USA > Tennessee > The military annals of Tennessee. Confederate. First series: embracing a review of military operations, with regimental histories and memorial rolls, V.1 > Part 9
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bridges near Stilesboro, and by the 25th were again in position -their right at Dallas, their left extending toward Alatoona on the railroad. The Army of Tennessee had marched on the 23d and 24th, and by the 25th occupied a line which crossed the road from Dallas to Atlanta and passed by New Hope Church toward the right. In his Narrative, General Johnston says (pages 326, 327): "As soon as his troops were in position, Lieu- tenant-general Hood, to 'develop the enemy,' sent forward Col- onel Bush Jones with his regiment (the united Thirty-second and Fifty-eighth Alabama) and Austin's sharp-shooters, in all about three hundred men." In this statement there is an omis- sion of the fact that Austin's sharp-shooters belonged to Gib- son's Louisiana brigade, and the brigade, or a portion of it, led by its gallant commander, participated in the reconnoissance. An hour and a half before sunset Hooker's corps of the Federal army, formed in several lines, attacked the center division of Hood's corps opposite New Hope Church. The front line of the division was occupied by Clayton's and Baker's Alabama brigades and Stovall's Georgia brigade. Gibson's Louisiana brigade was held in reserve. The enemy advanced resolutely under the fire of the three brigades and sixteen pieces of artil- lery until within fifty paces of the Confederate line, when they were compelled to fall back. A second time they were led for- ward as before, and again repulsed, the engagement lasting nearly two hours, and resulting in heavy loss to the enemy. No " breastworks " had been constructed by the division assailed, a few only of the men partially covered themselves by hastily ar- ranging such fallen 'timber as was found near their line. On the 27th Cleburne's division was transferred to the extreme right of the Confederate line, which the enemy were attempting to turn. Between five and six o'clock in the afternoon another Fed- eral corps-the Fourth-assailed Cleburne, the attack falling es- pecially on Granbury's Texans and two of Govan's Arkansas regiments. The enemy advanced to within a few yards of the Confederate line, but were driven back with very great slaughter. After these affairs, almost continuous skirmishing took place along the lines. The Federal intrenchments were daily extended eastward toward the railroad. To prevent being cut off from the railroad and Marietta, Johnston followed up their movement, holding the right of his line by dismounted cavalry in skirmish-
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ing order, because of the great inequality of force. At length :. early in June, he changed his position, placing his line so that its left rested on Lost Mountain, and the right, composed of car- alry, extended beyond the railroad and behind Noonday Creek. He states his losses in the three corps from the passage of the Etowah to this change of position at two hundred and seventy- six killed, seventeen hundred and twenty-nine wounded. The loss of the cavalry of the right, commanded by Major-general Wheeler, from the 6th to the 31st of May inclusive, was seventy- three killed, three hundred and forty-one wounded."
The new line crossed Pine Mountain, on which a portion of Lieutenant - general Hardee's command was posted. On the morning of the 14th General Johnston, in company with Lieu- tenant-generals Hardee and Polk, visited that part of the line to decide whether they should continue to hold it or not. Their presence drew together a party of soldiers that attracted the fire of a Federal battery some six or seven hundred yards distant. The second or third shot from a three-inch rifled gun struck Lieutenant-general Polk, passing from left to right through the middle of his chest, killing him instantly. His death was uni- versally lamented in the army and throughout the South. He was a brave soldier, of knightly courtesy and honor, and a true Christian gentleman.
The opposing lines had approached near enough to resume the usual skirmishing and partial engagements. The example set in Mill Creek Gap in front of Dalton led to the practice of intrenching the skirmish line, which was often assailed by the Federals in line of battle, almost invariably with heavy loss to them and with trifling casualties to the Confederates. On the 19th a new position was occupied, including the crest of Kenne- saw Mountain, the left extending nearly due south to the high ground north of a branch of Nose's Creek. Heavy and long- continued rains followed, which made the creek impassable. The enemy took advantage of this protection to extend his line several miles beyond the Confederate left toward the Chattahoo- che, covering his right with intrenchments. On the 20th "the most considerable cavalry affair of the campaign"+ occurred on the Confederate right. The Federal cavalry attacked Wheeler's command, and was routed with considerable loss. To meet the
* Johnston's Narrative, page 335. TIbid., pig. 339.
