USA > New Jersey > The history of New Jersey, from its discovery by Europeans, to the adoption of the federal Constitution > Part 34
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The whole of the English force having at length arrived, General Howe indicated his intention to remove to Long Island-a battle for its possession became inevitable. To this selection he was induced by its abundant pro- duct of the supplies which his forces required. He landed on the 22d of August, between the small towns, Utrecht and Gravesend, without opposi- tion; Colonel Hand, with a Pennsylvania regiment, retiring before him to the woody heights commanding the pass leading through Flatbush to the works at Brooklyn. Lord Cornwallis immediately marched to seize this pass, but finding it occupied, took post in the village.
VII. On the 25th of August, Major-general Putnam took command at Brooklyn, with a reinforcement of six regiments. On the same day, Gene- ral de Hleister landed with two brigades of' Hessians; and on the next, took post at Flatbush. In the evening, Lord Cornwallis drew off to Flatland. General Washington passed the day at Brooklyn, making arrangements for the approaching action, and returned at night to New York.
The Hessians, under de Heister, composed the centre of the British army at Flatbush; Major-general Grant commanded the left wing extending to the coast; and the greater part of the forces, under General Clinton, Earl Percy, and Lord Cornwallis, turning to the right, approached the opposite shore at Flatland.
The armies were now separated by the range of hills already mentioned. The British centre was scarce four miles from the American lines, at Brook- lyn. A direct road, from the one to the other, led across the heights. Another, but more circuitous road ran from Flatbush, by the way of Bedford,
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a small village on the Brooklyn side of the hills. The right and left wings of the British were' nearly equidistant, five or six miles from the American works. The road from the Narrows, along the coast, and by Gowan's Cove, was the most direct route to their left; and their right might either return by the way of Flatbush, and unite with the centre, or take a more circuitous course, and enter a road leading from Jamaica to Bedford. These roads united between Bedford and Brooklyn, a small distance in front of the American lines.
In the hills, on the direct road from Flatbush to Brooklyn, near the for- mer, the Americans had reared a fortress, which had a body of troops with several pieces of artillery, for its defence. The coast and Bedford roads were guarded by detachments, posted on the hills, within view of the English camp, which were relieved daily, and were engaged in obstructing the ways by which the enemy might advance. General Woodhull, with the militia of Long Island, was ordered to take post on the high grounds, as near the enemy as possible; but he remained at Jamaica, scarcely recognising the authority of the officer commanding on the island. Light parties of volun- teers patrolled the road from Jamaica to Bedford; about two miles from which, near Flatbush, Colonel Miles, of Pennsylvania, was stationed with a regiment of riflemen.
On the 26th, Colonel Lutz, of the Pennsylvania militia, commanded on the coast road ; and Colonel Williams, from New England, on the road leading from Flatbush to Bedford. Colonel Miles, with his regiment, remained where he had been, originally, placed. About nine at night, General Clin- ton, silently drew the van of the army from Flatland, in order to seize a pass in the heights, about three miles east of Bedford, on the Jamaica road. In the morning of the 27th, about two hours before day, within a half mile of the pass, he captured an American party, which had been stationed on the road, to give notice of the approach of the enemy. He possessed himself of the unoccupied pass, and with the morning light, the whole cohunn passed the heights, and advanced into the level country between thein and Brooklyn. They were immediately followed by another column, under Lord Percy. Before Clinton had secured the pass, General Grant proceeded along the coast, with the left wing, and ten pieces of cannon. As his first object was to draw the attention of the Americans from their left, he moved slowly, skirmishing with the light parties in his front.
As it had been determined to defend the passes through the hills, General Putnam, apprized of these movements, reinforced his advance parties, and as the enemy gained ground, employed stronger detachments on this service. About three o'clock in the morning, Brigadier-general Lord Stirling, with the two nearest regiments, was directed to meet the enemy, on the road lead- ing from the Narrows. Major-general Sullivan, who commanded all the troops without the lines, proceeded at the head of a considerable body of New Englandmen, on the road leading directly to Flatbush, while another detachment occupied the heights between that place and Bedford.
