Sketches and statistics of Cincinnati in 1859, Part 3

Author: Cist, Charles, 1792-1868
Publication date: 1859
Publisher: [Cincinnati : s.n.]
Number of Pages: 844


USA > Ohio > Sketches and statistics of Cincinnati in 1859 > Part 3


Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).


Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35


There are few events in western history more generally misun- derstood, and more inaccurately recorded, than the campaign against the Indians, waged by Harmar and St. Clair. This was, doubtless, incident to the character of the times and of the country. That both Harmar and St. Clair should mistake the locations of the battles they fought, and that statements connected with these cam- paigns, founded on conjectures, should pass current for years in the community to such an extent as to confuse the truth of history, would not create surprise, if we reflect on the wilderness charac- ter of the untrodden west, the scattered state of the settlements


29


EARLY ANNALS.


in the Miami country, the failure of communication between the respective parts, and the utter absence of mails and newspapers.


I commence with HARMAR's campaign. A page would hardly serve to point out the errors in dates, places, and facts generally, in print upon this subject. The best mode of correction is to compile the narrative anew, availing myself of unpublished man- uscript notes of Capt. John Armstrong, who commanded a compa- ny of the United States regulars attached to Harmar's army during that campaign, and whose escape with life in the first battle was so remarkable.


The western frontiers had been for some years, say from 1782 to 1788, in a very disturbed state by reciprocal aggressions of In- dians and whites. There does not appear, in the history of those days, however, any systematic and general movement of the In- dians for the extirpation of the whites, as was alleged to be the object of their great confederacy of 1782, which, dividing into two parties, broke, one upon the upper Ohio settlements, the other on the various Kentucky stations, carrying massacre and captivity so extensively along their course. The irregular and precarious mode of living among the savages forbade the accomplishment of such design, if it had even been their settled purpose; the sub- sistence of themselves and families being principally derived from the chase, a species of provision which did not permit the laying up extensive and permanent stores, if even their improvident mode of living had permitted the effort. But when they found the set- tlers intrenching themselves in fort after fort, circumscribing their range and cutting them entirely off from their favorite hunting- grounds south of the Ohio, there can be no doubt that a deter- mined hostility sprung up in the minds of the savage, which all the exertions of the American government failed to allay, and soon rendered it apparent that the two races could not live together in amity, while it was the policy of the one to reclaim the country from the hunter, and of the other to keep it a wilderness. .


After treaty upon treaty had been made and broken-and the frontiers had been suffering through this whole period from the tomahawk and the scalping-knife-the government, then just going into operation, detached a force of three hundred and twenty regu- lar troops, enlisted in New Jersey and Pennsylvania for the pro- tection of the frontiers, and devolved the command on Josiah Har- mar, who had borne arms as a colonel, with credit, during the late


-


30


EARLY ANNALS.


revolutionary struggle. A force of eleven hundred and thirty-three drafted militia, from Pennsylvania and Kentucky, was also placed under his orders. The regulars consisted of two battalions, com- manded respectively by Majors Wyllys and Doughty, and a com- pany of artillery under Captain Ferguson with three brass pieces of ordnance. Colonel Hardin, of Kentucky, was in command of the militia, in which Colonels Trotter and Paul, Majors Hall and McMillan, held subordinate commands. The orders to General Harmar were to march on to the Indian towns adjacent to the lakes, and inflict on them such signal chastisement as should pro- tect the settlements from future depredations.


The whole plan had been devised by Washington himself, who well understood the subject, having prior to the revolution, as is well known, learned much practically of the Indian character, as well as the condition of the west, although it is not easy to con- ceive why he should have selected such men as Harmar and St. Clair, who were destitute of the training he had himself acquired, and which could have been found on the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Kentucky, in many distinguished Indian fighters, ready for use. The force of circumstances probably biased his judgment, as it served to effect appointments equally exceptionable during the war of 1812, such as those of Hull, Dearborn, Bloomfield, and Chandler, men who had outlived their energies, if ever qualified practically for the weighty trust devolving on them.


