USA > New Jersey > The history of New Jersey, from its discovery by Europeans, to the adoption of the federal Constitution > Part 42
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XXXVIII. These fortunate affairs had the most important consequences. The whole Mohawk country was liberated from the foe-the Americans were at liberty to unite the whole of their forces in the northern department against Burgoyne-the militia and continental troops recovered confidence in them- selves-the opinion prevailed, that the enemy was already beaten, and that the assembling of the great body of the militia, only, was necessary to compel him to yield his arms. The disaffected became timid, and the wavering were no longer disposed to join an army whose capture was doomed. But other causes, also, united to produce the great result. Vengeance for the barbarities of the savages, fired every breast, and overcame the terror they had created; the last reinforcements of continental troops had arrived-the harvest which had detained the militia was gathered, and General Gates had succeeded the unfortunate, unpopular, but meritorious Schuyler .*
XXXIX. Notwithstanding these disasters, Burgoyne adhered to his original purpose. By a slow and toilsome mode, having collected provisions from Fort George, sufficient for thirty days, he crossed the Hudson with his whole army on the 14th September, and encamped on the heights and plains of Saratoga, with the determination of deciding in a general engagement, the fate of the expedition ..
Gates had removed his camp from the islands at the mouth of the Mohawk. to the neighbourhood of Stillwater. On the 17th, Burgoyne encamped within four miles of the American army; and, the interval being employed in the necessary repair of bridges between the two camps, on the 19th, a general engagement was fought, which terminated only with the day, and was in every respect favourable to the Americans. Beside the actual loss in battle, the Indians, Canadians, and provincialists, deserted in great numbers. The next day, intelligence was received from the north, which gave additional ani- mation to the Americans. Detachments from General Lincoln's force had been sent against the forts on the lakes, and Colonel Brown had succeeded in capturing Mount Defiance, Mount Hope, the old French lines, the landing, and about two hundred batteaux at the north end of Lake George; and with the loss of only three killed, and five wounded, had liberated one hundred American prisoners, and taken two hundred and ninety-three British. This success was magnified into the reduction of Ticonderoga, and Mount Inde- pendence; but the attempt on these posts had been repulsed.
The armies retained their positions at Stillwater, until the 7th Oct .; Bur-
* August 21.
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goyne, in hopes of relief, which had been promised him before the 12th, by Sir Henry Clinton, from New York; and Gates in gathering in the militia of the country. At length, the British general being obliged to diminish the rations of his men, resolved on another trial of strength with his adversary. This, like the preceding battle, was maintained until night, and the advantage was, again, decisively, with the Americans. Burgoyne was compelled to change his position, in order to avoid the renewal of the action, on the next day, with part of his works in possesion of the assailants. Ile subsequently retired to Saratoga, and endcavoured to open the road to Fort Edward. But bring surrounded, and his provisions reduced to a three days' supply, even at short allowance, he was constrained by the most humiliating necessity, to open a negotiation with the American general, and finally to surrender himself and his army, prisoners of war, upon condition, that he should march out of his camp with the usual honours, with permission to return to England, but not to serve against the United States until exchanged .* At the time of the con- vention, the American force amounted to 9093 continental troops, and 4129 militia; but the sick exceeded 2500 men. The British force was 5752; hav- ing been reduced since it left Ticonderoga, 3248 men. In addition to this very great military force, the British lost, and the Americans acquired a fine train of artillery, seven thousand stand of excellent arms, clothing for seven thousand recruits, with tents, and other military stores, to a very considera- ble amount.
XL. During these important events, Sir Henry Clinton had endeavoured. not very judiciously, certainly, to assist Burgoyne, by his operations in the south. He succeeded in capturing the forts in the Highlands, and in re- moving the obstructions to the passage of the North river. But so much time was spent in burning the continental villages, and Esopus, and in de- vastating the country, that he was too late to save or serve his countryman. Upon the capture of Burgoyne, the troops employed in this odious service returned to New York, having inflicted much injury upon the Americans, and added new intensity to their hatred; but, having done no good, to their own cause.
About the same time, the British, who had been left in the rear of Bur- goyne, destroying their stores, and abandoning their cannon, retreated to Ca- nada, leaving the country, so late the seat of furious war, restored to perfect tranquillity.
