USA > New York > A short history of New York State > Part 43
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The proposal for a four-year term for the governor was the only major recommendation made by the Reconstruction Commission that failed of adoption. Although Smith favored this change and campaigned for it on several occasions, he also believed that gubernatorial elections should not be held in the same years as presidential elections. But the legislature, which was controlled by Republicans who realized that, in the past, Republican presidential candidates had helped to elect Republican gov- ernors, passed a four-year amendment that provided for gubernatorial elections in presidential years. To Smith this provision completely killed the plan's effectiveness, for it made it exceedingly difficult for a voter to prevent his attitude toward national issues from influencing his views on state issues. Smith took his case to the people, and in 1927 the voters de- feated the four-year amendment that had been adopted by the legislature. In the same election eight other amendments, all of which had been endorsed by Smith, received large majorities. Smith's ability to obtain the defeat of one out of nine amendments indicates perhaps more clearly than any other event both his effectiveness as an educator and the peo- ple's confidence in his judgment.
Smith's reform program was not confined to the reorganization of the government, for he was also in large part responsible for the improvement and expansion of a number of the services which the state rendered to its citizens. He considered the people the state's most valuable asset, and the various progressive measures that he sponsored as governor were all designed to provide a better life for the individual New Yorker. This could be said of some of Smith's predecessors, but few of them had such a broad view of the general welfare, and no governor was a more skillful politician. His interests ranged over every phase of activity within New York, and the reforms adopted during his administration were as diversi- fied as the state.
Smith viewed education as one of the state's most important functions, and as governor he made constant efforts to improve the state's school system. His interest in education was undoubtedly stimulated by his in- ability to complete his own schooling. In his annual message of 1923 he asserted that "anyone desiring to have a proper understanding of the necessity for an education need only talk to the man who was denied it," and on the same occasion he insisted that it was the duty of the state to
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make sure that all children received the same educational opportunities. Realizing that it was impossible to "serve the cause of education with- out spending money to do it," he continually goaded the legislature into increasing the appropriations for the state's local school systems. In 1919 the legislature on his recommendation provided an additional $5,300,000 for salary increases for teachers; in the following year this figure was in- creased to $20,500,000. In 1925 he appointed a commission headed by Michael Friedsam to study the financial and administrative problems of the schools, and in 1927 the legislature adopted the Friedsam com- mission's proposals for increased state aid for education. Smith was also instrumental in raising the standards of the state's rural schools. In 1925, after repeated rebuffs from the legislature, he obtained an additional ap- propriation of $9,000,000 for schools in country districts. It was, moreover, under his direction that New York began to consolidate its rural school districts into larger units. A product of a Catholic church school on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, Smith did as much for upstate public schools as did any governor in the history of the state.
The reputation that Smith had earned as a friend of labor when he was an assemblyman was enhanced during the four terms he served as governor. Laws were passed to safeguard women and children in in- dustry; the statutory work week for children was reduced; and in 1927 the legislature, following recommendations that Smith had made in every annual message since 1919, adopted a bill for a forty-eight-hour week. At the same time both the efficiency and effectiveness of the state labor department were increased under the outstanding administrations of Bernard L. Shientag as industrial commissioner and Frances Perkins as chairman of the Industrial Board. To Smith, however, all these accom- plishments were overshadowed by the revision of the Workmen's Com- pensation Acts. In his last annual message Smith stated with justifiable pride that New York's Compensation Law was "perhaps the most liberal statute of its kind in the world."
During Smith's administration the state undertook an extensive pro- gram of public works that included new state office buildings, hospitals, prisons, parks, a bridge across the Hudson at Poughkeepsie, the elimina- tion of railroad grade crossings, highways, a state health laboratory, and the expansion of the facilities of the Teachers College at Albany. Al- though Smith initiated many of these projects and supported all of them, he gave his greatest attention and enthusiasm to the expansion of the state's park system. When he assumed office in 1919, some thirty-five different boards and commissions were responsible for the various parks and historic sites throughout the state. Each received separate appropria- tions, and a co-ordinated park program was an impossibility. At Smith's instigation the legislature in 1923 created a Council of Parks, consisting
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of the chairmen of the various state park boards. In the following year he proposed and the voters approved a $15,000,000 bond issue for the construction of parkways and the purchase of additional land for parks. By his final term as governor he had greatly expanded the size of the state's recreational areas, placed the park administration on a businesslike, nonpolitical basis, and taken the first steps to develop a system of park- ways.
