USA > New York > Westchester County > History of Westchester County, New York, from its earliest settlement to the year 1900 > Part 39
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53 | Part 54 | Part 55 | Part 56 | Part 57 | Part 58 | Part 59 | Part 60 | Part 61 | Part 62 | Part 63 | Part 64 | Part 65 | Part 66
PAGE FROM HEATH'S MEMOIRS.
In
368
HISTORY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY
been unavoidably taken up in landing at Frog's Neck, instead of going at once to Pell's Point, which would have been an imprudent measure, as it could not have been executed without much unneces- sary risk." It is difficult to conceive what great risk would have been involved in the latter proceeding, since there was no American post at the point of Pelham Neck on the 12th of October, or, for that matter, on the 18th of October either-the final landing of the British there on the latter date being accomplished withont the slightest interference on the part of the Americans, and indeed with- ont being known to them until the advance party of the invaders suddenly showed themselves to the American pickets a full mile and a half above the point. But even granting the force of the special objection to Pelham Neck as an original landing place, one marvels why Throgg's Neck should have been regarded as the only alterna- tive spot. Surely there was adequate depth of water at points farther up the Sound (Mamaroneck Harbor, for instance); and Gen- oral Howe's sole object being io ontflank Washington, it would have been rather an advantage than a disadvantage for him to disom- bark at a comparatively northernly locality. In whatever aspect the Throgg's Neck landing is viewed, it is hard for the dispassionate mind to regard it otherwise than as a prodigions strategie blunder.1
During the six days of Howe's supine occupation of Throgg's Neck, Washington's headquarters were continued at Harlem Heights, where also, in conjunction with the Kingsbridge dependency, the
A glance at the map shows that Throgg's Neck, in a purely geographical sense (not tak- ing into account either its practical insular character or the fact, which must have been known to Howe, that the adjacent country was well guarded by the Americans and Its roads had largely been rendered Impassable), was about the most unfavorable place that could have been hit upon for initiating a movement io set the royal army down In Washington's roar. It is, indeed, on a due-east line, sollte- what south of the Heights of Harlem and Kingsbridge; so that mpon lowe's arrival at Throgg's Neck Washington was actually in ad- vanre of him along the one open line of move- ment. The complacency of Washington In fe- maining in his Harlem Heights and Kings- bridge position until after Howe had pushed northward to Pell's Neck, although six days had elapsed meanwhile, Is of itself plain dem- onstration that Howe blundered egregiously in his choice of ground so far as his intention of ontBanking the patriot general was concerned. The civilian Duer, of the State convention, in his correspondence with Washington's head- unarters, shows a perfect grasp of the elements of the situation. In a letter to Tilghman, Og-
fober 14. he writes:
" They [the enemy] could not, I think, have blundered mare effectually than by Landing on thir Neck of Land they are now on. I should think a small Number of Men with Picl Pieces would suffice to prevent their penetrat- ing further into the Country from that Quar- for. You say that you think more of the Ene- my's Troops are moved up the Sound. I think they will endeavor to Land the Main Body of their Army near Rye and endeavor to sur- round our Troops from the Sound to the North River." And the next day, writing to Robert Harrison, Washington's secretary, he says:
"1 . .. am happy to find you have got the Enemy in so desirable a Situation.
" There appears to me an actual Fatality at- lending all their Measures. One would have naturally imagined from the Traitors they have among them, who are capable of giving them the most Minute Description of the Grounds In the County of Westchester, that they would have landed much farther to the Eastward [northward]. Hlad they puzzled their Imagina- tions to discover the worse Place they could not have succeeded better than they have done."
