USA > New York > Westchester County > History of Westchester County, New York, from its earliest settlement to the year 1900 > Part 38
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The documents begin with a letter from Duer to Tilghman, dated " Fish-Kills, Sept. 220, 1776," in which the latter is informed of the appointment of the committee and requested to accept the function of headquarters correspondent. The following are extracts from the correspondence up to the date of the landing of the British army in our county:
Duer to Tilghman, September 25. I shall communicate your Letter to the Convention to-morrow who will (I doubt not) be happy to find that their Attention to the Obstruction of Hudson's River meets with General Washington's approbation.
Duer to Tilghman, September 26 .-- I expect daily to hear of the Enemy's making some great Attempt. It is surely their Business if they hope to make a Campaign any wise hon- orable to them. Your present station [on Harlem Heights] appears to me extremely advan- tageous, and I have no doubt but you will give a good account of them should they be hardy enough to attack your Lines. I should have little anxiety were I convinced of the Sufficiency of our Obstructions in Hudson's River. I do not think it improbable that the Enemy may march part of their Forer to the Eastern Part of Long Island, and endeavor to transport
1 The correspondence was printed in detall In the New York Times of Aprit 7, 14, 21, and 28. 1895. 11 Ineludes much subsidiary matter of
Interest, which, however, not being specially pertinent to our general narrative, must he mmitted here.
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them across the Sound, in order to come on the Rear of our Works. I dare say however that Precautions will be made here to prevent any Surprise of that Kind.
Dner to Livingston, September 27 .- ] have heard it reported that near 100 Sail of the Enemy's ships are gone out of the look [Sandy Hook]. Is it true ? If so, it is far from improbable that they will go round Long Island into the Sound, and Endeavor to Land in the Rear of our Army. From many Circumstances I do not think it improbable they may attempt to land at Sutton's Neck,' about 10 miles from Kingsbridge. I Hatter myself we shall be on our Guard to prevent any Manoeuvre of this kind.
I expect every Moment to hear of some Attempt at Mount [Fort] Washington, wh' is in my opinion the most Important Post in all America as it commands the Communication betwixt the United States. Is it practicable for the Enemy to get Possession of the high Grounds on the West Side of the River ? If they should sneeeed in an Attempt of that kind -the Garrison in that Post [ Fort Lee] would be made very Uneasy. I trust however that our Army would never desert so important a Station without making it the dearest bought Ground wh' the Enemy have hitherto got.
Duer to Tilghman, September 28 .- You observe that if the Passage of the North River ix sufficiently obstructed that our Lines will keep the Enemy from making any Progress in Front. This is certainly true; but you must recollect that the Sound is, and must ever be, open: and if they should succeed in Landing a Body of Men in Westchester Conuty, they might by drawing lines to the North River as effectually hem us in, as if we were in New York, From Sutton's Neck to the North River (if I am not mistaken) is not above Twelve Miles.
1 expect that the Vessells wh the Convention of this State have ordered to Mount [Fort] Washington will be arrived before this letter; no Time I dare say will be lost in sinking them in the proper Channell, since the Snecess of our Army depends so much on this Measure.
Dner to Tilghman, September 30 .-- I am extremely happy to hear that you are in so good a Situation for opposing the Enemy should they make an Attempt to foree your Lines, and I should be still more so were the Vessells, we have lately sent down, properly Sunk. The Precaution you have taken by breaking up the Roads From the Sound are certainly are very proper; and will of course tend to impede the Motions of the Enemy should they land in that Quarter, wh for my own Part I think may be the Case.
The late Strong Sontherly Wind afforded in my Opinion a Strong Temptation to the Enemy to try the Strength of our Chevan de Frise. Probably they esteem them more effectual than we do. May this Sentiment prevail till we have completed these Obstructions.
Duer to Tilghman, October 1 .-- I am happy to tind by your Letter of the 30th ulto. that you are upon a Guard against the Enemys Operations of coming upon your Rear ; you may (I think ) depend that this will be their Mode of Attack. From the Nature however of the Grounds I think you will be able to make a Formidable Opposition. They ought not, must not, shall not get in your Rear. Should they succeed no Event so fatal could ever befall the American Canse.