On the 29th of December, 1789, General Harmar arrived at Cin- cinnati. He had been stationed for some months prior to this at the mouth of the Muskingum, waiting at that post for militia force and military supplies from the upper country, and the completion of Fort Washington, which Major Doughty with one hundred and forty-six men from Fort Harinar had been detached to construct. From this period to the 30th of September, 1790, he was employed in making everything ready for the expedition, and on that day all his preparations being made, he started with the regulars, the militia under Colonel Hardin having already set out.


The first day's advance was seven miles, and the encampment for the night was on a branch of Mill creek; course northeast. Eight miles more were made the second day, on a general course of northwest, the army encamping on another branch of Mill creek. On the third day a march of fifteen miles was made, the course generally north, and the encampment on the waters of Muddy


31


EARLY ANNALS.


creek, a tributary of the Little Miami, within one mile of Colonel Hardin's command. The next morning, Colonel Hardin, with the militia, were overtaken and passed, and halting at Turtle creck, one mile further on, the whole army encamped for the night.


On the 14th of October the army reached and crossed the Little Miami, on a northeast course moved up it one mile to a branch called Sugar or Casar's creek, near Waynesville, where they en- camped, having accomplished nine miles- that day. Next day a march of ten miles, still on a northeast course, brought the army to Glade creck, near where Xenia now stands. On the 6th it reached Chillicothe, an old Indian village, now Oldtown, and crossed again the Little Miami, keeping a northeast course, making nine miles that day. Next day the troops crossed Mad river, then called the Pickaway fork of the Great Miami, and made nine miles; their course for the first time becoming west of north. On the 8th, pursuing a northwest course, they crossed Honey creek, and made seven miles more. On the next day, they followed the same course, and marching ten miles, encamped within two miles of the Great Miami. Next day the army crossed the Miami, keeping still a northwest course, and made ten miles more. On the 11th, by a course west of north, it passed the ruins of a French trading sta tion, marked on Hutchens' map as the Tawixtwes, Twigtwees Encamped after making eleven miles. Next day the army kept a course west of northwest, near Loramie's creek, and across the head-waters of the Auglaize. Here they found the remains of a considerable village, some of the houses being still standing; four- teen miles made this day. On the 13th, marched ten miles, keop- ing west of northwest, and encamped, being joined by a reinforce -. ment from Cincinnati, with ammunition. Next day, the 14th, Col. Hardin was detached with one company of regulars and six hun- dred militia, in advance of the main body, and being charged with the destruction of the towns in the forks of the Maumee. On the arrival of this advance party they found the towns abandoned by the Indians, and the principal one burnt; the main body marching on the 14th ten miles, and on the 15th eight more, both days on a northwest course. Next day made nine miles same course, and on the 17th crossing the Maumee river to the Indian village, formed a junction again with Hardin at the Omee village. This was the same town burnt and abandoned by the savages.


At this point of the narrative there is considerable obscurity with


39


EARLY ANNALS.


names and places, which I must explore as I best can. The In- dians had seven villages, it seems, clustering about the junction of the St. Mary's and St. Joseph rivers, which, as is well known, form the river Maumee. These were, first, the Miami village, so " called after the tribe of that name, corruptly and by contraction Omec, from Au Miami, the designation given it by the French traders, who were here resident in great force. This lay in the fork of the St. Joseph and Maumee. Second, a village of the Miamis, of thirty houses, Ke Kiogue, now Fort Wayne, in the fork of the St. Mary's and Maumee. Third, Chillicothe, a name signifying "town," being a village of the Shawanees, down the Maumee, on its north bank, and of fifty-eight houses. Opposite this was another of the same tribe of eighteen houses. The Dela- wares had their villages, two on the St. Mary's, about three miles from its mouth and opposite each other, with forty-five houses to- gether, and one other consisting of thirty-six houses, on the east side of the St. Joseph's, two or three miles from its mouth.


The day of Harmar's junction with Hardin, two Indians were discovered by a scouting party as they were crossing a prairie. The scouts pursued them and shot one; the other made his escape. A young man named Johnson, seeing the Indian was not dead, attempted to shoot him again, but his pistol not making fire, the Indian raised his rifle and shot Johnson through the body, which proved fatal. This night the Indians succeeded in driving through the lines between fifty and one hundred horses, and bore them off, to the no small mortification of the whites.


