USA > New York > A short history of New York State > Part 58
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Most communities were willing to take drastic, indeed desperate, meas- ures to attract a railroad. When private capitalists proved reluctant to finance the lateral lines threading through the north-south valleys, citi- zens along the route rushed to bond their townships. No less than 310 cities, towns, and villages in fifty-five counties granted $36,888,190 in cash or municipal bonds to eighty-five railroad companies. Throughout the state, farmers were eager for rail service. Businessmen, fearing isolation
ESTOWN
OLEAN
ELMIRA
AMTON
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PAP
PENNA.
KINGST
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SYRACUSE
MECHANICVILLE
NY
ANIN
"LONG ISLAND SOUND
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A SHORT HISTORY OF NEW YORK STATE
and consequent economic loss, were equally enthusiastic. Many of them hoped that the lateral lines would enable their communities to secure cheap coal from Pennsylvania. Rochester, for example, subscribed over $1,000,000 to two railroad lines leading to the coal fields.
The Panic of 1873 bankrupted many companies and brought construc- tion to a halt. In many instances bondholders brought foreclosure action. With some exceptions, towns and villages lost their holdings in the process of reorganization, inasmuch as their capital stock had inferior standing to the bonds representing the funded debt of the roads. Several towns attempted to repudiate their debts on the ground that the promoters had defrauded the stockholders. Their search for legal technicalities that would enable them to wiggle out of the debt were unavailing. With few exceptions, the courts, and especially the federal courts, upheld the rights of the bona fide bondholders.
So loud was the outcry against the misuse of local aid that the Con- stitutional Commission of 1872-1873 recommended the prohibition of such aid in the future. After the ratification of the amendment in 1874, railroad promoters had to rely upon private sources for capital. Economic recovery was so rapid in the late 1870's, however, that plenty of capital became available for railroad construction.
Several trunk-line railroads connecting metropolitan New York with Buffalo were completed after 1860. Two of the anthracite coal roads- the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western and the Lehigh Valley-real- ized their ambitions of expanding from small local roads into trunk lines competing for the through freight between New York and the Great Lakes. The D.L. and W., swollen with Civil War profits, acquired ter- minal facilities in Newark and Hoboken as well as thousands of acres of rich coal lands. By leasing several short lines, it reached the port of Oswego in 1869. It then freed itself from dependence upon the Erie by completing its own line from Binghamton to Buffalo in 1882.
The Lehigh Valley struck eastward to the terminals of Jersey City and northward to Lake Ontario, which it reached by taking over several bank- rupt companies, including the Geneva and Ithaca and the Ithaca and Athens. For a time the Lehigh assigned its freight to and from the West to the Erie Railroad at Waverly. This arrangement, however, proved un- satisfactory because the Erie went out of its way to keep for itself most of the through traffic. In 1892 the Lehigh extended its line westward from Geneva to Buffalo, thus affording this lake port another through connec- tion with the port of New York.
The collapse of the Oswego Midland in 1873 brought despair to the thousands of individuals and scores of townships along its route. Perhaps no other major road in New York had less chance for success. Portions of its route from Oswego to Oneida to Norwich and thence to Jersey City
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ran through a sparsely populated countryside. After reorganization, the road took the name of New York, Ontario, and Western, but the change of name did not bring the road prosperity.
The West Shore, extending up the west bank of the Hudson and parallel- ing the New York Central across the state, was the result of speculative daring. Although promoters had planned it for many years, it was not until 1880 that the banker Edward Winslow succeeded in enlisting the support of George Pullman and other wealthy capitalists including (prob- ably) Jay Gould. Once the project was under way, the interests behind the Pennsylvania Railroad, principal rival of the New York Central, offered their aid.
Furious at what he deemed to be a plot against the Central, William K. Vanderbilt-who had succeeded his father, the famous Commodore, as president of the Central-declared war on his enemies by slashing rates. In 1884, the unfinished West Shore went bankrupt. Its receivers tried to force Vanderbilt to buy the bankrupt property, threatening another rate war. Vanderbilt, still smarting from the stiff price he had just paid for the New York, Chicago, and St. Louis which paralleled that part of the New York Central system south of Lake Erie-so stiff that he is said to have thought the rails must be made of nickel plate-refused. In the rate war which ensued, Vanderbilt not only matched every reduction made by his rival but carried the war into the enemy camp by investing heavily in the South Pennsylvania Company, a rival of the Pennsylvania. In this move he was joined by Andrew Carnegie, the Rockefellers, and other capitalists, who were anxious to break the tight monopoly of the Pennsylvania Railroad.
