USA > New York > Westchester County > History of Westchester County, New York, from its earliest settlement to the year 1900 > Part 43
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With Fort Lee, on the opposite side of the river, it constituted the military domain of General Nathaniel Greene. Greene had his head- quarters at Fort Lee. In common with most of the other subor- dinates of General Washington, he stubbornly insisted that it should be held after the evacuation of Harlem Heights and Kingsbridge, and this was the emphatic opinion of congress, which during the early stages of the war was always meddling with Washington's prerogative as commander-in-chief. Greene. in fact, regarded it as im- pregnable, going so far as to declare that the place could be held against the whole British army. Washington stood practically alone in regarding the attempted retention of the fort as an inexpedient measure. At the very first council of war on the subject, held at Kingsbridge on the 16th of October, he advised its abandonment, both because he was convinced that in the case of a siege it would be taken, and because he foresaw that the whole theater of war would soon be shifted from Manhattan Island and the lower Hudson, in which event its usefulness would be ended. But he was loath to set his authority against the unanimous judgment of his officers and congress, and while at every step personally favoring the with- drawal of the garrison, he finally permitted the fort to be defended.
On the day of the Chatterton's Hill engagement (October 28) Howe
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ordered General Knyphausen, then at New Rochelle, to take his whole command of mercenaries to Kingsbridge, with the exception of one regiment of Waldeckers, which was to be left at New Rochelle. This movement was probably intended as a preliminary step toward the general occupation of the lower portion of Westchester County. Knyphausen encamped at Kingsbridge on the 24 of November. By the 4th British troops had been stationed in the Mile Square, on Valentine's Hill, and at West Farms, and the New Rochelle Wat- deckers were transferred to Williams's Bridge. On the 6th, as al- ready related, Howe, with the main army, was at Dobbs Ferry. From there on the 7th he dispatched his pack of artillery to Kingsbridge, and immediately upon its arrival at that place the work of erecting batteries along the Westchester shore was begun. These were planted in conformity with the secret information about the Fort Washington works which the traitor Demont had furnished; and it was always a matter of astonishment to American officers in study- ing the plans of the siege that in every particular the enemy's ar. rangements were made with the most excellent judgment. Four separate lines of attack on Mount Washington were chosen-three of them proceeding from the Westchester shore. The first and main one was by way of Kingsbridge, the second by boats across the Har- lem River against Laurel Hill, the third by boats from a point farther down against the lines of fortifications near the Roger Morris house, and the fourth from New York City against the southern exposure of the works.
On the 13th Howe in person arrived at Kingsbridge, with all the forces that he had had at Dobbs Ferry. On the 15th, his plans being completed, he sent to Colonel Magaw, in command at Fort Washing- ton, a summons to surrender, signifying that if obliged to carry the fort by assault he would put the garrison to the sword. To this san- guinary threat Magaw replied that it was unworthy of General Howe and the British nation, at the same time declaring that he intended to hold out to the last extremity. During the night of the 15th numerous small boats for the transportation of the attacking troops from the Westchester side were passed up the Hudson and through Spuyten Duyvil Creek into the Harlem River. On the 16th the as. sault was made at every selected point and was crowned with com- plete success, although the enemy's killed and wounded were 458 against but 147 on the American side. The whole garrison, consist- ing of 2,818 men, including officers, became prisoners of war, and forty-three guns and a large amount of equipments and stores fell into the hands of the British.
This was a dreadful blow to Washington, almost a deadly one in
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the circumstances which encompassed him. The fall of the fort, so far from being a catastrophe, was a blessing in disguise. it was well to have it off his hands. But the loss of 3,000 men, at the moment when he was engaging in a new campaign having for its probable object the defense of the capital, with but a meager force at his dis- posal, which was rapidly moldering away in consequence of deser- tions and the expiration of militia terms of service, was abont as disastrous a thing as could betide short of his own destruction. On the 20th Fort Lee was taken by an expedition of 5,000, which landed the night before opposite Yonkers. No resistance was attempted, and although the garrison of 2,000 was promptly withdrawn, it barely escaped capture. Then began Washington's famous retreat across New Jersey, with Cornwallis and Knyphansen in hot pursuit. It does not come within the scope of the present work to follow him in detail in this movement and his subsequent operations. But the very important aspect of Lee's disobedient, if not traitorous, conduct in lingering in Westchester County despite the urgent orders of his chief to join him in New Jersey, belongs to the essential Revolu- tionary annals of our county.
