USA > Illinois > The era of the Civil War, 1848-1870 > Part 15
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and John Wentworth, Richard Yates and John M. Palmer led valiant charges on the "Buchaneers."
The republicans made effective use of the story of " bleeding Kansas." Illinois followed developments there with tense interest. The state contributed thousands of emigrants to the battle-ground of popular sovereignty, who either brought back in person livid tales of the outrages committed by the border ruffians, or kept their relatives and former neighbors informed through written communications. The republican newspapers eagerly garnered all fresh details while campaign orators equipped themselves with the "tyrannical laws of the bogus territorial legislature," and cudgelled their opponents, the "nigger-drivers," into silence or apology.60
The drive and energy of the republicans astounded their opponents. Huge parades and processions with gay banners and gorgeous floats preceded the meetings. At Peoria thirty- one young women dressed in white with wreaths of flowers about their brows, with one in mourning garb to represent Kansas, were embarked on a boat, drawn by eight splendid white horses; it was "The Constitution," "bound for the White House." 61 This device was adopted all over the state; often the young women were led by one more beautiful and splendidly attired than the rest to represent "the queen of hearts," the "adored Jessie," dashing wife of Colonel Fre- mont. Free dinners and barbecues, widely advertised in staring posters, drew together crowds of thousands; the roar of artillery, the fluttering of banners, and the melody of bands of wind and stringed instruments, aided in attaching the sturdy yeomanry of the Illinois prairies to the republican cause.
Northern Illinois with its Yankee prejudices became the base of the republicans. Egypt was the stronghold of the "unterrified " democracy, who shouted for " Buck and Breck; " only along the Mississippi, in the counties of Madison, St. Clair, Monroe, Randolph, Clinton, and Perry, where the German vote was strong, did the work of the Bloomington and
60 A. H. Herndon to Trumbull, June 16, 1856, Trumbull manuscripts; Illi- nois State Register, September 13, 20, 1855.
61 Rushville Times, September 26, 1856; Chicago Daily Democratic Press, October 11, 1856.
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Philadelphia conventions find supporters.62 The central section where old time whigs and Americans were numerous and an uncertain political quantity, was disputed territory. The anti- slavery whigs, led by Lincoln, Yates, Conkling, Browning, and others, had joined the anti-Nebraska cause. But many old Clay whigs of southern antecedents felt a strong impulse to affiliate with the democratic party as having the strongest claims to nationality. Don Morrison, E. B. Webb, Colonel Singleton, Robert S. Blackwell, and C. H. Constable were some of the leaders in this march into the open arms of the democracy.63
The know nothing situation provided a true political conun- drum. Although the national convention had brought out the American ticket in February, Illinois supporters hesitated before ratifying the nominations. Under the leadership of men like Joseph Gillespie of Madison county -who had, how- ever, been a signer of the Bloomington anti-Nebraska conven- tion 64- a state convention was held in May which drew up a state ticket and selected a group of Fillmore electors. The American nominee for governor was Colonel Archer, the anti- Nebraska whig candidate for congress in 1854 who had been defeated by one vote. Archer declined the nomination, declar- ing it folly for antislavery know nothings to throw away their strength on a third ticket, when the Nebraska know nothings were generally going for the Buchanan and Richardson ticket.65 Buckner S. Morris, an old-line whig, a southerner by birth and a slaveowner by marriage, was then brought out as the Fill- more candidate for governor. In the end the American move- ment courted by both parties and torn between the argument
82 Koerner, Memoirs, 2: 22-23 ; Parmenias Bond to Trumbull, June 28, 1856, Trumbull manuscripts.
63 Constable was made elector-at-large on the Buchanan ticket, though he was known as a nativist and as an anti-Nebraska man with bitter feelings toward Douglas and the "political incendiaries" whose "wicked ambition drove them rough shod over everything sacred to patriotism in the accomplish- ment of their selfish and factious designs." C. H. Constable to T. B. McClure, January 6, 1856, Belleville Advocate, August 20, 1856. Blackwell had been an anti-Nebraska whig candidate for congress in 1854. Rushville Times, June 27, 1856.
