USA > Tennessee > The military annals of Tennessee. Confederate. First series: embracing a review of military operations, with regimental histories and memorial rolls, V.1 > Part 6
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James Buchanan, the last Democratic President, was inaugu- rated in 1857. Soon afterward the Supreme Court of the United States rendered a decision -- in the celebrated Dred Scott case -- which conceded to slavery the utmost of its claim. This decis- ion was, in effect, "that a slave is a personal chattel, that he might be removed from place to place by his owner like any other piece of property, that the Constitution gave to every slave-holder the right of removing to or through any State or Territory with his slaves, and of returning at his will with them to a State where slavery was recognized by law, and that there- fore the Missouri Compromise of 1820, in so far as it prohibited the existence of African servitude north of a designated line, as well as the compromise measures of 1850, were unconstitutional and void." This opinion was held by seven of the nine judges composing the court-the Chief-justice and six associates-two of the associate justices dissenting.
Finally, in 1860, the nineteenth Presidential election resulted in the choice of Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, on a pledge to oppose any farther extension of slavery, and to maintain the freedom of all the Territories. With a trifling exception, the electoral vote of the North was cast for Lincoln and Hamlin, the candidates of the Republican party. The North had become the stronger section. The South foresaw, in the result of this election, the overthrow of what she regarded as her constitu- tional rights and guarantees, and the ultimate destruction of her entire social and industrial organization. It must be ac- knowledged that she also felt that the scepter had departed from Judah. and there was nowhere recorded the promise of a Shiloh to come and restore her power. The only alternatives were se-
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cession or submission. If her people thought it in every way better for them to separate from the Union and form a Confed- eracy of their own, on what just ground could they be prevented from doing so? and whence did the Government of the Union derive authority to coerce them? They did not desire war, but only to be permitted to go to themselves, and struck a blow when it became certain the other side was preparing to strike.
The people of Tennessee at least, though very far from being satisfied with the state of affairs, were not yet ready for seces- sion. The Legislature met in January, 1861. An act was passed submitting to a popular vote the question of calling a conven- tion. The people were afraid that such a body, convened in the midst of the prevailing excitement, would act hastily, and, by the adoption of an ordinance of secession, withdraw the State from the Union without giving them an opportunity to pass upon such course. When the vote was taken in February, the major- ity against calling a convention was nearly or quite sixty thou- sand. A distinguished member from Tennessee of the "Peace Congress," held in Washington the same month, reported that this vote caused Mr. Seward and others to believe that Tennes- see was " perfectly satisfied," and "did not want any thing."
Fort Sumter surrendered on the 13th of April, after thirty- four hours' resistance. On the 15th, President Lincoln issued a call on the several States for seventy-five thousand militia to suppress certain "combinations" in the seceding States. Ten- nessee was called upon to furnish her proportion of this num- ber. The Governor-Isham G. Harris-replied: "Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but fifty thousand, if necessary, for the defense of our rights or those of our South- ern brethren." This reply no doubt voiced the feeling of a vast majority of her people. They deprecated secession, and de- plored war. They were devoted to the Union under the Consti- tution; were willing to make any sacrifice short of honor to maintain it. They were not willing to look on as quiet spectators, witnessing the subjugation of their Southern brethren, to take their turn next. Still less were they disposed to aid the work of subjugation. They had done every thing possible to them to prevent secession and to avert war. They were convinced that an attitude of neutrality was impossible, as soon became evident in the case of Kentucky. They must take sides. There could
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be no hesitation as to which side to choose. The war-which the Federal Government might have averted, but would not- had already begun. It promised to be a long, costly, and bloody struggle. Yet, in June the people of Tennessee approved the act for "separation and representation " by nearly or quite as large a majority as that cast against a convention in February. This course was as unselfish and magnanimous as any of which history contains a record. It was in perfect keeping with the