On the 12th of November, upon taking command of the portion of the army dispatched to the west bank of the Hudson from the North Castle camp, Washington had at his back only 5,000 men, of whom more than half were militia whose periods of enlistment were ex- piring. Indeed, though he was strengthened eight days later by the 2,000 from Fort Lee, his ranks were so reduced by the departures of militiamen and other causes that by the time he gained the west shore of the Delaware on the 8th of December it is doubtful if he had more than 3,000 soldiers effective for active purposes. Soon after arriving in New Jersey he appealed in pressing terms to the governor of that State, to its legislature, and to congress for fresh troops. But his main reliance was upon Lee, whom he had left at North Castle as a purely temporary matter until the principal object of the enemy should be disclosed, and with definite instructions to move at once to the other side of the Hudson if it should appear that Howe's designs were in that quarter.
On the 16th, the day of the capitulation of Fort Washington, the commander-in-chief wrote to Lee at length upon the subject of the proper employment of his time so long as it should be expedient for him to remain in Westchester County, plainly giving him to under- stand that the North Castle position was no longer of any particular importance, and that for the time being he should devote his energies, in co-operation with General Heath, toward securing the Highland passes on both sides of the river and erecting works in advantageous
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places. To this injunction Lee gave not the slightest attention. On the other hand, in a letter written the same day to Colonel Reed, of Washington's staff, he expressed directly contrary opinions regard- ing the position at North Castle, concluding with the observation that he intended to remain there, and that he wished " not to cede another inch " to the enemy. Although this vainglorious boast was made before the receipt of Washington's letter, it indicated a fixed resolve in his mind to act an independent part. Indeed, from that day until his fortunate capture by a troop of British horse, his whole proceedings were those of a rebellious subordinate, arrogating to himself authority co-ordinate with that of the chief commander.
After Fort Washington's fall Lee wrote letters from North Castle to various per- sons filled with innuendoes against Washington on ac- count of that disaster. On the 19th he had the impu- dence to send to Washington in person a letter reciting his " objections " to moving from North Castle. On the CXC OR: 20th, when Fort Lee was NEW YORK STATE REGIMENTAL FLAG EMBLEM. abandoned and there re- mained no doubt that the British would begin a cam- paign in New Jersey, Wash- ington, then at Hacken- sack, dispatched an express to Lee ordering him to move. This command was repeated again and again during the succeeding days (sometimes twice a day). For five precious days Washington lay at Newark vainly awaiting the troops from Westchester County, and when he finally left that place on the 28th his rear had a narrow escape from the ad- vance guard of the enemy. With his insignificant force he pushed on to Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton, the Delaware, and across that river without receiving any satisfactory assurance of the ultimate obedience of Lee. One of Washington's master strokes was the se- curing in advance of every boat along the Delaware and its tribu- taries for a distance of seventy miles so as to prevent the enemy from crossing; but deeming it of transcendant importance to receive Lee's troops at the earliest practicable moment, he caused a large fleet of
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the boats to be kept in constant readiness for Lee at a point on the east bank of the stream.