Smith's conservation program went far beyond that proposed by any of his predecessors. In each of his five gubernatorial campaigns he ad- vocated public ownership and operation of the state's water-power facili- ties. The Republicans, however, had already put into effect a plan which called for public ownership and private operation. Under the terms of the Machold Storage Law of 1915, the state was divided into a number of "river regulating districts," and the officials of each district were author- ized to lease water-power sites to private companies. Following Miller's election as governor in 1920, a State Water Power Commission was estab- lished with authority to grant fifty-year leases to power companies. When Smith was re-elected governor in 1922 he sought to reverse the Republican policy, and in 1924 he succeeded in preventing the Water Power Com- mission from approving the application of two power companies for the use of the waters of the St. Lawrence River. Two years later the Water Power Commission, which had fallen under the control of the Republi- cans, proceeded to issue licenses to two corporations for power projects on the St. Lawrence. Meanwhile the legislature, on the recommendation of the Hughes commission, had transferred the authority vested in the Water Power Commission to a Water Power and Control Commission, two of whose three members were to be appointed by the governor. But the new law did not go into effect until January 1, 1927, and during the last month of its existence the old commission attempted to grant final approval for the St. Lawrence license. When Smith learned of the com- mission's intention, he announced that he planned to "take such action in the courts as may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the state." This threat scared off the companies, both of which withdrew their applications. For the remainder of his administration Smith dom- inated the Water Power and Control Commission, and no leases were granted to private power companies.
Although Smith prevented the transfer of the control of the state's power sites to private interests, he was not able to secure legislative approval for a public power policy. In his annual message in 1924 he recommended the creation of "a New York State Power Authority which shall be a public corporation, municipal in character, having no stockholders, deriving its powers from the state and having duties specifically imposed upon it to take over and develop the water power resources of the state." Although
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he repeated this proposal on numerous occasions to both the legislature and the voters, he failed of his objective. On two different occasions bills establishing a power authority were defeated by Republican legis- latures. Smith considered the rejection of his plan for a power authority a major defeat for the people, and he warned them: "Do not give up your water power. . .. We are poor citizens if we allow the things worth most to get into the hands of the few."
Because any expansion of the state's services cost money, one of Smith's principal tasks was to persuade the taxpayers to accept higher taxes. In the past politicians had sought to make political capital out of economy, and it was generally thought that there was a direct ratio between an administration's frugality and its popularity at the polls. Smith, however, believed that the people were willing to spend money if they knew why they were spending it and were given adequate assurances that they would receive their money's worth. On repeated occasions he obtained popular support for increases in state expenditures by explaining to voters the benefits that would accrue from the policies that he advocated. By using this approach he was able to convince a majority of the voters that taxes should always be judged by the services that they purchased. The voters seldom disappointed him. In his autobiography he wrote:
It is a mistake to think that the people approve of reduced appropriations when in the process of reducing them the state or any of its activities are to suffer. What the people want is an honest accounting for every dollar appropriated. They want every dollar of public money to bring a dollar's worth of service to the state. They have no patience with waste and there is a great difference between large appropriations and waste.
Under Smith's direction the state's revenue program was completely reorganized. The property tax, which at one time had provided the bulk of the funds used by the state, was steadily reduced until by 1928 it was only one-half mill per dollar of assessed valuation. At the same time other sources of revenue were developed. The liquor tax, mortgage tax, and the fees for the registration of motor vehicles ( all of which were intro- duced before Smith had entered office) helped to offset the decrease in the property tax. In his first year as governor the legislature passed an income tax, which eventually became the principal means of raising reve- nue, and in 1926 a franchise tax was adopted for state banks, trust com- panies, financial corporations, and national banks. To raise money for such long-term improvements as the elimination of grade crossings and the construction of state buildings and parks, Smith resorted to bond issues, each of which required the approval of the voters. Although Re- publican advocates of a pay-as-you-go policy generally opposed the bond issues, Smith in each instance obtained the support of a majority of the
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electorate. He maintained not only that it was good business to borrow money when interest rates were low, but also that bonds provided the most equitable method for distributing the costs of capital improvements whose benefits would be enjoyed by future generations of taxpayers.
Smith's fiscal policies proved advantageous to the state's communities. The decrease in the state property tax not only permitted towns and cities to raise their property taxes, but almost every form of state revenue was shared with the local governments. The precedent for the assignment of part of the receipts from a state tax to local governments was established with the passage of the Raines Liquor Tax Law in 1896, and the same policy was followed in the distribution of the proceeds from the mortgage tax, the fees for motor vehicle registration, the income tax, and the 1926 franchise tax on financial institutions. The amount of revenue from state administered taxes assigned to local governments rose from $9,318,000 in 1919 to $62,381,000 in 1928.
