History of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, Part 37

Author: Bean, Theodore Weber, 1833-1891, [from old catalog] ed; Buck, William J. (William Joseph), 1825-1901
Publication date: 1884
Publisher: Philadelphia, Everts & Peck
Number of Pages: 1534


USA > Pennsylvania > Montgomery County > History of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania > Part 37


Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).


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1704 .- John Evans. 1709 .- Charlea Gooken. 1717 .- Sir William Keith. 1726,-Patrick Gordon.


1736 .- James Logan, President of Council.


1738 .- George Thomas, Lieutenant-Governor.


1747 .- Anthony Palmer, President of Council.


1748 .- James Hamilton, Lieutenant-Governor. 1754 .- Richard II. Morris, Lieutenant-Governor.


1756 .- William Denny, Lieutenant-Governor.


1759 .- Jamea Hamilton, Lieutenant-Governor.


1763 .- John Penn, Lieutenant-Governor.


1771 .- Richard Penn, Lieutenant-Governor till 1776.


COUNTIES OF THE PROVINCE.


Philadelphia City and County, organized 1682. Bucka County, organized 1682.


Chester County, organized 1682. Lancaster County, organized May 10, 1729.


York County organized, August 9, 1749.


Cumberland County, organized January 27, 1750.


Burke County, organized March 11, 1752. Bedford County, organized March 9, 1771.


Northampton County, organized March 21, 1772.


Northumberland County, organized March 21, 1772.


Westmoreland County, organized February 26, 1773.


Council of Safety, instituted at Philadelphia, June 30, 1775, by the Assembly of the province.


" Resolved, That thia House approves the association entered into hy the good people of this colony for the defense of their livea, liberty and property.


" Resolved, That John Dickinson, George Gray, Henry Wynkoop, Anthony Wayne, Benjamin Bartholomew, George Ross, Michael Swoope, John Montgomery, Edward Biddle, William Edmunds, Bernard Dangherty, Samnel Hunter, William Thompson, Thomas Willing, Benjamin Franklin, Daniel Roberdeau, Jehn Cadwalader, Andrew Allen, Owen Biddle, Francis Johnson, Richard Reiley, Samnel Morria, Jun., Robert Morris, Thomas Wharton, Jun., and Robert White, Gentle- men, be a committee of safety for calling forth such, and so many, of the associators into actnal service, when necessity requires, as the said committee shall judge proper."


The Council of Safety was organized July 3, 1775, by electing Benjamin Franklin president and Wil- liam Govett clerk.


The first Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia on the 15th of July, 1776. This body not only entered upon the task of framing the con- stitution, but assumed the legislative power of the State. This was followed by the institution of the Supreme Council of Safety, in which reposed the executive powers of the commonwealth nntil the first constitution was revised in 1790. Thomas Whar-


ton, Joseph Reed, John Diekinson, Benjamin Frank- lin and Thomas Mifflin presided over this body in the order named between the years 1776 and 1788.


The colonial era closed with the adjournment of the Provincial Assembly on the 23d of September, 1 1776. Governor Richard Penn yielded reluctantly to the forces of revolution, and the last aet of pro- vincial authority was a fierce denunciation of the Constitutional Convention in assuming the legislative power of the State. "God save the King !" was said for the last time in a Pennsylvania Assembly ; hence- forth it was to be "God save the Commonwealth !"


CHAPTER XIV.


THE REVOLUTION.


THE memorable events associated with the move- ments of the Continental army, under the personal direction of General Washington, in the autumn of 1777 and winter of 1778, will always render Eastern


T.W XXYVE PROCLAIM LTHERTY APRILALA BY ORDER OF THE AS


PHILADA - MEDCCEIL.


INDEPENDENCE BELL.


Pennsylvania conspicuous in the annals of the Revo- lution. The provincial conservatism and peaceful character of the people who had permanently settled in the Schuylkill Valley woke slowly and painfully to the warlike preparations which preceded Lord Howe's attack upon Philadelphia, and when reverses befell our armies on the Brandywine a profound sense of alarm pervaded the capital city, shared by many sorrowing homes that lay on the line of march, and within limits certain to be desolated by hostile armies.


1 Under Stuyvesant, Dutch Governor of New York.


2 Under Richard Nichols, English Governor of New York.


159


THE REVOLUTION.