64 Ottawa Free Trader, May 24, 1856.
65 Rock River Democrat, June 3, 1856. Alfred M. Whitney, an elector from West Urbana, declined to serve for the same reason. Chicago Weekly Democrat, September 13, 1856.
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that a vote for Fillmore and Morris was either a vote for black republicanism or for the Buchaneers was stripped to its nucleus of old-line whigs and bitter-enders. 66
The republicans elected their candidates for congress from the four northern districts, while the democrats returned the other four. An interesting contest took place in the third dis- trict. Reverend Owen Lovejoy, the abolitionist, was nomi- nated by the republicans over Jesse O. Norton, the sitting member, and over other conservative candidates. Lovejoy had participated in fugitive slave rescues, and the circuit court records showed several suits against him for harboring run- away slaves; he was also said to be an uncompromising know nothing. The delegates from the southern and eastern por- tion of the district objected to Lovejoy's antecedents on the slavery question and accordingly decided to bolt the nomination and run a candidate of their own. A separate convention was held at Bloomington and T. L. Dickey of Ottawa nominated; he had the support of former whigs led by Churchill Coffing and Isaac Funk.67 Judge Dickey later decided to leave the field whereupon the democrats fell upon Lovejoy with the charges of the bolters and waged merciless war upon him. Much to their surprise, however, Lovejoy carried the district by six thousand.
These circumstances complicated the problem of the for- eign vote. The Irish controlled by the adroit politicians of their race, were generally firm in their democratic allegiance and strongly hostile to nativism. The Germans, like the Scan- dinavians, were, on the whole, anti-Nebraska but not clear as to the party alignment that this required.68 The word "demo- crat" was still magic to their ears, while charges of the know
66 B. S. Morris to B. D. Eastman et al., August 12, 1856, Illinois State Reg- ister, August 21, 1856. Canton Weekly Register, September 23, 1856. The lead- ing light in Illinois nativistic movements was W. W. Danenhower, editor of the Native Citizen, which came to be printed at the office of the Chicago Times. Danenhower encouraged by Douglas, started on an aggressive campaign in which he deplored the possible success of Fremont, the " sectional candidate."
67 Chicago Daily Democratic Press, July 19, 1856; Danville Independent clipped in Our Constitution, July 24, 1856; Joliet Signal, July 22, 1856.
68 On July 4, a Swedish paper, Den Svenska Republikanen I Norra Amerika, was started by the Bishop Hill colony at Galva to support Fremont and Dayton. It was the only Swedish journal in the west. Koerner to Trumbull, July 29, 1856, Trumbull manuscripts.
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nothingism of many republican nominees made them suspicious of a new attachment. Beset by arguments from both sides they usually followed the leadership of spokesmen like Gustave Koerner, Friedrich Hecker, Francis Hoffman, and George Schneider, who supported Fremont and Bissell. Koerner usu- ally declared himself still an old-line democrat, working for the original aim of democracy, opposition to slavery extension.
The fall elections generally seemed to point to the election of Buchanan, although uncertainty existed in the three-cornered fight. Interest in the outcome became more intense as Novem- ber fourth approached. When finally the votes were registered and counted, it seemed that Fremont had rolled up a vote in northern Illinois that must overwhelm the Egyptian democracy. 69
As the returns came in, however, Buchanan showed an unexpected strength in the southern districts, which smothered the republican majorities of the northern counties. Winnebago county was the banner republican county, Fremont having polled 89 per cent of the total vote; dominated by Rockford, where three republican newspapers flourished, it was a Yankee stronghold in the west. St. Clair was the lone star republican county in lower Egypt, where conservative democracy piled up powerful majorities for Buchanan. The republicans consoled themselves, however, that this stronghold of democracy was a true "land of darkness" with a monopoly on the illiteracy of the state. Republicanism failed primarily in being unable to draw off a sufficient number of the whig and American voters in the center of the state and in the military tract. It was felt, however, that Fremont had done nobly; the Illinois Journal declared that while it had not favored Fremont's nomination, the election had "proved it right." 70
The election was in one sense, moreover, a humiliating democratic defeat. Colonel Richardson and the state ticket went down before Bissell and his associates. Bissell had been a remarkably strong candidate. He was popular with every- one, with his former democratic associates, with the whigs,
