USA > Tennessee > The military annals of Tennessee. Confederate. First series: embracing a review of military operations, with regimental histories and memorial rolls, V.1 > Part 8
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The Federal army remained in Middle Tennessee until the middle of August, when it began a forward movement across Cumberland Mountains. By the 4th of September it had crossed the Tennessee at Bridgeport, where no resistance was offered. In order to dislodge Bragg from Chattanooga, the Federal right under McCook and the center under Thomas were thrown across Lookout Mountain-the former at Valley Head, the latter from Trenton-while the left under Crittenden was to demonstrate directly against Chattanooga. In the meantime, General Burn-
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side had been sent into East Tennessee with a Northern army, and occupied Knoxville. Buckner, the Confederate commander in East Tennessee, fell back to Loudon, and finally united with the Army of Tennessee. General Bragg was apprehensive, should he remain in Chattanooga, that his communications would be seized and his supplies cut off. It was important also, as reen- forcements were coming from Virginia under Longstreet, to keep the way open for them to reach him. He determined, therefore, to abandon Chattanooga, to march south toward La Fayette, Georgia, and if possible strike the columns of Rosecrans in de- tail as they crossed the mountains. Rosecrans was completely deceived, and, supposing Bragg to be in retreat upon Rome or Atlanta, directed Crittenden to occupy Chattanooga with a brigade, and pursue the Confederates on the road leading to Ringgold and Dalton, At the same time, McCook was ordered to advance on Alpine and Thomas on La Fayette. Thus it hap- pened that ten or eleven days before the battle of Chickamauga was fought the finest opportunity of the war was presented to Bragg to strike a decisive blow. The larger part of Rosecrans's center was at Davis's Cross-roads, in the valley between Look- out Mountain and Pigeon Ridge; his left was near Chattanooga, perhaps twenty miles distant to the north, his right in the vicin- ity of Alpine, as far to the south. Bragg was in a position to crush the enemy's center and interpose his army between the wings, which could not have escaped. He saw his chance; he had a sufficient force near Davis's Cross-roads to dispose of Thomas, and ordered an attack to be made. A precious day was wasted. The order was not obeyed, the enemy discovered his egregrious blunder, and the golden opportunity was gone for- ever. Whatever apologies may have been offered for this fail- ure, the real cause of it was the lack of confidence on the part of the superior officers of the Army of Tennessee in its com- mander. If Robert E. Lee or either of the Johnstons had been in command, the blow would have been struck, and in all human probability Rosecrans's army would have been destroyed. One man, sometimes, is of as much value as an army. His followers said truly to King David: "But now thou art worth ten thousand of us." During the next day or two attempts were made to strike Crittenden toward Chattanooga and MeCook toward Al- pine, but they proved abortive. By the 19th of September the 6
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two armies were concentrated on or near the Chickamauga -- "the river of death " -- in the vicinity of Lee and Gordon's Mill, about midway between La Fayette and Chattanooga. Bragg had been reenforced by the arrival of a portion of Longstreet's corps. Some preliminary skirmishing took place during the evening of the 18th, while the troops were taking up the positions assigned them preparatory to the death-struggle that awaited them. The plan of General Bragg was to interpose his right between Rose- crans's left and Chattanooga, and, in case of defeat, force him on a line of retreat toward the mountains. While in motion to re- connoiter a road leading from their left toward Chattanooga, a body of Rosecrans's men encountered the cavalry which covered Bragg's right, and brought on the battle before his preparations were completed. During the remainder of the day and into the night the conflict raged with varying fortunes and no decisive result. In the course of the night Longstreet arrived with the remainder of his corps, and dispositions were made by General Bragg to attack at daylight on the 20th. The command of the right wing of the Confederate army was assigned to Polk; of the left to Longstreet. The orders were to begin the attack on the extreme right at daylight. It was to be taken up on the extreme left, and extend from both wings to the center. These orders were not obeyed. The delay was improved by the enemy in strengthening his position. It must have been as late as ten o'clock when officers of the staff of General Bragg passed along the lines giving orders directly to division and brigade command- ers to move at once upon the enemy. The men had been wait. ing since daylight, ready and eager for the charge, which, at the word, was made in the most gallant style, and soon a general and desperate conflict was raging. The storm of battle swayed to and fro along the lines, but on the whole the Confederate stand- ard advanced, the enemy were routed at different points, and finally, at a late hour in the afternoon, his entire force was swept from the field, and fled, apparently in the greatest confusion, to- ward Chattanooga.