. heroic and martial spirit for which they were famed, and which had won for Tennessee the proud title of "the Volunteer State." From first to last she maintained her prestige and her perfect right to this title by furnishing to the Southern cause probably a hundred thousand volunteer troops, and to the Northern-for her people were divided-not less than thirty thousand, exclud- ing negroes. No portion of the Confederate armies proved more loyal to their cause and the flag which symbolized it than did the soldiers of Tennessee. Three times during the struggle they were driven from their own State, but they never once thought of deserting their flag or giving up the contest, although their homes were in possession of the enemy and their fields furnishing him subsistence. In the beginning of 1862 they fol- lowed the fortunes of that truly great man and soldier, Albert Sidney Johnston, from Fishing Creek, Bowling Green, Fort; Donelson and Henry, and Columbus, to Shiloh, the field of his triumph and fall. With Bragg they retreated from Perryville to Murfreesboro, and finally to Chattanooga, Chickamauga, and Dalton. Under Joe Johnston they fought from Dalton to Al- lanta, marking the route with the blood and the graves of the invader. At the command of Hood they marched back to bloody Franklin and the vicinity of Nashville. From the Brentwood hills with longing eyes and yearning hearts they beheld the spires and domes of the beautiful capital of their beloved State. When overwhelmed by the torrent which Thomas let loose upon them, with empty haversacks and naked, bleeding feet, though in midwinter, they followed the "stars and bars" to Tupelo. whence in 1862 they had set out for Kentucky and Perryville. Finally, when in the early spring of 1865 the broken and shat- tered fragments of the Army of Tennessee gathered once more. with other wasted remnants of the Confederate armies, around the standard of " Old Joe," in North Carolina, for a final stand
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against Sherman, a large proportion of Tennesseans answered to roll-call, participated in the " affair near Bentonville," and sur- rendered at Greensboro.
The State of Tennessee has no reason to be ashamed of the conduct of her sons who espoused the Southern cause. They were to be found in the Army of Northern Virginia as well as in the Army of Tennessee, and wherever heavy blows were to be given and received. They participated in all the great battles of the war, and on every field proved themselves worthy descend- ants of the men who fought and conquered under Jackson at New Orleans, under Taylor at Buena Vista and Monterey, and under Scott from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico. No Southern State produced a more brilliant galaxy of military leaders and heroes than that which gives luster to the name of Tennessee, composed of such men as Cheatham, Forrest, and Donelson; Brown, Bate, Zollicoffer, Humes, and Hatton; Adams, Jackson, Strahl, and Tyler; Vaughn, Wright, Dibrell, Campbell. and Gordon; Hill, Preston Smith, Porter, Carter, Frazer, Bell, and many others.
The States which composed the Confederacy were Virginia, Tennessee, and Arkansas, along the northern border; and south of them, lying on the Atlantic and Gulf, were North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, though slave States, were prevented by their situation, by the divisions among their people, and by the early military movements, from uniting with their brethren of the South. In July, 1861, the seat of the Confederate Government was changed from Mont- gomery, Alabama, to Richmond, Virginia. Gradually and nat- urally four great lines of military operations established them- selves: One, east of the mountains, from Washington south through Richmond; another, west of the mountains and east of the Mississippi River, from Louisville through Nashville, toward Atlanta and Mobile; the Mississippi River itself constituted the third; and the fourth, west of the Mississippi, from Missouri through Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. The grand objects in view on the part of the Federal Government were to hold Mary- land and Delaware, capture Richmond, and get possession of and hold Virginia; to prevent Kentucky from joining the Confed- eracy, gain Nashville and Tennessee, and thence penetrate to the
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States south; to hold the Mississippi River, and separate the States east and west of it; and to overrun Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. Expeditions by sea were sent against the forts and sea-ports of the Southern Atlantic and Gulf coasts to gain pos- session of and hold them, thus isolating the Confederacy from the rest of the world, diminishing the sources of supply of her armies, and establishing bases from which operations could be carried on in aid of those along the interior lines. The superi- ority of the North in men and war material was immense. More than two and a half millions of men were mustered into the Union armies in the progress of the war. The forces actually in the field were not less than eight hundred thousand. Often they exceeded a million. More than a million were mustered out of service at the close of the war. The white population of the Confederate States was only about six millions, and accord- ing to Stephens, "the Confederates, all told, in like manner could not have much, if any, exceeded six hundred thousand," while their total effective force at any time could not have been greater than two hundred thousand. The Union armies therefore out- numbered those of the Confederacy in the proportion of two, three, and four to one. If this vast superiority of force had been concentrated and skillfully handled, no doubt the war would have ended sooner, and with far less destruction of life and prop- erty. The policy of the South seemed to be to guard her entire northern frontier, to prevent invasion, and confine the war to the border slave States. That of the North, on the other hand, was apparently to advance simultaneously along the entire line which separated the sections, and with her larger armies to envelop those of the South and crush all at once, after the manner of an anaconda. In consequence, the forces on both sides were scat- tered, operations were indecisive, and the war was protracted. The real struggle, however, took place east of the Mississippi River, on the line of operations through Virginia, and on that through Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia. The Confederate armies on these lines came to be known as the Army of North- ern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee. It is proposed now to sketch briefly the history and services of the latter.
