks sent up the shout of 'Coffee! coffee!' which passed along the column until it finally convinced the leader thereof that the earnest demand for refreshment should be heeded. About 7 o'clock, when the heat had already become unbearable, we turned into a field by the side of a clear stream near Warrenton Junction or Catlett's Station, stacked arms, refreshed ourselves with a good wash, cooked coffee, and stretching shelter tents to protect us from the broiling rays of the June sun, we were all soon asleep.
"At noon the march was resumed and taking the railroad track moved toward Bristoe Station and Manassas Junction. But oh! the sultriness of that
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long afternoon ! The parched lips that gasped for water! The dozens of men overcome by the heat who dropped down by the wayside, especially in the long stretches of treeless and breezeless plantations that the column was compelled to cross! Of the Seventh Regiment, comprising about two hundred and fifty officers and men, there certainly were not twenty- five who followed the Colonel's horse into bivouac at Manassas Junction, when the command halted there at nine o'clock on the night of the fifteenth of June. But the stragglers came in as fast as their strength could carry them, and by morning all were ready for another start except the dozen or so made sick by the heat and march of the day before.
" This exhaustive ordeal was followed by two nights of good rest, and on the seventeenth, refreshed and buoyant, a change in the temperature also favoring us, we went along at a swinging gait across Bull Run, over the battle ground of '61, up the heights of Centreville, where we halted and rested another day. On the nine- teenth we marched across Fairfax County toward the mountains in the distance. That day the column kept well together. There was no straggling and no annoyances from dust or heat.
" Hooker's manœuvering of his army was occasioned by his lack of knowledge of Lee's intentions, based upon the supposition that Washington was Lee's objective point, and to keep his army between Lee and Washington ready to be interposed upon any route of approach to that city which the enemy might select.
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Thus it was that we first covered the fords of the upper Rappahannock, and now at Gum Spring, where we went into camp on the evening of the nineteenth, the passes to the Valley were fully masked, while Hooker "in his headquarters at Fairfax Court House, received hourly intelligence from the cavalry outposts in the gaps of the movements of the Confederate army through the Valley.
" The signal stations at Aldie, Goose Creek and Fair- fax Court House formed an unbroken chain. The Seventh New Jersey was detached from the brigade to guard the signal station from bushwackers, or Moseby's guerillas, who, we were all well aware, were all around us in their peaceful homes in the garb of honest farmers, and innocent of all hostile intent, as long as we were in force among them and on the alert. From the rocky promontory at Goose Creek, on which the signal station was placed, there was spread out below us the Valley of the Potomac, Leesburg, Edward's Ferry and the mountains in the distance. It was a beautiful pros- pect and thoroughly appreciated by the men of the Seventh who had been for two years shut up in the pine woods and lowlands of Virginia."
CHAPTER VII.
HOOKER'S PERPLEXITIES AGGRAVATED-A DASHING CAV- ALRY EXPLOIT-LEE'S ARMY IN PENNSYLVANIA- THE UNION FORCES CROSS THE POTOMAC-STUART'S RAID-GENERAL HOOKER RESIGNS.
T HE Army of the Potomac was daily undergoing serious depletion by the withdrawal of large num- bers of the nine months' regiments owing to the expiration of their terms of service. To supply their places General Hooker made urgent appeals to the government for reinforcements, but he was only par- tially successful. Stannard's Vermont Brigade, a nine months' command, was ordered to him and assigned to Doubleday's division of the First Corps, Lockwood's Maryland Brigade was ordered to the Twelfth Corps, and Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves at Alexandria were also directed to be sent to him. Stahl's division of cavalry, six thousand strong, were added to the Cavalry Corps. The hysterical cries of inaction which poured down upon Hooker, while he did not permit them to influence his actions, did produce a marked effect upon the government, and the administration without giving him credit for any sagacity whatever found much fault with him, and at the same time would
COLONEL HENRY W. BROWN, Colonel Com'd'g 3d Regt. N. J. Vols., Inf. (From a War-time Photograph.)
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not give him the help he needed. His suggestions were treated as of little account. In the very begin- ning of the campaign when he had proposed to attack Hill at Fredericksburg and get between Lee and Rich- mond, the President wrote to him :
" If you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappa- hannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entan- gled upon the river like an ox jumped half over a fence, liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other."
Later, on June 10, the President wrote :
" Lee's army and not Richmond is your true objective point. If he comes toward the upper Potomac, follow on his flank on the inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight him when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is fret him and fret him."
