USA > West Virginia > Randolph County > The history of Randolph County, West Virginia. From its earliest settlement to the present, embracing records of all the leading families, reminiscences and traditions > Part 17
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While the Confederates were fortifying their positions in Randolph and Barbour Counties, the Union forces were not idle. On June 22 General McClellan crossed the Ohio River at Parkersburg. The next day at Graf- ton he issued two proclamations, one to the citizens of West Virginia, the other to his soldiers. To the citizens he gave assurance again that he came as a friend, to uphold the laws, to protect the law-abiding, and to punish those in rebellion against the Government. In the proclamation to his soldiers he told them that he had entered West Virginia to bring peace to the peaceable and the sword to the rebellious who were in arms, but mercy to disarmed rebels. He began to concentrate his forces for an attack on Garnett. He moved his headquarters to Buckhannon on July 2, to be near the center of operations. Clarksburg was his base of supplies, and he con- structed a telegraph line as he advanced, one of the first, if not the very first, military telegraph lines in America. From Buckhannon he could move in any desired direction by good roads. He had fortified posts at Webster, Clarksburg, Parkersburg and Grafton. Eight days later he had moved his headquarters to Middle Fork, between Buckhannon and Beverly, and in the meantime his forces had made a general advance. He was now within sight of the Confederate fortifications on Rich Mountain. General Morris, who was leading the advance against Laurel Hill, was also within sight of the Confederates. There had already been some skirmishing, and all believed that the time was near when a battle would be fought. Colonel John Pegram, with thirteen hundred Confederates, was in command at Rich Mountain; and at Laurel Hill General Garnett, with between four thousand and five thousand men, was in command. There were about six hundred more Confederates at various points within a few miles.
After examining the ground McClellan decided to make the first attack on the Rich Mountain works, but in order to divert attention from his real purpose, he ordered General Morris, who was in front of General Garnett's position, to bombard the Confederates at Laurel Hill. Accordingly shells were thrown in the direction of the Confederate works, some of which ex- ploded within the lines, but doing little damage. On the afternoon of July 10 General McClellan prepared to attack Pegram at Rich Mountain, but upon examination of the approaches he saw that an attack in front would probably be unsuccessful. The Confederate works were located one and a half miles west of the summit of Rich Mountain, where the Staunton and Parkersburg pike crosses. When the Union forces reached the open coun- try at Roaring Creek, a short distance west of the Confederate position,
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. Colonel Pegram planned an attack upon them, but upon mature reflection, abondoned it. There was a path leading from Roaring Creek across Rich Mountain to Beverly, north of the Confederate position, and Colonel Pegram guarded this path with troops under Colonel Scott, but he did not know that another path led across the mountain south of his position, by which McClellan could flank him. This path was left unguarded, and it was in- strumental in Pegram's defeat. General Rosecrans, who was in charge of one wing of the forces in front of the Confederate position, met a young man named David Hart, whose father lived one and a half miles in the rear of the Confederate fortifications, and he said he could pilot a force, by an obscure road, round the southern end of the Confederate lines and reach his father's farm, on the summit of the mountain, from which an attack on Colonel Pegram in the rear could be made. The young man was taken to General McClellan and consented to act as a guide. Thereupon General McClellan changed his plan from attacking in front to an attack in the rear. He moved a portion of his forces to the western base of Rich Mountain, ready to support the attack when made, and he then dispatched General Rosecrans, under the guidance of young Hart, by the circuitous route, to the rear of the Confederates. Rosecrans reached his destination and sent a messenger to inform General Mcclellan of the fact, and that all was in readiness for the attack. This messenger was captured by the Confeder- ates, and Pegram learned of the new danger which threatened him, while McClellan was left in doubt whether his troops had been able to reach the point for which they had started. Had it not been for this perhaps the fighting would have resulted in the capture of the Confederates.