This bitter conflict, which threatened to ruin both the Central and the Pennsylvania and to demoralize all railroad securities, was terminated only when J. P. Morgan, Sr., hurried home from England and succeeded in inducing the warring parties to make peace. As a consequence, the Pennsylvania took over the South Pennsylvania, and Chauncey M. Depew, attorney for the Central, leased the West Shore. Shortly thereafter the latter road was sold at foreclosure to parties acting for the Central; the bondholders received fifty cents on the dollar for their claims. The Central promptly leased the road for 475 years. Vanderbilt thus acquired, at the bargain price of $2,000,000 in annual interest charges, another route to Buffalo which has proven useful in freight carriage.
The Delaware and Hudson, originally a canal company, became the third most important railroad system in New York. Scarcely had the Al- bany and Susquehanna Company completed its road from Albany to Binghamton in 1869 when the Delaware and Hudson Canal Navigation Company and the Erie sought control of this important link. Rival boards of directors armed with conflicting decrees from pliant judges sent out
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A SHORT HISTORY OF NEW YORK STATE
armed bands to seize control of the track. After much bickering, the Delaware and Hudson faction made good its claims. The company also acquired many small lines north of Albany and extended the road up the western shore of Lake Champlain to Plattsburgh, from whence a line was constructed to Montreal.
The Rome, Watertown, and Ogdensburg was the most important rail- road in the north country in 1861. Its managers pushed a line westward to Oswego and acquired a short line from that lake port to Syracuse. When the Lake Ontario Shore Railroad was sold at auction in 1875, the directors of the Rome, Watertown, and Ogdensburg could not resist the tempta- tion to acquire this line, which certain Oswego enthusiasts had pushed toward Rochester along the southern rim of Lake Ontario. Far from in- creasing the prosperity of the Watertown road, the new property dragged it into bankruptcy.
In 1882 Charles Parsons, a capitalist interested in the north country, captured control of the Watertown road, and in 1886 he absorbed his only rival in that region, the Utica and Black River, which had thrust north- ward to Ogdensburg in 1878 and had also made direct connection with Watertown. Parsons' system boasted half the mileage of the New York Central within the state. Fearing that Parsons would build a line from Rome eastward to Mechanicville and there make connections with the Fitchburg line of Massachusetts, the managers of the New York Central in 1891 leased the 643-mile Parsons system. About this same time Dr. W. Seward Webb, a son-in-law of William H. Vanderbilt, bought control of the Herkimer, Newport, and Poland, a tiny narrow-gauge line running northward from Herkimer. Webb pushed his line through the Adirondacks to Malone, where another company thrust a prong through to Montreal. Late in 1892 parlor and sleeping cars were running from New York to Buffalo to Montreal over this route. These satellites of the New York Cen- tral eventually lost their corporate form and became absorbed into the mother system.
The Long Island Railroad was originally laid out to facilitate the through passenger traffic between New York and Boston via Greenport and ferry to Stonington, Connecticut. It failed to serve most of the com- munities on the island and missed some of the more fertile agricultural regions. Oliver Charlick, president of the company between 1863 and 1874, seemed intent only on money-making, to the disgust of many com- munities. Citizens along the south shore backed a new South Side Rail- road in 1866 and communities along the north shore promoted several short lines. Rate wars brought ruin to most of the companies, including the Long Island. During the 1880's the system got back on its feet, espe- cially as the summer recreation industry developed, and the management built several branches to serve new communities. The Long Island needed
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an entrance into Manhattan Island and secured it from the legislature in 1899. The next year the Long Island Railroad became part of the Penn- sylvania system.
Cornelius Vanderbilt rapidly became the outstanding figure in New York railroads in the period after 1860. A half century of experience in the rough school of shipping had sharpened his native shrewdness and had brought him one of the largest fortunes of the time. As his steamship lines expanded, the Commodore took more interest in the railroads serving the various ports. In the 1850's Vanderbilt acquired a large interest in the New York and Harlem Railroad. By 1863 he also owned a large block of shares in the Hudson River Railroad. Skillfully, he fought off raids by "bears" who tried to depress the value of Harlem Railroad shares by abrogating its franchises.
Relations between the New York Central and the Hudson River Rail- road were not cordial. The Central, guided by the politically powerful Erastus Corning, held a whip hand over the Hudson River company. It could and did throw much eastbound business to the steamboats at Albany during the season of navigation. When ice choked the river, the Central would send its freight and passengers to the Vanderbilt line, forcing it to keep additional locomotives and freight cars on hand.