I am sorry the Ships have been so long detained; but I hope they will be with you before this arrives. Don't let their Youth or their Beauty plead for them, if there is the least Probability of their rendering the Obstructions in that part of Hudson's River more effectual. I am convinced upon the Maturest Reflection that a Million of Money would be a trifling Compensation for the Loss of the Navigation of Hudson's River.
Duer to Tilghinan, October 2 .- 1 can scarcely describe to yon my feelings at this interesting Period. What, with the Situation of our Enemies in your Quarter, and the eursed Machinations of our Internal Foes, the Fate of this State hangs on a Single Battle of
1 The neck of land just below Mamaroneck Harbor. Mamaroneck proved to be the niti- mate point on the Sound occupied by the Brit- ish in their Westchester County campaign - that is, after landing far below, at Throgg's Neck, they slowly advanced. without striking
a blow at the Americans or seeking any other object than a satisfactory basie position, to New Rochelle, whence they sent a detach- ment to the place indicated by Duer as their most available original landing point for offert. ive purposes of strategy.
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any Importance. I am happy to find you are securing your Flanks and I hope our best Troops will be ready to give the Enemy a Reception on their Landing. .
I hope to hear in your next that the North River is completely obstructed.
Tilghman to Duer, October 3 .-- Capt. Cook is now up the River entting Timber for Chevaux de Frise, as he is much wanted here to sink the old Vessels the General begs that he may be sent down immediately, we are at a Stand for want of him, for as he has Super- intended the Matter from the Beginning he best knows the properest places to be obstructed. If the new ships should be found necessary to our Salvation you need not Fear their being Sacrificed, but our public Money goes fast enough without using it wantonly.
Duer to Tilghman, October 3 .- I am glad you have so nearly completed your Defences in the Front, and hope you will be expeditions in fortifying your Flanks to the Eastward of Harlem River. I think that the Enemy must be meditating some General Attack but as Providence has been generally kind to us I hope they will postpone it till Lee, and Mifflin return to Camp.
Robert Benson to Tilghman, October 5 .- Agreeable to your request, our President [of the State convention] dispatched a letter to Capt. Cooke at Poughkeepsie requesting him to repair immediately to Mount [Fort] Washington. He is now at Fishkill Landing on his Way down & is to set out in the Morning with a quantity of Oak Plank &c.
Dner to Tilghman, October 8 .- 1 cannot account for the Enemys Procrastination unless it proceeds From some of their Ships being sent into the Sound round Long Island for the Purpose of making an Attempt to Land in West Chester County.
They never certainly will make any Attempt but on our Flanks ?
Tilghman to the committee, October 9 .- About 8 O'clock this Morning the Roebuck & Phoenix of 14 Guns each and a Frigate of about 20 Guns got nuder way from about Bloom- ingdale, where they have been laying some time, and stood on with an easy Southerly Breeze towards our Chevauz de Frise, which we hoped would have given them some Interruption while our Batteries played upon them. But to our Surprise and Mortification they all ran through without the least difficulty, and without receiving any apparent damage from our Forts, which kept playing on them from both sides of the River. How far they intend up 1 dont know, but His Excellency thought to give you the earliest Information, that you may put Genl. Clinton upon his Guard at the Highlands, for they may have troops concealed on Board with intent to surprise those Forts. If you have any Stores on the Water Side you had better have them removed or secured in time. Boards especially for which we shall be put to great Streights if the Communication above should be eut off. The Enemy have made no Move on the land Side.
P. S .- Be Pleased to forward this Intelligence up the River and to Albany. The two new Ships are put in near Colo. Phillips's. A party of Artillery with 2 twelve pounders and 100 Rifle Men are sent up to endeavor to secure them.