Lee's defiant behavior in tarrying in Westchester County was ag- gravated by every circumstance of formal pretension and presump- tion. On the 20th he wrote the following astonishing words to Ben- jamin Rush, a member of congress: " I could say many things-let me talk vainly-had I the powers I could do you much good-might I but dictate one week-but I am sure you will never give any man the necessary power-did none of the congress over read the Roman history?" On the 21st, upon receiving Washington's order from Hackensack, Lee not merely ignored it, but with unparalleled effrontery directed General Heath, commanding at Peekskill, to de- tach 2,000 men from his force and send them to the commander-in- chief. Heath refused, quoting his own explicit instructions from Washington, whereupon Lee (November 26) wrote: " The comman- der-in-chief is now separated from us. 1, of course, command on this side of the water, and for the future I must and will be obeyed." Washington was obliged to notify Lee in a positive communication that not a man must be taken from Heath. In a letter to Bowdoin, then at the head of the Massachusetts government, Lee characterized Washington's instructions to him to move from North Castle as " absolute insanity," and complacently added that for himself, should the British move toward his quarter, he would entertain no expecta- tion of being succored by the " western army "-implying that there were now two distinct armies, a western commanded by Washington and an eastern headed by himself. In a confidential letter of the 24th to Reed he alluded to an enterprise which he wanted to com- plete before moving, after which, he said, " I shall tly to you, for to confess a truth I really think our chief will do better with me than without me-
Westchester County was at last evacuated by Lee on the 3d and 4th of December. The movement was of course by way of King's Ferry. Stopping at Peekskill on the way, he endeavored to persuade and, failing in that, to brewbeat Heath into a violation of Washing- ton's repeated commands. He requested Heath to give him 2,000 of his troops, and when that was refused, to let him take 1,000. The latter bluntly declared that not a single soldier should march from the post by his order. Lee then assumed, as senior in command, to issue the order himself, but Heath required him to sign a statement certifying that he did this exclusively upon his own responsibility. Lee thereupon detached two of Heath's regiments for his own use, but the next morning, after sober second thought, he concluded that he was playing too boll a part, and ordered them back to Heath's
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camp. On the 4th, while at Haverstraw, says Bancroft, he intercepted 3,000 men who had been hurried down for Washington's relief by General Schuyler, of the Northern Army, and incorporated them in his division. Later he ordered General Heath to send him three regi- ments which had come from Fort Ticonderoga. He marched leis- urely through New Jersey, still taking pains to have it understood that he considered himself an independent commander. To a com- mittee of congress he stated that it was not his intention " to join the army with Washington," and to Heath he wrote, " I am in hopes of reconquering the Jerseys." On the 13th of December, ten days after passing the Hudson, he was made prisoner at Baskingridge, N. J., by some British horsemen, having just completed a letter to General Gates, in which he said: " Entre nous, a certain great man is most damnably deficient." His troops, thus happily disencumbered of him, presently joined Washington, although not in time to partici- pate in the glorious victory of Trenton.
General Lee's occupation of the North Castle position for nearly a month after the dismemberment of the army was not attended by events or proceedings of any noteworthy character. But several matters of some interest in this connection deserve passing notice.
According to Sparks in his biography of Lee, the number of troops left by Washington in the encampment at North Castle was 7,500, of whom 4,000 were militia about to return to their homes. It is quite certain that upon Lee's departure he took with him hardly more than 3,000. Indeed, the militiamen were constantly filing off, glad to escape from the service before the rigors of winter should set in. It is recorded that the ambitions general, who possessed decided elocutionary gifts, industriously practiced his persuasive powers upon them, haranguing them publicly on the gravity of the situation and their solemn duty as American patriots. These impassioned appeals were without avail, however. The condition of the men under Lee's command was deplorable, most of them being without shoes, stock- ings, blankets, or proper clothing, and this was instanced by him as an excuse for not leaving the post. But he was no worse off than Washington in that particular. When the latter, with his band of heroes, attacked the Hessians at Trenton, the whole line of march of the little army was stained with the bloody footprints of the shop- less soldiers.