Colonel Pegram, finding that he was to be attacked from the rear, sent three hundred and fifty men to the point of danger, at the top of the moun- tain, and built the best breastworks possible in the short time at his disposal. When Rosecrans advanced to the attack he was stubbornly resisted, and the fight continued two or three hours, and neither side could gain any ad- vantage. Pegram was sending up reinforcements to the mountain when the Union forces made a charge and swept the Confederates from the field. Colonel Pegram collected several companies and prepared to renew the fight. It was now late in the afternoon of July 11. The men were panic- stricken, but they moved forward, and were led around the mountain with- in musket range of the Union forces that had remained on the battle ground. But the Confederates became alarmed and fled without making an attack. Their forces were scattered over the mountain, and night was coming
on. Colonel Pegram saw that all was lost, and determined to make his way to Garnett's army, if possible, about fifteen miles distant, through the woods. He commenced collecting his men and sending them forward. It was after midnight when he left the camp and set forward with the last remnants of his men in an effort to reach the Confederate forces on Laurel Hill. The loss of the Confederates in the battle had been about forty-five killed and about twenty wounded. All their baggage and artillery fell into the hands of the Union army. Sixty-three Confederates were captured. Rosecrans lost twelve killed and forty-nine wounded.
The retreat from Rich Mountain was disastrous. The Confederates were eighteen hours in groping their way twelve miles through the woods in the direction of Garnett's camp. Near sunset on July 12 they reached the Tygart River, three miles from the Laurel Hill camp, and there learned from the citizens that Garnett had already retreated and that the Union
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forces were in pursuit. There seemed only one possible avenue of escape open for Pegram's force. That was a miserable road leading across the mountains into Pendleton County. Few persons lived near the road, and the outlook was that the men would starve to death if they attempted to make their way through. They were already starving. Accordingly, Col- onel Pegram that night sent a flag of truce to Beverly, offering to surren- der, and at the same time stating that his men were starving. Early the next morning General McClellan sent several wagon loads of bread to them, and met them on their way to Beverly. The number of prisoners surren- dered was thirty officers and five hundred and twenty-five men. The remainder of the force at Rich Mountain had been killed, wounded, cap- tured and scattered. Colonel Scott, who had been holding the path leading over the mountain north of the Confederate position, learned of the defeat of Pegram and he made good his retreat over the Alleghanies by way of Huttonsville.
It now remains to be told how General Garnett fared. The fact that he had posted the greater part of his army on Laurel Hill is proof that he expected the principal attack to be made on that place. He was for a time deceived by the bombardment directed against him, but he was undeceived when he learned that Colonel Pegram had been defeated, and that General McClellan had thrown troops across Rich Mountain and had successfully turned the flank of the Confederate position. All that was left for Garnett was to withdraw his army while there was yet time. His line of retreat was the pike from Beverly to Staunton, and the Union forces were pushing forward to occupy that and to cut him off in that direction. On the after- noon of July 12, 1861, Garnett retreated, hastening to reach Beverly in ad- vance of the Union forces. On the way he met fugitives from Pegram's army and was told by them that Mcclellan had already reached Beverly, and that the road in that direction was closed. Thereupon Garnett turned eastward into Tucker County, over a very rough road. General Morris pursued the retreating Confederates over the mountain to Cheat River, skirmishing on the way. General Garnett remained in the rear directing his skirmishers, and on July 14, at Corrick's Ford, where Parsons, the county seat of Tucker County, has since been located, he found that he could no longer avoid giving battle. With a few hundred men he opened fire on the advance of the pursuing army and checked the pursuit. But in bringing off his skirmishers from behind a pile of driftwood, Garnett was killed and his men were seized with panic and fled, leaving his body on the field, with a score or more of dead.
When it was found that the Confederates were retreating eastward Federal troops from Grafton, Rowlesburg and other points on the Balti- more and Ohio Railroad were ordered to cut off the retreat at St. George, in Tucker County. But the troops could not be concentrated in time, and the concentration was made at Oakland, in Maryland, with the expectation of intercepting the retreating Confederates at Red House, eight miles west of Oakland.