Duer to Tilghman, October 10 .- There is no Event wh could have happened that could have given me more Uneasiness than the Passage of the Enemys Ships up the River. Lean- not persuade myself that there only design is to ent off the Communication of Supplies by Water to our Army at Kingsbridge: though that is an Event which will be highly preju- dicial to our Army. They certainly mean to send up a Foree (if their Ships have not Soldiers already on board) so as to take Possession of the Passes by Land in the Hylands. In this they will be undoubtedly joined by the Villains in Westchester and Dutchess County. It is therefore of the utmost Consequence that a Force should be immediately detached from the Main Body of our Army to occupy these Posts. It is impossible for the Convention to draw ont a force which can be depended on from the Counties last mentioned.
By the Intluence and Artifices of the Capital Tories of this State the Majority of Inhabitants in those Counties are ripe for a Revolt; many Companies of Men have actually been enlisted in the Enemys service, several of whom are now concealed in the Mountains. From the Frontier Counties little Strength can with Safety be drawn, and that not in Time to prevent such an attempt of the Enemy. These Matters I have in a few Words suggested to the Convention (for my Business on the Committee I am in is so urgent that I have only been a Few Minutes in Convention this Day). If they have not wrote to Genl. Washington, let me earnestly entreat that a Force may be immediately sent to the Highlands on this Side.
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by this Means you will not only keep up the Communication with the Army, but I verily believe prevent a Revolt in Westchester and Dutchess Counties.
llow are yon of for Flour, and Salt Provisions ? Will it not be wise to lay in Maga- zines in Time in this Quarter [Fishkill] lest through the Fortune of War our Army should be obliged to retreat to the Highlands ?
Tilghman to the committee, October 11 .-- We have no Intelligence of any Troops, either Horse or Foot, going round long Island into the Sound.
Duer to Tilghman, October 12 .- Notwithstanding the Enemy had, agreeable to your last Advices, sent no Vessells up the Sound, depend upon it they will endeavor to make an Attack upon your Flanks by means of Hudson's and the East River. Several Examinations wh we have taken mention this as their intended Operation: aud indeed it is the only one wh can give them any Probability of Success. Il' we may give Credit to Intelligence proen'd through the Channell of the Tories, Thursday next is fix'd upon for them to make their Attack, and for their Partisans in this State to Cooperate with them.
You will now have an Anxious Task to watch both the Rivers, and I am afraid all your Vigilance will not be altogether etlectual.
Three facts stand out very distinctly from this correspondence- first, that the protection of the Hudson River was the thing of fore- most concern to the Americans, even a tentative intrusion of the enemy above Fort Washington causing the direst forebodings of im- pending preparations for seizing the Westchester river bank as a principal factor of the new British campaign about to be inaugu- rated; second, that the superior availability of the Sound shore of Westchester County as a departing point for the main body of Howe's army was well appreciated, although there were but vague notions as to lowe's probable intentions in that direction; and third, that Howe's slowness in developing his plans was supposed to indicate that they were much more elaborate than they eventually proved to be, and that they contemplated ultimate connecting operations between river and Sound.
As late as the 11th of October tthe very day before Howe's com- plete disclosure of his project) Colonel Tilghman, writing to the committee of the State convention from the American camp, with full knowledge of such information as Washington himself pos- sessed, made this peculiarly malapropos statement: "We have no in- telligence of any troops, either horse or foot, going round Long Island into the Sound." Thus up to the last moment Washington was not only quite unsuspicions of the impending blow, but apparently re- garded the possibility of a movement against him from the Sound as a still remote eventuality, to be considered for the time only in relation to the rumored departure of an expedition around Long Island (that is, around the eastern extremity of the island and thence through the Sound). Well may it be believed, as several historical writers aver, that the intelligence brought to Washington on the morning of October 12 that the whole British army was sailing up the East River and disembarking ou Throgg's Neck, completely sur-
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HISTORY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY
prised him. We are told by Dawson that he " appears to have given way to despair in view of his powerlessness, and to have become do- spondent," and that the record of his official acts for the day is remarkable chietly for singular lack of the active proceedings nat- urally to have been expected from the commander-in-chief in such an emergency.
