USA > West Virginia > Randolph County > The history of Randolph County, West Virginia. From its earliest settlement to the present, embracing records of all the leading families, reminiscences and traditions > Part 16
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In these orders sent out General Lee expressed a desire to be kept in- formed of the success attending the call for volunteers. Replies soon be- gan to arrive at Richmond, and they were uniformly discouraging to Gen- eral Lee. It was early apparent that the people of Western Virginia were not enthusiastic in taking up arms for the Southern Confederacy. Major Boykin wrote General Lee that the call for volunteers was not meeting with success. To this letter General Lee replied on May 11, and urged Major Boykin to persevere and call out the companies for such counties as were not so hostile to the South, and to concentrate them at Grafton. He stated that four hundred rifles had been forwarded from Staunton to Beverly, in Randolph County, where Major Goff would receive and hold them until further orders. Major Boykin requested that companies from other parts of the State be sent to Grafton to take the places of companies which had been counted upon to organize in that vicinity, but which had failed to ma- terialize. To this suggestion General Lee replied that he did not consider it advisable to do so, as the presence of outside companies at Grafton would tend to irritate the people instead of conciliating them.
On May 16 Colonel Porterfield had arrived at Grafton and had taken a hasty survey of the situation, and his conclusion was that the cause of the Southern Confederacy in that vicinity was not promising. On that day he made a report to R. S. Garnett, at Richmond, Adjutant General of the Vir- ginia army, and stated that the rifles ordered to Beverly from Staunton had not arrived, nor had they been heard from. It appears from this report that no volunteers had yet assembled at Grafton, but Colonel Porterfield said a company was organizing at Pruntytown, in Taylor County; one at Weston, under Captain Boggess; one at Philippi, another at Clarksburg, and still another at Fairmont. Only two of these companies had guns, flint- locks, and no ammunition. At that time all of those companies had been ordered to Grafton. Colonel Porterfield said, in a tone of discouragement, that those troops, alinost destitute of guns and ammunition, were all he had
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to depend upon, and he considered the foree very weak compared with the strength of those in that vieinity who were prepared to oppose him. He complained that he had found much diversity of opinion and "rebellion " among the people, who did not believe that the State was strong enough to eontend against the Government. " I am, too, eredibly informed," said he, "to entertain doubt that they have been and will be supplied with the
means of resistance. * * * * Their efforts to intimidate have had their effeet, both to dishearten one party and to encourage the other. Many good citizens have been dispirited, while traitors have seized the guns and am- munition of the State to be used against its authority. The foree in this section will need the best rifles. There will not be the same use for the bayonet in these hills as elsewhere, and the movements should be of light infantry and rifle, although the bayonet, of course, would be desirable."
About this time, that is near the middle of May, 1861, General Lee ordered one thousand muskets sent to Beverly for the use of the volunteer companies organizing to the northward of that plaee. Colonel Heck was sent in charge of the guns, and General Lee instrueted him to call out all the volunteers possible along the route from Staunton to Beverly. If the authorities at Richmond had learned by the middle of May that Western Virginia was not to be depended upon for filling with volunteers the ranks of the Southern armies, the truth was still more apparent six weeks later. By that time General Garnett had erossed the Alleghanies in person, and had brought a large force of Confederate troops with him and was en- trenehed at Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain, in Randolph County. It had been claimed that volunteers had not joined the Confederate standard be- eause they were afraid to do so in the face of the stronger Union companies organizing in the vicinity, but that if a Confederate army were in the eoun- try to overawe the advocates of the Union eause then large numbers of recruits would organize to help the South. Thus Garnett marched over the Alleghanies and ealled for volunteers. The result was deeply mortifying to liim as well as discouraging to the authorities at Richmond. On June 25, 1861, he wrote to General Lee, dating his letter at Laurel Hill. He complained that he could not find out what the movements of the Union forces were likely to be, and added that the Union men in that vieinity were much more active, numerous and zealous than the secessionists. He said it was like carrying on a campaign in a foreign country, as the people were nearly all against him, and never missed an opportunity to divulge his movements to MeClellan, but would give him no information of what MeClel- lan was doing. "My hope," he wrote to Lee, "of increasing my force in this region has so far been sadly disappointed. Only eight men have joined me here, and only fifteen at Colonel Heck's eamp-not enough to make up my losses by discharges. The people are thoroughly imbued with an igno- rant and bigoted Union sentiment."