XLI. The effect produced by the capture of this whole British army was of the highest importance, in three points of view. It established, incontesta- bly, the ability of the United States to maintain their independence: and though the contest might be prolonged, its ultimate result was no longer doubtful. It created doubts in Great Britain of the success in the war-and it taught foreigners to confide in, and confiding, to aid, the exertions of the States.
XLII. The captured army was marched to the vicinity of Boston, where some difficulties in procuring proper quarters for the officers, induced a re- monstrance from the General to Gates, in which he observed-" the public faith is broken." This expression led Congress to believe, that, if liberated, the troops would immediately join the British garrisons in America: and they passed a resolution suspending the embarkation, till a distinct and ex- plicit ratification of the convention of Saratoga should be properly notified by the court of Great Britain. This event did not take place for many months. during which the troops continued prisoners.
* October 13.
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CHAPTER XV.
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Campaign of 1778 .- I. Condition of the Army at the Valley Forge and at the com- mencement of the Campaign .- II. British foraging excursions in New Jersey. -III. Fortunate escape of an advance party under La Fayette -IV. Effect of the American successes abroad-Efforts of American Agents .- V. Measures for Foreign Alliances-Duplicity of France-Treaties with her .- VI. War between Great Britain and France .- VII. Opinions in Great Britain-Ministerial mea- sures .- VIII. Reception of those measures in America .- IX. Arrival of a French Minister Plenipotentiary .- X. The British Army evacuates Philadelphia-March through Jersey .- XI. Battle of Monmouth-British Army regain's New York .- XII. Arrival of the French Fleet-proceeds to Rhode Island .- XIII. Attempt on Newport-Appearance of the English Fleet-French and English Fleets put to Sea-dispersed by Storm .- XIV. British Incursions in Connecticut .- XV. Dis- position of the American Army .- XVI. British Incursions into New Jersey .- XVII. Movements of the adverse Fleets-Detachment against the Southern States .- XVIII. American Army retires to winter quarters-Its improved con- dition .- XIX. Indian devastations-Massacre at Wyoming .- XX. Operations against the Indians .- XXI. Discontent in the Jersey line .- XXII. March of Ge- neral Sullivan to the Indian country-Events there,-XXIII. Expedition under Colonel Broadhead by the Allegheny River .- XXIV. Expedition against the Cherokees under General Pickens .- XXV. Unprovoked Slaughter of the Indians at Muskingum.
I. During the winter of 1777, 1778, the condition of the American army at the Valley Forge was one of great peril and suffering; requiring all the attractive powers of the cause and of the general in command, to preserve that army from dissolution. Every department was imperfectly organized. But the want of system and experience was no where more visible than in those of the quartermaster and the commissariat. Stores of the first neces- sity, invaluable from their scarcity, were carelessly abandoned, lost, or em- bezzled ; and in a plentiful country, the troops were in danger of perishing for want of food. Tempting opportunities of annoying the enemy were frequently lost from the absolute impossibility of supplying the parties de- tailed with the indispensable provisions. Several times, during the winter, the soldiers were days without meat; and vegetables and other articles, indispensable to health, were almost unknown to them. The subsistence of an army, and the agents engaged in it, should be as dependent on. and responsible to, the commander-in-chief, as its military movements, and the officers who conduct them ; and the negligence, fraud, or sluggishness of the commissary should be as promptly and severely punishable as the coward- ice or treachery of the combatant. But this dependence was denied by that passion for engrossing power, and the jealousy which refuses it to others, in- herent in popular assemblies. Congress would relinquish no powers which it could, itself, exercise. Early in the war, the office of commissary-general had been conferred upon Colonel Trumbull, of Connecticut, a gentleman well qualified for its duties, but who, notwithstanding, having to struggle through the difficulties of inexperience and original organization, could not fulfil them with universal satisfaction. The remedy resorted to by Congress increased the disease. They rendered his subordinates independent of the head, and made them accountable only to their body. Disgusted with a system, which subjected him to all the danger of responsibility, without the means of pro- tection and indemnity, Mr. Trumbull threw up his commission. Conse- quently, the army was subjected to the dread, and, not unfrequently, to the pain, of famine. Relief was to be obtained only by compulsory military .