Yet, when General Hooker sent for Crawford's Penn- sylvania Reserves to join his army, which had been ordered to him, the Military Governor of Alexandria, where the brigade was stationed, detained them there in defiance of Hooker's order, and was sustained by General Halleck in this act of insubordination .* There were in the immediate defences of Washington a large body of troops under Generals Heintzelman and Schenck, and General Hooker's suggestion that they be sent to the front where they could be of direct service against the enemy, was refused. A request
* Comte de Paris.
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by General Hooker to General Heintzelman that the latter send a force of two thousand men from Pooles- ville, Md., to the passes of South Mountain, and thus aid in keeping Lee's column still further to the west, was likewise refused on the ground that the passes were not part of the Defences of Washington. Hooker was certainly in an unenviable position.
Pleasonton's cavalry performed the serviceable task of "fretting" Stuart-forcing him to combat wherever he could find him. A brilliant passage at arms between the troopers of these rival chieftains took place at Upperville on June 21st. Gregg's division engaged the enemy in front, while Buford swept entirely around their flank and threw his whole line of battle upon their weakest point. Chaplain Pyne thus describes the scene :
" Every field was the scene of a sanguinary contest, and every stone wall was made a fresh line of defence. On one occasion a regiment of rebels pouring into a field commenced forming line behind a wall, as the Eighth Illinois were forming on the other side of it. The race for first formation was one for life and death ; and the eager horses came bounding into their places with a speed that partook of desperation. At length the Illinois regiment opened a deadly fire from their carbines. The rebels gallantly attempted a reply but · the effort was too much for their failing endurance. Breaking in disorder, they were chased by Buford's exulting men, leaving twenty men stone dead in that short minute of fire. From that moment there was no
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longer a pretence at resistance. At full gallop the enemy hurried into and through Ashby's Gap, leaving nearly all their wounded, a crowd of prisoners, two guns, and several colors in our hands as trophies of the victory. The Confederate cavalry had lost its prestige forever."
Pleasonton at once started to rejoin the army, and this movement was interpreted as a retreat by the enemy. The First New Jersey Cavalry covered the rear, and though followed by the rebels in a spiritless manner no encounters of any moment took place. On one occasion when the cavalry had almost reached the limit of their day's march, the enemy opened upon them with artillery, a piece of shell striking Louis Vande- grift, of Company D, First New Jersey, fatally wound- ing him. Orders had been received to fall back when Vandegrift was hit, but before vacating the ground his comrades concealed his body in a corner of the fence. After the line halted for the night five volun- teers rode back to the spot, and while four of them faced the enemy, the other one dismounted and placed the body on his horse. Thus guarded the five gallant fellows rejoined their commands and Vandegrift was given a soldier's burial. This was the only casualty in the course of the movement.
The retrograde movement of Pleasonton convinced Lee that Hooker would not engage him in battle south of the Potomac, and he accordingly gave the order for the long contemplated invasion. On the 22d of June, Ewell crossed the Potomac river and 8
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Jenkins with his cavalry brigade was ordered forward to Chambersburg, which place Rodes and Johnson's divisions reached the next day, Early's division taking the road to York by way of Gettysburg. Jenkins left Chambersburg on the arrival of these troops and proceeded toward Harrisburg, which place Ewell had been directed to take possession of if possible. On the 23d, Lee having been apprised of Pleasonton's retreat ordered the corps of Longstreet and Hill to cross the Potomac, the former at Williamsport, the latter at Shepherdstown, which was consummated on the 24th and 25th, both forces uniting at Hagerstown, in support of Ewell's advance. On the 27th, two- thirds of Lee's army was massed near Chambersburg, with Ewell proceeding on his northern mission.
General Hooker was apprised of Ewell's advance on the 23d and on the 25th had knowledge of the proposed movement of the two remaining corps, and being now fully satisfied that Washington was safe from a surprise movement by Lee gave orders for the advance of his army on a line parallel to that of the enemy, taking the east side of the South Mountain. On the 26th the Twelfth Corps crossed the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry, with orders to proceed to Harper's Ferry, and act in conjunction with the forces there against Lee's communications with Richmond, and follow up his rear through the Cumberland Valley. The rest of the army proceeded on the line as marked out, the First Corps halting at Middletown on the 27th, the Second at Barnesville, the Third at Middle-
LIEUT .- COL. CHARLES EWING, Major Com'd'g 4th Regt. N. J. Vols., Inf. (From a War-time Photograph.)
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town, the Fifth at Ballinger's Creek, the Sixth bring- ing up the rear at Poolesville. The Twelfth Corps reached Knoxville, three miles from Harper's Ferry on its special errand. The First New Jersey Cavalry, which covered the rear of the army, was the last body of troops to cross the river.