About break of' day, Lord Stirling reached the summit of the hills, where he was joined by the troops which had been already engaged, and were re- tiring slowly before the enemy, who almost immediately appeared in sight. Having posted his men advantageously, a warm cannonade commenced on both sides, which continued several hours; and some sharp, but not very close skirmishing took place between the infantry. Lord Stirling being anxious, only, to defend the pass, could not descend in force from the heights; and General Grant did not wish to drive him thence, until the part of the - plan intrusted to Sir Henry Clinton, should be executed.
2 D
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In the centre, De Heister, soon after daylight, began to cannonade the troops under Sullivan; but did not remove from Flatbush, until the British right had approached the left and rear of the American line. In the mean time, the more effectually to draw attention from the point where the grand attack was intended, the fleet was put in motion, and a heavy cannonade commenced on the battery at Red Hook.
About half past eight o'clock, the British right having then reached Bed- ford, in the rear of Sullivan's left, De Heister ordered Colonel Donop's corps to advance to the attack of the hill, following himself with the centre. The approach of Clinton was now discovered by the American left, which imme- diately endeavoured to regain the camp at Brooklyn. They were retiring from the woods by regiments, with their cannon, when they encountered the front of the British, consisting of the light infantry and light dragoons, who were soon supported by the guards. About the same time, the Hessians advanced from Flatbush, against that part of the detachment which occupied the direct road to Brooklyn .* Ilere General Sullivan commanded in per- son; but he found it difficult to make his troops sustain the first attack. The firing towards Bedford had disclosed to them the alarming fact, that the British had turned their left flank, and were getting into their rear. Per- ceiving, at once, their danger, they sought to escape, by regaining the camp with the utmost celerity. The sudden route of this party enabled De Heister to detach a part of his force against that engaged near Bedford. In that quarter, too, the Americans were broken and driven back into the woods, and the front of the column led by General Clinton, continuing to move for- ward, intercepted and engaged those who were retreating along the direct road from Flatbush. Thus attacked in front and rear, and alternately driven by the British on the Hessians, and by the Hessians on the British, a succes- sion of skirmishes took place in the woods, in the course of which, some parts of corps forced their way through the enemy, and regained the lines of Brooklyn, and several individuals saved themselves under cover of the forest ; but a greater proportion of the detachment was killed or taken. The fugitives were pursued to the American works, and such was the ardour of the British soldiery, that their cautious commander could scarce prevent an immediate assault.
The fire towards Brooklyn gave the first intimation to the American right, that the enemy had gained their rear. Lord Stirling perceived that he could escape only by instantly retreating across the creek, near the Yellow Mills, not far from the cove. Orders to this effect were immediately given, and the more effectually to secure the retreat of the main body of the de- . tachment, he determined to attack, in person, a corps of the British, under Lord Cornwallis, stationed at a house somewhat above the place at which he proposed crossing the creek. About four hundred of Smallwood's regiment were drawn out for this purpose, and the assault was made with great spirit. This small corps was brought several times to the charge, and Lord Stirling was on the point of dislodging Lord Cornwallis, when the force in his front increasing, and General Grant also advancing on his rear, he could no lon- ger oppose the superior numbers which assailed him, on every quarter; and the survivors of this brave party, with their general, became prisoners of war. This bold and well judged attempt, though unsuccessful, was not without its advantages; giving an opportunity to a large part of the detach- ment, to save themselves by crossing the creek.
The loss sustained by the American army on this occasion was conside- rable, but could not be accurately ascertained. Numbers were supposed to
* General Howe's Letter.