On the 10th of September, 1861, a special order was issued from the Adjutant-general's office in Richmond, from which is taken the following extract:
£
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MILITARY ANNALS OF TENNESSEE.
ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, Richmond, September 10, 1:31.
SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 149.
14. . . . General Albert Sidney Johnston, Confederate States Army, is as- signed to the command of Department No. 2, which will hereafter embrace the States of Tennessee and Arkansas and that part of the State of Mississippi west of the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern and Central railroad; also the military operations in Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian country im- mediately west of Missouri and Arkansas. He will repair to Memphis, Tennes- see, and assume command, fixing his head-quarters at such point as in his judg- ment will best secure the purposes of the command.
By command of the Secretary of War:
(Signed )
JOHN WITHERS, Assistant Adjutant-general.
An immense field was thus assigned to that great commander, a man whom Jefferson Davis has pronounced " the first man, civil or military, in the United States." Our attention will be con- fined to that portion of Johnston's department which lay east of the Mississippi River.
The State of Kentucky had assumed an attitude of neutrality, which, however, could not long be maintained. Early in Sep- tember Major-general Polk, the Confederate commander in West Tennessee, learned that General Grant, Federal commander at Cairo, was about to seize Columbus and Paducah. He accord- ingly anticipated him, and on the seventh occupied Columbus, Grant seizing Paducah about the same time. The State of Ten- nessee endeavored to guard against invasion by way of the Ten- nessee and Cumberland rivers by constructing and arming two forts, one (Fort Henry) on the east bank of the Tennessee, the other (Fort Donelson) on the west bank of the Cumberland. These forts were twelve miles apart, and just within the bound- ary-line between Tennessee and Kentucky. General Johnston reached Nashville September 14th, and immediately deter- mined to occupy Bowling Green. At his request, S. B. Buck- ner, of Kentucky, was appointed a Brigadier-general in the Confederate army, and was placed in command of the column of advance, which began its movement on the 17th of Sep- tember, and on the 1Sth occupied Bowling Green. A few days earlier General Felix K. Zollicoffer, Confederate com- mander in East Tennessee, advanced to Cumberland Ford, in South-eastern Kentucky. Thus the line of defense by which Tennessee and the States to the south were to be covered was a broken line extending from South-eastern Kentucky to Bowling
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Green, where the Louisville and Nashville railroad crosses the Big Barren River; thence to Forts Donelson and Henry; thence to Columbus, on the Mississippi, with a salient at Bowling Green and a reentering angle at the forts. This line was nearly three hundred miles long, and of course was very weakly guarded. "Early in October Polk had some ten thousand men to protect Columbus from Grant's twenty thousand or twenty-five thousand troops at and near Cairo. Buckner's force had increased to six thousand against double that number of adversaries under Sherman, and Zollicoffer's four thousand men had eight or ten thousand opposed to them in Eastern Kentucky under General Thomas."" There were small permanent camps at Feliciana and Mayfield, insignificant garrisons at Donelson and Henry, two or three regiments at Hopkinsville. A small force in Cen- tral Tennessee watched the roads to Jamestown and Jacksboro, and another was recruiting in Eastern Kentucky. The different points of this line were not in supporting distance of each other, and an attack anywhere with sufficient force would break it and compel its abandonment. If the people of the South had been fully aware of the nature of the struggle before them, doubtless a different plan of defense would have been adopted. Colum- bus, Forts Henry and Donelson, Nashville, Bowling Green, and Knoxville, would have been thoroughly fortified, and each placed in the best possible condition to stand a siege. The entire force under Johnston's command east of the Mississippi was not half that opposed to him, so that an offensive campaign was impossi- ble. Moreover, certain physical and political considerations dic- tated the defensive as the only wise policy.