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quisitions, and the whole country within seventy miles of head quarters was, by the resolutions of Congress, placed at the disposition of the commander- in-chief, whereon to levy whatever might be necessary for his army. That patriotism which rises and expends itself in sudden ebullition, is of ordinary growth-is a fever contagious in crowds-whilst that which endures under the deprivation of food and raiment, amid the severities of winter, and the perils of disease and battle, is as rare as it is estimable-but it is not so rare as that, which in the non-combatant, withstands the forcible, hourly, hope- less, unremunerated drain of the purse. Against the exactions, therefore, of the army, even the friendly farmer or dealer opposed the resources of his cunning; and though he did not furnish supplies to the enemy who tempted him with gold, he concealed them from his friends who could pay for them, at best, in almost worthless paper, and frequently, only, in naked. promises. But many, very many, had not the negative merit of forbearing to supply the foc; in despite of the unceasing efforts of the American army, they car- ried large quantities of provisions to British quarters. General Washington could obtain relief, only, by the strenuous exertions of his best officers. Ge- neral Greene, with a strong detachment, searched the surrounding country. Captain Lee and Captain M'Lane, excellent partisans, were despatched to Delaware and Maryland, and Colonel Tilghman into New Jersey-at the same time Washington urged upon the executives of the several states, to exert themselves for the army and the nation. But the appointment of General Greene to the office of commissary general, under the immediate di- rection of the commander-in-chief, in March, 1777, was the most efficient remedy.
The sufferings of the troops for want of proper clothing, was not less than from want of food. Their deplorable condition, in this respect, disabled them from keeping the field. The returns of the first of February, exhibit the astonishing number of three thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine men, in camp, unfit for duty, for want of clothes ; of whom, scare one had shoes. Even among those returned, capable of duty, very many were so badly clad, that exposure to the colds of the season, must have destroyed them. Although the total of the army then exceeded seventeen thousand men, the effective rank and file, amounted, only, to five thousand and twelve. Nakedness amid frost, unhealthy food, and hunger, filled the hospitals with patients. In these miserable receptacles, death was most frequently found by those who sought for health. The provision made for them, at all times inadequate to their wants, was misapplied. They were crowded in small apartments, and a violent putrid fever raged among them, destroying more than all the other diseases of the camp. Had the British army, at this season, taken the field, it might, though with great suffering to itself, have compelled the American general, either to fight with inferior numbers, and to stake his army upon a battle, or to retreat further into the country; which could not have been effected without great loss, with his naked and barefooted soldiers.
Happily, the real condition of this army was not fully known to Sir William Howe. The present position had been assumed for the purpose of covering the country of Pennsylvania, protecting the magazines laid up in it, and cut- ting off the supplies of the British army. The plan extended no further than to guard, with the militia, the north of the Schuylkill, and the east of the Delaware, so as to restrain the people of the country from carrying in their provisions to market, to which they were irresistibly allured, by specie pay- ments. These objects were, in a great measure, though not effectually, gained; nor, however, without occasionally inflicting personal chastisement upon delinquents.
II. In the species of war which this state of things produced, the advan.
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tage was with the British, who, being unassailable in their quarters, and possessing the command of the Delaware, might, at any time, ravage the coast of Jersey, before assistance could be rendered by the continental troops. The resistance of the militia was inconsiderable, and scarce ex- pected. Yet the wants of such a number of persons and horses, required a greater supply of fresh provisions and forage than could be procured, by light parties or ordinary means. And as the spring opened, with the design to relieve their own army, and to distress that of the United States, about the middle of March, Colonel Mahwood and Major Simcoe were detached into Jersey, at the head of about twelve hundred men. They landed at Salem, and dispersed the small bodies of militia stationed in that part of the country, under Colonels Hand and Holme. The militia were posted at Quinton's Bridge, Alloways' Creek, over which it was supposed the British would endeavour to force a passage. Their numbers being unequal to an effectual resistance, it was only intended to keep the enemy in some check, until they should be reinforced. A judicious plan to sur- prise them, was skilfully executed by Major Simcoe, one of the best par- tisans in the British service, and their guard was cut to pieces. The loss of the militia, in several skirmishes, in killed and taken, was between fifty and sixty.