Up to the time of the fight at Corrick's Ford the retreat had been orderly, but after that it became a rout. The roads were narrow and rough, and the excessive rains had rendered them almost impassible. Wagons and stores were abandoned, and when Horse Shoe Run, a long and narrow defile leading to the Red House, in Maryland, was reached inform- ation was received that Union troops from Rowlesburg and Oakland were
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at the Red House, cutting off retreat in that direction. The artillery was sent to the front. A portion of the cavalry was piloted by a mountaineer along a narrow path across the Backbone and Alleghany Mountains. The main body continued its retreat to the Red House, and pursued its way un- molested across the Alleghanies to Monterey. Two regiments marching in haste to reinforce Garnett at Laurel Hill had reached Monterey when news of Garnett's retreat was received. The regiments halted there, and as Garnett's stragglers came in they were re-organized. .
The Union army made no pursuit beyond Corrick's Ford, except that detachments followed to the Red House to pick up the stores abandoned by the Confederates. Garnett's body fell into the hands of the Union forces and was prepared for burial and sent to Richmond. It was carried in a canoe to Rowlesburg, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, thirty miles be- low, on Cheat River, in charge of Whitelaw Reid, who had taken part in the battle at Corrick's Ford. Reid was acting in the double capacity of cor- respondent for the Cincinnati Gazette and an aid on the staff of General Mor- ris. When Rowlesburg was reached Garnett's body was sent by express to Governor Letcher, at Richmond.
This closed the campaign in that part of West Virginia for 1861. The Confederates had failed to hold the country. On July 22 General Mcclellan was transferred to Washington to take charge of military operations there. In comparison with the greater battles and more extensive campaign later in the war, the affairs in West Virginia were small. But they were of great importance at the time. Had the result been different, had the Confeder- ates held their ground at Grafton, Philippi, Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill, and had the Union forces been driven out of the State, across the Ohio, the outcome would have changed the history of the war, but probably not the result.
CHAPTER XVI.
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PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
After Garnett's retreat in July, 1861, there were few Confederates in West Virginia, west of the Alleghanies, except in the Kanawha Valley. But the Government at Richmond and the Confederate Government were not inclined to give up so easily the part of Virginia west of the mountains, and in a short time preparations were made to send an army from the east to re-conquer the territory beyond the Alleghanies. A large part of the army with which Mcclellan had defeated Garnett had been sent to other fields; the terms of enlistment of many of the soldiers had expired. When the Confederates re-crossed the mountains late in the summer of 1861 they were opposed by less than ten thousand Federals stationed in that moun- tainous part of West Virginia about the sources of the Greenbrier, the Tygart Valley River, Cheat, and near the source of the Potomac. In that elevated and rugged region a remarkable campaign was made. It was not remarkable because of hard fighting, for there was no pitched battle; but because in this campaign the Confederates were checked in their purpose of re-conquering the ground lost by Garnett and of extending their con- quest north and west. This campaign has also an historical interest because it was General Lee's first work in the field after he had been assigned the command of Virginia's land and sea forces. The outcome of the campaign was not what might be expected of a great and calculating general as Lee was. Although he had a larger army than his opponents in the field, and had at least as good ground, and although he was able to hold his own at every skirmish, yet, as the campaign progressed he constantly fell back. In September he fought at Elkwater and Cheat Mountain, in Randolph County; in October he fought at Greenbrier river, having fallen back from his first position. In December he had fallen back to the summit of the Alleghanies, and fought a battle there. It should be stated, however, that General Lee, although in command of the army, took part in person only in the skirmishing in Randolph County. The importance of this cam- paign entitles it to mention somewhat more in detail.