"The spirit of 1776," which animated leaders and Revo- lutionists, was by no means universal in the province. Society was divided by well-marked differences of opinion, stoutly maintained at the cost of large es- tates, the sacrifice of comfortable homes, domestic pleasures and social advantages. A century and more of time has well and wisely obscured from public notice the bitter feuds and political animosities which prevailed in this locality during and for many years after the close of the struggle. The student of our colonial era is amazed at the uncompromising char- aeter of the men and measures of the period. The British officers found ready friends in every township from the Brandywine to the Delaware, from the fatal massacre of Paoli to its attempted repetition upon the force of Lafayette at Barren Hill. The Tory, not less for his King than for the love of his gold, was ever ready to peril his life and honor ; on the other hand, the Revolutionists resorted to confiscation of property, banishment and imprisonment of those who declined to espouse their cause. For eight years these aliena- tions prevailed, until society seemed to be known, in the common parlance of the day, as "Rebel" and " Tory."


No just conception of the scope and magnitude of the campaign organized for the defense of Eastern Pennsylvania and the capital city in the autumn of 1777 can be realized unless it comprehend the move- ments and results of the two principal armies of the Middle States, and for whose conduct Washington, as commander-in-chief, was responsible to the Conti- mental government.1 To disconcert him by strategy, to compel him to battle with troops superior in arma- ment and discipline, and to overwhelm him with numbers was the general and well-matured plan of the enemy. The preparations of the home govern- ment to this end were commensnrate with the reason- able hope of success ; and the belief that the resources of men and means so lavishly confided to commanders would speedily end the conflict, and compel submis- sion to the mother-country, was shared by many of the wayward and doubting of the period.


The efforts of Washington through the winter of 1777 to organize a powerful army for the ensuing campaign is a matter of history. The hopes inspired from time to time by the flattering reports which reached his headquarters were cruelly disappointed, and he found himself not only powerless to take the aggressive, but unequal to that measure of defensive warfare necessary to preserve his long lines unbroken.


The steady and persevering courage, however, which had supported him and the American cause through the gloomy scenes of the preceding year did not for- sake him, and that sound judgment which applies to the best advantage those means which are attain- able, however inadequate they may be, still remained. His plan of operation was adapted to that which he believed the enemy had formed. He was persuaded either that General Burgoyne would endeavor to take Ticonderoga, and penetrate to the Hudson, in which event General Howe would co-operate with him, by moving up that river and possessing himself of the forts and high grounds commanding its passage, or that Burgoyne would join the grand army at New York by sea, after which the combined armies would proceed against Philadelphia.


To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might be, to defend the three great points alike vital to the country-Ticonderoga, the Highlands of the Hudson and Philadelphia-against two power- ful armies so much superior to his in arms, num- bers and discipline, it was necessary to make such disposition of his troops as would enable the several departments to reciprocally aid each other without neglecting objects of great and almost equal magnitude, which were alike endangered, though widely divergent. To effect these purposes, the troops of New England and New York 2 were divided between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from New Jersey to North Carolina, inclusive, were directed to assemble at the camp to be formed in New Jersey.


The situation in May, 1777, was critical, and called into activity the magnificent horoscope of the com- mander-in-chief. In camp at Morristown, with an effective rank and file, excluding cavalry and artil- lery, of less than six thousand men, after a winter of censeless anxiety in camp and field and vain endeavor to seenre large and certain accessions to his army ; the enemy certain to assume the aggressive as soon as the season wonld warrant the movement of troops; the Flowes in possession of New York City with an army twice the number of his own, with a navy at command large enough to transport it with the speed of the winds to any point on the coast deemed vulnerable ; General Burgoyne with ten thousand veteran and volunteer troops on Lake Champlain, and Colonel St. Leger with a co-operating army of veterans, Tories, and savages in the Mohawk Valley, waiting orders to march at the earliest practicable moment.


As late as June 18th, says a distinguished historian,3 " the cares of the Northern Department were thrown upon the American commander-in-chief, and Schuy- Ier besieged him with entreaties to supply his wants and remedy all that was going wrong." As com- mander-in-chief of America, Washington watched with a peculiar care the Northern Department.


1 On the 19th of June, 1775, Washington received his commission and instructions as "General and Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the United Colonies, and of all the forces raised or to be raised by them, and all others who shall voluntarily offer their services and join the army for the defense of American Liberty."