The state also assisted local governments with grants-in-aid. Although it was already an established practice for the state to help communities to finance their school systems, in this period the amounts granted were mark- edly increased and the program was extended to several other fields of local endeavor. The Lowman Act of 1920 provided for financial assistance for county roadbuilding programs; in 1924 the state granted money for the first time for local health units; in the following year a subvention was made for public health nursing; and in 1926 the legislature authorized aid for the construction of county hospitals and the maintenance of county health units. In 1919 state subventions accounted for only 2.8 per cent of the cost of local government. Nine years later the amount had risen to 9.3 per cent. Through grants-in-aid and the allocation of tax revenues, the state was able to promote local autonomy without producing local bankruptcy.
The aid program for local communities was just one of the many ways in which Smith employed the state's power to increase the people's power over their own affairs. Although his conservative opponents maintained that government intervention tended to destroy popular rights, he re- peatedly maintained that the state's assumption of new duties and obliga- tions strengthened rather than weakened political democracy. By making the state an active and immediate force in the lives of its people he helped to create one of the most alert electorates in the nation.
Chapter 31
Toward a New Deal
The country needs and ... the country demands bold, per- sistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it: If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something.
-FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, May 22, 1932
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT's two terms as governor were a transi- tional period in New York's history and in his own personal career. Elected in 1928 at the height of the boom, he completed his final year in office in 1932 at the depth of the depression. In the interval he had helped to prepare a New Deal for the state and the nation. In one sense, his gov- ernorship was an apprenticeship for the larger task before him, but in another it was a series of political skirmishes that were designed above all else to secure his election to the presidency.
Born in 1882 at Hyde Park, in Dutchess County, Roosevelt was a de- scendant of an old and respected New York Dutch family and the only child of well-to-do parents. His family belonged to the landed aristocracy of the Hudson Valley, and Theodore Roosevelt was a distant cousin. Edu- cated at home by governesses and tutors, he took occasional trips abroad with his parents and devoted much of his time to nature study and naval history. At the age of fourteen he was sent to boarding school to com- plete his preparation for college. At Harvard, which he entered in 1900, he gave enough attention to his studies to graduate in about the middle of his class, but his principal interests appeared to be club life-he be- longed to eight undergraduate clubs-and the Harvard Crimson, which he edited in his senior year. Although he attended Columbia Law School, he withdrew in 1907 before completing the requirements for the degree. In the same year he passed the bar examinations and went to work for the law firm of Carter, Ledyard, and Milburn. Three years later he entered politics.
When Roosevelt in 1910 agreed to be a Democratic candidate for the
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state Senate, his chances seemed hopeless, for the district in which Hyde Park was located had not sent a Democratic senator to Albany since 1884. Throughout his campaign, however, he appeared blissfully unaware of this fact, and to the surprise of almost everyone he defeated his Republi- can opponent by 1,140 votes. His victory was in large part the product of factors over which he had no control. He belonged to an established and well-known family in the district; he was related to the illustrious Teddy; and he was an indirect beneficiary of the growing cleavage be- tween the conservative and progressive factions of the Republican party. In his first term at Albany, he led the revolt against the Tammany candi- date for the United States Senate and astounded his colleagues by refus- ing to let Dutchess County accept its helping from the state's pork barrel. More than one politician wondered at his sanity.
His reputation as an anti-Tammany Democrat aided him in his success- ful campaign for re-election to the Senate in 1912. A year later it was un- doubtedly one of the factors that helped him to secure a place in Wood- row Wilson's administration. Because Charles Murphy had sought to block Wilson's nomination in 1912, the President turned the patronage in New York over to independent Democrats and made Roosevelt, an early and enthusiastic supporter of the New Freedom, assistant secretary of the navy. In his new post Roosevelt demonstrated that he was an able and imaginative administrator. He cut red tape, reformed the Navy yards, eliminated middlemen in the purchase of supplies, was an outspoken advocate of "preparedness," helped establish the North Sea barrage dur- ing the war, and supervised the liquidation of the Navy's stores in Eu- rope after the war. His reward for this outstanding record-not to mention the party's recognition of the fact that his name was Roosevelt -was the Democratic nomination for the vice-presidency in 1920. De- spite the fact that all the signs pointed to an overwhelming Republican victory, he waged an intensive campaign in which he made more speeches than any previous candidate for the vice-presidency. The signs, however, were accurate. Following Warren G. Harding's election as president, Roosevelt retired from public life to enter business.
Less than a year after the election of 1920 he contracted poliomyelitis, and for the next seven years he devoted most of his energy to an attempt to regain the use of his legs. While making frequent visits to Warm Springs, Georgia, where he took regular exercises in the spring waters, he also managed to maintain most of the political contacts that he had estab- lished in the preceding decade. Throughout this period he was especially close to Al Smith. It was largely because of Roosevelt's insistence that Smith agreed to be the Democratic candidate for governor in 1922. Two years later Roosevelt was well enough to make the nominating speech for Smith at the Democratic national convention. In 1928 he again placed
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Smith's name before the convention, and the New York governor became the party's choice for the presidency.