Lee was kept in entire ignorance of Hooker's prompt action, by the absence of Stuart with his cavalry, who, with the permission of his chief, had started to make a circuit of the Union army. Stuart's intention was to turn the left flank of Hooker, and delay, if not prevent his crossing of the Potomac river. This raid, so full of discomfiture, disappoint- ment and vexation, absolutely barren of any important result, was of great value to the Union cause. Leaving behind him the brigades of Jones and Robertson, who were to keep close watch of the Union army and follow its movements, Stuart on the night of June 24th set off on his famous raid. Moving in a southerly direction he encountered the Second Corps at Haymarket, which compelled him to make a wide detour to conceal his movement, and on the 27th, when Lee's troops were near Chambersburg and Hooker's army had all crossed the Potomac and were far away in Maryland, his two columns were at Burke's and Fairfax Stations. Following in the rear of the Union army he reached Drainesville on the day the Sixth Corps left it, and discovered the important fact that Hooker instead of waiting to have his flank turned had moved off, Stuart did not know.
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where. Under the impression however that the Union troops were marching in force toward Lees- burg, he, with great difficulty, crossed the Potomac near Drainesville, intending to rejoin Lee by marching through Maryland. He was simply following in the rear of Hooker's army, who had two days the start of him.
Ignorant of the ridiculous position he was in, his troopers began to pick up small detachments of Union soldiers, capturing wagon trains, creating a panic among teamsters, and committing depredations almost within sight of the Capital. On his northward march he did considerable damage to railroad tracks and bridges, and burdened himself with a long train of captured wagons, filled with supplies of all kinds, and with which he was anxious to get to Lee's lines. But he was ignorant of its whereabouts, and on the 29th moved toward Westminster, where he was confronted by a squadron of Union cavalry, who stoutly contested his advance, and inflicted considerable loss upon him before they gave way. On the 30th Stuart started for Hanover, hoping to find Early there or to get some information as to his whereabouts, but as he ascended the small hills overlooking the town, to his dismay he saw a column of Union cavalry marching through the place, going north. Here was a dilemma. Retreat was out of the question, and as he seemed to be sur- rounded by enemies in whatever direction he moved, he determined, with becoming audacity, to attack Kilpatrick's column, and gain possession of the Gettys-
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burg Road. His encounter with Kilpatrick, at first successful, was turned into defeat by the timely arrival of reinforcements, and taking a more easterly route he marched his men all night long, arriving in Dover on the morning of the first, only to learn that Early had occupied all that territory but had departed suddenly. Moving on the afternoon of the Ist of July to Carlisle he encountered General W. F. Smith's troops from Harrisburg, who had taken possession of the town, and remaining only long enough to demand its surrender under threat of bombardment he started for Gettys- burg where he arrived on the afternoon of the 2d of July, and greeted his chief for the first time in seven days. His men were worn out and exhausted after their long, arduous and fatiguing journey.
In thus digressing to follow Stuart in his erratic movement and bewildering surprises, the regular course of events with the main bodies of troops have been interrupted. The orders for the Union army for June 28th directed the First Corps to Frederick City, the Second to Monocacy Junction, the Third to Woodsboro, the Sixth to Hyattstown, the Eleventh to Middletown, and the Twelfth to Frederick City. The contemplated movement on the rear of Lee's army was thus abandoned, by the refusal of General Halleck to permit the troops at Harper's Ferry to be placed under Hooker's control and that officer resigned his command, which was promptly accepted.
It is very evident that the removal of General Hooker was a subject that had for some time been
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in contemplation by the government. He was delib- erately refused every important thing he asked for, and realizing that without the active support and cooperation of the government, the army would be crippled in an encounter with the enemy, he promptly resigned. The feeling of the government as it existed toward Hooker is fully explained in the following extract from Mr. Blaine's "Twenty Years in Con- gress " :
" The indispensable requisite to Union success was a commander for the Army of the Potomac in whose competency the administration, the people, and most of all the soldiers, would have confidence. In the judg- ment of military men it was idle to entrust another battle to the generalship of Hooker, and as the army moved across Maryland, General Hooker was relieved and the command of the army assigned to General George G. Meade."