If more time was required to aseertain the sentiment in the Kanawha Val- ley than had been necessary in the northern and eastern part of the State, it was nevertheless seen in due time that the Southern Confederaey's supporters ers in that quarter were in a hopeless minority. General Henry A. Wise, ex Governor of Virginia, had been sent into the Kanawha Valley early in 1861 to organize such forees as could be mustered for the Southern army. He was one of the most fiery leaders in the Southern Confederacy, and an able man, and of great influenee. He had, perhaps, done more than any other
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man in Virginia to swing that State into the Southern Confederacy, He it was who, when the Ordinance of Secession was in the balance in the Rich- mond Convention, rose in the convention, drew a horse-pistol from his bosom, placed it upon the desk before him, and proceeded to make one of the most impassioned speeches heard in that tumultuous convention. The effect of his speech was tremendous, and Virginia wheeled into line with the other Confederate States. General Wise hurried to the field, and was soon in the thick of the fight in the Kanawha Valley. He failed to organize an army there, and in his disappointment and anger he wrote to General Lee, August 1, 1861, saying: "The Kanawha Valley is wholly disaffected and traitorous. It was gone from Charleston to Point Pleasant before I got there .. Boone and Cabell are nearly as bad, and the state of things in Braxton, Nicholas and part of Greenbrier is awful. The militia are nothing for warlike uses here. They are worthless who are true, and there is no telling who is true. You cannot persuade these people that Virginia can or will reconquer the northwest, and they are submitting, subdued and de- based." General Wise made an urgent request for more guns, ammunition and clothing,
While the Confederates were doing their utmost to organize and equip forces in Western Virginia, and were meeting discouragements and failure nearly everywhere, the people who upheld the Union were also at work, and success was the rule and failure almost unknown. As soon as the fact was realized that Virginia had joined the Southern Confederacy; had seized upon the government arsenals and other property within the State, and had commenced war upon the government, and was preparing to continue the hostilities, the people of Western Virginia, who had long suffered from the injustice and oppression of the eastern part of the State, began to pre- pare for war. They did not long halt between two opinions, but at once espoused the cause of the United States. Companies were organized every- where. The spirit with which the cause of the Union was upheld was one of the most discouraging features of the situation, as viewed by the Con- federates who were vainly trying to raise troops in this part of the State. The people in the Kanawha Valley who told General Wise that they did not believe Virginia could re-conquer Western Virginia had reasons for their conclusions. The people along the Ohio, the Kanawha, the Monongahela; in the interior, among the mountains, were everywhere drilling and arming.
There was some delay and disappointment in securing arms for the Union troops as they were organized in West Virginia. Early in the war, while there was yet hope entertained by some that the trouble could be ad- justed without much fighting, there was hesitation on the part of the Gov- ernment about sending guns into Virginia to arm one class of the people. Consequently some of the first arms received in Western Virginia did not come directly from the Government arsenals, but were sent from Massa- chusetts. As early as May 7, 1861, a shipment of two thousand stands of arms was made from the Watervleit arsenal, New York, to the northern Panhandle of West Virginia, above Wheeling. These guns armed some of the first soldiers from West Virginia that took the field. An effort had been made to obtain arms from Pittsburg, but it was unsuccessful. Campbell Tarr, of Brooke County, and others, went to Washington as a committee, and it was through their efforts that the guns were obtained. The govern- ment officials were very cautious at that time lest they should do something without express warranty in law. But Edwin M. Stanton advised that the 9
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guns be sent, promising that he would find the law for it afterwards. Gov- ernor Pierpont had written to President Lincoln for help, and the reply had been that all help that could be given under the constitution would be furnished.
