USA > Illinois > The era of the Civil War, 1848-1870 > Part 31
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13 See Joseph Medill's personal explanation, Chicago Tribune, May 15, 1868. 14 Illinois State Journal, June 1, 1864. Butz, who was leader of the rad- ical Fremont forces in Illinois, had been publishing at Chicago the Deutsch- Amerikanische Monatschefte, a journal on the plan of the Atlantic Monthly, with anti-Lincoln editorial policy. Joliet Signal, March 15, 1864. Ernest Schmidt as well as Butz and Pruessing signed one of the calls for the Cleveland conven- tion. McPherson, Political History of the Rebellion, 410-411.
15 Diary of Gideon Welles, 2:44, 45.
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drift at Washington, passed on to Baltimore where, acting out of a sense of duty, they nominated Lincoln by acclamation but without any display of real enthusiasm.
The Fremont-Lincoln imbroglio rent the membership of the party. Lincoln's renomination was explained as the work of the spoilsmen : officeholders and contractors. In vain did the moderators praise the president and plead for union and harmony. The democratic papers fanned the fires of republican discontent by generous publicity for the Fremont movement.16
The republicans thus entered upon the campaign of 1864 under divided leadership. Nothing seemed to go satisfactorily during the summer months. With blunders on the sea, with failures in the land operations which in spite of a ruthless sacri- fice of blood and treasure in Grant's attempted offensive, exposed Washington to capture by a small hostile force, more and more was said of the incompetency of the republican administration. Congress even went so far as to ask the president to set apart a day for fasting, humiliation, and prayer ; when the appointed day arrived, August 4, Secretary of the Navy Welles soberly commented: "There is much wretchedness and great humiliation in the land, and need of earnest prayer." 17
The break between Lincoln and the radicals was widened by conflicting views on the question of reconstruction. Repub- lican leaders like Thaddeus Stevens and Senator Sumner held that secession had destroyed the statehood of the southern states which would have to accept the drastic jurisdiction which congress was authorized to exercise over territories. The "state suicide" theory found its advocates in Illinois, while others believed that the south would have to be subjected to the fate of conquered provinces.18
16 Cairo Democrat, August 7, 9, 1864; cf. Chicago Times, June 6, 7, 9, 1864 17 Diary of Gideon Welles, 2: 93; Chicago Times, June 29, 1864.
18 See ante, 290; Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1863. One zealot proposed that "South Carolina be confiscated entire and become a territory to belong to the United States & be governed by the laws of Congress as the District of Columbia & let the whole state be appropriated to the blacks where they can cultivate the soil enjoy the benefit of schools and the institutions of the gospel preparatory to their carrying the same blessings to their fatherland and to the colonies they may form elsewhere." [no signature] to Trumbull, April 11, 1862, Trumbull manuscripts.
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In an amnesty proclamation dated December 8, 1863, Lin- coln had alarmed the radical republicans by assuming the restoration of the southern states under executive direction; but these advocates of congressional jurisdiction were pacified by his expressed willingness to abandon his own matured plan for one which might better "accomplish the great end of sav- ing the Union, and redeeming the land from the curse of slavery." 19 When, however, in the early summer of 1864 the radicals in congress brought forward their own scheme in the Wade-Davis bill Lincoln, who considered it too drastic, de- feated it with a pocket veto. This forced the issue; the radicals replied with a manifesto, crying out their defiance in a note that echoed over the prairies of Illinois.20
With all these elements of weakness in the administration party, it seemed to be doomed. Prominent supporters of Lin- coln in Illinois, like Congressman Elihu B. Washburne, agreed with their associates elsewhere that they were fighting a losing battle. The republican national executive committee notified Lincoln of his probable defeat. Lincoln resigned himself to his fate and prepared "to so cooperate with the Presi- dent-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration." 21
Out of the gloom of those depressing months of 1864 there rose before the American people a dread vision of the human lives destroyed by confederate bullets and camp disease, of widows and orphans, of more suffering and anguish and de- spair. The faith of many in "war to the finish " was shaken. "Peace ! Peace !" was the cry that rose on every hand. Many distinguished and patriotic Americans believed and said that the war was a failure. Wendell Phillips undertook to remind himself and the nation that all civil wars are ended by com- promises. Horace Greeley voiced the growing demand for a move to bring about an understanding with the south; so discouraged was he with the military situation that he was ready for peace at almost any price. Declaring that nine-
19 Chicago Tribune, December 11, 1863; Chicago Morning Post, December 17, 1863.
20 Cairo Democrat, August 13, 1864.
21 Writings of Abraham Lincoln, 7: 196-197. Lincoln informed Gustave Koerner of his fears of defeat. Koerner, Memoirs, 2:432.
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tenths of the people were equally anxious for an end to the war, he brought such pressure to bear upon Lincoln that the latter was compelled to sanction informal conferences with confederate agents at Niagara and Richmond. President Lin- coln, however, submitted such an extreme ultimatum that, as he expected, it was straightway rejected; he was therefore denounced as an intolerant opponent of fair peace terms.22 In Illinois the democrats found rich political capital in this situation. The administration party, declared the Chicago Times, July 25, 1864, "has been offered peace and Union, and has rejected the offer. It demands the wealth and lives of our people to prosecute a crusade against an institution whose rights are guaranteed by the law investing them with temporary power, and which they have sworn to defend and support." "The unceasing and still-recurring demands of Mr. Lincoln for more human lives is absolutely appalling. Where are the million and a half of human beings which the war has already swallowed up?" 23 "We are told," declared the Cairo Daily Democrat, July 31, " that we must fight on, fight ever, for the Union ! We want the Union! None in the Lincoln army whether fanatic or Democrat wants the old Union more than we do. We would fight for it, die for it. But we must have peace."