General Reynolds succeeded General Mcclellan in command of this part of West Virginia. He advanced from Beverly to Huttonsville, a few miles above, and remained in peaceful possession of the country two months after Garnett's retreat, except that his scouting parties were con- stantly annoyed by Confederate irregulars, or guerrillas, usually called bushwhackers. Their mode of attack was, to lie concealed on the summits of cliffs, overhanging the roads or in thickets on the hillsides, and fire upon the Union soldiers passing below. They were justly dreaded by the Union troops. These bushwhackers were usually citizens of that district who had
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taken to the woods after their well-known southern sympathies had ren- dered it unsafe or unpleasant to remain at home while the country was occupied by the Union armies. They were excellent marksmen, minutely acquainted with all the ins and outs of the mountains and woods; and, from their manner of attack and flight, it was seldom that they were captured or killed. They hid about the outposts of the Union armies; picked off senti- nels; wayland scouts; ambushed small detachments, and fled to their moun- tain fastnesses where pursuit was out of the question. A war is considered severe in loss of life in which each soldier, taken as an average, kills one soldier on the other side, even though the war is prolonged for years. Yet, these bushwhackers often killed a dozen or more each, before being themselves killed. It can be readily understood why small detachments dreaded bushwhackers more than Confederate troops in pitched battle. Nor did the bushwhackers confine their attacks to small parties. They often fired into the ranks of armies on the march with deadly effect. While in the mountains of West Virginia General Averell's cavalry often suffered severely from these hidden guerrillas who fired and vanished. The bush- whacking was not always done by Confederates. Union soldiers or sympa- thizers resorted to it also at times.
General Reynolds, with headquarters at Beverly, spent the summer of 1861 in strengthening his position, and in attempting to clear the country of guerrillas. Early in September he received information that large num- bers of Confederates were crossing the Alleghanies. General Loring established himself at Huntersville, in Pocahontas County, with 8500 men. He it was who had tried in vain to raise recruits in West Virginia for the Confederacy, even attempting to gain a foothold in Wheeling before McClellan's army crossed the Ohio River. He had gone to Richmond, and early in September had returned with an army. General H. R. Jackson was in command of another Confederate force of 6000 at Greenbrier River where the pike from Beverly to Staunton crosses that stream, in Pocahontas County. General Robert E. Lee was sent by the Government at Richmond to take command of both these armies, and he lost no time in doing so. No order sending General Lee into West Virginia has ever been found among the records of the Confederate Government. It was probably a verbal order, or he may have gone without any order. He concentrated his force at Big Spring, on Valley Mountain, and prepared to march north to the Baltimore and Ohio Road at Grafton. His design was nothing less than to drive the Union army out of northwestern Virginia. When the matter is viewed in the light of subsequent history, it is to be wondered at that General Lee did not succeed in his purpose. He had 14500 men, and only 9000 were opposed to him. Had he defeated General Reynolds; driven his army back; occupied Grafton, Clarksburg and other towns, it can be readily seen that the seat of war might have been changed to West Virginia. The United States Government would have sent an army to oppose Lee; and the Confederate Government would have pushed strong reinforcements across the mountains; and some of the great battles of the war might have been fought on the Monongahela river. The campaign in the fall of 1861, about the head waters of the principle rivers of West Virginia, therefore, derives its chief interest, not from battles, but from the accomplishment of a great purpose-the driving back of the Confederates-without a pitched battle. Virginia, as a State, made no determined effort after that to hold Western Virginia. By that time the campaign in the Kanawha Valley was
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drawing to a close and theConfederates were retiring. Consequently, Vir- ginia's and the Southern Confederacy's efforts west of the Alleghanies in this State were defeated in the fall of 1861.