69 Rockford Republican, November 6, 1856; Rock River Democrat, November 18, 1856.
70 Illinois State Journal, November 19, 1856.
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THE ERA OF THE CIVIL WAR
who had helped to send him to congress in 1852, with the foreigners, and with the nativists in spite of his Catholic faith. Northern and southern Illinois united to support his candidacy. The Southern Illinoisan upheld Bissell as a democrat of the Jeffersonian school along with the democratic national ticket; Egypt was urged to enlist on his side, rather than that of the "burly demagogue and sottish blackguard of the north," in order to show that its neck no longer yielded to the yoke of Douglas domination.71 Bissell, therefore, led the state ticket to victory with a plurality of nearly five thousand.
When the contest was finally decided and the governor-elect turned his attention to the problems of his administration, he found himself confronted by a democratic legislature opposed to republican policies. It was necessary for him in his inaug- ural address to begin the task of bringing this hostile majority to accept at least some of his measures. The problem was one not easily solved. Bissell had gone on record as opposed to slavery extension, was elected on that principle, and was bound to vindicate it; the charges that the republicans were largely know nothing had to be met by a liberal policy toward foreign born citizens, if the party was not to suffer from a loss of their vote as in the late election. Finally, the injustice of the existing division of electoral districts made it highly advisable to remind the legislature of its constitutional obligations to pass a law districting the state according to the population of the census of 1855. After long and serious consultations over portions of the message, these matters were agreed upon; the final wording left to Bissell " whose mastery of style was undis- puted." 72 The first republican state paper in Illinois was a challenge to the very existence of the weakening democracy.
71 Southern Illinoisan clipped in Belleville Advocate, July 9, August 20, 1856; Chicago Daily Democratic Press, October 14, 1865.
72 Koerner, Memoirs, 2: 37-38.
VII. THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES
T THE fruitage of the democratic victory in 1856 was a demand promulgated through the supreme court in the famous Dred Scott decision that the country at large accept the extreme southern doctrine-the right of slavery to go into the territories without restriction either from congress or from any other source. Here was a blow aimed not only at republican slavery restriction ground but also at negative action under the squatter sovereignty doctrine. The consequences of that decision were so serious that Dred Scott, the Negro slave, became a freedman and passed from view on the stage of his- tory long before Illinois politicians had evolved satisfactory solutions to the problems that were raised.
The republican journalists sought to cover party embar- rassment involved in this blow to their doctrine of congres- sional restriction by proclaiming the decision as an infamous attack upon the cause of freedom. "Where will the aggres- sions of slavery cease ? " asked the Illinois State Journal, March II, 1857. " Freedom and white men are no longer safe." "The infamous decision of the Dred Scott case, has aroused the whole North to a realization of the danger which our free institutions are subject to, at the hands of the slave power, and their adher- ents in the Supreme Court," commented the Aurora Beacon, March 6, 1857. "It now devolves upon the people," declared the Belleville Advocate, April 8, "to say whether they will submit to this revolution, or take their government into their own hands." Greater determination was conspicuous in all this comment; little consolation was sought in the fact that the blow had been struck in the form of what was clearly an extra- judicial opinion, "which even Judge McLean and Judge Curtis declined to recognize as authority." 1 Convinced that the decision was rendered "through political chicanry [sic] &
1 Illinois State Journal, March 25, 1857.
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fraud for corupt [sic] and political purposes,"2 they set to work with greater zeal and energy to fight the battles for republicanism.
Democrats received the decision with a silence that betrayed their bewilderment and uncertainty ; naturally inclined to resent the principles proclaimed, they hesitated to declare themselves in opposition to the president whom they had just placed in the executive office. Better to wait for a cue from some one who might discover an escape from the dilemma ; they awaited the return of Senator Douglas to secure the advice of the cham- pion of popular sovereignty. Meanwhile they sought to forget their own troubles by enjoying the discomfiture of their oppo- nents whom they accused of being repealers if not rebels ;8 they pointed out that the decision declared unconstitutional nearly every point sought to be accomplished by the republican party.