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extension of the Federal right toward the Chattahoocheeod's corps was transferred to the Confederate left. Two of his di- visions were attacked; they repulsed the enemy, followed and drove them from a line of light intrenchments, but the fire of intrenched artillery which they attempted to capture compelled them to withdraw, with a loss of about a thousand men.
"On the morning of the 27th, after a furious cannonade, the Federal army made a general assault upon the Confederate po- sition, which was received everywhere with firmness, and repelled with a loss to the assailants enormously disproportionate to that which they inflicted."* The Confederate loss in killed, wound- ed, and missing was eight hundred and eight. The Federal loss must have been far greater. General Johnston says in his Nar- rative that "after maintaining the contest for three-quarters of an hour until more of their best soldiers lay dead and wounded than the number of British veterans that fell in General Jack- son's celebrated battle of New Orleans, the foremost dead lying against our breastworks, they retired, unsuccessful, because they had encountered intrenched infantry unsurpassed by that of Na- poleon's Old Guard or that which followed Wellington into France out of Spain." The brunt of this attack fell upon Cheatham's division, which fought on open ground unprotected by intrenchments, and the left of Cleburne's.
"Thus far in the campaign Generals Sherman and Johnston had each kept up the most persistent belligerence to keep the other from detaching troops to Virginia. But on the 28th Gen- eral Grant authorized General Sherman to make his movements without reference to the retention of General Johnston's forces where they were. This independence and the necessity of active offense induced immediate preparations for an effort to reach General Johnston's communications."f Sherman accordingly endeavored to turn Johnston's left, and strike the railroad be- tween him and the Chattahoocheeridge. To meet this attempt, on July 3d General Johnston fell back to a position previously selected and prepared ten miles south of Marietta, and on the 5th to a line of works on the high ground near the Chattahooche which covered the approaches to the railroad bridge and Tur- ner's Ferry. On the Sth two corps of the Federal army crossed
* Johnston's Narrative, page 341. + Van Horne: "History of the Army of the Cumberland," Vol. II, page 95.
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the river above the railroad bridge and intrenched. The Con- federate army crossed during the night of the 9th, and was es- tablished two miles south of the river. Peach-tree Creek emp- ties into the Chattabooche just above the railroad bridge. Its channel is broad, deep, and muddy. The Federal army would have to cross it in advancing upon Atlanta. General Johnston had already been reenforced by a division of the Georgia mili- tia under command of Major-general G. W. Smith. Governor Brown promised to bring ten thousand more of them to the army within a few days. General Johnston's plan, as explained to one of his corps commanders, was to hold the works around Atlanta with the militia, while he operated with his army in the field. A position for the army was selected on the high ground south of Peach-tree Creek, but it was not intrenched. The only prep- aration made was to clear of timber the good artillery positions. He expected that in passing the creek the Federal army would be so divided as to afford him a favorable opportunity for attack. If successful, he might reasonably hope for decisive results. If unsuccessful, his army could take refuge in intrenched lines close at hand, and hold the enemy in check until the State troops could be assembled. These would man the works around Atlanta on the side toward Peach-tree Creek, the army would leisurely fall back into the town, and, when the enemy approached, would. march out and attack him ou one of his flanks. A successful attack would drive him to the Chattahoocheelow Peach-treo Creek, where there were no fords, or to the east away from his communications, according as it might fall on his left or right. Should the attack prove unsuccessful, the army could take ref- uge in Atlanta, and hold it as long as might be necessary.
On the 17th the whole Federal army had passed the Chatta- hooche, and began driving in the Confederate outposts north of the creek. It seemed as though the most favorable oppor- tunity for Johnston of the entire campaign was about to present itself. Within the next two or three days it was certain the Federal army would attempt the passage of the creek in the face of the Confederates. Just then, at ten o'clock at night of the 17th, General Johnston received a telegraphic order from Adju- tant-general Cooper relieving him from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which he was directed to turn over to General Hood.