The Civil War opened in West Virginia by a conflict between the Con- federate forces in the State and the Federal forces sent against them. The first Union troops to advance came from Wheeling and beyond the Ohio River. Colonel Benjamin F. Kelley organized a force at Wheeling, and was instructed to obey orders from General Mcclellan, then at Cincinnati.
The first order from Mcclellan to Kelley was that he should fortify the hills about Wheeling. This was on May 26, 1861. This appears to have been thought necessary as a precaution against an advance on the part of the Confederates, but Mcclellan did not know how weak they were in West Virginia at that time. Colonel Porterfield could not get together men and ammunition enough to encourage him to hold Grafton, much less to advance to the Ohio River. It is true that on the day that Virginia passed the Ordi- nance of Secession Governor Letcher made an effort to hold Wheeling, but it signally failed. He wrote to Mayor Sweeney, of that city, to seize the postoffice, the custom house, and all government property in that city, hold them in the name of the State of Virginia. Mayor Sweeney replied: "I have seized upon the custom house, the postoffice and all public buildings and documents, in the name of Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, whose property they are."
Colonel Kelley, when he received the order to fortify the hills about Wheeling, replied that he did not believe such a step was necessary, but that the proper thing to do was to advance to Grafton and drive the Con- federates out of the country. McClellan accepted the suggestion, and ordered Kelley to move to Grafton with the force under his orders. These troops had enlisted at Wheeling and had been drilled for service. They were armed with guns sent from Massachusetts. They carried their am- munition in their pockets, as they had not yet been fully equipped with the accoutrements of war. They were full of enthusiasm, and were much grat- ified when the orders came for an advance. The agent of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Wheeling refused to furnish cars for the troops, giving as his reason that the railroad would remain neutral. Colonel Kelley an- nounced that if the cars were not ready by four o'clock next morning he would seize them by force, and take military possession of the railroad. The cars were ready at four the next morning .* While Kelley's troops were setting out from Wheeling an independent movement was in progress at Morgantown to drive the Confederates out of Grafton. A number of companies had been organized on the Monongahela, and they assembled at Morgantown, where they were joined by three companies from Pennsyl- vania, and were about to set out for Grafton on their own responsibility, when they learned that Colonel Kelley had already advanced from Wheel- ing, and that the Confederates had retreated. Colonel Porterfield learned of the advance from Wheeling and saw that he would be attacked before his looked-for reinforcements and arms could arrive. The poorly-equipped force under his command were unable to successfully resist an attack, and he prepared to retreat southward. He ordered two railroad bridges burned,
* " Loyal West Virginia," by T. F. Lang,
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between Fairmont and Mannington, hoping thereby to delay the arrival of the Wheeling troops.
At daybreak on May 27 Colonel Kelley's troops left Wheeling on board the cars for Grafton. When they reached Mannington they stopped long enough to rebuild the burnt bridges, which delayed them only a short time. While there Kelley received a telegram from McClellan informing him that troops from Ohio and Indiana were on their way to his assistance. When the Wheeling troops reached Grafton the town had been deserted by the Confederates, who had retreated to Philippi, about twenty-five miles south of Grafton. Colonel Kelley at once planned pursuit. On June 1 a consid- erable number of soldiers from Ohio and Indiana had arrived. Colonel R. H. Milroy, Colonel Irvine and General Thomas A. Morris were in command of the troops from beyond the Ohio, They were the van of General McClel- lan's advance into West Virginia. When General Morris arrived at Grafton he assumed command of all the forces in that vicinity, Colonel Kelley's plan of pursuit of Colonel Porterfield was laid before General Morris and was approved by him, and preparations were immediately commenced for carrying it into execution. It appears that Colonel Porterfield did not ex- pect pursuit. He had established his camp at Philippi and was waiting for reinforcements and supplies, which failed to arrive. Since assuming com- mand of the Confederate forces in West Virginia he had met one diappoint- ment after another. His force at Philippi was stated at the time to number two thousand, but it was little more than half so large. General Morris and Colonel Kelley prepared to attack him with three thousand men, ad- vancing at night by two routes to fall upon him by surprise.