Corning and his close associate and successor, Dean Richmond, ap- pealed to Vanderbilt in 1864 to help them prevent another faction from getting control of the Central. In exchange, Richmond granted to the Vanderbilt road a pro rata share of through freight rates and also an annual bonus of $100,000. A new faction headed by William Fargo and Henry Keep got control of the Central soon after the death of Richmond. These gentlemen canceled the agreement, whereupon the Commodore struck back hard. Vanderbilt announced on January 14, 1867, that his rail- road would not accept through tickets on freight or passengers from the New York Central. As a result eastbound freight piled up at the Albany warehouse and passengers were forced to clamber across the river ice carrying their baggage. Indignation ran high, but the old Commodore pressed his advantage. Finally the Central agreed to furnish as much freight to the Hudson River Railroad as it received and to prorate the tariffs.
Vanderbilt in late 1867 won over a majority of the board of directors of the New York Central and two years later he combined his two rail- roads. Vanderbilt also secured control of the Lake Shore, which ran west- ward from Buffalo toward Chicago, but his attempts to gain control of the Erie ( described in Chapter 27) were not successful.
Vanderbilt and his able son, William, took a keen interest in improv- ing the operations of his railroads. He constructed the huge Grand Central Terminal at Forty-second Street in Manhattan and, under civic pres-
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A SHORT HISTORY OF NEW YORK STATE
sure, began the tedious and costly job of lowering the tracks on Park Ave- nue, north to Ninety-sixth Street. In 1873 he borrowed enough money to lay another set of double tracks across the state west from Albany. In general, Vanderbilt paid little attention to the manipulation of securities, which activity occupied the energies of so many railroad magnates of his day. To be sure, Vanderbilt did not hesitate to declare a stock dividend of 80 per cent, and on occasion he operated pools in Wall Street. His blunt speech and rough and piratical tactics did not endear him to the public, which envied his wealth and feared his power. As the largest corporation in the state, the New York Central had to take a hand in politics not only to secure privileges but also to fend off attacks, such as proposals for regulatory commissions.
By the middle 1870's the era of lavish public assistance to the railroads was over. The enthusiasm for railroads so evident in pre-Civil War years gave way to indifference and in many instances to open hostility. Labor leaders, antimonopolists, land reformers, and shippers of all kinds began to be increasingly critical of railroad rates and other aspects of manage- ment. The activities of Drew, Fisk, and Gould, in connection with the Erie (see Chapter 27) and the large number of railroad bankruptcies and reorganizations which usually benefited insiders at the expense of farmers, merchants, and other taxpayers, were influential factors in the change. Exorbitant charges plus rate discriminations were prime factors in rous- ing hostility. The climax came, as already noted, in 1872, when the United States Supreme Court ruled that counties, townships, cities, and villages were fully liable for all debts contracted to foster railroad building.
Wherever there was competition between two or more railroads within the state there were rate wars. Especially was this true in the 1870's, when the various trunk lines began to carry grain from Buffalo, Chicago, and other western points. Each railroad did its utmost to secure as large a proportion of the grain-carrying business as possible. After several disas- trous rate wars, followed by poorly kept agreements to maintain rates, the presidents of four trunk lines-the New York Central, the Erie, the Penn- sylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio-affixed their signatures to the famous agreement of April 5, 1877, which has survived with minor modi- fications, temporary suspensions, frequent evasions, and intermittent at- tacks. The heart of this agreement provided that export rates from Chicago to Philadelphia and Baltimore should be two cents and three cents per one hundred pounds, respectively, below the rate for New York. Equally important was the decision by these four railroads to set up machinery for enforcement of the compact. All traffic westward was to be pooled.
A storm of criticism greeted this agreement, which undoubtedly gave impetus to the establishment of a state commission in 1882 to investigate railroad practices and to the creation of the Federal Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. To both of the commissions the railroads made token
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compliance, but despite the continuance of popular protest high rates and secret agreements continued. Indeed, not until the passage of the Hepburn Act in 1906, giving the Interstate Commerce Commission more effective control over railroad rates, was the door opened to the solving of this most vexing of railroad abuses.
During the last half century the railroads of the state have spent mil- lions of dollars on improvements. Roadbeds have been widened and better ballasted; curves eliminated; greater care has been exercised in the selec- tion and preservation of the wooden ties to which the rails are anchored. "Tie plates" of iron or steel have been placed between the rail and the tie to lengthen the life of the tie and to prevent shearing of the spikes which fasten the rail to the tie. Heavier steel rails have been substituted for the lighter and much less durable rails. Gigantic bridges of steel and concrete have replaced lighter structures.