The records of Lee's transactions while at North Castle show that not only the whole upper portion of Westchester County, but the central sections as well, were quite abandoned by the enemy during that period. Two of Lee's official letters are dated from " Philips- bourg " (probably Tarrytown). As far south as Dobbs Ferry the
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Americans appear to have been in undisputed control. On the 26th of November General Sullivan, in a report to Lee, alluded to an ad- venture which the continental guard at Dobbs Ferry had had with a party of supposed British horse, which made off npon being chal- lenged. Even Mamaroneck was deserted by the British. Writing to Reed on the 24th of November, Lee mentioned a project he had formed to ent off Rogers's corps of Queen's Rangers at that place, together with a troop of light horse and a part of the Highland (Scotch) and another brigade; but upon attempting to carry it into exeention he found that these hostile forces had been withdrawn. But though the enemy for the time being occupied none of West- chester County except the part immediately adjacent to Manhattan Island, their ships-the " Phomix," " Roebuck," and " Tartar "-still continued in the Hudson River, preventing the use of the Dobbs Ferry ronte for the transfer of the American troops to the other side.
Whilst dallying at North Castle Lee dispatched to the lower por- tion of the county a strong detachment to levy contributions on the farmers-the first of the predatory raids to which the unfortunate inhabitants of Westchester County were so frequently subjected throughout the Revolution. On the 220 of November he issued orders to General Nixon to proceed with two brigades and a party of light horse " to Phillips's house," and, beginning at that place, collect all the stout, able horses, all the cattle, fat and lean, and all the sheep and hogs, with the exception of such few milk cows and hogs as should be necessary to the subsistence of the families, and drive them up to the camp. Nixon was also directed to oblige the people to give up all their extra blankets and coverlings, reserving a single one for each person. To the citizens thus dispossessed, however, certificates were given which entitled them to reimbursement upon application to the proper army authorities.
CHAPTER XIX
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION-THE NEUTRAL GROUND
ITH the breaking up of the North Castle camp and the de- parture of Lee, the military situation in Westchester County assumed a very simple complexion. Only the two extreme positions, Kingsbridge and Peekskill, remained in the possession of any considerable body of troops.
The former place preserved, under British domination, all the im- portance attached to it while held by the Americans. It was the key to New York City, which, until the end of the war, continued to be the principal and indeed only reliable base for the British forces in America. It is true that Newport (R. I.) was taken in the winter of 1776, Philadelphia in the fall of 1777, and various important Southern points af later periods. But all these were occupied only by isolated, temporary, or shifting British commands. New York alone, from the beginning to the end of its possession by the enemy, was hekl without incidental disturbance on the part of the Americans or in- cidental loss of essential value to the British through the modifying circumstances of changing events. Hence Kingsbridge was at all times the primal outlying British post. After the retirement of the last detachment of the American army in October, 1776, and its seiz- ure by the enemy, the place was fortified anew, the chief defensive position on the Westchester side continuing to be the old American Fort Independence on Tetard's Hill. This fortress, although be sieged by Heath in January, 1777, and several times threatened, never vielded to the Revolutionary arms. On the other hand, the British were content to abide at Kingsbridge as their most advanced perma- nent establishment, never attempting to take a formal stand above as an added feature of their basie position. Their occupation of Westchester County beyond Kingsbridge was only for the minor busi- ness of covering that place, controlling the territory to some extent, cutting off occasional American detachments, and furnishing con- stant adventurous employment for a few bodies of their troops, mostly Loyalist rangers. There was nover a second British move- ment in force through Westchester County, although two expedi-
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tions of importance destined for forcing the entrance to the High- lands were landed in the county. A few days after Lee marched away from North Castle our people residing along the Sound were thrown into renewed consternation by the appearance of a fleet of some seventy sail, which came up out of the East River. But it left our shores undisturbed. This was the expedition to Rhode Island, which was the means of securing for the British a prolonged lodg- ment in that quarter. Rhode Island was too remote, however, for any co-operating land relations with New York-especially as during the British continuance in the former locality the field operations of the contending armies did not once take a direction east of the Ind- son River. And like the Rhode Island expedition, the various British attacks on Connecticut (with one minor exception) proceeded by water from New York, accomplishing nothing but local results. Con- sequently although Westchester County was continually exposed to the enemy at the south, and suffered terribly and withont cessation from his incidental occupation and aggression, it was not similarly exposed at the east, and, on account of the choice of other sections of the country than New England for the formal military campaigns, was almost wholly exempted, after the experience of 1776, from the presence of the foe in any pretentious array.