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have been drowned in the creek, or suffocated in the marsh; and exact ac- counts from the militia could not be procured. General Washington did not admit it to exceed a thousand men, but in this estimate he could only have included the regular troops. General Howe states the prisoners to have amounted to one thousand and ninety-seven, among whom were Major-gene- ral Sullivan, and Brigadiers Lord Stirling, and Woodhull, by him named Udell. He computes the loss of the Americans at three thousand three hun- dred, but this computation is, probably, excessive. He supposes too, that the troops engaged on the heights, amounted to ten thousand; but it is impossi- ble they could have much exceeded half that number. His own loss, he states at twenty-one officers, and three hundred and forty-six privates killed, wounded, and taken.
As the action became warm, General Washington passed over to the camp at Brooklyn, where he saw with inexpressible anguish, the destruction in which his best troops were involved, and from which it was impossible to ex- tricate them. He could direct his efforts only to the preservation of those which remained.
Believing the Americans to be much stronger than they were in reality, and unwilling to commit any thing to hazard, General Hlowe made no imme- diate attempt to force their lines. He encamped in front, and on the twenty. eighth, at night, broke ground in form, within six hundred yards of a redoubt on the left.
VIII. Successful resistance to the victorious enemy being now hopeless, and the American troops, lying in the lines without shelter from the heavy rains, becoming daily more dispirited, the resolution was taken to withdraw the army from Long Island. This difficult movement was effected on the night of the 28th, with such silence and despatch, that all the troops and military stores, with a greater part of the provisions, and all the artillery ex- cept some heavy pieces, which, in the state of the roads, could not be drawn, were carried over in safety. Early the next morning, the British outposts perceived the rear-guard crossing the East river, out of reach of their fire. If the attempt to defend Long Island, so disastrous in its issue, impeach the judgment of the commander-in-chief, his masterly retreat, justly, added to his reputation among military men.
IX. But the -effect of this defeat was most injurious to the American cause. It took from the troops the confidence which preceding events had created, and planted in its place, a dread of the enemy, to whom the perfec- tion of military skill was now ascribed.
In a letter from General Washington to Congress, the state of the army, after this event, was thus feelingly described. "Our situation is truly dis- tressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo, has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled their minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utinost efforts to a brave and manly opposition, in order to repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off, in some instances, almost by whole regiments, in many, by half' ones, and by companies at a time. This circumstance of itself, inde- pendent of others, when fronted by a well appointed enemy, superior in num- ber to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable: but when it is added, that their example has infected another party of the army; that their want of discipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government, have rendered a like conduct but too common in the whole; and have produced an entire disregard of that order and subordination neces- sary for the well doing of an army, and which had been before inculcated as well as the nature of our military establishment would admit; our condition
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is still more alarming, and with the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops.
" All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained, and which I, more than once, in my letters, took the liberty of mentioning to Congress; that no dependance could be put in a militia, or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations have hitherto prescribed. I am persuaded, and am as fully convinced as of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must, of necessity, be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence be left to any but a permanent army.
" Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops, as would be competent to every exigency, far exceed that which is incurred by calling in daily succours, and new enlistments, which when effected, are not attended with any good consequences. Men who have been free, and subject to no control, cannot be reduced to order in an instant; and the pri- vileges and exemptions they claim, and will have, influence the conduct of others in such a manner, that the aid derived from them is nearly counter- balanced by the disorder, irregularity. and confusion they occasion."