369
CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF WHITE PLAINS
main body of the American army remained. The apparent confusion of mind which he experienced upon being apprised of Howe's land ing was not of long duration; and indeed his energetic qualities as a commander were probably never displayed with greater or more judicious attention to detail than throughout the period of the Brit- ish general's inactivity on the Sound. On the evening of the 12th he rode over to Westchester village and personally inspected the sit- nation, becoming satisfied that it threatened no immediate danger and that his plain duty, pending a further disclosure of the enemy's intentions, was to strengthen his defensive position in every way. At a loss to understand why Throgg's Neck should have been se. lected if the British purpose was to quickly push into his rear and ontap him, he inclined to the opinion that. Howe's final object was to move on his works af Kingsbridge, and that to that ond he would presently be supported by a second expedition, to be landed lower down, probably at Morrisania. On the other hand, he was by no means numindful of the contingency that the grander project might be meditated; but he was convinced that so long as Howe stayed on Throgg's Neck he could afford to wait for aetnalities. His confidence in his ability to repel a mere movement against Kingsbridge is well reflected in the following extract from a letter written from head- quarters on the 13th of October by Lieutenant-Colonel Tilghman to the committee of correspondence of the State convention:
The Grounds leading from Frogs Point towards our Post at Kingsbridge are as defensible as they can be wished. the Roads are all lined with Stone fences and the adjacent Fields divided off with Stone likewise, which will make it impossible for them to advance their Artillery and Amunmition Waggons by any other Ronte than the great Roads, and I think if they are well lined with Troops, we may make a considerable slaughter if not discomfit them totally. Our Rifle Men have directions to attend particularly to taking down their Horses, which if done, will impede their March effectually. Our Troops are in good Spirits and seem inclined and determined to dispute every Inch of Ground. Our Front is now so well secured that we can spare a considerable Number of our best Troops from hence if they are wanted.
If we are forced from this post we must make the best Retreat we can, but I think this Ground should not be given up but upon the last Extremity.1
The cheerful remark in this letter that the commander-in-chief had matters so well in hand as to be able to spare a considerable number of his best troops for purposes other than his own defense against Howe received practical application on the same day by the send-
1 This letter of Tilghman's was replied to on the 14th, by William Duer. From the citations made In previous pages from the Door- Tilgh- man correspondence, the reader will doubtless have been impressed with the perspicacity of Imer's views of the military situation; and the following comment made by him In his letter of the 14th, upon one of Tilghman's optimistle expressions, is a further instance of his discre- tion:
" I approve much of selling at a dear Price every foot of Ground; but if the Enemy should. by their Manoeuvres, contrive to encirele our Army, and as 1 before Observed Ocrupy these Mounts [the Highlands], while their Vessels obstruct the Navigation of Hudson's River and the Sound, there will have no Occasion to haz- ard a battle. Wants of Supply would. ! fear. make us fall an inglorious Sacrifice."
370
HISTORY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY
ing off of Colonel Tash's regiment of New Hampshire militia to Fish- kill " for the assistance of the committee of safety in holding the dis- affected in check." By recurring to the conseentive extracts from the Dner-Tilghman correspondence printed on pp. 359-362, it will be seen that Duer, on the 12th of October, communicated to Wash. ington's headquarters information (or supposed information) which the State convention, by " several examinations" of Tories had ob- tained, of a concerted plan for a grand British movement upon both flanks of the American army " by means of Hudson's and the East River," in which enterprise " their partisans in this State " were to co-operate-" Thursday next " (the 17th of October) being fixed for the united undertaking. In almost every letter written by Dner to Tilghman during the eventful month from the 22d of September to the 21st of October, mention is made with much particularity and in the bitterest terms of the very numerous Tory conspiracies then rife.1 Moreover, Washington was constantly apprehending conspir- ators and suspects, and no one had a keener appreciation than he of the need of strict measures against the seditions Tories. The de- tachment of a whole regiment from his army for the local purposes of the committee of safety in such critical circumstances as prevailed on the 13th of October is a peculiarly interesting incident. Wash- ington seems also to have been considerably impressed by Duer's in- telligence of a general British plan for the 17th of October. The pre. diction was evidently treasured up at headquarters, for Tilghman, writing to Duer on the 15th, remarks: " The information you for- nish concerning the intended operations on Thursday next deserve our highest thanks; it may be false, if it is, there is no harm done, but we shall be better prepared for them if true. It will effectually pre- vent surprise, the most fatal thing that can befall an Army." And on the 17th he takes occasion to remind his correspondent that " the 17th October is come and nearly passed without the predicted
September 28, he writes that " A Discovery was made sometime ago of a Battalion of Rangers, which was raising in Westchester County to be commanded by Major Rogers, who is for that Purpose commissioned by Lord Howe "; also of the discovery of a company misting in Dutchess County, whose muster- roll contained fifty-seven names, " Twenty-five of whom we have already apprehended." Or- tober 1, he reports that thirty-two of the latter organization have been taken into custody, and. alluding to other conspirators, says: "1 hope Matters may be so managed that two or three of the principal Misoreants who have been taken may be hanged as Sples." October 3, referring to the Tory conspirators captured by Washington, he exclaims: " In the Name
of Justice hang two or three of the Villains you have apprehended. They will certainly come under the Denomination of Spies." Deto- ber &, he says: "i am sorry to tell you ffor the Credit of this State) that the Committee I belong to make daily fresh Discoveries of the Infernal Practices of our Enemies to exelte In- surrertions amongst the Inhabitants of this State. To-morrow one Company actually en- listed in the Enemy's Service will be march'd to Philadelphia. there to be confined in jail till the Establishment of our Conrts enables us to hang the Ring leaders." And on October 10 (see p. 361) he goes so far as to declare that unless vigorous measures are instantly taken a revolt will surely supervene in Westchester and Dutchess Counties.