Colonel Kelley was to march about six miles east from Grafton on the morning of June 2, and from that point march across the mountains during the afternoon and night, and so regulate his movements as to reach Philippi at four o'clock the next morning. Colonel Dumont, who had charge of the other column, was ordered to repair to Webster, a small town on the Park- ersburg branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, four miles west from Grafton, and to march from that point toward Philippi, to appear before the town exactly at four o'clock on the morning of June 3. Colonel Kelley's task was the more difficult, for he followed roads that were very poor, Gen- eral Morris suspected that spies in and about Grafton would discover the movement and would carry the news to Colonel Porterfield at Philippi, and that he would hurriedly retreat, either toward Beverly or eastward to St. George, on Cheat River. Colonel Kelley was therefore ordered, in case he received positive intelligence that Porterfield had retreated eastward, to follow as fast as possible and endeavor to intercept him; at the same time he was to notify Colonel Dumont of the retreat and of the movement to in- tercept the Confederates.
Colonel Kelley left Grafton in the early morning. It was generally supposed he was on his way to Harper's Ferry. Colonel Dumont's column left Grafton after dark on the evening of June 2. The march that night was through rain and in pitch darkness. This delayed Dumont's division, and it seemed that it would not be able to reach Philippi by the appointed time, but the men marched the last five miles in an hour and a quarter, and so well was everything managed that Kelley's and Dumont's forces arrived before Philippi within fifteen minutes of each other. The Confederates had not learned of the advance and were off their guard. The pickets fired a few shots and fled. The Union artillery opened on the camp and the utmost
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confusion prevailed. Colonel Porterfield ordered a retreat, and succeeded in saving the most of his men, but lost a considerable portion of the small supply of arms he had. He abandoned his camp and stores. This action was called the "Philippi Races," because of the haste with which the Coll- federates fled and the Union forces pursued. Colonel Kelley, while leading the pursuit, was shot through the breast and was supposed to be mortally wounded, but he subsequently recovered and took an active part in the war until its close.
General Mcclellan, who had not yet crossed the Ohio, was much encouraged by this victory, small as it appears in comparison with the mo- mentous events later in the war. The Union people of West Virginia were also much encouraged, and the Confederates were correspondingly depressed.
Colonel Porterfield's cup of disappointment was full when, five days after his retreat from Philippi, he learned that he had been superseded by General Robert S. Garnett, who was on his way from Richmond to assume command of the Confederate forces in West Virginia. Colonel Porterfield had retreated to Huttonsville, in Randolph County, above Beverly, and there turned his command over to his successor. A court of inquiry was held to examine Colonel Porterfield's conduct. He was censured by the Richmond people who had sent him into West Virginia, had neglected him, had failed to supply him with arms or the adequate means of defense, and when he suffered defcat, they threw the blame on him when the most of it belonged to themselves. Little more than one month elapsed from that time before the Confederate authorities had occasion to understand more fully the situation beyond the Alleghanies; and the general who took Colo- nel Porterfields place, with seven or eiglit times his force of men and arms, conducted a far more disastrous retreat, and was killed while bringing off his broken troops from a lost battle.
Previous to General Mcclellan's coming into West Virginia he issued a proclamation to the people, in which he stated the purpose of his coming, and why troops were about to be sent across the Ohio river. This procla- mation was written in Cincinnati, May 26, 1861, and sent by telegraph to Wheeling and Parkersburg, there to be printed and circulated. The people were told that the army was about to cross the Ohio as friends to all who were loyal to the Government of the United States; to prevent the destruc- tion of property by the rebels; to preserve order, to co-operate with loyal Virginians in their efforts to free the State from the Confederates, and to punish all attempts at insurrection among slaves, should they rise against their masters. This last statement was no doubt meant to allay the fears of many that as soon as a Union army was upon the soil there would be a slave insurrection, which, of all things, was most dreaded by those who lived among slaves. On the same day General Mcclellan issued an address to his soldiers, informing them that they were about to cross the Ohio, and acquainting them with the duties to be performed. He told them they were to act in concert with the loyal Virginians in putting down the rebellion. He enjoined the strictest discipline and warned them against interfering with the rights or property of the loyal Virginians. He called on them to show mercy to those captured in arms, for many of them were misguided. He stated that, when the Confederates had been driven from northwestern Virginia, the loyal people of that part of the State would be able to organize and arm, and would be competent to take care of themselves, and then the
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services of the troops from Ohio and Indiana would be no longer needed, and they could return to their homes. He little understood what the next four years would bring forth.