To be elected, Smith-among other things-had to carry New York. This, in turn, necessitated a strong state ticket. Herbert Lehman, who had contributed heavily to Smith's campaign and was relatively well known because of his philanthropic activities, had agreed to run for lieutenant governor. Although Roosevelt was Smith's choice for governor, he had repeatedly stated that he would not accept the nomination. But on the eve of the Democratic state convention, Roosevelt, who had been under constant pressure from Smith and other party leaders, agreed to run if he was drafted. The next day he was nominated by acclamation, and Lehman was selected as his running mate. Roosevelt's reluctance to ac- cept the nomination was due ostensibly-and, to a large degree, actually -to his desire to continue his program of therapy under which he had already made enough progress so that he could walk with the aid of canes. There is reason, however, to believe that political considerations also colored his thinking. He had his eye on the presidency, which he and his closest advisers believed could not be won by a Democrat until 1936. But Smith persuaded him that he had a duty to the party in 1928, the Depression moved the Democratic presidential year up to 1932, and the rest is history.
Roosevelt's health became a campaign issue in spite of the efforts of responsible leaders in both parties to avoid the question. Although the press in general viewed his physical condition as an irrelevancy, there were persistent reports that he had been forced to "sacrifice" his health to Smith's political ambitions. Roosevelt eventually felt impelled to issue a statement denying such reports. Far more convincing, however, was the vigor with which he campaigned, for by election day he had made more speeches than his Republican opponent. Campaigning on his predeces- sor's program and the promise to complete it, he carried the state by 25,000, while Smith lost the state by more than 100,000.
Many explanations have been offered for Roosevelt's victory in 1928, but in all likelihood the most decisive factor was the dissension in the Republican party. Albert Ottinger, the Republican candidate for gov- ernor, who had been an able attorney general of the state and had dem- onstrated that he was an effective vote-getter with a large following in New York City, offended Hamilton Ward of Erie, the Republican nom- inee for attorney general. The Ward organization dragged its heels in the gubernatorial campaign.
When Roosevelt became governor, his most obvious political assets were his name, his record with the Navy in Washington, and his winning personality. A strikingly handsome man, he almost invariably impressed visitors with his buoyancy, easy manner, and self-assurance. In earlier
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years many observers, including Frances Perkins, thought him something of a snob, and Hugh Johnson at the outset of the Wilson administration had written disparagingly of Roosevelt's "Hah-vahd accent." But by 1929 he had a relaxed, informal manner that usually made individuals from every class and background feel that he was their friend. As effective be- fore large gatherings as in small groups, he was an extraordinarily per- suasive public speaker with a "radio voice" that still remains as a standard of perfection to which politicians aspire. He was cheerful without being a Pollyanna, and his awareness of the solemnity of his official position never had an adverse effect on his sense of humor or his seemingly in- finite capacity for enjoying life.
Roosevelt was not a profound thinker, but he possessed an unusual ability to gauge and interpret public opinion. It was this ability, more than any other attribute, that made him a great popular spokesman and a successful party leader. This same ability could also make him overly cautious and inclined to temporize on controversial issues while he was governor. An ambitious man, he viewed Albany as a way station on the road to Washington. As a consequence, during his governorship he often gave the impression that he was using his admittedly brilliant talents as a politician, not to force a program through the legislature, but to further his own career by avoiding any moves that might alienate substantial voting blocs. As president, he was often and rightfully considered a dar- ing innovator, but this was after he had achieved his goal and Albany lay behind him. A man who would eventually go down in history as a superb fighter, he preferred during his two terms as governor to win his victories at the council table rather than on the warpath.
Throughout his governorship Roosevelt was aided by a group of po- litical advisers whose astuteness was matched by their desire to see him reach the White House. Foremost among these was Louis McHenry Howe, a former upstate political correspondent for the New York Herald, who managed Roosevelt's campaign for the state Senate in 1910, served as his special assistant when he was assistant secretary of the navy, was with him at Campobello when he was stricken with poliomyelitis, and stuck by him when he was out of politics in the 1920's. A small, frail man who preferred to remain in the background, Howe gave Roosevelt his complete loyalty. He was perhaps the greatest political strategist of his generation and deserves a large share of the credit for Roosevelt's rise to the presidency. James A. Farley was all that Howe was not. A big, jovial extrovert, who was justifiably proud of his ability to remember the names of the lowliest precinct workers, he was a former New York boxing commissioner who had become chairman of the Democratic State Com- mittee. He had the confidence of organization Democrats throughout the state, and he was largely responsible for strengthening the party's ma-
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