General Washington had received carly intelligence of this expedition, which he communicated to Governor Livingston, with a request, that he would immediately order out the militia in force, to join Colonel Shreve, whose regiment was detached into Jersey to aid in protecting the country. The governor could not bring his militia with sufficient expedition into the field. The Legislature had neglected to make provision for paying them; and the repugnance to military duty which this circumstance could not fail to occa- sion, received no small addition from their unwillingness to expose themselves to its dangers, until a continental force should appear, as a point around which they might rally. On the arrival of Colonel Shreve at Haddonfield, he found, that the militia who had been assembled to aid him, and to inter- cept the communication with Philadelphia, amounted to less than one hun- dred men ; and Colonel Ellis, their commanding officer, remarked, in a letter to the governor, that, " without some standing force, little was to be expected from the militia, who being, alone, not sufficient to prevent the incursions of the enemy, each one naturally consults his own safety, by not being found in arms."
Mahwood wrote to Colonel Hand, proposing to re-embark his troops, to refrain from further injury to the country, and to pay for the cattle and forage he had taken, in sterling money, on condition, that the militia would lay down their arms and depart to their homes; threatening, on refusal, to arm the tories, to attack all persons he found in arms, burn their dwellings, and reduce their families to the utmost distress. And that his threats might not be supposed in vain, he subjoined a list of the first objects of his intended vengeance .* Colonel Hand indignantly rejected the proposition, and Mah- wood, but too faithfully, executed his threat; and, although his incursion continued six or seven days, he returned to Philadelphia unmolested. Not more than two hundred men could be collected to reinforce Colonel Shreve, who, unable to act with effect, did not even march to the lower parts of Jersey, which were plundered without restraint.
* These were, Edmund Keasby, Thomas Sinnickson, Samuel Dick, Whitten Crips, Ebenezer Howell, Edward Hall, John Bowen, Thomas Thompson, George Trenchard, Elisha Cattle, Andrew Sinnickson, Nicholas Keen, Jacob Hufty, Benjamin Holmes, William Schute, Anthony Sharpe, and Abner Penton.
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Applications to General Washington for detachments of continental troops, sufficient to cover the country, were necessarily rejected, as the enemy could reinforce with more facility than he, and could, consequently, maintain his superiority until the whole war would be transferred to Jersey. He, how- ever, permitted Colonel Shreve to remain on the east side of the Delaware, and reinforced him with an additional regiment; but would not consent to add to the strength of this detachment, or to depart from his design to keep on that side of the Delaware, only, such force as would break off the ordinary intercourse between the town and country. A larger one would only direct the attention of Sir William Howe towards it, and induce him to plan its destruction. Such an attempt on Colonel Shreve, was disappointed by a precipitate retreat, attended with some loss.
In addition to the vessels which had been engaged in defence of Fort Mit- flin, others had been commenced above Philadelphia, but were not completed, when the British obtained possession of the river. To protect these from the enemy, Washington had directed them to be sunk in such a manner as to be weighed with difficulty. This order was disregarded. Against these vessels and some stores collected at Bordentown, an expedition was successfully sent. General Dickenson was in the neighbourhood, but his force was too small to interrupt the enterprise; and General Maxwell, who had been de- tached on the first intelligence, that the enemy was advancing up the Dela- ware, was retarded in his march by a heavy rain, which did not delay the movement of the British troops, on board of vessels in the river.
III. To cover the country effectually on the north of the Schuylkill, and to form an advance guard, which might annoy the rear of the enemy, should he evacuate the city, an event, deemed daily more probable, the Marquis de La Fayette was detached, with more than two thousand choice troops, and a few pieces of cannon, to take post on the lines, with orders to occupy no station, permanently, lest the enemy should successfully concert an attack upon him. Having taken a momentary position at Barren Hill, ten miles in front of the army, at the Valley Forge, notice thereof was given to General Howe; who, having reconnoitred his post, despatched General Grant, on the night of the nineteenth of May, against him. He succeeded in getting, un- discovered, into the rear of the Marquis, whilst General Gray, with a strong detachment, advanced by the south side of the Schuylkill, to a ford, two or three miles in front of his right flank, and the residue of the army en- camped on Chesnut IIill. The Marquis discovered the perils which envi- roned him, just in season, by a dexterous movement, to avoid them. He rapidly recrossed the Schuylkill by Matson's Ford, and took a post so favourable for defence, that although the enemy pursued him to the bank, he did not dare to wade the river to assail him. From the apparent impru- dence, which might be inferred by his surprise, the Marquis is exonerated, by the fact, that the troops placed by him on his left flank, had, without his knowledge, changed their position.
