USA > Oregon > History of Oregon, Vol. II, 1848-1888 > Part 57
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53 | Part 54 | Part 55 | Part 56 | Part 57 | Part 58 | Part 59 | Part 60 | Part 61 | Part 62 | Part 63 | Part 64 | Part 65 | Part 66 | Part 67 | Part 68 | Part 69 | Part 70 | Part 71 | Part 72 | Part 73 | Part 74 | Part 75 | Part 76 | Part 77 | Part 78 | Part 79 | Part 80 | Part 81 | Part 82 | Part 83 | Part 84
43 Yreka Despatches, in Oregonian, Dec. 21, 1872; S. F. Alta, Dec. 13, 1872.
583
PREPARATIONS.
ington Guards of Portland offered their services, which were declined only because the militia general, John E. Ross of Jacksonville, and captain O. C. Applegate of Klamath, had tendered and already had their companies accepted.# Applegate's company was made up of seventy men, nearly half of whom were picked Klamaths, Modocs, Shoshones, and Pit River Indians from the reservation. In the interval before the first pitched battle they were occupied scout- ing, not only to prevent fresh outrages, but to intercept any of Jack's messengers to Camp Yainax, and prevent their drawing off any of the Sconchin band, whom, although they declared their loyalty to be unimpeachable, it was thought prudent to watch. Another reason for surveillance was that Jack had threatened Camp Yainax with destruction should these Modoes refuse to join in the insurrection, and they were exceedingly nervous, being unarmed, except the guards. To protect them was not only a duty, but sound policy.
In the mean time neither the troops nor the Ind- ians were idle. Perry was still at Van Bremer's, with forty cavalrymen. Ross was near Whittle's ferry, at Small's place. On the 16th of December detachments from both companies made a reconnoissance of Jack's position, approaching within half a mile of the strong- hold, and from their observations being led to believe that it was possible so to surround Jack as to compel his surrender, although one of his warriors shouted to then defiantly as they turned back, "Come on ! Come on!" This exploration revealed more perfectly the difficult nature of the ground, broken by fissures, some a hundred feet in depth and as many in width; and it revealed also that in certain places were level flats of a few acres covered with grasses, and furnished with water in abundance, where the Indian horses grazed in security. Nothing could be better chosen than the Modoc position; and should their ammuni-
" Oregonian, Dec. 3, 1872; Applegate's Modoc War, MS., 17.
584
THE MODOC WAR.
tion become exhaused, nothing was easier for them than to steal out unobserved through the narrow chasms, while watch was kept upon one of the many lofty pinnacles of rock about them. But they were not likely to be soon forced out by want, since they had taken $700 in money at one place, and $3,000 worth of stores at another, besides a large amount of ammunition and a few rifles, in addition to their own stock on hand. Everything indicated that hard fight- ing would be required to dislodge the Modocs. An- other delay now ensued, caused by sending to Van- couver for two howitzers, to assist in driving them out of their fastnesses.
Both the regular troops and militia were restive under this detention. The 23d infantry had just come from fighting Apaches in Arizona, and were convinced that subduing a band of sixty, or at the most eighty, Modocs would be a trifling matter if once they could come at them; and the state troops, having only enlisted for thirty days, saw the time slipping away in which they had meant to distinguish themselves. The weather had become very cold, and the militia were ill supplied with blankets and certain articles of commissariat. Another difficulty now pre- sented itself. They had enlisted to fight in Oregon, whereas the retreat chosen by the enemy lay just over the boundary in California; but General Wheaton overcame this last, by ordering Ross to pursue and fight the hostile Indians wherever they could be found. 45
Actual hostilities were inaugurated December 22d, by Captain Jack attacking Bernard's wagon-train as it was returning from Bidwell with a supply of ammu- nition, guarded by a small detachment. The attack was made a mile from camp, on the east side of the lake, by firing from an ambuscade, when one soldier and six horses were killed at the first fire. Lieuten- ant Kyle, hearing the noise of shooting, hastened to
" Boyle's Conduct of the Modoc War, MS., 9.
585
READY TO FIGHT.
the rescue with nearly all the troops in reserve, but ten having had time to mount, and in this unprepared manner fought the Indians the remainder of the day. In this skirmish the long range of the United States arms seemed to surprise the Modocs, as it saved the train. The Indians failed to capture the ammunition, but lost their own horses, and four warriors killed and wounded. A bugler whom they pursued escaped to headquarters, when Jackson's troops were sent to reënforce Bernard; but before his arrival the Modocs had retreated.46 About the same time they showed themselves on Lost River, opposite headquarters, in- viting the attack of the soldiery; and also near Van Bremer's, where Perry and Ross were encamped to- gether.