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The campaign had lasted seventy-four days-from May 5th to July 17th inclusive. It had been almost a continuous battle. The Confederate losses in killed and wounded, as given by Med- ical Director A. J. Ford, amounted to nine thousand nine hundred and seventy-two. The loss inflicted on the enemy was probably four to six times as great. Throughout the campaign the sol- diers and animals of the army had been regularly and abun- dantly supplied, and no material was lost. The army was in high spirits, and reposed unbounded confidence in its command- ing General. It had received reinforcements during the cam- paign amounting to fourteen or fifteen thousand effectives. The accessions to the Federal army were much greater.
General Hood asserted in his published report, and endeav- ored to prove in his "Advance and Retreat," that when he took command of it the Army of Tennessee had become demoralized by General Johnston's method of conducting the campaign. A sufficient refutation of this unfounded charge is to be found in the conduct of the army while under General Hood's com- mand, General Hood himself being the witness, and subsequent- ly at Bentonville, North Carolina, after the reinstatement of General Johnston, and also in the testimony of two of the corps commanders of the army, as contained in the following letters copied from Johnston's Narrative :*
"In a letter to me, dated April 20, 1868, Lieutenant-general Hardee testifies:
"'General: In regard to the condition of the Army of Tennes- see when, on the 18th of July, 1864, at Atlanta, Georgia, you were relieved of command, I have the honor to say that, in my opinion, the organization, morale, and effectiveness of that army, excellent at the opening of the campaign, had not been impaired at its close. There had been nothing in the campaign to pro- duce that effect. It is true that the superior numbers of the enemy, enabling them to cover our front with a part of their forces and to use the remainder for flanking purposes, rendered our positions successively untenable, and that we lost territory. But the enemy's loss in men and morale was more than an equiv- alent. The continuous skirmishing and sharp partial engage- ments of the campaign uniformly resulted in success to our arms; and in the seventy days preceding the 18th of July we
* Johnston's Narrative, pages 365-359.
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had inflicted upon the enemy a loss probably equal to our whole numbers.
""'Our changes of position were deliberate, and without loss. disorder, or other discouragement. The troops were well fed, well cared for, and well handled. When we reached Atlanta we were nearer to our base, and the enemy farther from his; the disparity in numbers between the two armies had been dimin- ishing daily; our army had suffered no disaster, and the enemy's had gained no advantage; and altogether the results of the cau !- paign summed up largely in our favor. Our soldiery were in- telligent enough to appreciate this; and, in my judgment then, it was not only a fact, but a natural and logical result of the premises, that the morale of the army, so far from being im- paired, was improved.
"'The troops were in buoyant spirits. They felt that they had been tested in a severe and protracted campaign, and that they had borne the test; they had more confidence in themselves and in their officers; and especially they had unwavering and unbounded confidence in the commanding General.
"'Speaking for my own corps, I have no hesitancy in saying that I should have led them into action with more confidence at the close than at the beginning of the campaign.'
"On the 11th of February, ISGS, Lieutenant-general Stewart wrote to me on the same subject:
"' . . . . You desired my opinion as to the condition of the army when you were relieved from command. I first joined that army a few days before the battle of Shiloh. It was then mostly without discipline, as the battle of Shiloh too sadly evinced. Our stay at Tupelo, Mississippi, after the retreat from Corinth. was improved in drilling and disciplining the army. General Bragg had brought it to a high state of efficiency by the time he set out on his campaign into Kentucky. The army was in a fine condition also when General Bragg retreated from Middle Tennessee in 1863, and up to the disaster on Missionary Ridge in November of that year. I do not know that its morale was ever before equal-certainly never superior-to what it was when the campaign opened in Georgia in 1864 under your command. You were the only commander of that army whom men and off- cers were disposed to trust and confide in without reserve. While at Dalton I frequently heard this subject of the unbounded con-
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fidenoe of the men in "Old Joe" discussed among the officers, who seemed but little, if any, exceeded by the rank and file in this respect. The officers seemed to regard this feeling as a great element of strength (as it certainly was), and looked upon it as a part of their duty to cherish and promote it. The army had confidence in itself, and had long been wanting a commander in whom it could place reliance. The consequence was, that army surrendered to you; they gave you their lore and unlimited confidence, were willing to follow you, advancing or retreating, and you could have led them wherever you chose. At the time of the retreat from Resaca, and perhaps for a few days follow- ing, this feeling of entire trust in you somewhat abated; but it speedily revived, and was as perfect as ever when you retired. I cannot imagine it possible for an army to entertain more per- sonal affection for a commander, or to place more implicit reli- ance on one, than that army did for you. I believe the last man of them would have willingly died at your bidding.