371
CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF WHITE PLAINS
Blow." Evidently Dner's prophecy for the 17th was one of the varions conjoining things which influenced Washington to suspect that lowe's movement to Throgg's Neck was but a part of the enemy's plan, and accordingly to allow a full week to pass by with- ont inaugurating any new plan of his own.
On the morning of the 13th Washington issued a stirring address to the army, probably as characteristic a specimen of his writings of this nature as his career affords: " As the enemy seem now to be endeavoring to strike some stroke before the close of the cam- paign," said he, "the General most earnestly conjures both officers and men, if they have any love for their country and concern for its liberties and regard to the safety of their parents, wives, children, and countrymen, that they will act with bravery and spirit becoming the cause in which they are engaged; and to encourage and animato them so to do, there is every advantage of ground and situation, so that if we do not conquer it must be our own faults. How much bet- ter will it be to die honorably, fighting in the field, than to return home covered with shame and disgrace, even if the ernelly of the enemy should allow you to return! A brave and gallant behavior for a few days, and patience under some little hardships, may save our country and enable us to go into winter quarters with safety and honor."
General Washington lost no time in strengthening Heath's com- mand, which made the force above Kingsbridge the major part of the American army; and troops were posted at all important points so as to check any possible advance of the enemy. On the 14th Major General Charles Lee arrived from the South, and was assigned by Washington to the chief command in Westchester County-an assign- ment not to take effort, however, " until he could make himself ar- quainted with the post, its circumstances, and arrangements of duty," General Heath in the interim retaining the authority which he had administered so conscientiously and ably. At that period Lee was still generally estimated at his own enormous valuation of himself; and it is amusing to note in the public and private correspondence of the time the satisfaction with which the coming of this littlest of little sonls, most vile of marplots, and most heinons and despicable of willing thongh impotent traitors was hailed on account of his supposed majestic genius and scientific qualifications for the
Pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war.
" I beg my Affectionate Compliments to Gonl. Lee," wrote the im- pressionable but, as we have seen, eminently sensible Duer, in one of his letters (October 15), " whom I sincerely congratulate on his arrival in Camp-partly on account of himself, as he will have it in
372
HISTORY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY
his power to reap a fresh Harvest of Laurels, and more on account of this Country wh looks up to him as one of the brave Apostles of her dearest Rights." Lee's machinations to supplant Washington in the supreme command were in course of development at this period, and the gloomy outlook for the American canse, with the appalling record of recent disaster, gave buoyancy to his selfish expectations. His participation in the campaign that followed is best remembered for his sneers and gibes at his commander, which passed from month to month of his clique, both in the army and in congress. His ro- mark that Washington was condneting the war mainly with the pickax and the spade was circulated with particular enjoyment. Finally, when Washington departed to New Jersey after the battle of White Plains, Lee, left in command in Westchester County, took a course of almost open insubordination.