On the 25th of December Wheaton ordered the volunteers to the front, and word was sent to Langell Valley, where five families still remained, to fortify. Preferring to go to Linkville, they set out in wagons, and were fired upon from an ambush near the springs on Lost River, but were relieved and escorted to their destination by a scouting party. A supply-train from Klamath was also attacked, and a part of the escort wounded, being relieved in the same manner by the volunteers.
Colonel Green, who still retained the immediate command of the troops, was now ordered to attack the Indians whenever in his judgment sufficient mate- rial of war was on hand. "With the howitzers and one snow-storm I am ready to begin," had been his asseveration. On the 5th of January another recon- noissance was made, by Captain Kelly of Ross' bat- talion, with a detachment of twelve men, with the objeet of finding a more practicable route than the one in use from Van Bremer's, where Green had taken up his headquarters, to the Modoc stronghold. On
46 Rept of Gen. Wheaton, in H. Ex. Doc., 122, 48-9, 43d tong. Ist sess .; Boyle's Conduct of the Modoc Wur, MS., 7-9; Red Bluff Sentinel, Feb. 1, 1873.
586
THE MODOC WAR.
the way they had a skirmish with twenty of Jack's people, who retreated toward camp, but being pursued, dismounted and fortified. The firing brought a reen- forcement from Jack's camp, when the volunteers retreated to an open field, while the Indians, not car ing to engage again, returned to the lava-beds. A scout by Applegate with twenty men revealed the fact that the high ridge between Van Bremer's and the lava-field, known as Van Bremer's Hill, was used as an observatory by the Modocs, who kept them- selves informed of every movement of the troops.
On the 12th of January an expedition consisting of a detachment of thirteen inen under Perry, a handful of scouts under Donald McKay, and thirty of Applegate's mixed company, the whole under Colo- nel Green, made a recounoissance from headquar- ters to ascertain whether wagons could be taken to a position in front of the Modoc stronghold. Green was fired on from a rocky point of the high bluff on the verge of and overlooking the lava-field. Perry returned the fire, driving in the Modoc sentinels, and shooting one of the Hot Creek Indians through the shoulder. Applegate came up in time to observe that the Modocs were dividing into small parties to ascend the hill and get on the flauk of the troops, when he stretched a skirmish-line along the bluff for a considerable distance to intercept them. Scar- face, who was stationed on a high point in the lava- bed, cried out in stentorian tones to his warriors, "Keep back, keep back; I can see them in the rocks!"47
The Modoc guard then fell back half-way down the hill, where they made a stand and defied the soldiers, but made strong appeals to the Indian allies to for-
" Applegate's Modoc Hist., MS. Another instance of the wonderful voice- power of Scarface is mentioned hy a writer in the Portland Herald, and in Early Affairs in Siskiyou County, MS. 'We distinctly heard, incredible as it may seem, above the distant yells and cries of the camp below, three or four miles away a big basso voice, that sounded like a trumpet, and that seemed to give command. The big voice was understood and interpreted as saying: "There are but few of them, and they are on foot. Get your horses ! Get your horses ! "'
587
HEAP BIG TALK.
sake the white men and join their own race to fight. The leaders were very confident. Hooker Jim said once he had been for peace, but now he was for war, and if the soldiers wished to fight, they should have the opportunity, while Jack and Black Jim challenged the troops to come down where they were.
A medicine-woman also made an address to the Klamath and Modoc scouts, saying that were all the Indians acting in concert they would be few enough, and entreating them to join Jack's force. Donald McKay answered in the Cayuse tongue that their hands were reddened with the blood of innocent white people, for which they should surely be pun- ished, when Jack, losing patience, replied that he did not want to fight Cayuses, but soldiers, and he invited them to come and fight, and he would whip them all. The Klamaths asked permission to reply, but Colonel Green, thinking the communication unprofitable, for- bade it.48
It not being Green's intention to fight that day, a retreat was ordered. To this the Klamaths were opposed, saying he had the advantage of position, and could easily do some execution on the Modocs. As Green withdrew, the Modoes resumed their position on the hill, and the Klamaths, being then on the crest of the second hill, wished to open on them, but were restrained.
There was much discussion about this time away from the seat of war concerning the causes which led to it,49 and much dissatisfaction was felt that nothing had been done to restrain Jack's band, which still
48 It was certainly unsafe allowing the Indian allies to converse with the hostile Modocs, who appealed to them so strongly for help. The regular offi- cers afterward entertained the belief that the Klamaths acted deceitfully, and promised Jack help, in the Modoc tongue. But Applegate's confidence was never shaken, and he trusted them in very great emergencies. Modoc Hist., MS.