" You know how I felt when you showed me the order reliev- ing you. When, after the fall of Atlanta, President Davis vis- ited us at Palmetto Station, he asked me whom the army pre- ferred as its commander. My reply was, in substance: They pre- fer General Johnston; next to him, of those available for the command, they prefer General Beauregard. He then inquired as to the grounds of their preference for General Johnston. Another officer present advanced the opinion that it was because they believed General Johnston would take care of them, and not expose them to danger. I interrupted, and asserted emphat- ically that such ideas did great injustice to the army; that the true reason of their confidence in General Johnston was they trusted his skill and judgment, and believed that whenever he issued an order for battle they would fight to some purpose. They would have engaged the enemy under your command on the day you left it with as much cheerfulness and confidence as on the day the campaign opened. You left on Monday (the 18th, I believe, of July). My own corps showed no demoraliza- tion on Wednesday, the 20th, on Peach-tree Creek; and it was not either any demoralization on our side, nor the "electric" effect of General Hooker's presence on his troops, that saved him that day.
"'Did not the troops fight well on the 20th and 22d, and every-
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where under General Hood, especially at Franklin, Tennessee? 'Had they been demoralized? I could say much more on this subject, but perhaps have said enough. .
"'You are not now, General, at the head of an army, with influence, and promotions to award. What may be said cannot be ascribed to interested motives. The Army of Tennessee lorel you and confided in you implicitly, as an army of brave men will love and confide in skill, pluck, and honor."
The two officers who wrote the above letters served with the Army of Tennessee from its first organization by Sidney John- ston at Corinth, as the Army of the Mississippi, to the fall of Atlanta under Hood; and one of them to the close of the war. They were competent to pronounce judgment on the condition of that army at different periods, and their testimony respecting it at the time of Joliston's retirement is absolutely true.
General Johnston, in obedience to the order from Richmond, transferred the command of the army to General Hood, who placed it in line of battle-facing Peach-tree Creek-on the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th of July. The disposition was: Stewart's corps on the left, Hardee's in the center, Cheat- ham's and the Georgia militia, commanded by Major-general G. W. Smith, on the right. On Wednesday, the 20th, the favorable opportunity which Johnston anticipated presented itself, and Hood, to whom Johnston had explained his plans, determined to attack. One of Sherman's armies, or corps, was crossing the creek, the other two were several miles to the left or east, near Decatur, on the Georgia railroad. The former was to be attacked by the two corps of Hardee and Stewart. In his official report Hood says: "Specific orders were given these Generals. in the presence of each other, as follows: The attack was to begin at 1 P.M .; the movement to be by division, en échelon, from the right, at a distance of about one hundred and fifty yards, the effort to be to drive the enemy back to the creek, and then to- ward the river into the narrow space formed by the river and creek, every thing on our side of the creek to be taken at all hazards, and to follow up as our success might permit. Each of these Generals was to hold a division in reserve. Owing to the demonstrations of the enemy on the right, it became necessary to extend Cheatham a division front to the right. To do this, Hardee and Stewart were each ordered to extend a half divis-
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ion front to close the interval. Foreseeing that some confusion and delay might result, I was careful to call General Hardee's attention to the importance of having a staff officer on his left to see that the left did not take more than a half division front. This, unfortunately, was not attended to, and the line closed to the right, causing Stewart to move two or three times the proper distance. In consequence of this, the attack was delayed until nearly 4 p.M." In the meantime the enemy were crossing the creek and intrenching themselves. When the movement began, full three hours after the time fixed, "General Stewart carried out his instructions to the letter. . .. . General Stewart and his troops nobly performed their duty in the engagement of the 20th. At the time of the attack his corps moved boldly for- ward, drove the enemy from his works, and held possession of them until driven out of them by an enfilade fire of batteries placed in position by General Thomas. .. . . Unfortunately, the corps on Stewart's right, although composed of the best troops in the army, virtually accomplished nothing. In lieu of moving the half division front promptly to the right, attacking as ordered, and supporting Stewart's gallant assault, the troops of Hardee-as their losses on that day indicate-did nothing more than skirmish with the enemy. Instead of charging down upon the foe as Sherman represents Stewart's men to have done, many of the troops, when they discovered that they had come into contact with breastworks, lay down, and consequently this attempt at pitched battle proved abortive.