General Reynolds sent a regiment to Elkwater, and soon afterwards occupied Cheat Mountain. This point was the highest camp occupied by soldiers during the war. The celebrated "Battle Above the Clouds," on Lookout Mountain, was not one-half so high. The whole region, including parts of Pocahontas, Pendleton and Randolph Counties, has an elevation above three thousand feet, while the summits of the knobs and ridges rise to heights of more than four thousand, and some nearly five thousand feet. General Reynolds fortified his two advanced positions, Elkwater and Cheat Mountain. They were seven miles apart, connected by only a bridle path, but a circuitous wagon road, eighteen miles long, led from one to the other, passing around in the direction of Huttonsville. No sooner had the United States troops established themselves at Elkwater and Cheat Mountain than General Lee advanced, and skirmishing began. The Confederates threw a force between Elkwater and Cheat Mountain, and posted another force on the road in the direction of Huttonsville. They were attacked, and for three days there was skirmishing, but no general engagement. On Sep- tember 13 Colonel John A. Washington, in the Confederate service, was killed near Elkwater. He was a relative of President Washington, and also a relative General R. E. Lee, whose family and the Washingtons were closely connected. General Lee sent a flag of truce and asked for the body. It was sent to the Confederate lines on September 14. That day the Con- federates concentrated ten miles from Elkwater, and the next day again advanced, this time threatening Cheat Mountain, but their attack was un- successful. In tliis series of skirmishes the Union forces had lost nine killed, fifteen wounded and about sixty prisoners. The result was a defeat for the Confederates, who were thwarted in their design of penetrating northward and westward. The failure of the Confederates to bring on a battle was due to their different detachments not acting in concert. It was Lee's plan to attack both positions at the same time. He sent detachments against Elkwater and Cheat Mountain. The sound of cannon attacking one position was to be the signal for attacking the other. The troops marched in rain and mud, along paths and in the woods, and when they found them selves in front of the Federal position, the detachment which was to have begun the attack failed to do so. The other detachment waited in vain for the signal, and then retreated. General Lee was much hurt by the failure of his plan. *
General Loring's army of 8,500, which was camped at Huntersville, in Pocahontas County, was sent to that place for a particular purpose. He was to sweep round toward the west, then march north toward Weston and Clarksburg, strike the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and by threatening or cutting off General Reynolds' line of communication with his base of sup- plies, compel him to fall back. This plan was General Lee's. He left its execution to General Loring, who moved slowly, halted often, camped long, hesitated frequently, and consumed much valuable time. His men became sick. Rains made progress difficult, and he did not seem in a hurry to get along. General Lee waited but Loring still failed to march. He was an older officer than Lee, and although Lee had a right to order him forward,
* See H. A. White's Life of Robert E. Lee.
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he refrained from doing so for fear of wounding Loring's feelings. The time for executing the movement passed, and the flank movement, which probably would have succeeded, was given up.
The Confederates were not yet willing to abandon West Virginia. They fell back to the Greenbrier River, thirteen miles from the Union camp, on Cheat Mountain, and fortified their position. They were commanded by General H. R. Jackson, and their number was believed to be about nine thousand. On October 3, 1861, General Reynolds advanced at the head of five thousand troops. During the first part of the engagement the Union forces were successful, driving the Confederates nearly a mile, but here several batteries of artillery were encountered, and reinforcements arriving to the support of the Confederates, the battle was renewed and General Reynolds was forced to fall back, with a loss of nine killed and thirty-five wounded. On December 10 General Reynolds was transferred to other fields, and the command of the Union forces in the Cheat Mountain district was given to General R. H. Milroy. Within three days after he assumed command he moved forward to attack the Confederate camp on the summit of the Alleghanies. The Confederates had gone into winter quarters there; and as the weather was severe, and as the Union forces appeared satisfied to hold what they had without attempting any additional conquests in mid- winter, the Confederates were not expecting an attack. However, on December 13, 1861, General Milroy moved forward and assaulted their posi- tion. The fighting was severe for several hours, and finally resulted in the retreat of the Union forces. The Confederates made no attempt to follow. General Milroy marched to Huntersville, in Pocahontas county. and went into winter quarters. The Rebels remained on the summit of the Allegha- nies till spring and then went over the mountains, out of West Virginia, thus ending the attempt to re-conquer northwestern Virginia.
It now remains to be seen what success attended the efforts of the Con- federates to gain control of the Kanawha Valley. Their campaign in West Virginia for the year 1861 was divided into two parts, in the northwest and in the Kanawha Valley. General Henry A. Wise was ordered to the Kana- wha June 6, two days before General Garnett was ordered to take command of the troops which had been driven south from Grafton. Colonel Tomp- kins was already on the Kanawha in charge of Confederate forces. The authorities at Richmond at that time believed that a General, with the nucleus of an army in the Kanawha Valley, could raise all the troops neces- sary among the people there. On April 29 General Lee had ordered Major John McCausland to the Kanawha to organize companies for the Confed- eracy. Only five hundred flint-lock muskets could be had at that time to arm the troops in that quarter. General Lee suggested that the valley could be held by posting the force below Charleston. Very poor success attended the efforts at raising volunteers, and the arms found in the district were insufficient to equip the men. Supplies were sent as soon as possible from Virginia.
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