Three weeks had not elapsed after Colonel Porterfield retreated from Philippi before General Mcclellan saw that something more was necessary before Western Virginia would be pacified. The Confederates had been largely reinforced at Huttonsville, and had advanced northward within twelve miles of Philippi and had fortified their camp. Philippi was at that time occupied by General Morris, and a collision between his forces and those of the Confederates was likely to occur at any time. General McClellan thought it advisable to be nearer the scene of operations, and on June 22, 1861, he crossed the Ohio with his staff and proceeded to Graf- ton, where he established his headquarters. He had at this time about twenty thousand soldiers in West Virginia, stationed from Wheeling to Grafton, from Parkersburg to the same place, and in the country round about.
Colonel Porterfield was relieved of his command by General Garnett, June 14, 1861, and the military affairs of northwestern Virginia were looked after by Garnett in person. The Richmond Government and the Southern Confederacy had no intention of abandoning the country beyond the Alle- ghanies. On the contrary, it was resolved to hold it at all hazards; but subsequent events showed that the Confederates either greatly underesti- mated the strength of McClellan's army or greatly overestimated the strength of their own forces sent against him. Otherwise Garnett, with a force of only six thousand, would not have been pushed forward against the lines of an army of twenty thousand, and that, too, in a position so remote that Garnett was practically isolated from all assistance. Rein- forcements numbering about two thousand men were on the way from Staunton to Beverly at the time of Garnett's defeat, but had these troops reached him in time to be of service, he would still have had not half as large a force as that of Mcclellan opposed to him. Military men have severely criticised General Lee for what they regard as a blunder in thus sending an army to almost certain destruction, with little hope of perform- ing any service to the Confederacy.
Had the Confederates been able to hold the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- road, the disaster attending General Garnett's campaign would probably not have occurred. With that road in their hands, they could have thrown soldiers and supplies into Grafton and Clarksburg within ten hours from Harper's Ferry. They would thus have had quick communication with their base of supplies and an open way to fall back when compelled to do so. But they did not hold the Baltimore and Ohio Road, and their only practicable route into Western Virginia, north of the Kanawha, was by wagon roads across the Alleghanies, by way of the Valley of Virginia. This was a long and difficult route by which to transport supplies for an army; and in case that army was compelled to retreat, the line of retreat was lia- ble to be cut by the enemy, as it actually was in the case of Garnett.
On July 1, 1861, General Garnett had about four thousand five hundred men. The most of them were from Eastern Virginia and the States further south. . A considerable part of them were Georgians who had recently been stationed at Pensacola, Florida. Reinforcements were constantly arriving over the Alleghanies, and by July 10 he had six thousand men. He moved northward and westward from Beverly and fortified two points
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on Laurel Hill, one named Camp Rich Mountain, six miles west of Beverly, the other fifteen miles north by west, near Belington, in Barbour County. These positions were naturally strong, and their strength was increased by fortifications of logs and stones. They were only a few miles from the out- posts of Mcclellan's army. Had the Confederate positions been attacked only from the front it is probably that they could have held out a con- siderable time. But there was little in the way of flank movements, and when Mcclellan made his attack, it was by flanking. General Garnett was _ not a novice in the field. He had seen service in the Mexican War; had taken part in many of the hardest battles; had fought Indians three years on the Pacific Coast, and at the outbreak of the Civil War he was traveling in Europe. He hastened home; resigned his position in the United States Army and joined the Confederate Army, and was almost immediately sent into West Virginia to be sacrificed.
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