Upon invitation Douglas on June 12 addressed the grand jury at Springfield on the topics of the day. He declared his acceptance of the Dred Scott decision; it was now the law of the land and should be obeyed. He insisted, however, that the great principle of popular sovereignty and self-government was sustained and firmly established by the authority of this decision. The right to enter the territories with slaves, he explained, " necessarily remains a barren and worthless right, unless sustained, protected, and enforced by appropriate police regulations and local legislation, prescribing adequate reme- dies for its violation. These regulations and remedies must necessarily depend entirely upon the will and wishes of the people of the Territory, as they can only be prescribed by the locallegislatures."
Lincoln replied to Douglas in behalf of the republicans on June 26, also at Springfield. Suggesting that the merits of the case lay with the dissenting opinions of McLean and Curtis rather than with the decision of Chief Justice Taney, he de- clared that republicans had no intention of resisting the decision. They acknowledged that the decisions of the supreme court on constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control not only the particular cases decided but the general policy of the
2 T. P. Cowen to Trumbull, May 26, 1857, Trumbull manuscripts.
3 Ottawa Free Trader, March 14, April 18, 1858.
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country. More than this would be revolution. "But we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court that made it, has often over-ruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it over-rule this. We offer no resistance to it." Lincoln, however, claimed the right for his party to treat this decision, made by a divided court with strong evidence of a partisan bias, as not having yet established a settled doctrine for the country.4
Douglas playing on the natural disgust in the minds of nearly all white people at the idea of an indiscriminate amal- gamation of the white and black races had championed white supremacy. Lincoln asserted that the guarantees of the Dec- laration of Independence were intended to include the Negro and met Douglas' specious reasoning squarely: "I think the authors of that notable instrument meant to include all men, but they did not declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say that all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what respects they did consider all men created equal-equal with 'certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' This they said, and this [they] meant."
Senator Trumbull paid his respects to the Dred Scott de- cision in a speech which his supporters felt surpassed the efforts of Lincoln. Gustave Koerner regarded Lincoln's speech as "too much on the old conservative order;" Lincoln was "an excellent man, but no match to such impudent Jesuits & Sophists as Douglas." "Why D. nor the Democratic party ever sub- mitted to the principle decided by the Supreme court in the case of the national bank. He is a pretty fellow to talk about the sanctity of such decisions further than as regards the case decided." 5
The summer of 1857 was one of great uncertainty for both political parties. It was, moreover, not a year for important elections, and party lines were normally weak in local contests. The situation was one which would try even the most adroit politician who might be under the practical necessity of adjust-
4 Illinois State Journal, July 1, 1857.
5 Koerner to Trumbull, July 4, 1857, Trumbull manuscripts.
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ing his position to the will of the sovereign people. Lincoln and the republicans stood pat in their hostility to the principle of the Dred Scott decision; unless they did so the new party had been organized in vain. Their attention was centered on holding existing strength and on adding recruits from the dem- ocratic and know nothing ranks. The support of know nothing voters was encouraged by the nomination of moderate mem- bers who had never been elected to office by that party. An organized campaign sought to get democratic readers and sub- scribers for republican papers. C. D. Hay was instrumental in securing a thousand subscriptions in upper Egypt for the Chicago Tribune and the St. Louis Democrat; John G. Nicolay and others also added hundreds of subscriptions to antislavery papers.6
Douglas, however, was in a quandary; the previous elec- tion had revealed a restlessness on the part of his democratic constituency which the existing uncertainty could scarcely allay. Could the voters swallow the Dred Scott diet without result- ing nausea? Were they ready to follow him in any course save opposition to the democratic administration at Washing- ton? These were questions to which Douglas sought to find answers; they meant a serious summer's task for the doughty senator and promised to determine his success or failure in the coming contest for his seat in congress. Quietly and unobtru- sively he set about feeling the public pulse. The support of central Illinois was especially important; he sought to learn its will. In September he appeared at the state fair at Spring- field and jovially greeted all persons whom he met with a shake of the hand or a slap on the shoulder; he joined groups con- versing on the topics of the day and soon became the center of the discussion.7 The evidences of a growing antislavery sentiment in Illinois could not escape' so shrewd an observer.