19 It was intimated in Cal. that speculation in Oregon had much to do with it, to which a writer in the Oregonian, Jan. 18, 1873, retorted that he agreed with Gov. Booth in that respect, for citizens of Cal. had for years encouraged the Modocs in refusing to go upon the reservation, for no other reason than to secure their trade, etc .; which the facts seem to show.
588
THE MODOC WAR.
made predatory excursions away from their strong- hold. It was now the middle of January. The set- tlers in Klamath Valley remained under cover. The road from Tule Lake southward was closed. Fairchild and Dorris had converted their homes into fortified camps. There was much uneasiness in northern Cal- ifornia, and talk of forming companies of home-guards, Dorris being selected to visit Booth to obtain aid. But Booth had other advisers, and instead of furnish- ing arms, made a recommendation to the government to set apart five thousand acres of land where Jack desired it, as a reservation for his band, all of which interference only complicated affairs, as will be seen.
On the 16th of January, everything being in readi- ness, and the weather foggy, which answered in place of a snow-storm to conceal the movements of the troops, the army marched upon Jack's stronghold.50 The regulars in the field numbered 225, and the vol- unteers about 150. In addition to the companies already mentioned was one of twenty-four sharp- shooters under Fairchild. Miller of the Oregon mi- litia had been ordered to the front by Governor Grover, but took no part in the action which followed.
At four o'clock in the morning Colonel Green, with Perry's troops, moved up to the bluff on the south- west corner of Tule Lake to clear it of Modoc pickets, and cover the movements of the main force to a camp on the bluff three miles west of Jack's stronghold, so located as to be out of sight of the enemy. By three in the afternoon the whole force was in position, con- sisting of two companies of infantry under Captain Burton and Lieutenant Moore, a detachment of another company under Sergeant John McNamara,
60 Wheaton wrote to Canby on the 15th that all things were in excellent condition, the most perfect understanding prevailed of what was expected of each division, and the troops were in the most exuberant spirits. 'If the Modocs will only try to make good their hoast to whip 1,000 soldiers, all will be satisfied. Our scouts and friendly Indians insist that the Modocs will fight us desperately, but I don't understand how they can think of attempt- ing any serious resistance, though of course we are prepared for their fight or flight.' H. Ex. Doc., 122, 49-50, 43d cong. Ist sess.
589
ATTACK ON THE LAVA-BEDS.
Ross' volunteers under Hugh Kelly and O. C. Apple- gate; the howitzer battery under Lieutenant W. H. Miller, and Fairchild's sharp-shooters; all, but some of the scouts, dismounted, furnished with a hundred rounds of ammunition, with fifty in close reserve, and cooked rations for three days. A line of pickets was thrown out along the edge of the bluff and another around the camp.
On the east side of the lake were Bernard's and Jackson's companies, and twenty regularly enlisted Klamath scouts under the chief David Hill, all com- manded by Bernard, who had been directed to move up to a point two miles from the Modoc position, to be in readiness to attack at sunrise; but proceeding in ignorance of the ground, and contrary to the advice of his guide, he came so near to the stronghold that he was attacked, and compelled to retreat with four men wounded,51 which unfortunateerror greatly embarrassed him next day.
As the troops looked down, on the morning of the 17th, from the high bluff, the fog which overhung the lava-bed resembled a quiet sea. Down into it they were to plunge and feel for the positions assigned them. Mason with the infantry had his position at the extreme left of the line, resting on the lake, with Fairchild's sharp-shooters flanking him. On his right were the howitzers, in the centre General Wheaton and staff, and generals Miller and Ross of the militia; on the right of these Kelly and Applegate with their companies, and on the extreme right Perry's troop, dismounted.52
Deseending the bluff by a narrow trail, surprised at meeting no Modoc picket, the troops gained their po- sitions, in the order given, about seven in the morning. It was the design to move the line out on the right until it met Bernard's left in front of the Modoc posi-
61 Boyle's Conduct of the Modoc War, MS., II.
62 Boyle places Perry in the centre, but he was not on the field, and Green and Applegate were, whose reports I follow.
590
THE MODOC WAR.
tion, where three shots were to be fired by the howit- zers to announce a parley, and give Jack an opportu- nity to surrender.