The favor lavished on the new chief of the Northern Department raised a doubt whether Washington retained authority over him, till Congress resolved, August, 1777, that "they never intended to supercede or cir- cumscribe his power."-Bancroft's " History of the United States," vol. v. p. 591.


2 Marshall's " Life of Washington," vol. i. p. 145.


3 Bancroft's " History of the United States, " vol. v. p. 566.


160


HISTORY OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY.


Alarmed at Schuyler's want of fortitude, he ordered Arnold to his command, also Lincoln, who was ae- knowledgedly popular among the New England troops. Besides detaching these two distinguished officers and assigning them to the Northern Department, he added to their command General Glover's brigade of Continental troops, and yiehled Colonel Morgan's corps of riflemen, upon request being made through Congress for them. The Continental army,1 under the immediate command of Washington, charged with the defense of the capital city, was the objec- tive-point of the grand campaign, and the coveted prize of Lord Howe. To engage it in battle, to thoroughly defeat and dispirit it, to seize, fortify and garrison Philadelphia, then quickly transfer the bulk of his army to co-operate with Burgoyne, and insure his triumph over Schuyler and Gates on the Hudson, was a consummation to which all energies were directed.


The persistence of Washington in declining battle, save in his fortified camp at Middlebrook, his constant readiness to attack the flank of his sagacious adversary should he attempt to cross the Delaware, there to be confronted by Arnold with a hastily im- provised army, compelled General Howe to change the general plan of operations for the season, and rendered all further co-operation between him and Burgoyne impossible. While employed in discom- fiting Howe, he was actively engaged in resisting the impending advance of St. Leger and Burgoyne. Says Marshall: 2 " He hastened the march of those generals designed to act in that department, pressed the Governors of Easteru States to reinforce the retreating army with all their militia, and made large detachments of choice troops from his own army. The fame of being himself the leader of the victorious army did not, with false glare, dazzle his judgment or conceal the superior public advantage to be derived from defeating Burgoyne."


Having used his best efforts to hasten the concen- tration of troops from the Eastern States, and over- come in some measure the shock to public confi- dence resulting from the loss of Ticonderoga and the disastrous retreat of General St. Clair ; having strengthened the willing hands of General Schuyler in bringing into the field the militia of New York State, rendering the victory at Bennington and other minor points possible, and witnessed the de- parture of Lord Howe from New York Bay, he turned the head of his devoted columns toward the Dela- ware, massing his army at Germantown early in the month of August, 1777.


For days and weeks the work of marshaling new troops, collecting supplies and fitting the command to resist the impending attack by Howe went on. The commander-in chief was in daily consultation


with committees of Congress, heads of departments, and for the first time met the youthful and heroic Lafayette, who was by him assigned to duty on his staff, with the rank of major-general. The public mind became feverish and excited in anticipation of events now certain to affect the gravest interests of the colony. War, with its desolation, its bloody horrors, its blighting consequences upon society and sacrifice of life, was at the threshold of a community devoted by sentiment, religion, and pecuniary iuter- ests to peaceful pursuits. Evidence of disaffection increased with the certainty of Howe's approach, and when his presence, with fleet and army, in the Chesa- peake Bay was announced, it was deemed politie by the government that Washington should march his army through the city as he moved south to meet the advance of the foe. It was accordingly done, and the 24th of August, 1777, was a memorable day in the history of the capital city, as well as in the lives of the patriotic soldiers, who received at every square the most marked consideratiou at the hands of the populace, who were wild in their demonstrations of joy as divisions marched by them under commanders who had grown into popular favor, resulting from their distinguished services in the field. On the other hand, the displeasure of those who, from a sense of duty, adhered to the mother-country was manifest in the frowning faces and silent contempt with which they apparently treated the unusual events of the day.


The story of the campaign which was opened by this movement of the Continental army, to meet and resist the combined operations of the enemy, to save the capital if possible, and to preserve the army, though the city should be lost, has always possessed a rare interest to Pennsylvanians who participated in it and to their descendants.


Other fields, in other States, before and afterwards, witnessed the brighter triumph of our arms and the more immediate results of victories won ; but nowhere on the long and varying line of battle were more san- guinary engagements fought, in no campaign of the protracted struggle was the suffering of the troops so continuous and severe, at no time was the solicitnde of the commander-in-chief so keenly exercised or the patriotism of the people more sorely tried.