Of course, if practicable, he should have been closely and hotly pursued, and the victory rendered decisive. There was no pursuit. The beaten foe collected within the strong works which the Confederates had constructed around Chattanooga, where he remained for two months, undergoing a siege, strengthening
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the fortifications, and preparing for another advance. For a time his situation was critical, on account of the difficulty of pro- curing supplies. They were hauled from Bridgeport over very bad roads, and many of his teams and wagons were destroyed or captured by the Confederate cavalry.
On the 19th of October General Rosecrans was superseded, as Buell had been the year before. The Military Division of the Mississippi was created by the Federal authorities, and General Grant assigned to its command, with control of three Feder- al armies-the Army of the Tennessee, the Army of the Cum- berland, and the Army of the Ohio. Hooker had been sent out from Virginia with two corps to reenforce Rosecrans. On the morning of October 27th a poontoon bridge was thrown across the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry, nine miles below Chattanooga. Hooker was permitted to seize and hold the road from Bridge- port to the ferry, by which means the difficulty in getting sup- plies to Chattanooga was relieved, and the siege was virtually at an end.
Soon afterward Longstreet's corps was detached from the Army of Tennessee, and sent toward Knoxville to look after Burnside. Subsequently other troops were detached to reën- force Longstreet. While the Confederate army was thus weak- ened, Grant-now in command at Chattanooga -- was further re- enforced by the arrival from the West of Sherman's army, which was moved into position above Chattanooga for the purpose of attacking the right of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge. This line was a very long one, and, although the position was natu- rally strong, it seemed like folly to attempt to hold it in the face of the immense force concentrated in its front. The prepara- tions made by General Bragg indicated a purpose to retreat. About noon of November 23d, however, the Federal army be- gan its movement against his position. A reconnoissance was made on the right, the Confederate pickets and front lines were driven in upon the main line, and the enemy intrenched and held the ground he had gained. This caused an undue concentration toward the right, while the center and left were strung out into little more than a skirmish line. On the 24th Lookout Mount- ain, on the extreme left, was carried; and on the memorable 25th, like a spring-tide from the mighty ocean, the enemy, in overwhelming force, rushed up the slopes of Missionary Ridge
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and swept from its erest the attennated line by which it was held. Under cover of night the Confederates crossed the Chickamau- ga, and in a few days went into camp for the remainder of the winter in the vicinity of Dalton. At his own request, General Bragg was relieved from the command of the Army of Tennes- see. As soon as possible after his success at Missionary Ridge, General Grant dispatched ample reinforcements to East Ten- nessee. They were not needed. for previous to their arrival at Knoxville Longstreet raised the siege of that place, retreated eastward, and finally rejoined the army of General Lee in Vir- ginia.
The year 1863 had been a very eventful one. Vicksburg and Port Hudson had fallen, and the enemy were in possession of the Mississippi River. Gettysburg, perhaps the decisive battle of the war, had been fought and lost. The Army of Tennessee had retreated across the Cumberland Mountains, had fought and gained the great battle of Chickamauga, and, as at Shiloh and Murfreesboro, had lost the fruits of victory, and suffered the disaster of Missionary Ridge. It was not disheartened. It knew there were brave men in vastly superior numbers opposed to it, but had confidence in itself and in its ability to cope with its adversaries, provided the odds were not too great and it were skillfully handled. The command was offered to Lieutenant- general Hardee, but declined. There was great rejoicing when, a month after the disastrous rout at Missionary Ridge, it was announced that General Joseph E. Johnston had been assigned to the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee. Except the advance into Kentucky in 1862, the army had been " falling back" since the beginning of the war. It had retreated from Fishing Creek, Bowling Green, Henry and Donelson, and Columbus to Shiloh; thence to Corinth and Tupelo. Transferred to Chattanooga. the flank movement into Kentucky was made. the battle of Perryville was fought. and the army fell back through East Tennessee to Murfreesboro, where the year 1562 closed and 1863 opened with another great battle and victory, followed by retreat. The summer and fall of 1863 witnessed the abandonment of Middle Tennessee, the crossing of Cumberland Mountain and the Tennessee River, the evacuation of Chatta- nooga, and the rout at Missionary Ridge. The army hoped now, with another Johnston at its head, to be put on the offensive.