"General Sherman writes as follows in regard to this engage- ment: ' .... The enemy came pouring out of their trenches down upon them, they became commingled, and fought in many places hand-to-hand. . . . . After a couple of hours of hard and close conflict, the enemy retired slowly within his trenches, leav- ing his dead and many wounded on the field.'"*
Such is the testimony of General Hood himself, and also of General Sherman, as to the conduct of one corps of the Army of Tennessee only two days after Johnston left it, and during its first battle under Hood. That corps certainly had not been demor- alized, and neither the men composing it nor their commander would claim superiority over the other corps. The trouble with Hardee's corps was that Hardee himself was very greatly dis-
*"Advance and Retreat," pages 168-172.
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satisfied because a junior officer had been appointed over him to command the army. He did not, for some reason, communicate to his command the orders of the commanding General. Gen- eral Hood was not on the field the whole of that eventful after- noon. He remained at Stewart's head-quarters-a mile or two in the rear-instead of going to the field to superintend the exe- cution of his orders. Had Johnston been in command there would have been no miscarriage, and the corps that fought would not have lost a thousand men to no good purpose whatever.
Hood was a brave soldier, a man of many excellent qualities, and a good subordinate. There were many who thought he was not fitted, either by capacity or temperament, to command an army and conduct a campaign.
On the 21st Sherman's line extended from the vicinity of De- catur on the east nearly to the Western and Atlantic road north of Atlanta. General Hood had a new line of intrenchments constructed during the day on high ground, to correspond with that of the enemy, and at night transferred his army to this line. Hardee was directed to move south, on the McDonough road, across Intrenchment Creek at Cobb's Mills, and to com- pletely turn Sherman's left under McPherson, and attack in re- verse at daylight, or as soon thereafter as possible. The cavalry under Wheeler was to join in the attack to the right of Hardee. The other troops, who were occupying the intrenched line, were to take up the battle from right to left so soon as Hardee should succeed "in forcing back or throwing into confusion the Federal left, and assist in driving the enemy down and back upon Peach- tree Creek." The movement failed. Hardee found the Federal left thrown back and covered by several lines of intrenchments. He attacked them, carried and held several of them, and, as Hood himself testifies, his troops "fought, seemingly, with de- termination and spirit." He lost heavily; one of his division commanders, Major-general W. H. S. Walker, and the Federal General McPherson were killed; but the object General Hood had in view, to defeat Sherman and drive him away from Atlan- ta, was not accomplished. Everywhere, in describing the oper- ations of this day, the fourth after Johnston's retirement, Gen- eral Hood testifies to the gallantry of the several commands engaged-Hardee's corps, the Georgia militia, the corps now commanded by Cheatham. So that his own testimony as to the
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fighting on the 20th and 22d embraces the entire army, and dis- proves the charge of demoralization. He implies that Hardee did not possess the capacity to execute the movement-"a very simple one" -- that had been assigned him, and asserts that it was necessary for him to move only a little farther to the right to achieve a brilliant victory. It is much more probable he would have lost his corps. The Federals, with their overwhelm- ing numbers, could afford a lavish expenditure of men. It be- hooved the Confederates to be sparing of theirs, and to fight only at advantage. General Hood says: "My failure on the 20th and 22d to bring about a general pitched battle arose from the unfortunate policy pursued from Dalton to Atlanta, and which had wrought such demoralization amid rank and file as to render the men unreliable in battle." There was never a sin- gle occasion during the entire campaign, and during the period Hood was in command, and on to Bentonville, the last conflict of the war in which it was engaged, that the "rank and file" of the Army of Tennessee failed in its duty. Again he says: "The failure in the battle of the 22d is to be attributed also to the effect of the 'timid defensive' policy upon this officer [Hardee], who, although a brave and gallant soldier, neglected to obey orders."* Then it was not due to the fact that "the men were unreliable in battle."
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