The same day, October 17th, was employed in searching in the hazel thickets for hidden effects. Much corn was found buried in the earth. On the evening of this day, Captain McClure and a M., McCiary fell upon a stratagem peculiar to backwoodsmen. They conveyed a horse a short distance down the river, undiscov- ered, fettered him, unstrapped the bell, and concealed themselves with their rifles. An Indian, attracted by the sound of the bell, came cautiously up, and began to untie him, when McClure shot him. The report of the gun alarmed the camp, and brought many of the troops to the place. A young man, taken prisoner at Lora- mie's, was brought to see the Indian just killed, and pronounced him to be " Captain Punk-great man-Delaware chief."


The army burned all the houses at the different villages, and destroyed about twenty thousand bushels of corn, which they


33


EARLY ANNALS.


discovered in various places where it had been hid by the Indians, a large quantity having been found buried in holes dug for that purpose. In this destruction a variety of property belonging to French traders was involved. On the 18th, the main body of the troops was moved to Chillicothe, the principal town of the Shawa- nese, General Harmar having previously detached a party of one hundred and eighty militia, and thirty regulars, in pursuit of the Indians, who appeared to have retired westward, across the St. Joseph, after the destruction, by themselves, of the Omee town, Captain John Armstrong commanding the regulars, and Colonel Trotter, of the Kentucky militia, the entire force. They found and cut off a few Indian stragglers, but did not overtake the main body, being recalled to camp by signal late in the evening. Next morning the same detachment was ordered out anew, and being placed under the command of Colonel Hardin, pursued the same route in search of the savages. Finding himself in their neigh- borhood, he detached Capt. Faulkner, of the Pennsylvania militia, to form on his left, which he did at such a distance as to render his company of no service in the approaching engagement. Har- din's command moved forward to what they discovered to be the encampment of the enemy, which was flanked by a morass on each side, as well as by one in front, which was crossed with great promptness by the troops, now reduced to less than two hundred, who, before they had time to form, received a galling and unex- pected fire from a large body of savages. The militia immediately broke and fled, nor could all the exertions of the officers rally them; fifty-two of the dispersing being killed in a few minutes. The enemy pursued until Major Fountain, who had been sent to hunt up Faulkner and his company, returning with them, compelled them to retire, and the survivors of the detachment arrived safely in camp.


The regulars under Armstrong bore the brunt of this affair; one sergeant and twenty-one privates being killed on the battle- ground, and while endeavoring to maintain their position, were thrown in disorder by the militia running through their lines, fling- ing away their arms without even firing a shot. The Indians killed in this affair nearly one hundred men.


As regards the force of the savages, Captain Armstrong, who was under no temptation to underrate their number, speaks of them as about one hundred strong. Their strength has been stated,


EARLY ANNALS.


but, as I think, without any data, by Marshall, in his Life of Wash- ington, at seven hundred. The real strength of the Indians was in a well-chosen position, and in the cowardice of the militia, who formed, numerically, the principal force opposed to them. This destructive contest was fought near the spot where the Goshen State road now crosses Eel river, about twelve miles west of Fort Wayne. Captain Armstrong broke through the pursuing Indians, and planged into the deepest of the morasses referred to, where he remained all night in water to his chin, with his head concealed by a tussock of high grass. Here he was compelled to listen to the nocturnal orgies of the Indians, dancing and yelling around the dead bodies of his brave soldiers. As day approached they retired to rest, and Armstrong, chilled to the last degree, extricated him- self from the swamp, but found himself obliged to kindle a fire in a ravine, into which he crawled, having his tinder-box, watch, and compass still on his person. By the aid of the fire, he recovered his feeling and the use of his limbs, and at last reached the camp in safety.


For some years after, bayonets were found upon this spot in numbers, and bullets have been cut out of the neighboring trees in such quantities as to attest the desperate character of this en- gagement.


On the morning of the 19th, the main body of the army under General Harmar, having destroyed the Miami village, moved about two miles to a Shawanee village called Chillicothe, where, on the 20th, the General published the following order :


. . "Camp at Chillicothe, one of the Shawanee towns on the Omee [Maumee] river, Oct. 20, 1790.