Better roadbeds and improved trackage have made possible larger and heavier rolling stock. The passenger car of the mid-twentieth century, for example, is vastly different from the long wooden car of the 1880's with its raised roof, its crude wood- or coal-burning stoves, and its kerosene or gas lights.
Facilities for the handling of freight have also been greatly improved. Indeed, the crudely constructed open cars and boxcars, mounted and with a capacity of three to five tons, were playthings in comparison with the fifty-ton-capacity freight cars of today. Today all of our coal cars and an increasing percentage of our boxcars are made of pressed steel. With the increase in industrial specialization, carriers have varied their equip- ment. There are now cars for special kinds of freight ranging from con- tainers for gases under high pressure to specially designed refrigerator cars.
Heavier trains, both freight and passenger, made heavier demands on motive power. As a consequence, heavier and heavier steam locomotives were built. In 1914 the Baldwin Locomotive Works delivered to the Erie a Triplex Articulated locomotive with twenty-four drivers. This engine weighed 853,050 pounds. In recent years electric and Diesel engines have displaced the steam locomotive.
Shifts in both industry and population within the state have led to the abandonment of some feeder lines. On the other hand, the rejuvenation of mining in certain Adirondack areas has occasioned some new construc- tion. Even so, the railway mileage within the state was less in 1955 than in 1900. The bankruptcy of the New York, Ontario, and Western and its recent abandonment of operations are the latest evidence that railway mileage in the state is decreasing.
During the last seventy-five years the railroads of the state have been threatened by other means of transportation: the electric railway, the automobile, aircraft, and water transport.
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A SHORT HISTORY OF NEW YORK STATE
The application of electricity to transportation dates back to the late 1880's, when Lieutenant Frank J. Sprague successfully operated elec- trically propelled cars by means of an overhead trolley, over the street railway tracks of Richmond, Virginia. No sooner had the success of this new method of transportation been demonstrated than a veritable craze for "trolley lines" within the state ensued. Not only were they cheap to construct and maintain, but they were faster, cleaner, and more remunera- tive. By the end of the century most of the cities of the state had installed the new system, and the tempo of urban transit was revolutionized.
Although the managers of the Erie, the New York Central, the Delaware and Hudson and the other steam railroads of the state were greatly in- terested in this new means of transportation and regarded it as a most useful substitute for the old-fashioned and slow moving city horsecar, few of them foresaw it as a competitor of their own lines. By the turn of the century, however, it was rapidly extending into the suburbs and even linking interurban communities. By 1910 most of the towns in the more thickly settled regions of the state were connected with newly con- structed electric railways, as Map 14 indicates. Over four thousand miles were built by the one hundred companies that were organized.
The effect of the electric railway upon the railroads is difficult of meas-
FPEEKSKILL VERPLANCK TARRYTOWN
PLATTSBURGH
WHITE PLAINS
CLIFF HAVEN
PORT KENT
HUNTINGTON
PAUL SMITH'S
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SEA CLIFF
KEESEVILLE,
LAKE CLEAR JCT.
HICKSVILLE
ALEXANDRIA BAY REDWOOD
SAYVILLE
BROOKLYN
AMITYVILLE
DEXTER
STATEN
ROCKAWAY
ISLAND
WATERTOWN
VERMONT
Lake Ontario
WARRENSBURG
MANITOU BEACH
OSWEGO
GLENS FALLS
YOUNGSTOWN
OLCOTT
ROME
GROVE ASARATOGA
LOCKPORT
ROCHESTER
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NIAGARA FALLS
SYRACUSE
HONEOYE
MANLIUS
BUFFALO
.DEPEW
AUBURN
JAMESVILLE
EBENEZER
ORCHARD PARK
PENN YAN
PREBLE
HAMBURG
BRANCHPORT
S.LANSING
CORTLAND
HORNELL
MASS.