But the accident of the previous afternoon having put the Modocs on their guard, hardly had the line formed when the Indians opened fire, and instead of surrounding them and demanding their surrender, the troops found that they must fight for every foot of ground between them and the fortress. The fog, too, now became an obstacle instead of an aid to success. Unable to discern their course, the troops were com- pelled to scramble over and amongst the rocks as best they could, at the risk any moment of falling into am- bush, making the movement on the right painfully slow. Nevertheless it was steadily pushed forward, all caution being used, the men often lying flat and crawling over rocks within a few yards of the Indians, who could be heard but not seen. The howitzers, which had been relied upon to demoralize the Indians, proved useless so long as the enemy's position was concealed from view. The line, after advancing a mile and a half, was halted and a few shells thrown, causing the Indians some alarm, but through fear of hitting Bernard's command the firing was soon sus- pended. Again the line was pushed on another mile and a half by a series of short charges, jumping chasms and sounding the war-whoop.
About one o'clock the extreme right of the line, which now enveloped the stronghold on the west and south, was brought to a halt by a deep, wide gorge in the lava, which could not be crossed without sacrifice of life,53 as it was strongly guarded, and in close neigh- borhood to the main citadel. On consultation with Wheaton and other officers, Green determined to move the west line by the left and connect with Bernard by the shore of the lake.
At this point some confusion occurred in the line.
63 The reader should not forget that Green intended to capture Jack with- out a serious fight, if possible.
591
PROGRESS OF THE FIGHT.
In the skirmishing and clambering among the rocks, and the bewilderment of the fog, the volunteers had changed places with Perry's troop, and were now on the extreme right. They had, in fact, charged down the ravine, and Applegate's company had gained a position on the sage plain beyond where they lay con- cealed. Then came an order, "Look out for Bernard!" and a volley which mowed down the sage over their heads, so near were they to a junction with him. While the volunteers were preparing to charge on the stronghold the regular troops had begun to withdraw, seeing which, they were for a time puzzled, until near- ing the Modoc position, it was discovered that most of the troops were passing to the left under the bluffs on the west side of the lake; soon after which an or- der reached the volunteers to report to headquarters, where they found a portion of Perry's troop and a re- serve of infantry under Lieutenant Ross.
Meanwhile Mason and Green were endeavoring to make the junction by the left, the troops encountering a destructive fire as they plunged into a ravine on the shore of the lake nearly as dangerous to cross as that on the route first pursued. By pushing forward the sharp-shooters and a detachment of Burton's company to cover the troops as they passed, the crossing was effected. But as Wheaton afterwards said, "There was nothing to fire at but a puff of smoke issuing from cracks in the rock;" while the Modocs were stationed at the most favorable points for picking off the men as they hurried past, crawling over the sharp rocks on their hands and feet, suffering terribly.
After Green had passed the first ravine, Bernard was heard to say that he was within four or five hun- dred yards of the stronghold, and Green resolved if possible to join him, and make a charge before dark. But after sustaining a fire from the Modocs stationed in the cliffs overhanging the lake shore until he had almost made the junction, he found himself confronted by another deep cañon, so well defended that he was
592
THE MODOC WAR.
unable to effect a crossing, and was, besides, compelled to defend himself from a flank movement by the Mo- docs on his left. While in this discouraging position the fog lifted, and a signal was received from Wheaton to come into camp, established in a small cove on the lake shore, if he thought best. But fearing to expose his men a second time to the peril of passing the Mo- doc position, Green declined, and when night had fallen, commenced a march of fourteen miles, over a trail fit only for a chamois to travel, passing the dreaded ravine, carrying the wounded in blankets or on the backs of ponies captured during the day. Their sufferings were severe. One man, belonging to Fair- child's company, rode the whole distance with his thigh-bone broken and his leg dangling.5* When a halt was called, the men fell asleep standing or riding. Their clothing was in shreds from crawling among the rocks; their shoes were worn off their feet. A month in the field would not have brought them to such a state. It was not until past noon of the 18th that Green's command reached Bernard's camp on the east side of the lake. After making arrangements for the removal of the wounded to Fort Klamath, seventy miles away, over a rough road, three miles of which was over naked bowlders, Green and Mason, with an escort of ten Indian scouts, returned to head- quarters that same night by the wagon-road around the north side of the lake.
When the volunteer captains reported to Wheaton, they were ordered to take their men to the lake for water, and then to take up a position in the crags, and extend a skirmish line to the left. While in this position, the Modocs not being far off, Hooker Jim was heard to call the attention of the other leaders to the separation of the volunteers from the regular troops, and that by moving around to the right of the volunteers they could cut them off, and also cut off
54 Boyle's Conduct of the Modoc War, MS., 18-19. This was Jerry Crook. He died in February.
593
DEFEAT OF THE SOLDIERS.
communication between Wheaton's camp by the lake and his supplies on the hill, which were left in charge of only ten men. Signal-fires were already springing up in that direction.