" The party under the command of Captain Strong is ordered to burn and destroy every house and wigwam in this village, together with all the corn, etc., which he can collect. A party of one hun- dred men (militia), properly officered, under command of Colonel Ifardin, is to burn and destroy effectually, this afternoon, the Picka- way town, with all the corn, etc., which he can find in it and its vicinity.


"The cause of the detachment being worsted yesterday, was entirely owing to the shameful, cowardly conduct of the militia, who ran away and threw down their arms without firing scarcely a single gun.


35


EARLY ANNALS.


"In returning to Fort Washington, if any officer or men shall presume to quit the ranks, or not to march in the form that they are ordered, the General will, most assuredly, order the artillery to fire on them. He hopes the check they received yesterday will make them, in future, obedient to orders.


1634274


"JOSIAH HARMAR, Brig. Gen.""


On the 21st, the army left Chillicothe on their return to Fort Washington, marching eight miles, when the scouts, who had been scouring the country, came in and reported that the Indians had re-occupied the " Omee" village, lying in the junction of the St. Joseph and Maumee rivers. Harmar, anxious to efface the stigma resting on the American arms in the affair of the 19th, detached Colonel Hardin, with orders to surprise the savages and bring on an engagement. The party under his orders consisted of three hundred militia, of which three companies were mounted men, with sixty regulars under command of Major Wyllys.


Colonel Hardin arrived at the Omee town early on the morning of the 22d. His force had been divided into two parties, the left division of which was to have formed down the St. Mary's, and cross at the ford, after which they were to rest until daylight, and cross the St. Joseph, and commence an attack on the Indians in front who had encamped out, near the ruins of their town. The right division, under Hardin and Wyllys, were to proceed to " Har- mar's" ford, on the Maumee, where they were to remain until McMillan's party had reached the river and commenced the attack, which was to be the signal for them to cross the Maumee and attack the Indians in the rear. Owing to the treachery or igno- rance of the guides, however, McMillan's force lost its way in the thickets through which they had to pass, and although traveling all night, did not reach the ford until daylight. As soon as the In- dians, who had been encamped about the ruins of their town, dis- covered Hardin's men, they began to rally for the fight; the alarm spreading and the Indians rushing in, Colonel Hardin, discovering that unless he crossed immediately he would be compelled to do it in the face of superior numbers, and expecting every moment to hear the report of McMillan's men in his rear, gave the order to cross, and by the time two-thirds of his force had passed over the battle began. A severe engagement ensued; the desperation of the savages in the contest surpassed anything previously known,


36


EARLY ANNALS.


and the greater part throwing down their arms, rushed on the bayonets, tomahawk in hand, thus rendering everything useless but the rifles of the militia, and carrying rapid destruction every- where in their advance. While this attack was going on, the rifles of the remaining Indians were fatally employed picking out the officers. Majors Fountain and Wyllys, both valuable officers, fell . directly after the battle began, the former pierced with eighteen bullets. Fifty-one of Wyllys' regulars shared his fate, and the other divisions also suffered severely in both killed and wounded.


Major McMillan came up with his force while the battle was raging, but could not turn its tide, although he succeeded in ena- bling the discomfited troops to retire, which they did in compara- tively good order.


The militia behaved well on this memorable day, and received the thanks of General Harmar for their good conduct. What the carnage in this battle was, may be inferred from the return of one hundred and eighty killed and wounded, not more than half of those engaged in it escaping unhurt. There is no doubt as re- spects the second battle, whatever was the fact in the first, that the savages outnumbered as well as overpowered Hardin's forces, and the disparity was rendered still greater by the plan of night attack, which separated McMillan from the main body when his aid was most needed.


It is alleged in some narratives that the American troops were not defeated, as was proven by their regular retreat, a disorderly .. fight being the usual concomitant of defeat. But the fact that our troops were obliged to leave the remains of the brave soldiers who fell on that occasion, to become scalped and lie unburied and their bones bleaching on the ground until Wayne's visit. four years after- ward, obtained them decent burial, discards the idea.