General Hooker would evidently have been relieved had he not resigned, but it was clearly a mistake to have retained him so long in command without giving him the support and cooperation he deserved. His request for the utilization of the forces at Harper's Ferry was refused. General Meade was permitted to use them without a murmur. The Pennsylvania Reserves, refused to Hooker, joined Meade on the march. In fact Meade, whose competency to com- mand had yet to be proved, who had yet to win the confidence of the soldiers as a leader, was to be as strenuously upheld in all his acts as Hooker had been
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repressed. The difficulty of choosing a successor to Hooker had for some time been a source of trouble to the Secretary of War, and it is related that when the messenger whom Secretary Stanton had sent with the order putting Meade in command of the army, returned, the Secretary was impressed with the great fact that General Meade, while he had no desire to succeed to the command of the army, made no com- ment on the removal of Hooker. This may or may not be true, but General Meade very wisely made no change in the personal staff, retaining that of General Hooker's as his own.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE ALARM IN THE NORTH-NEW JERSEY'S GOVERNOR APPEALS TO THE PRESIDENT-THE NEW UNION COMMANDER-MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMIES-REMI- NISCENSES OF AN OFFICER OF THE SECOND NEW JERSEY BRIGADE-THE THIRTEENTH NEW JERSEY AT LITTLESTOWN -THE NIGHT BEFORE THE BATTLE.
T HE alarm which prevailed in Pennsylvania when Jenkins made his raid of the 17th subsided on his return to Williamsport, only to break out afresh and with increased anxiety when the forward movement of Lee's army began in earnest. The Twenty-third New Jersey Regiment had returned home and on the 27th of June was mustered out; the Twenty-Seventh Regi- ment remained until the 26th of June when it left Harrisburg for Newark, where it was mustered out on July 2d; the militia under Captain Murphy had received orders from Governor Parker to return, but the changed situation caused him to remain until all danger was over. With Longstreet and Hill at Cham- bersburg, Ewell with two divisions at Carlisle while Early was moving toward York, destroying the
BVT. MAJOR-GEN. WILLIAM J. SEWELL, Colonel Com'd'g 5th Regt. N. J. Vols., Inf. (From Photograph Since the War.)
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Northern Central railroad, and levying contributions on the people, and Jenkins with a large cavalry force moving directly on Harrisburg, the invasion assumed immense proportions.
The finest agricultural region of the North lay at the mercy of the rebel army. If Lee's horses laughed and his men became merry at the bounteous plenty which surrounded them they met their Bartholomew a few days later. The tendency to pillage and destroy was great, and many unnecessary burdens were placed upon these peaceful people ; but war is a terrible, earnest thing, and General Lee endeavored to mitigate its severities by issuing strict orders as to the manner in which supplies should be taken. If the revengeful spirits of his men overcame their respect for their commander's instructions, that was a matter beyond his immediate control.
Governor Curtin called anew for troops and issued a proclamation for the raising of sixty thousand men. Vain call. There were no arms with which to supply so large an army except old flint locks and shot-guns, and the time was short for the proper organizing of such a host. But some came. New York, West Virginia and Philadelphia responded, and additional appeals were made to New Jersey for aid. The attempt to muster into the United States service all the troops which had volunteered for the emergency, seemed to Governor Parker a serious thing, as it would take from his control the militia of the State then serving in Pennsylvania, and his own fears that New
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Jersey was imperilled led him to telegraph to Presi- dent Lincoln direct as follows :
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, TRENTON, June 29, 1863.
To the President of the United States :
The people of New Jersey are apprehensive that the invasion of the enemy may extend to her soil. We think that the enemy should be driven from Pennsyl- vania. There is now certainly a great apathy under such fearful circumstances. That apathy should be removed. The people of New Jersey want McClellan at the head of the Army of the Potomac. If that can- not be done, then we ask that he may be put at the head of the New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania troops now in Pennsylvania defending these middle States from invasion. If either appointment be made the people will rise en masse.
I feel it my duty, respectfully, to communicate this state of feeling to you.
JOEL PARKER.
The President replied as follows :
WASHINGTON, June 30, 1863. To Governor Parker :
Your dispatch of yesterday received. I really think the attitude of the enemy's army in Pennsylvania presents us the best opportunity we have had since the war begun.
I think you will not see the foe in New Jersey.
I beg you to be assured that no one out of my
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position can know so well, as if he were in it, the difficulties and involvements of replacing General McClellan in command, and this aside from any impu- tations upon him.
Please accept my sincere thanks for what you have done and are doing to get troops forward.
A. LINCOLN.
The invasion, however, came to an abrupt and sud- den termination. On the 28th of June General Lee had been reliably informed of the presence of the Army of the Potomac at Frederick. This was startling news, as he had supposed that that army was still south of the Potomac, held in check by the ambitious and dar- ing Stuart. He saw at once that his communications were endangered, and, as Hooker had predicted, an attack in Lee's rear would compel him to turn back and give battle, or at least bring the invasion to an end. Realizing the great peril of his position he determined upon the no less bold and audacious plan of threatening Baltimore, and thus he simply did what General Meade was preparing to meet, though not exactly in the manner in which he was compelled to. Lee at once sent couriers to all his corps commanders to concentrate their troops at Gettysburg, and on the 29th the rebel columns headed southward.
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