This determined Wheaton to fall back to camp, and he again signalled to Green his change of plan, author- izing him to withdraw to Bernard's camp, as just re- lated. At dark the retreat to camp began, Applegate leading, the wounded in the centre, and Kelly's com- pany, with the detachment under Ross, skirmishing in the rear. As the evening advanced the Modocs withdrew, and the stumbling and exhausted men reached camp a little before midnight.
The loss sustained in the reconnoissance of the 17th- for it could hardly be called a battle-was nine killed and thirty wounded.55 Among the latter were Cap- tain Perry and Lieutenant Kyle of the regular ser- vice, and Lieutenant George Roberts of the sharp- shooters. The dead were left upon the field, where if life were not extinet the Modoc women soon despatched them. The high spirits of the morning were sunken in a lethargy of mingled sorrow and exhaustion at night. Every officer who had taken part in the oper- ations of the 17th was surprised at the result of six weeks' preparation for this event, and it became evi- dent that a much larger force would be required to capture the Modocs in their stronghold-the strongest natural position ever encountered by the army, if not, indeed, the strongest possible to find on earth.56
The loss of life on the side of the Modocs was not thought to be great. The arms and ammunition cap- tured on the persons of the fallen soldiers made good much of their loss in material. They were, in fact, scouting within six miles of Lost River on the 19th, Lieutenant Ream with twenty-five volunteers having
65 This is the official count. Applegate says the loss was 41, of whom 11 were killed. He may count some who did not die on the field, but lived & few days.
56 Rept of Gen. Wheaton, in H. Ex Doc., 122, 43d cong. Ist sess. HIBT. OR., VOL. II. 38
594
THE MODOC WAR.
encountered some of them as he was on his way to Bernard's with the horses of Fairchild's company, and Applegate was sent to guard the settlements.
The time for which the Jacksonville volunteers en- listed having expired, they were now anxious to return to their homes and business, which had been hastily left at the call of their fellow-citizens. Applegate, too, fearing the effect of the late defeat on the reservation Modocs, wished to return to camp Yainax. In con- sideration of these circumstances, Wheaton sent a de- spatch to Portland, by way of Yreka, asking Canby for three hundred foot-troops and four mortars, and sug- gesting that the governor of California should be called upon to send militia to guard that portion of his state open to incursions from the Modocs. Canby immediately responded by ordering two companies of artillery and two of infantry to the seat of war, and as the inhabitants of Surprise Valley apprehended an uprising of the Shoshones on account of the Modoc excitement, a company of cavalry was sent to their defence, making the number of troops in the Modoc region six hundred, exclusive of the garrisons at the several posts in the district of the lakes. But even with these, the country being in part inadequately guarded, the general sent a recommendation to army headquarters at Washington, that conditional author- ity should be given him to call upon the governors of Oregon and California for two companies of volun- teers from each state.
On the 23d the encampment at Van Bremer's was broken up, the troops and stores removed to Lost River ford, and a permanent camp established, where preparations were carried on for attacking Jack in his stronghold, when two mortar-boats should have been constructed, by which his position could be shelled from the lake side-a plan which, if it had been put in execution, would have ended the war.
But now again outside interference with the Modoc
595
A PEACE COMMISSION.
question was productive of the worst results.57 It hap- pened that E. L. Applegate, brother of O. C. and Ivan Applegate, commissaries on the reservation, was in Washington as a commissioner of immigration; but the legislature of Oregon having failed to furnish funds for his purposes, he was in need of some other commission. Meacham, ex-superintendent of Indian affairs, was also there, and these two men proposed to the perplexed secretary of the interior a plan of settle- ment of the Modoc difficulty in harmony with his prejudices. 58 When the scheme was ripe, Attorney- general Williams arranged an interview, and the thing was accomplished. Other politicians made the appeal in favor of a peace commission, and closed their argu- ment by recommending Meacham as a commissioner, being a man "in whom they have great confidence"- meaning the Modocs. All this seems very singular, when it is remembered that Jack would have none of Meacham's advice when he was superintendent. It was not less singular that E. L. Applegate should have consented to act directly in opposition to the opinions of his family, gained by a harassing experi- ence; but the fact remains that Meacham returned to Oregon as chairman of a peace commission.50
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.