It is true that, contrasted with the conditions which would have obtained if Howe had been in possession of the Undson simulta- neously with opening his campaign from the Sound, the situation created by his sudden descent on Throgg's Neck was not withont an element of hope. At least, one flank of the American army re- mained quite unimperiled, which afforded scope for thwarting the designs of the enemy upon the other by the resources of defensive generalship. But aside from that single comforting aspect, the ont- look was alarming in an extreme degree. Washington, intrenched on the Heights of Harlem-that is, in the northwestern portion of Manhattan Island,-with New York City below him in the hands of the British, and Howe making ready to fall upon him on his flank, had but three possible courses of action-first, to remain in that posi- tion and undergo a siege, which could have resulted in nothing but early capitulation, as he would have had no sources From which to draw supplies; second, to retreat at once across the Hudson River into New Jersey under the protection of Fort Washington and Fort Lee, a programme not to be thought of even if it could have been carried out successfully, since it would have involved abandoning the whole country northward, including the Highlands and conse- quently the river to its source; or third, to seek a new defensive position at the north, where he could fight the enemy under toler- ably advantageous geographical conditions, backed by the West- chester hills and finally by the Highlands, with the King's Ferry route to New Jersey and Philadelphia open. Of these three possible courses, one was equivalent to ruin and another to disgrace, while the third and only feasible one was hedged abont by a variety of strangely doubtful and difficult circumstances. In the first place, Washington was under every disadvantage of unpreparedness for such a movement. He was even unprepared in judgment, so unex- pectedly did the necessity of considering the matter prosent itself. It was by no means plain to him at first just what ultimate object Howe's appearance on Throgg's Neck imported, or whether it repre- sented all or even the essential part of the British scheme. \ too precipitate retirement to the north on Washington's part would have had the aspect and all the ill moral effect of a cowardly retreat; whereas just on this occasion it was most important for him to gain
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some prestige. Finally, when there was no mistaking the fact that lowe's sole aim was to outflank him, he found himself terribly em- barrassed in marching to a new position by deficient facilities in the way of teams and wagons for the transportation of his guns and baggage. £ Indeed, it was not until the 20th of October- eight days after the landing of the British on Westchester soil-that, having at last evacuated his intrenchments on Harlem Heights, Washington had so far moved up his rear as to make his headquar- ters at Kingsbridge. Moreover, he had to provide for the highly probable emergency of battle along the route, or at least of serions interferences with the progress and integrity of his column. To this end it was necessary to protect himself by a series of intrenched camps at intervals all along the line of march, his destination being White Plains, preappointed by certain circumstances which will be set forth later. Meantime the royal army, as the aggressor, had but to march with reasonable expedition to White Plains-the natural destination for Howe as for Washington, because, in Howe's case, of its central location, and the excellent roads leading thither from the Sound, and the circumstance that all the other roads of the county converged there,-and Washington would be completely hemmed in. In the light of all that followed, the one vital question at the ouiset of this campaign was, Who should first arrive at and possess White Plains? and the advantage was decidedly with Howe, because he was not hampered by any of the physical difficulties that beset Wash- ington. Such were the elements of the startling Westchester situa- tion whose details we shall now trace with as much brevity as is con- sistent with clearness.