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But whether so or not, expression was given, by regiments, bri- gades, and divisions, of the utmost confidence in the new com- mander, and of a loyal purpose to be true to the cause and fol- low his lead, "whether he advanced or retreated." There was something remarkable in the manner in which the army took its new General into its affections and confidence. General Bragg, though an able officer, had been unfortunate in this respect. His greatest defect was that he did not win the love and confi- dence of either the officers or men. The reverse was true of General Johnston.
The winter was passed in providing for the comfort and im- proving the instruction and discipline of the army. Many ab- sentees returned, all reasonable wants were supplied, and proba- bly no army was ever in better condition to begin a campaign than that which took the field under Johnston early in May, 1864.
During the winter there were occasional skirmishes between scouting parties and pickets. In February a Federal army of thirty-five thousand men marched eastwardly from Vicksburg under the command of General Sherman. In obedience to or- ders from President Davis, Hardee's corps was sent from Dalton to the support of Lieutenant-general Polk, who was in command of the Army and Department of Mississippi. Immediately Thomas, under orders from Grant, moved from Chattanooga with all his available force "to gain possession of Dalton, and as far soutli of that as possible." He was met and repulsed at every point on the 25th and 26th, and retraced his steps. The movement of Sherman across Mississippi-which possibly had Mobile as its objective-point-terminated with the destruction of Meridian. On the 21st he began his return march to Vicks- burg, and Hardee's corps was ordered back to Dalton.
The Army of Tennessee hoped its next campaign would be an offensive one. Such appears also to have been the desire of the Confederate authorities at Richmond, and of General Johnston himself. Unfortunately, there was a difference of opinion as to the plan and details. On the 22d of March General Johnston dispatched to General Bragg-now acting as Chief of Staff to the President-as follows: "In my dispatch of the 1Sth I ex- pressly accept taking the offensive. Only differ with you as to details. I assume that the enemy will be prepared to advance before we are, and will make it to our advantage. Therefore, I
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propose, as necessary both for the offensive and defensive, to assemble our troops here immediately. Other preparations for ud- cance are going on."* The plan of operations proposed by Gen- eral Johnston was to move as soon as his means and force could be collected, so as to reach and cross the Tennessee River near Kingston, East Tennessee. Longstreet, still in the upper part of East Tennessee, was to move simultaneously by a route east and south of Knoxville and form a junction with Johnston. Thus Knoxville would be isolated and Chattanooga threatened. If the enemy then failed to offer battle outside of his intrenched lines, Johnston was to cross the mountains from Kingston to Sparta, capture Nashville, if possible, or at any rate isolate Chat- tanooga and compel its abandonment. At the same time a heavy column of cavalry would be thrown into West Tennessee, and thence, if practicable, into Middle Tennessee, to distract the enemy's attention and operate on his lines of communication. General Johnston's strength was estimated at forty-one thou- sand. His army was to be augmented by three thousand cav- alry under Martin, five thousand infantry drawn from Polk's department, ten thousand from Beauregard's, and the whole of Longstreet's force-sixteen thousand-swelling his total to ser- enty-five thousand. General Johnston objected to the plan- that the enemy could prevent the proposed junction at Kingston by attacking his own or Longstreet's army with his united forces; that the presence of Grant at Nashville indicated that he would retain the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and would certainly advance; that it was impossible to estimate the time Grant would require for preparation, and therefore the army at Dalton should be put in condition for successful resist- ance as soon as possible by assembling there the proposed re- enforcements. He thought it would be easier to march into Middle Tennessee through North Alabama, and that Grant would be ready to move before he could be. In that event, if suffi- ciently prepared, he might fight a battle, and if victorious be in a far better position to take the offensive. The Government ap- pears to have understood him as declining to adopt the plan pro- posed to him, and to act on the offensive, and therefore his army was not reenforced. A defensive campaign was the only one possible in view of the overwhelming odds opposed to him.