IV. In the course of the winter. the effect, abroad. of the success of the American arms, began to develope itself. The government of France could not observe, without deep interest, the contest which was about to shake, to the foundation, the empire of her great enemy and rival. Though, labouring under financial embarrassments resulting from her late wars, she could not, hastily, involve herself in new expenses, yet the ministry and the nation, longed for an opportunity of retaliating the mortifications and defeat they had sustained. When the discontents of the colonies had broken into open hostilities, M. de Vergennes and other members of the French ministry . declared it to be the policy of France and Spain, to avoid aggression, for three causes; the two latter of which, were, doubtless, founded in truth, 2 L
4
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and are entirely comprehensible :- First, for moral reasons, which were conformable to the known opinions of the two monarchs: secondly, on account of the condition of the finances, the necessity of time for reco- very of exhaustion, and the danger of perpetuating their weakness by premature exertion; and thirdly, that an offensive war, on the part of France and Spain, might reconcile the mother and her colonies; giving .the minister a pretext for yielding, and the provinces a motive for acceding to his propositions, in order to obtain time to consolidate themselves, to ripen their plans, and to increase their means. They came to the con- clusion, therefore, to watch events in Europe and America; avoiding every thing which might create an opinion that they had, in the latter, any authorized agent; to facilitate to the colonists, the means of procuring, by commerce, the articles, and even the money which they needed, but without a departure from neutrality; to refit and prepare for sea, the naval force; but to precipitate nothing, unless the conduct of England should afford real cause to believe, that she had determined to commence hostilities. Upon these principles, the conduct of the cabinet of Versailles was, for a time, regulated. A party, however, existed in that cabinet, at whose head was the Queen, which avowed a disposition to seize the. present moment for revenge, by humbling Great Britain, and dismembering her empire.
The Americans had carly sought the countenance of foreign powers, and, particularly, of France. The impossibility of obtaining a supply of arms and ammunition by ordinary means, had, in 1775, induced the appointment of agents to procure military stores abroad; who communed with a secret committee of Congress, empowered to correspond with their friends in Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of the world. In the spring of 1776, Mr. Silas Deane appeared in Paris, as a political and commercial agent, with in- structions to ascertain the disposition of the French king. That monarch, was still reluctant to do any act which might commit him with his enemies. The declaration of independence encouraged the court of Versailles to fur- nish, privately, means for continuing the war; but it was neither willing, nor prepared, to acknowledge the independence of the United States.
V. As soon as Congress had resolved on the declaration of independence, but before it was published, a project for treaties with foreign powers was prepared, and ministers appointed to negotiate them. Mr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Jefferson, were nominated; but the last named, declining the appointment, Mr. Arthur Lee, then in London, was substituted. They assembled in Paris, early in the winter, were favourably, but not publicly, re- ceived; and were assured, that the ports of France would remain open to their ships, and that free commercial relations should be cherished. So closely did the Count de Vergennes conform to his system of caution, that, though the fact was known to the American commissioners, that military stores had been exported from the king's magazines to America, he affected, in their presence, to be wholly ignorant of it. In this state of the negotiation, the utmost circumspection was observed in regard to Great Britain. Every step was taken publicly to gratify her. The remonstrances of her ambassador were scrupulously attended to; the departure of ships, having military stores was forbidden, although they were privately permitted to sail, or sailed without permission ; officers having leave of absence, and about to join the Americans, were recalled; strict orders were given, that American prizes should not be sold in French ports; and in some cases, cruisers were compelled to give up the ships they had captured, and to enter into security to cruise no more in the European seas. At the same time, the American agents were privately informed, that in despite of these exactions of policy, they might confide in the good will of the government. Means were also taken to facilitate to
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