About daybreak on the morning of Saturday, October 12. 1776,-a very foggy morning .- many boatloads of British troops, led by Gen- eral Howe in person, embarked at Kip's Bay, Manhattan Island, pro- ceeded through Hellgate and up the Sound, and landed, under the guns of the frigate " Carysfort," on Throgg's Point, where Fort Schy- ler now stands. A second large detachment, conveved by " forty-two sail," was deposited at the same place in the afternoon; and for soy- oral days afterward there was a continuous transportation thither of soldiers and all manner of army appointments. Neither the Point nor any part of the Neck was occupied by American troops, but al Westchester causeway and also at the head of the creek, the only lo- valities affording passage to the mainland, the picked riflemen posted about a week previously, through the happy foresight of General Heath, still stood guard. As soon as the presence of the invader on the Neck became known to them, the men at the bridge ripped up its planking; and when the first reconnoitering party of redeoats
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approached they gave them the contents of their muskets. The enemy beat a hasty and disorderly retreat; and, although the defenders of the bridge were only twenty-tive against many thousands, and the possession of that pass was of supreme importance to General Howe, no serious attempt was made to secure it. He however ordered a breastwork erected, facing the structure. For the rest, he sent out detachments to explore the unknown and mysterious land upon which he had debarked, who, returning, gave him the disheartening infor- mation that it was an island, with only one possible crossing-point to the main, a fording-place, where also a party of rebels with rifles of particularly deadly quality disputed the way. In such circumstances Howe was powerless, at least pending the conveyance of intelligence to the American camp, which, of course, resulted in the dispatching of re-enforcements. General Heath " immediately ordered Colonel Prescott, the hero of Bunker Hill, with his regiment, and Captain- Lieutenant Bryant, of the artillery, with a three-pounder, to ro- enforce the riflemen at Westchester causeway, and Colonel Graham. of the New York line, with his regiment, and Lieutenant Jackson, of the artillery, with a six-pounder, to re-enforce at the head of the creek; all of which was promptly done." These forces, insignificant though they were in comparison with what Howe could have Inunled against them, proved sufficient. He did not care to take the hazard of forcing either pass; and from the 12th to the 18th of October he remained ridiculously penned up on Throgg's Neck by a contemptible few of the starveling continentals who up to that melancholy hour had fled terror-stricken before his ferocious grenadiers. Indeed, his whole programme of entering Westchester County by way of Throgg's Neck had to be abandoned finally; and he was obliged, after six days' delay, to put his army on boats and ship it across Eastchester Bay to Pelham (or Rodman's) Point, a locality not ent off from the main by creeks and marshes and strategie passes.
The responsibility for the selection of Throgg's Neck as the Brit- ish landing place has been charged to the commander of the fleet, Admiral Lord Howe, General Howe's brother; and in ex- planation of the choice of that locality it has been urged that a direct landing on Pell's Neck would have been an imprudent meas- ure because of the shallowness of the water at the latter place, preventing the co-operation of any vessel of sufficient battery to cover the landing. But whatever share of the responsibility may be shifted to Admiral Howe, General Howe at least offered no objection to Throgg's Neck, and indeed he subsequently justi- tied its selection. " Four or five days," he said in a speech before an investigating committee of the House of Commons in 1779, " had
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70 HEATH's MEMOIRS. [OCT. 1776.
1 1 th .- There was a considerable movement among the British boats below. This afternoon, Gen. Wafhington's pleafure-boat, coming down the river with a frefh breeze, and a topfail hoifted, was fup- pofed, by the artillerifts at Mount Wafhington, to be one of the Britifh tenders running down. A 12 pounder was difcharged at her, which was fo exactly pointed, as unfortunately to kill three Americans, who were much lamented. The fame day, feveral of Gen. Lincoln's regiments arrived, two of which were pofted on the North River.
12th .- Early in the morning, 80 or 90 Britifh boats, full of men, flood up the found, from Montre- fors Ifland, Long-Ifland, &c. The troops landed at Frog's Neck, and their advance pufhed towards the caufeway and bridge, at Weft. Chefter mill. Col. Hand's riflemen took up the planks of the bridge, as had been directed, and commenced a fir- ing with their rifles. The British moved towards the head of the creek, but found here alfo the Amer- icans in poffeffion of the pafs. Our General imme- diately (as he had affured Col. Hand he would do) ordered Col. Preicott, the hero of Bunker Hill, with his regiment, and Capt. Lieut. Bryant of the artil- lery, with a 3 pounder, to reinforce the riffemen at Weft-Chefter caufeway ; and Col. Graham of the New-York line, with his regiment, and Lieut. Jack- fon of the artillery. with a 6 pounder, to reinforce at the head of the creek ; all of which was promptly done, to the check and difappointment of the cn. emy. The British encamped on the neck. The riflemen and Yagers kept up a fcattering popping at each other acrofs the marth ; and the Americans on their fide, and the Britifh on the other, threw up a work at the end of the caufeway. Capt. Bryant, now and then, when there was an object, faluted the Britith with a field-piece.
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