The field of Eastern Pennsylvania presented a tempting prize to the British commander at the period referred to. Philadelphia was the seat of the colonial and continental government. Its occupation by the enemy, it was thought, would greatly dispirit the colonists from Massachusetts to South Carolina. Howe's point of attack being selected but fifty-one miles south of the city, with no natural barriers to resist the advance of his land forces, assuming, not without reason, that Washington's army had been weakened by detachments sent to the Northern De- partment, he was confident that, with a few days' easy marches and perhaps a battle, the fall of the capital


1 Bancroft's " History of the United States " vol. v. p. 602.


2 Marshall's " Life of Washington," vol. i. p. 152.


161


THE REVOLUTION.


would follow. Then a rapid march across New Jersey, and he would be able to co-operate with Burgoyne and St. Leger, and overwhelm Gates in New York.


With these results accomplished, his fleet securely anchored in the Delaware, a base of operations for fresh conquest farther south would be finally estab- lished, and the work of subduing the colonists so nearly done as to assure the home government of ultimate success and prevent the interposition of those friendly offices of France, growing more and more imminent each succeeding month. One more con- sideration entered into the plans of the campaign upon the part of the enemy. The settlement was largely of Englishmen, and it was therefore assumed, because of the influential following of Penn and the many devotees of the Established Church, that sen- timents of loyalty to King George would be inspired anew by their presence, and terms of accommodation, permanent in character, would be suggested and accepted as inevitable.


Washington promptly drew his line of battle be- tween the approaching enemy and the capital city. Conscious of the overwhelming disparity of numbers, impressed with the importance of preventing the con- centration of Howe's forces with those from which he had recently separated, believing that his dispositions in the Northern Department were such as would in- sure success, his great work in hand now was to delay the enemy in the accomplishment of a purpose which. with the means at hand, he might not ultimately de- feat. His hostile attitude on White Clay Creek and display of resources put Howe upon his caution, who, pleading the want of cavalry-which in truth he greatly felt-lost days and weeks in feeling his way from the place of debarkation. Twenty-three days elapsed be- fore he drew the American commander to determined battle on the Brandywine, and then he was obliged to concede to him the choice of position.


On the 11th of September, 1777, the battle of Brandywine was fought. The plan of the engage- ment, as subsequently revealed, the necessities which induced it, the skillfully executed movement of the enemy upon the right of the patriot army, the ineffi- ciency of Washington's mounted troops in not dis- closing the movement of Cornwallis at an earlier hour in the day, the uncertain and embarrassing reports that reached him from sources that should have been reliable, the partial surprise, and the heroic, though ineffectual, effort to meet and resist a fierce attack from a direction unlooked for, the deeds of valor upon the part of officers who sought to retrieve misfortune by personal daring, and the usnal conduct of battle- shocked troops have gone into history, and been graph- ically described by Marshall, Botta, Lossing, Headley, Bancroft and others, less distinguished iu history, it may be, but by no means less truthful in narrative.1


The battle was lost, and its discouraging features were keently felt by those who lett the field in posses- sion of the enemy. But its effects, as measured by them, were by no means as disastrons as intended or


all doubt in the mind of Washington as to the designs of the enemy, and in his judgment left but one proper course to pursue : to give battle to the enemy. He at once proceeded to concentrate all his forces. Orders were issued directing detachments to join the main army by forced marches, while the greatest activity prevailed in all the departments, in order to prepare the army for a vigorous campaigu. lo order to strengthen the regular or Continental army, and have in process of or- ganization a reserve force, the militia of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Dela- ware and the northern part of Virginia were direct to report to the main army. As soon as the forces thus concentrated were in a condition to move Washington commenced his march to meet Howe.


In order to encourage the patriots and overawe, if possible, the many disaffected residents of Philadelphia, whe were fully apprised of the de- signs of the enemy, Washington cencinded to march his troops through the principal streets of the city as he moved South.


The movement continued southward, until the advance gnard reached White Clay Creek, Delaware, when it halted, while the main body of the army took position on the left bank of Red Clay Creek, the right wing restiog on the town of Newport, on the then great road to Philadelphia and the left wing extending to the town of Hockesen, in the direction of the Delaware River.