Interest in the situation in "bleeding Kansas" was unusu-
6 O. C. Dake to Trumbull, September 14, 1857, C. D. Hay to Trumbull, October 4, November 7, 1857, John O. Johnson to Trumbull, October 9, 1857, John G. Nicolay to Trumbull, December 20, 1857, Trumbull manuscripts.
7 See O. M. Hatch to Trumbull, September 11, 1857, Trumbull manuscripts. The effect was to arouse the ire of zealous republicans, who resented having this " truckling politician turn the fair grounds into a political arena."
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ally keen and popular sympathy was generally with the free state party. Just after the November elections came the news of certain developments under democratic auspices in Kansas that threatened to be a source of embarrassment to Douglas and his followers in Illinois.8 Under authorization of the territorial government, a constitution had just been drawn up at Lecompton authorizing slavery and providing for its con- tinuance in the future state; the unique feature of the schedule was the arrangement for a popular referendum not on the entire document but merely on the slave state provision.
Douglas, however, either on principle or out of political expediency, soon decided to oppose the Lecompton constitu- tion as a fraud against the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Brilliantly playing up the virtue of consistency, he was heralded by his henchmen and by his party organ as the champion of fair play, if not of freedom in Kansas.9 At Washington he defied the authority of President Buchanan as a party leader by promptly announcing his anti-Lecompton position. Such a new and unexpected development tried the patience of the leaders in both political parties. What does he mean-is Douglas sincere ?- was the question on every- one's lips.
Republican leaders were suspicious of his move. They could but wonder whether it was not an act of self-preservation, a ruse to guarantee the senator's reelection. The conversion seemed too sudden to be sincere; to them it appeared merely a stand to attract support from the republican party.10 By introducing an enabling bill into the new session of congress Douglas could assume the leadership in the fight against the proslavery forces on pure unadulterated popular sovereignty ground. But the "little giant" with an air of injured innocence undertook to inform republicans through various channels that they had unjustly accused him of selfish motives in his present position ; was he not ready to combat the administra-
8 Washington Union, November 17, 1857.
9 Chicago Daily Times, November 10, 17, 18, 1857.
10 " Let Republicans not be deceived by the treacherous 'little Joker!'" warned the Urbana Union, December 17, 1857. "Douglas has seven reasons for disagreeing with the President - five loaves and two fishes," explained the Garden State, clipped in Urbana Union, January 14, 1858.
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tion to the bitter end in order to carry out the principles of the Nebraska bill ? 11
Republicans who felt no responsibility for the integrity of the organization swallowed this sop and began to shout for Douglas ; Saul has at length got among the prophets, they said. Party leaders anxiously contemplated the difficulty of prevent- ing former democrats from responding to Douglas' new appeal. A conference was called and held at Springfield in January, 1858, but no decision was reached except to " keep cool for the present." 12 Though it seemed best that the party should keep clear of all alliances, it was obviously good tactics to use Douglas as long as he could be of any service to them; they accordingly encouraged him and the democratic schism, hoping to profit by the "treason " without embracing the "traitor." 13
It soon became evident that Douglas rather than the repub- licans had correctly judged the sweeping effect of his anti- Lecompton fight; not a split in the party but a mass transfer in democratic allegiance from the administration to the Doug- las camp seemed imminent. The democratic press almost with- out exception came out for Douglas,14 while the voters re- sponded with enthusiasm to his bold leadership; only office- holders, office seekers, and ultra conservatives came out in support of the administration of President Buchanan. South- ern Illinoisians wavered somewhat in their choice, but demo- crats of the northern section decided immediately for Douglas.
11 Lest Douglas by raising the standard of rebellion should be able to rally to his leadership an important following of republicans, Chicago and Springfield editors of republican papers felt that their party ought to steal Douglas' thunder by having their own representatives at Washington introduce the enabling bill. C. H. Ray to Trumbull, November 24, 1857, C. S. Wilson to Trumbull, November 26, 1857, E. L. Baker to Trumbull, December 18, 1857, Trumbull manuscripts; see also Tracy, Uncollected Letters of Abraham Lincoln, 82, 83.
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