It was not until the 16th of October that any official decision was arrived at looking to abandonment of the Harlem Heights and Kings- bridge position, and even then the action taken was only in the form of a resolve upon a proposition of policy. A council of war was held at the headquarters of General Lee, the officers in attendance, be- sides the commander-in-chief, being Major-Generals Lee, Putnam, Heath, Spencer, and Sullivan, Brigadier-Generals Lord Stirling, Mifflin, MeDougal, Parsons, Nixon, Wadsworth, Scott, Fellows, George Clinton, and Lincoln, and Colonel Knox, commanding ihe artillery-to whom Washington, after conveying such information as he possessed respecting the conjectured purpose of the enemy to surround the army, put the following question: " Whether (it hav- ing appeared that the obstructions in the North River have proved insufficient, and that the enemy's whole force is now in our rear, at Frog's Point) it is now deemed possible, in our present situation, to prevent the enemy from cutting off the communication with the coun- try and compelling us to fight them, at all disadvantages, or sur- render prisoners at discretion?" The assembled officers, with the single exception of General George Clinton, replied that " it is not possible to prevent the communication from being ent off; and that one of the consequences mentioned in the question must certainly follow." This of course implied a practically unanimons conclu- sion on the part of Washington's generals that the " present situa- tion " should be given up. At the same time the expediency of re- faining possession of Fort Washington was considered, and all the general officers, most of them influenced doubtless by the desire of congress that this stronghold should be held as long as possible, favored the policy-although Washington's judgment was against it.
Preparations were now begun, though with no special haste, for
373
CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF WHITE PLAINS
securing the withdrawal of the army. Orders were given for put- ting the roads leading to the north, on the west side of the Bronx River, in good condition. Washington thoroughly familiarized him- self with the nature of the country above, and in that connection. on the 16th, carefully examined the ground adjacent to Pelham Neck, which proved to be the next stage in the progress of the enemy. At this early date considerable bodies of troops were advanced as far northward as Valentine's Hill and the Mile Square, both in the present City of Yonkers; and during the subsequent few days de- tachments were gradually sent forward to establish a line of tem- porary intrenched camps on the high grounds bordering the west bank of the Bronx all the way to White Plains.1 Besides, Washing- ton was not unmindful of the chance of danger from the Hudson River. On the 15th two regiments of Massachusetts militia were sent up to Tarrytown to watch the British ships of war lying oppo- site that place and oppose any attempt to land men from them; and, not withstanding the previous failure of the cheraur de frise at Fort Washington to bar the navigation of the river, and the large expense incident to an attempted completion of that barrier, the work upon it was energetically continued. " We are sinking the Ships as fast as possible," wrote Tilghman to Duer on the 17th; - 200 Men are daily employed, but they take an immense Quantity of Stone for the purpose."
Although the ultimate necessity of quitting Manhattan Island and Kingsbridge was not decided on until the 16th, and the beginning of the formal movement was delayed several days longer, the objee- tive point in the coming northward march of the army was well in- dicated by circumstances beforehand. It happened that the prin- cipal magazine of provisions had been accumulated at the village of White Plains, a place not too far removed from the Harlem Heights headquarters and yet at a sufficient distance in the interior to be deemed safe. Moreover, there was a considerable magazine at Rye on the Sound-a decidedly unsafe locality in view of the complete control of that coast by the British fleet; and the removal of the Rye stores to White Plains as the most available spot of safety was therefore a manifest necessity as soon as the general situation be- came menacing. And finally White Plains commanded the whole country below, and equally the country above, since all the roads centered there; while directly in its rear rose the range of North
1 In most historical references to Washington's march through Westchester County the Impres- sion is given that the intrenched camps along the Bronx were constructed by detachments from the army during Its actual progress. But
Dawson's remarks on this point (Scharf, 1 .. 427, noto sein. to our mind. to establish beyond question that those defensive works were pre- pared in advance by pioneers detailed for the special purpose.
374
IHISTORY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY
Castle hills, where the army could be made secure against almost any possible attack in case it should be necessary to fall back farther. These various conditions positively indicated White Plains as the essential point for Washington to reach-oven before his actual movement was inaugurated. The stores at White Plains were under the guard of a militia force of some 300 men.