The enemy, who by this time had disembarked, were in position en the left bank of the Elk River, with the advanced guard as far north ae Gray's Hill. General Maxwell, of the patriot army, with his corps of riflemen, hold the line on White Clay Creek with slight defensive earth- works.


In advance of Maxwell there were employed four regiments of cavalry, composed of nine hundred men, including persons of every description. These partisan soldiers, composed of independent organizations, occupied the country as far south as Iron Hill, and did good service in watching the movements of the enemy and reporting the same to the commander- in-chief.


The enemy, having completed bis preparations to advance upon Phila- delphia, commenced a flank movement upon the right of Washington, and succeeded in compelling him to fall back to the Brandywine River, which he crossed at Chadd's Ford, on the 10th of September, and went into position. Here he determined to give battle to the enemy if he at- tempted to advance upon him, believing, as he did, that I'hiladelphia could only be saved by a victory.


The centre of Washington's army covered Chadd's Ford, his right wing extending in the direction of Birmingham Meeting-llonse, north- west of the ford. and the left, several miles south of the ford, was held by General Armstrong, who commanded the Pennsylvania militia.


The front, on the south er right bank of the river, was occupied by Maxwell's riflemen, who had been delaying the advance of the enemy's cavalry.


The situation was critical ; the stake for which the impending battle was to be fonght on the morrow involved the fate of the capital of the new nation, and, to an unusual degree, the hopes of the people who had resolved to sever their political relations with Great Britain. On the other hand, Howe, with a finely appointed army, which outnumbered that of Washington, felt that victory was within his grasp-only a silver thread, which the morning enn would betray, and mark as the coming line of battle, lay between him and the coveted prize. At the dawn of day on the morning of the 11th the British army was in motion.


Howe had formed his army into two grand divisions. The one de- signed to make a feint on the position of Washington, at Chadd's Ford, was commanded by General Knyphausen, the Hessian, the other, the flanking column, was commanded by Lord Corowallis. They moved up its right flank on south side of the Brandywine some fifteen miles, cross- ing at Jeffries' and other ferries, where the headwaters unite, and where the stream is narrow and easily forded.


While this movement was in progress, unknown to Washington, the advance of General Koyphausen fell in with the troops commanded by General Maxwell, on the south side of the river, and a skirmish ensued. Maxwell's forces fell back, were promptly reinforced, and in turn drove the English back upon the original line. Kuyphausen immediately brought up his reserves, and compelled Maxwell to retire to the north side of the river.


Batteries were immediately placed in position, and a fnrions cannonade


I The arrival of Sir William Howe in the Chesapeake Bay late in the mouth of August, 1777, with an army eighteen thousand strong, removed


11


162


HISTORY OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY.


believed to be. Marshall, referring to the immediate results of the engagment, declares, "It was not con- sidered decisive by Congress, the general or the


opened upon the American line, while the disposition of troops, now plainly visible, was of such a character as indicated an intention to force a passage of the river at the point covered by the centre of Washington's army.


The advance upon this part of the line was promptly met with counter dispositions of troops by the commander-in-chief, and the enemy seemed to be foiled in every effort to cross the river at this point. Meanwhile Lord Cornwallis, at the head of the flanking column, by a well-conceived and woobserved line of march, reached the forks of the Brandywine, crossing at Trimble's and Jeffries' Fords, without opposition, at ahout two o'clock in the afternoon, and then turning down the river, took the road to Dilworth, in order to strike the right flank of the American army.


This was a most critical bour on that memorable day. The fact that Cornwallis had reached a position on the flank of Washington's army was at the hour spoken of unknown to him. Various reports reached his ear ; about noon he received a report that General Howe was in command of a large body of the enemy, who were moving ou his right flank. Upon this information, which he deemed reliable, he immediately con- ceived the idea of recrossing the river with the main body of his army, overwhelm Knyphausen before llowe could reach him, very properly concluding that the advantage thus obtained would more than compen- sate for whatever loss he might sustain by leaving his right wing exposed to the assault of lowe and Cornwallis. Accordingly, he ordered General Sullivan to pass the river at an upper ford and attack Knyphausen on his left, while he in person should cross lower down, and fall upou his right. They were both in the act of moving their troops when a second report arrived, representing what had really taken place as false, or, in




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