Peekskill was no less clearly indicated as the vital post for the Americans, to be maintained at all hazards, than Kingsbridge was for the British. Lying just below the Highlands and just above the point on the Hudson River where its waters, previously confined be- tween closely approaching banks, suddenly spread out into a broad sen, it commanded equally the passes into the mountains, the navi- gation of the whole upper river, and the communication with the western shore, and consequently with all the middle and southern States. The lower river, all the way from New York Bay to Ver- planck's Point, was controlled absolutely by the British ships, and on account of its great width, as well as of the barrier from west to east interposed by the wide expanse of the Croton, was utterly un- available for American use after the removal of the army from Kings- bridge and the fall of Fort Washington. Consequently no point sonth of Peekskill was to be considered for a moment as a suitable station for the principal American counterpoise to the enemy's position below. Other points all the way down through the county were, of course, occupied by guards. In this respect it was at first the Ameri- can policy to push down advance posts as near as practicable to the enemy's sphere, and at no time did the patriots retire their lines to the northward of Pine's Bridge across the Croton. Yet Peekskill, with the country immediately dependent upon it, always remained
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the seat of the serions American establishment for general purposes. The choice of positions farther down by Washington during his sub- sequent visitations of Westchester County (including that of Dobbs Ferry for the united American and French armies in 1781) proved in each case only a temporary expedient.
It can not, however, be said of the main American position at Peekskill. as of the enemy's at Kingsbridge, that it was one upon which its possessors could rest in cal and undisturbed confidence and without reference to any of the ordinary possible developments of general strategy. Because of the natural location of New York City, with all its surrounding waters controlled by the fleet and only the position at Kingsbridge open to practicable attack. the British could abide there in- definitely without apprehen- sion of any serret or sudden American designs. In order to make a formidable campaign on New York City -- which could proceed only by way of Kingsbridge, a point not to be reached except by a long march down the Westches- ter County peninsula, and not to be deliberately assailed without the previous concen- tration of all of Washington's forces-the Americans would SIR HENRY CLINTON. have had to lay bare their intentions weeks in advance.
How different the situation at Peekskill! It could always be surprised by a river expedition from New York City, with but the briefest possi- ble foreknowledge on Washington's part. It was a point of supreme importance, but only one among several. He therefore had to dis- tribute his forces, uncertain where the enemy's next blow would fall, but at all times convinced that he would seek sooner or later to push up the Hudson River. The safety of the Hudson was Washington's greatest concern, and with the beginning of each campaign he suf- fered torments on that subject. There was an incessant marching and countermarching of troops to and from Peekskill. and Washing- ton himself. except when during his campaign in Pennsylvania, in the southern part of New Jersey, and finally in Virginia, was never more than a few days' march distant from the place. Indeed,
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in several of his main movements preliminarily to the unfolding of the enemy's principal project for the impending campaign, he made it the cardinal point of his programme to take a central station from which he could with equal convenience march to Peekskill or to other threatened points according to ultimate circumstances. To the vigilance with which he watched the Hudson, his carefulness in fortifying it. and his promptitude in counteracting British attempts upon it. the final success of the Revolution was unquestionably due as much as to any single factor.
Peekskill itself was never a Revolutionary stronghold. The village was the headquarters for the military commander of the district, which embraced all of the Highlands. Later. upon the completion of the defenses at West Point, the latter locality enjoyed this distinc- tion, and Peekskill, with Verplanck's Point, was attached to the West Point command.
The fortification of the Highlands was begun under the auspices of the New York convention shortly after the arrival of the British invading expedition. At the time of Washington's visit to Peek- skill. in November, 1776, the work had made tolerable progress. Wash- ington. it will be remembered, spent one whole day and part of a second in reconnoitering this locality and the Highlands above. After indicating what should be done toward perfecting the defensive posi- tions, he left his able engineer, Colonel Rufus Putnam, to carry out his plans under the direction of General Heath. The situation as finally developed was in detail briefly as follows:
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