In the latter part of October and early in November move- ments took place along the entire Federal line that indicated a general advance. Nothing serious grew out of them, however, except in the case of the demonstration against Columbus, which resulted in the battle of Belmont. On the 7th of November a Union force landed on the Missouri shore at a bend of the Mis- sissippi some miles above Columbus. It consisted of five regi- ments of infantry, a battery of field artillery, and two squad- rons of cavalry. A Confederate regiment of infantry-the Thir- teenth Arkansas. Colonel Tappan-and a field battery commanded by Colonel Beltzhoover, were camped on the upper bank of the
*"Life of General A. S. Johnston," p. 349.
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river opposite Columbus. in a clearing they had made in the forest. General Polk, apprised of the movement, "sent over three regiments under General Pillow" to the support of Tap- pan; "then at intervals three others, then General Cheatham." Finally he crossed himself "with two other regiments to sup- port a flank movement." Pillow formed his line 'some three or four hundred yards from the river-bank. The enemy attacked it, but met with an obstinate resistance. His ammunition fail- ing, Pillow resorted to the bayonet, but was finally compelled to fall back. The camp of the Thirteenth Arkansas was burned, and Beltzhoover's battery was captured. The Federal line was then formed apparently at right angles to the river with the design of moving up the bank, completing the rout of the Confederates, and capturing them. The line thus formed presented a fair tar- get to a single gun of heavy caliber and long range that had been mounted on the bluff above Columbus. The field of bat- tle was in full view from this gun, whose fire was opened on the Federal line, which immediately faced to the left and retreated for shelter toward the woods. About the same time a field bat- tery was thrown into position in the lower part of Columbus, and opened its fire on the retreating foe. Reenforcements and ammunition arriving, the Confe lerate line was re-formed. and under the command of Polk, Cheatham, and Pillow, drove the enemy, with great slaughter, to his boats. During the day the Federal gun-boats Taylor and Lexington several times engaged the Confederate heavy batteries, but were repulsed.
On the 9th of December Zollicoffer, who had advanced from Cumberland Ford, crossed the Cumberland River at Mill Springs. About the Ist of January Major-general George B. Crittenden, who had been assigned by President Davis to that district, reached Zollicoffer's head-quarters and assumed command. Two columns of the enemy were in motion, one under Thomas against the Confederate left, the other under Schoepf to attack in front. Crittenden resolved to anticipate them, and take them in detail, attacking Thomas first. At midnight of January 18th he marched out of his intrenchments, and on the next day fought the disastrous battle of Fishing Creek, in which the brave Zollicof- fer was killed. The Confederates, poorly armed and most un- skillfully handled, were badly defeated and driven back to their intrenchments; where they remained quietly until midnight, and
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then, with the aid of a steam-boat and some barges, recrossed the river. "The condition of the Confederate army was truly deplorable. On the night of the 18th it had marched ten miles, and on the 19th, after a fierce battle, had retreated to its camp. That night it had stood at the breastworks till midnight, then crossed the river; and now, without sleep and without food, it struggled through the rain and cold of a winter night to reach some place where it might be secure from assault. For several days the troops endured terrible hardships." It was a blunder to cross to the north side of the river with a small force, thinly elad for winter and poorly armed, with a river behind them, and invite attack from superior numbers. Courage is a very essential quality for soldiers; but it requires far more than mere bravery to make good soldiers, and especially to make good Gen- erals. This defeat opened to the enemy the road to East Ten- nessee, whose population very largely adhered to the Union cause, and also exposed Middle Tennessee.