The frequent remonstrances of the commander-in-chief, the opinions of all military men, and the severe correcting hand of experience, at length, produced their effect on the government of the union; and soon after the defeat on Long Island, it had been referred to the committee composing the board of war, to prepare a plan of operations for the next succeeding campaign. Their report, which was adopted, proposed a permanent army to be enlisted for the war, and to be composed of eighty-eight battalions, to be raised by the several states in proportion to their ability .* As induce- ments to enlist, a bounty of twenty dollars was allowed to each recruit, and small portions of vacant latals promised to every officer and soldier."t
. X. Lord Howe, in his character of commissioner, sought, immediately, to avail himself of the impression, which he supposed the victory of the twenty- seventh might have made on Congress. For this purpose, General Sullivan was sent on parole, to Philadelphia, with a verbal message, purporting, that though his lordship could not, at present, treat with Congress as a political body, yet he was desirous to conter with some of its members, as private gentlemen, and to meet them at such place as they would appoint: That, with General Howe, he had full powers to compromise the dispute between Great Britain and America : the obtaining of which had delayed him near two months in England, and prevented his arrival at New York before the declaration of independence: That he wished a compact to be settled, at . this time, when no decisive blow was struck, and neither party could feel compulsion to enter into an agreement : That, if Congress were disposed to treat, many things which they had not yet asked, might, and ought to be, granted; and that if, upon conference, there should be a probability of accommodation, the authority of Congress would be recognised, as indispen- sable to the completion of the compact.
This proposition was embarrassing. Absolute rejection might give colour to the opinion, that, if independence were waved, restoration of the ancient connexion, on principles, formerly deemed constitutional, was practicable;
* New Hampshire 3, Massachusetts 15, Rhode Island 2, Connecticut 8, New York 4, New Jersey 4, Pennsylvania 12, Delaware 1, Maryland 3, Virginia 15, North Caro- lina 9, South Carolina 6, Georgia I .- es.
t To a colonel 500 acres, lieutenant-colonel 450, major 400, captain 300, lieutenant 200, ensign 150, and a non-commissioned officer or private 100 acres.
The resolution was afterwards changed so as to give the option to enlist for three years, or during the war. Those enlisting for three years not to be entitled to land.
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whilst to enter upon negotiation under existing circumstances might impair confidence, in the determination of Congress, to maintain the independence they had declared. The difficulty was, in a measure, surmounted by the reply, " that Congress, being the representatives of the free and independent states of America, could not, with propriety, send any of its members to con- fer with his lordship in their private characters; but, that ever desirous of establishing peace upon reasonable terms, they would send a committee of their body, to know whether he had authority to treat with persons autho- rized by Congress for that purpose, on behalf of America ; and what that authority is; and to hear such propositions as he shall think proper to make respecting the same." General Washington was, at the same time, instruct- ed, that no proposition for peace ought to be regarded, unless made in writing, and addressed to the representatives of the United States in Con- gress, or to persons authorized by them; and that if application were made to him, on the subject, by any of the British commanders, he should inform them, that the United States having entered into the war, only, for the de- fence of their lives and liberties, would cheerfully agree to peace on reasona- ble terms, whenever it should be so proposed to them. These resolutions had the appearance of maintaining independence, without making it the con- dition of peace.
Dr. Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge, the committee of Con- gress, met Lord Howe on Staten Island. The conference was fruitless. The committee, in their report, gave a summary of its matter, saying, "It did not appear, that his lordship's commission contained any other anthority than that expressed in the act of Parliament; namely, that of granting par- dons, with such exceptions as the commissioners should think proper to make; and of declaring America, or any part of it, to be in the King's peace on submission : for as to the power of inquiring into the state of America, which his lordship mentioned to us, and of conferring and consulting with any per- sons the commissioners might think proper, and representing the result of conversation to the ministry, who, provided the colonists would subject them- selves, might, after all, or might not, at their pleasure, make any alterations in the former instructions to governors, or propose, in Parliament, any amendment of the acts complained of; we apprehended any expectation from the effect of such a power, would have been too uncertain and precarious to be relied on by America, had she still continued in her state of dependence."
XI. A council of war, convoked by Washington, resolved to act on the defensive, and not to risk the army for the state of New York; but a middle line between abandonment and defence, was, for a short time, adopted. The public stores were removed to Dobb's Ferry, about twenty-six miles from New York. Twelve thousand men were ordered to the northern ex- tremity of York Island, and four thousand five hundred returned for the de- fence of the city : the remainder occupied the intermediate space, with direc- tions to support the city or the camp, at King's Bridge, as exigencies might require. As it was impossible to determine where the British would attempt to land, it was necessary, pursuant to the system of procrastination, and the determination to gain time to raise works for defence at various points. At length, (September 12th) another council of war directed the abandonment of the city. General Mercer, who commanded the flying camp on the Jersey shore, also, moved np the North river, to a post opposite Fort Washington.