# Johnston's Narrative, page 298.
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In the latter part of March Grant superseded Halleck in chief command at Washington. He was succeeded by Sherman in the command at Chattanooga. On the first of May the effective strength of the Army of Tennessee, as given by General John- ston, was thirty-seven thousand six hundred and fifty-two in- fantry, twenty-eight hundred and twelve artillery, twenty-three hundred and ninety-two cavalry; total, forty-two thousand eight hundred and fifty-six. The 5th of May, 1864, was fixed for the simultaneous advance in Virginia and Georgia of the great ar- mies commanded by Grant and Sherman against those under Lee and Johnston respectively. Sherman's force consisted of three armies combined-the Cumberland, under Thomas; the Tennessee, under MePherson; the Ohio, commanded by Schofield. By the 6th these armies were practically united in North Geor- gia. Their combined strength amounted to a hundred thousand men, two and a half times that of the army opposed to them.
The campaign that followed was conducted with great skill on both sides, and to the infinite credit of the Army of Tennes- see and its able commander. The Federal army was composed of the best fighting material the North possessed. The General in command of it was by far the ablest soldier on that side. He made no blunders; nor did he succeed, even with his immense superiority of numbers, in catching his watchful adversary una- wares.
About two and a half to three miles west of Dalton lies Rocky Face Ridge, whose general trend is nearly north and south. There is a gap in this ridge three and a half miles north-west of Dalton, through which passes Mill Creek and the railroad from Chatta- nooga to Atlanta. The ridge extends only some three miles north of Mill Creek Gap. Farther to the south, and west from Tilton, is Snake Creek Gap. Between the two gaps the ridge protects the railroad on the west, and covers the approach to Resaca from the direction of Chattanooga. On the 5th of May General Johnston formed his troops to receive the enemy, who. were already in motion. He posted them in Mill Creek Gap and along the west of the mountain to the right, in the valley east of the mountain, and in front of Dalton, facing north, to resist an attack from the direction of Cleveland. On the 7th the enemy advanced slowly, and by three in the afternoon had driven back the Confederate cavalry within Mill Creek Gap. During the
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two following days several affairs took place along the lines, with little damage to the Confederates, but with heavy loss to the en- emy, which, in the language of General Sherman, "attained the dimensions of a battle." On the 9th Johnston received intelli- gence of the arrival in Snake Creek Gap of McPherson's army. Reports on the 11th indicated a general movement of the Fed- eral troops in that direction, covered by Rocky Face. A recon- noissance on the 12th revealed the fact that Sherman's main body was marching toward Snake Creek Gap, on its way to Re- saca. During the night of the 12th and 13th the Confederate infantry and artillery were withdrawn from the front of Dalton and marched to Resaca, the cavalry following after day-break as a rear-guard.
At least one corps commander, and perhaps other officers. of the Army of Tennessee thought that when Sherman had divided his force by detaching MePherson's army to make the flank move- ment through Snake Creek Gap, Johnston should have massed his troops and attacked Sherman in front of Mill Creek Gap. Months afterward, in conversation with another officer of the same army, General Johnston mentioned the fact that such opin- ion had been entertained, and added: "Napoleon said that any General who would risk his communications ought to be sbot." The force remaining in front of Mill Creek Gap was still greatly superior in numbers to that which could be massed against it- perhaps as two to one. To have attacked it and failed would have been the destruction of the Army of Tennessee. The chances of success were too doubtful, in General Johnston's opinion, to justify the risk of losing the army.