Before proceeding farther in our narrative, we think it indispensa- ble to briefly point out the true character of Washington's move- ment from Harlem Heights and Kingsbridge to White Plains. It is generally characterized by loose and hasty writers-and not in- frequently by more careful ones-as a retreat. This is a strange mis- conception of its nature. It was not a retreat in any proper or ad- missible sense of the term, but really a deliberate countermove for position, fearless and almost aggressive in its fundamentals. So far from retreating upon the appearance of his foe at Throgg's Nock, Washington did not even retire. He calmly held his original posi-
ON THE MARCH TO WHITE PLAINS.
tion for days, and, in fact, until Howe himself went forward. Then, it being apparent that Howe was marching to flank him, he promptly took measures to countertank Howe, and exeented them with the mosi admirable judgment and great dispatch and success in view of his circumstances. Regarded strictly in its ultimate complexion, Washington's movement to White Plains was indeed the reverse of a retreat or retirement. If his object had been simply to retire beyond his enemy's reach, he would not have stopped at White Plains, a comparatively exposed locality, but would have gone at once to the North Castle hills, which were practically impregnable with the force he had. But with those hills at his back to resort to in case of need, he was satisfied to offer battle at White Plains, because, with the conditions of ultimate position favorable to him, he deemed it expedient to first fight a battle that he had a fair chance to win. Eventually it was Howe and not Washington who declined the gen- eral battle at White Plains, which Washington, by all his prelim- inary operations, had accepted in advance. We now return to the enemy at Throgg's Neck.
375
CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF WHITE PLAINS
The 18th of October was the day chosen by General Howe for ex- posing his further intentions. Up to that time he had neither done nor attempted anything but the transportation of his army, with its artillery, equipments, and stores, from New York City to Throgg's Neck. After finding, upon his arrival there on the 12th, that his progress from the Neck to the mainland was disputed by a de- termined force of Americans, he refrained from all pretensions to ground beyond his little island, but caused earthworks to be con- strneted, and during the succeeding days " the scattering fire across the marsh continued, and now and then a man was killed." That was all. Finally, at one o'clock on the morning of the 18th, he (m- barked a portion of his forces on flatboats and had them rowed over to Pelham's or Rodman's Point, on the opposite side of East- chester Bay. They were successfully landed in the darkness. This was a preliminary movement to secure the ground for his main body, which he put in motion at daylight; and simultaneously he caused an embrasure to be opened in his earthwork facing Westchester causeway, so as to give the Americans the impression that he was preparing to force his way over under a cannonade. The Americans readily concluded that such was his object; and strong re-enforce- ments were speedily sent forward by General Heath, who soon after- ward came to the spot in person to direct the operations. Washing- ton himself presently arrived on the scene; and the course taken by him is of much interest in connection with what our readers already know about his strong and persevering suspicion that lowe's design would eventually prove to be a direct advance on Kingsbridge, with the support of a cooperating expedition from the quarter of Mor- risania. Washington, says Heath in his " Memoirs," "ordered him (Heath) to return immediately and have his division formed ready for action, and to take such a position as might appear best caleu- lated to oppose the enemy should they attempt to land another body of troops on Morrisania, which he thought not improbable."
Having distracted the attention of the Americans by his pretended plan of crossing the marsh from Throgg's Neck, Howe dispatched his main body as rapidly as possible to Pell's Point on boats, and the transfer was completed with promptness and in entire safety. Meanwhile the presence of the British vanguard, which had been ferried over in the night, became known to the American force sta- tioned on the neck above, resulting in a series of lively encounters. This American force consisted of the excellent brigade of General James Clinton, which, at the time, was commanded by Colonel Glover. It embraced four regiments, Shepard's, Read's, and Baldwin's, in ad- dition to Glover's (the last being under the temporary command of
376
HISTORY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY
Captain Curtis). Its total strength upon this occasion was about 750, and it was equipped with three field pieces, which, however, were not brought into action because of the unevenness of the ground and the nature of the tactics employed. The fact that the American general had the discretion to place so relatively numerous and offer- tive a body on Pelf's Nock, despite his lingering belief that the enemy's plans did not contemplate any movement thither, is one among many exceedingly practical and convincing demonstrations of the thoroughness and intelligence with which the patriot forces were disposed from the very beginning of the Westchester campaign.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.