On the fifteenth General Howe commenced to land his forces, under cover of some ships of war, on the East river, between Kipp's and Turtle Bays. The works, at this point, were capable of defence for some time; but the troops, stationed in them, terrified at the fire from the ships, abandoned them without waiting an attack, and fled with precipitation. When the cannonade
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had commenced, the brigades of Generals Parsons and Fellows were put in motion, and marched to the support of the lines, and General Washington, himself, rode towards the scene of action. The panic of the fugitives, from the works, was communicated to the advancing troops, and the commander- in-chief, had the extreme mortification to meet the whole retreating in the utmost disorder, despite the great efforts of their generals to check the dis- graceful flight; and whilst he, himself, attempted to rally them, a small corps of the enemy coming in sight, they again broke and fled in the utmost con- fusion. The usually firm and equable mind of this admirable man, seems, on this occasion, to have been swayed by a gust of natural passion ; and for the first, and perhaps, the only time, he despaired of the cause in which he had embarked his fortune, his life, and his fame. In the rear of his das- tardly troops, with his face to the enemy, he appeared willing to bury the pangs of the present, and the dreaded infamy of the future, in an honourable grave. His aids and friends, who surrounded his person, by indirect vio- lence, compelled him to retire, and preserved a life, perhaps, indispensable to the independence of his country .*
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The only part remaining to be taken after this dereliction, was to withdraw the few remaining troops from New York, and to secure the posts on the heights. For the latter purpose, the lines were instantly manned, but no attempt was made on them. The retreat from New York was effected with an inconsiderable loss of men, in a skirmish at Bloomingdale; but all the heavy artillery, and a large portion of the baggage, provisions, and military stores, were unavoidably abandoned. No part of this loss was more severely felt, than that of the tents. In this shameful day, one colonel, one captain, three subalterns, and ten privates, were certainly killed; one lieutenant- colonel, one captain, and one hundred and fifty-seven privates were missing. The conduct of the troops on this occasion, calls for remarks which are alike applicable to the prior and subsequent armies of the United States. They had not the experience which teaches the veteran to do his duty, wherever he may be placed; in the assurance, that others will likewise do theirs; and to rely, that those who direct the whole will not expose him to useless hazard nor neglect those precautions which the safety of the whole may require.t
Unfortunately, there existed in many parts of the army, other causes beside the shortness of the terms of enlistment, and the inefficiency of the militia, which prevented the acquisition of these military sentiments. In New Eng- land, whence the war had been principally supported, the zeal excited by the revolution had taken such a direction, as in a great measure to abolish those distinctions between the platoon officers and the soldiers, which are indispen- sable to the formation of an efficient army. Many of these officers, here, as in other parts of the union. were elected by the men, and were, consequently, disposed to associate with them on the footing of equality. In some instances, those were chosen who had agreed to put their pay in common stock with that of the soldiers, and to divide equally with them. It is not cause of wonder, that among such officers, the most disgraceful and unmilitary prac- tices should sometimes prevail ; nor that privates should fail in respect, sub-
* Ramsay's American Revolution, vol. i. p. 392. Mr. Marshall does not notice, to affirm or deny, this statement of Mr. Ramsay. If the suppression have been made for the purpose of aggrandizing the hero of the biographer, it is reprehensible .- The office of apotheosis belongs to the poet or the slave. It is above or below the historian. . And no human character can suffer less, from full disclosure, than that of General Washington. Such shades, as this, are but the foil of the brilliant, serv- ing to perfect its lustre. Such instances of weakness, improve the exemplar which his life affords. Were it marked by unvarying wisdom, it would be rejected in despair, as unattainable.
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