The sites of Forts Henry and Donelson, especially the former, may not have been well chosen for defense. At the time of their location Kentucky occupied a position of neutrality. It seemed necessary, therefore, to place them within the limits of Tennes- see, yet as near the Kentucky line as possible. The Federal commanders determined to make their next attack on these forts, in order to break the line from Bowling Green to Columbus near its center. On the 2d of February, 1862, a force of seventeen thou- sand men in transports set out from Cairo under the command of General Grant, accompanied by seven gun-boats commanded by Commodore Foote. On the 4th the troops were landed some three miles below Fort Henry, while the gun-boats approached within a mile, to test the range of their guns. There were thirty- four hundred effective men at Fort Henry, and twenty-four hun- dred at Donelson, all under the command of General Tilghman, and badly armed. Some skirmishing took place on the 5th, and on the morning of the 6th there were indications of a combined attack by the gun-boats and the land force. "It is evident that on the 5th Tilghman meant to dispute Grant's advance. But on the 6th, just before the attack by the gun-boats, he changed his purpose, abandoned all hope of a successful defense, . ordered Colonel Heiman to withdraw the command to Fort Don- elson, while he himslf would obtain the necessary delay for the
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movement by standing a bombardment of Fort Henry."* An artillery company of seventy-five men only was retained to work the heavy guns of the fort. The fleet consisted of four iron- plated boats, carrying in all forty-eight guns, and three unar- mored vessels of nine guns each, making a total of seventy-five guns. The armament of the fort consisted of seventeen guns, twelve of which were so placed as to bear well on the river. The gun-boats opened fire at 11:45 A.M., approaching to within six hundred yards. The engagement lasted two hours and ten minutes. Four guns in the fort had been disabled, six were idle for want of artillerists, and but two were replying to the fire of the gun-boats. At 1:55 p.M. Tilghman lowered his flag and sur- rendered. A shot through the boiler of the gun-boat Essex had caused an explosion, which forced her to retire.
An attack on Fort Donelson was of course the next movement in order. The two forts were only twelve miles apart, and con- nected by a good road, which had been constructed by Tilgh- man's orders. No attempt whatever appears to have been made to obstruct this road, or to oppose the march of Grant's army, which took up its position around Donelson on the 12th. The failure to obstruct the roads and oppose Grant's advance was very unfortunate. A delay of a few days would have been of incalculable advantage to the Confederates, and would have caught the Federals on the march in unusually severe weather. The force at Donelson at this time numbered some twelve to fifteen thousand effectives. The fort consisted of two water bat- teries, armed with only thirteen guns, and protected landward by an irregular bastioned earth-work, which inclosed about a hun- dred acres. Three-fourths of a mile farther inland was a range of hills, which was selected as a line of defense against Grant's attack. A line of field-works was laid off along the crests of these hills by Major Gilmer, Chief Engineer on Johnston's staff, and, though rudely constructed, these works are said to have been formidable. General Floyd, who arrived at daylight on the 13th, was in chief command. The right wing was assigned to Buck- ner, the left to Pillow. The Federal force numbered at least twenty-five thousand effectives. The flotilla ascended the Cum- berland to cooperate with the land attack. It consisted of four heavy-armored, iron-clad gun-boats, of thirteen guns each, and
* "Life of General A. S. Johnston," p. 430.
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three unarmored boats, each carrying nine guns, making a total of seventy-nine guns.
Several distinct "battles" occurred. On the 13th an attack on the Confederate right and center was repulsed. This affair was called "the battle of the trenches." "The battle of the gun-boats" was fought on the 14th. It lasted an hour and ten minutes, and resulted in great damage to the fleet, which was compelled to withdraw and return to Cairo for the repair of damages. The Confederate batteries were uninjured, and not a man in them was killed, although the action was fought "within point-blank range." During the evening of the 13th the Fed- erals were reenforced-by way of the river-with ten thousand men. In consequence, the Confederates determined, next morn- ing, to attack the enemy's right, and open communication with Charlotte in the direction of Nashville. The orders given by General Johnston were, in substance: "Do not lose the fortress if it can be helped; but do not lose the army anyhow." "If you lose the fort, bring your troops to Nashville if possible." The proposed attack on the enemy's right was countermanded early in the afternoon by General Floyd at the instance, as was said, of General Pillow, who, after drawing out his troops, thought it too late in the day to accomplish any thing. This hesitation and consequent delay probably cost the Confederates both the fort and the army. During the night it was decided to make the attack next morning, and drive the Federal right back until the road to Charlotte should be uncovered. "The battle of Dover" opened on the morning of the 15th by six o'clock. "The Federal right was doubled back. The Wynn's Ferry road was cleared, and it only remained for the Confederates to do one of two things. The first was to seize the golden moment and, adhering to the original purpose and plan of the sortie, move off rapidly by the route laid open by such strenuous efforts and so much bloodshed. The other depended upon the inspira- tion of a master-mind, equal to the effort of grasping every element of the combat, and which should complete the partial vic- tory by the utter rout and destruction of the enemy."# Neither alternative was adopted. Floyd, swayed alternately by Buckner and Pillow, who did not agree, yielded to the influence of the latter, and the troops were recalled to the trenches. During the
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