An affecting incident occurred at the place of crossing the river. A young Indian with his father and brother were crossing, when the ball of a white man passed through his body. He fell. The old man, seeing his boy fall, dropped his rifle, and attempted to raise his fallen son, in order to carry bim beyond the reach of the white man, when the other son also fell by his side. He drew them both to the shore, then sat down between them, and, with fearless, Ro- man composure, awaited the approach of the pursuing foe, who came up and killed him also.


If there be any generalship in thus sending out detachment


1


37


EARLY ANNALS.


after detachment to be cut up in detail, then General Harmar de- serves that distinction. He put the best face on the matter which the nature of the case permitted, and issued the following orders on the 22d of October, the day of the second battle:


"Camp, eight miles from the ruins of the Maumee towns, 1790.


"The General is exceedingly well pleased with the behavior of the militia in the action of this morning. They have laid very many of the enemy dead upon the spot. Although our loss is great, still it is inconsiderable in comparison to the slaughter among the savages. Every account agrees that upward of one hundred warriors fell in the battle; it is not more than man for man, and we can afford them two for one. The resolution and firm determined conduct of the militia this morning has effectually retrieved their character in the opinion of the General. He knows they can and will fight."


It is easy to judge, by the preceding narrative and orders, what kind of fitness Harmar possessed for the service to which he was called. A general who encamps in the neighborhood of the enemy, with a force large enough to exterminate him, and con- tents himself with sending out detachments to be destroyed suc- cessively, where no adequate reason exists why the whole force should not have been brought into action, deserves not the name of a military man. Harmar kept two-thirds or three-fourths of his troops eight miles from the battle-ground inactive, and of as little service as if he had left them at Fort Washington. He appeared to be fully consoled for the loss of the brave officers and soldiers, who fell by the savage tomahawk and rifle, by the reflection ex- pressed in the general orders, that the American troops could afford to lose twice as many men as the Indians. My unfavorable judgment on this subject is supported by that of the actors of that campaign who still survive.


The celebrated Indian chief, Meshecanoque, or Little Turtle, commanded the savages in both battles with Colonel Hardin and his troops, as he did afterward in St. Clair's defeat, besides bearing a conspicuous part in the battle with General Wayne at the Fallen Timbers.


Harmar returned by easy marches to Fort Washington, where he arrived on the 3d of November, and which he left soon after-


38


EARLY ANNALS.


ward for Philadelphia, being succeeded in his military command by St. Clair. He resided in comparative obscurity for some years on the banks of the Schuylkill, and died about 1803. I was pie- sent at the funeral, which was conducted with great military pomp; his horse being dressed in mourning, and his sword and pistols laid upon his coffin, which was borne on a bier, hearses not being in use in those days.


Various attempts to negotiate with the Indians were resorted to; but having all failed, another body of troops, under the command of General St. Clair, was raised for the defense of the frontiers. St. Clair, after repairing to Lexington to obtain the assistance of the Kentucky militia, reached Cincinnati on the 15th May, 1791. His expedition against the Indians was protracted till late in the season, by the slowness with which recruits were raised; their de- lay in descending the Ohio, in consequence of low water; and, as it was alleged, an unpardonable negligence of the quarter-master and commissary departments. On the 7th of August, all the troops which had arrived, except the artificers and a small garrison for the fort, moved to Ludlow's station, six miles north of Cincinnati, in order to obtain forage from the woods, which was entirely con- sumed about Ft. Washington, and to await the arrival of the troops which were expected. The army, amounting to two thousand and three hundred non-commissioned officers and privates, moved from Ludlow's station, on the 17th of September, to the Great Miami, where they erected Fort Hamilton. Having placed a small garri- son in the fort, the army then proceeded on its march, and, by the 12th of October, reached the site, where they built Fort Jefferson, about forty miles north of Fort Hamilton. These posts were in- tended as placos of deposit and of security, either for convoys of provisions which might follow the army, or for the army itself, should any disaster befall it.


On the 14th, the ariny, consisting of seventeen hundred non- commissioned officers and privates, fit for duty, again commenced its march, with not more than three days' supply of flour. Many of the horses died for want of forage, and on the 31st, sixty of the Kentucky militia deserted in a body.




Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.