General Johnston posted his army on the west and north-west of Resaca, the left resting on the Oostanawla below, the right extending to the Connesauga above the town. It remained in this position until midnight of the 15th. There was skirmish- ing, and occasionally a battle, at different points of the line, usually with heavy loss to the enemy, whose repeated assaults were invariably repelled. On the 15th it was ascertained that the right of the Federal army was crossing the Oostanawla near Calhoun. In consequence of the danger to his line of commu- nications, Johnston regarded the continued occupation of Re- saca as too hazardous. The army was therefore ordered to cross the river about midnight of the 15th. Lieutenant-general Polk,
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from the Department of Mississippi, had been ordered to join the Army of Tennessee with all his infantry. He arrived at Resaca with Loring's division-Canty's having preceded him a day or two-in time to hold in check the Federal army in its ad- vance on Resaca from Snake Creek Gap until the troops from Dalton could occupy the positions assigned them.
In his Narrative, General Johnston makes the following expla- nation in regard to his conduct of the campaign:
"The disposition of the Confederate army about Dalton was predicated on the belief that the Federal General would attack it there with his whole force. For that reason its entire strength was concentrated there, and the protection of its communica- tions left to Lieutenant-general Polk's troops, then on their way from Alabama through Rome to join us. I supposed from Gen- eral Sherman's great superiority of numbers that he intended to decide the contest by a battle, and that he would make that bat- tle as near his own and as far from our base as possible-that is to say, at Dalton. On general principles that was his true pol- icy. It is evident that he did not so act, because he thought as I did, that in the event of his assailing us, the chances would have been very strong in our favor.
" My own operations then and subsequently were determined by the relative forces of the armies, and a higher estimate of the Northern soldiers than our Southern editors and politicians were accustomed to express, or even the Administration seemed to entertain. . .. . It was not to be supposed that such troops, under a sagacious and resolute leader, and covered by intrench- ments, were to be beaten by greatly inferior numbers. I there- fore thought it our policy to stand on the defensive, to spare the blood of our soldiers by fighting under cover habitually, and to attack only when bad position or division of the enemy's forces might give us advantages counterbalancing that of superior numbers. So we held every position occupied until our com- munications were strongly threatened, then fell back only far enough to secure them, watching for opportunities to attack, keeping near enough to the Federal army to assure the Confed- erate Administration that Sherman could not send reenforce- ments to Grant, and hoping to reduce the odds against us by partial engagements. A material reduction of the Federal army might also be reasonably expected before the end of June by
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the expiration of the terms of service of the regiments that had not reënlisted. I was confident, too, that the Administration would see the expediency of employing Forrest and his cavalry to break the enemy's railroad communications, by which he could have been defeated." *
As no good position could be found near Calhoun or Adairs- ville, the army moved on to Cassville. At Adairsville the main body of the enemy divided-one column taking the direct road to Cassville, the other following the railroad to Kingston. Gen- eral Johnston hoped to engage and defeat one of these columns before it could receive aid from the other. He was joined near Adairsville by Jackson's division of cavalry from Mississippi, and at Cassville by French's division of Polk's corps.
On the 19th of May dispositions were made to attack the column of the enemy marching on the direct road from Adairs- ville; but an unfortunate loss of time in the movements of one of his corps, according to General Johnston's account, made it impracticable to carry out the plan, and the opportunity was lost. The army was then placed in position on a ridge south of Cass- ville to meet the reunited Federal forces, which came up during the afternoon and opened an artillery fire on the right and cen- ter of the Confederate line, which was continued until night. After dark General Johnston was informed by the corps com- manders on the right and in the center that they would be una- ble to hold their positions the next day, owing to the fact that they were exposed to an enfilade fire of artillery from the ene- my's left. He thought the position "the best I [he] saw occu- pied during the war."f They claim to have said that "whilst our position was as good as we could desire to move forward from and engage the enemy in pitched battle, the line we held was unsuited for defense; and if he did not intend to assume the offensive the next morning, we would advise him to change his position." # The army, in consequence, moved before day-break, and crossed the Etowah River about noon. Johnston places his total loss from the opening of the campaign to the passage of the Etowah at four hundred and forty-five killed, twenty-nine hundred and forty-three wounded.
On the 23d the Federal troops crossed the Etowah by the
* Johnston's Narrative, pages 317, 318. tIbid., page 322. "Advance and Retreat," page 106
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