CANISTEO
WESTFIELD
LITTLE VALLEY
PAINTED POST
WATKINS GLEN
PORT DICKINSON
SALAMANCA
CORNING
BINGHAMTON
BOLIVAR
ELMIRA
WAVERLY
INION
SHINGLE HOUSE
ATHENS
WARREN
BRADFORD
NEW PALTZ
HIGHLAND
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WALDEN
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NEWBURGH MIDDLETOWN
GOSHEN
SODUS POINT
BREWERTON
MOUNTAIN LAKES MIDDLE
PSOUTH HAY
GLOVERS- VILLE
BALLSTON
LITTLE FALLS
JOHNSTOWN
TONAWANDA WILLIAMSVILLE
SENECA FALLS
FALLS
FONDA SCHENECTADY
YMECHANICVILLE HOOSICK FALLS
GENEVA
MT. LIMA
MORRIS
ALBANY
TROY
Lake Erie
COOPERSTOWN
McGRAW
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ONEONTA
LEEDS. HUDSON
CATSKILL
CHAUTAUQUA JAMESTOWN
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AND QUEENS
BABYLON
MANHATTAN AND BRONX
HOLTSVILLE PATCHOGUE
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1
PENNSYLVANIA
Map 14. Electric railways in New York, 1910. (Adapted from Stephen A. McGuire, Empire State Trackage, New York, 1938.)
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urement. Some of the area served by the electric lines had not been tapped by the steam roads, and the traffic, therefore, was noncompetitive. Where the electric lines paralleled the steam roads, however, and espe- cially where the electric lines attempted to equal or excel their steam rivals in frequency, comfort, and convenience of service, their adverse effect was felt in passenger, express, and light freight business. To meet this competition, the older roads had recourse to fare reductions, elim- ination of unused cars, fewer passenger trains, improved service, agree- ments with their competitors, or outright purchase of the electric lines.
But the competitive threat of the electric railway to the railroads proved to be only temporary, for, like the horsecar which it replaced, it was only a stage in the evolution of American transportation. By the beginning of World War I it reached its zenith and was on the decline. Spokesmen for the electric railways maintained that the extravagant demands of labor, the high cost of raw materials, inability to secure capital at reasonable rates, the evils of government regulation, and, above all, motor vehicle competition, were responsible for the decline. This did not tell the full story. The electric railways were suffering just as the steam railroads had long suffered from overexpansion, overcapitalization, and gross manipu- lation. Especially was this true in New York City, where financial buc- caneers of the type of William C. Whitney and Thomas Fortune Ryan, and lesser promoters, using methods strikingly similar to those employed by Jay Gould, literally plundered many of the electric railway properties. Unquestionably the methods employed by Whitney and Ryan were largely responsible for the development of the movement which ultimately led to the public ownership and operation of the city's elevated and subway lines in the twentieth century.
Had there been no jobbery and mismanagement of the electric lines, the coming of the motorcar, bus, and truck would have brought their doom anyway. Like so many other products of the machine age, the motor vehicle passed through an embryonic experimental stage. The motor industry was not sufficiently important in 1899 to be listed in the federal census under a separate heading. Everywhere doubt was ex- pressed as to its real worth. Some thought it might be useful for military purposes; others were of the opinion that at best it was an expensive toy -a "plaything of the rich." The few who dared prophesy that the day was not far distant when thousands of motor vehicles per year would be pro- duced were held up to scorn and ridicule. But doubts as to the prac- ticability of the automobile did not discourage its makers, and during the two decades following 1900 enormous strides were made. Handicraft methods gave way to standardization and mass production. Mechanical improvements by the thousands were made: in materials and construc- tion, spring suspension, chassis design, tire construction, steering devices,
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starting apparatus, and electrical equipment. The breakdowns and un- certainties so characteristic of earlier years were greatly minimized. The vestiges of bicycle and buggy design were eliminated. Continued compe- tition, skilled manufacturing technique, consideration for the pocketbook of persons of different economic levels, high-pressure salesmanship, and the use of the installment-purchase plan were the principal factors which made people, irrespective of their social status, motor-conscious.
Mechanical imperfections and resultant breakdowns were not the only difficulties that confronted the pioneer motorist. The roads over which he had to drive were frequently abominable. With the exception of iso- lated stretches, the highways of the state were little better in 1890 than at the close of the Civil War. After the craze for plank roads which swept the state in the 1850's almost nothing was done in the way of highway im- provement. Construction and maintenance rested almost entirely in the hands of local, town, or road-district commissioners and roadmasters who had neither the money nor the competence to build all-weather roads. Farmers usually paid their road taxes by personal and team labor on the highways. During the winter roads were usually clogged with snow, and in summer were either clouds of dust or seas of mud. At all times they were rutted, uneven, and dangerous for the motorist. With the coming of the bicycle and more particularly, the motor vehicle, the demand for better highways gathered momentum.
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