The Chicago Times was explicit as to "how democrats would end the war:" "In detail, the policy of the democracy, after gaining possession of the government, and thus remov- ing the cause of the secession of the South, would be to remedy one by one the grievances inaugurated by the republican admin- istration, and against which the South is fighting. They would offer the South the constitution, and with it the guarantee that for all time the rights of the States under that constitution should be preserved inviolate. This would be a victory over the rebellion more potent than the taking of a dozen Richmonds or the slaughter of an hundred thousand rebels in arms." 24
The organization of this peace propaganda the democrats
22 This in Greeley's opinion was sufficient in itself to involve his defeat. Rhodes, History of the United States, 4: 513-514, 517; Cairo Weekly Democrat, January 3, 1864; Cairo Morning News, July 23, 1864.
23 Chicago Times, February 5, 1864.
24 Ibid., July 2, 1864; cf. Cairo Democrat, July 29, 1864.
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of Illinois had started openly in the late spring of 1863 ; under the lead of General Singleton, a series of democratic peace conventions had declared that peace was the creed of the demo- cratic party. Conservative leaders sought to hold the party to this course; John Reynolds in " An appeal to the Democratic party of Illinois " urged peace, declaring that " Abolitionism is, and always was, the cause of the war." "The slave States," he stated, "have not now, and never had, any intention to dismember the Union, until Abolitionism forced them to defend their property." 25
In line with this movement leading democrats made pro- vision for an expression of opinion at a mass "democratic convention " at Peoria early in August, 1864. The meeting was arranged by the Illinois Order of American Knights and the list of 146 signers of the call included such peace advocates as James W. Singleton, Amos Green, Madison Y. Johnson, and David Sheean. Several thousand persons responded to the call -the Chicago Times said ten to twenty thousand, while the Tribune estimated the attendance as seven or eight thousand.26 The convention adopted resolutions that declared the coercion and subjugation of sovereign states impossible as well as un- authorized by the constitution and urged an armistice, a conven- tion of the states, and the repeal of all unconstitutional edicts and pretended laws as a preliminary to a final and honorable peace. The meeting resolved to reassemble at Springfield on August 18. Again the pilgrims of peace gathered in multi-
25 Belleville Democrat, January 9, 1864. On November 25, 1863, a conven- tion of war democrats from all parts of the union met at Chicago to establish a war democracy; on December 3, 1863, a "consulting convention of peace democrats " from the northwestern states met there for special organization. The Chicago Post and the Chicago Times frowned on both of these abortive movements as unnecessary and harmful to the democratic cause. Chicago Morn- ing Post, November 8, December 15, 1863; Chicago Times, November 26, Decem- ber 12, 1863.
26 Illinois State Journal, July 11, 21, August 6, 1864; the Chicago Times, July 8, 1864, protested the call of a democratic mass convention without refer- ence to the regularly constituted authority of the party. Cf. Canton Weekly Register, July 18, 1864. The Chicago Morning Post (democratic) protested against the peace party's use of the name of the democratic party; it suggested that " love for Peoria whiskey " helped to explain the participation of at least certain politicians. The Peoria Mail said there were from twenty-five thou- sand to forty thousand people at the meeting, the Illinois State Register, August 6, said fifteen to twenty-five thousand, while the Peoria Transcript said less than two thousand.
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tudes, arriving on horseback and in wagons bearing white ban- ners with peace devices and mottoes; silver-tongued orators from neighboring states and from the different sections of Illi- nois charmed the large audience which was adorned with white rosettes and peace badges emblematic of the rôle of a triumph- ant democratic party.27
The democrats, without their having turned a hand, seemed to have victory within grasp. Posing as the watchful guard- ians of the constitution, they quietly enjoyed their steady gains and waited to organize their campaign. Yet within their ranks were all shades of opinion on war and peace, so that it was no casy task to figure out the strategy of their position. They finally held a state convention in June to select delegates to the national convention and to place an electoral ticket in the field; but postponed nominations for state offices to a later date. The state convention was clever enough to declare inexpedient the adoption of a platform since the national convention would make the necessary declaration of principles;28 in this way it avoided a split over the issue of the desirability of a "war" platform or a "peace platform."
The date of the democratic national convention was post- poned from July 4 until August 29. The party leader had carefully canvassed the field of presidential candidates; Gen- eral Grant had been favored by many because of his avail- ability as a military hero; though his democracy was dormant, it was sufficiently sound for the situation. Grant, however, repudiated the idea of presidential aspirations and a new candi- date had to be found.29 Governor Horatio Seymour of New York was the favorite candidate of many moderate democrats, while Pendleton of Ohio was supported by certain ultra peace advocates. General George B. McClellan was supported as having an availability similar to Grant's; he was a favorite with the army of the Potomac-personally liked and admired
27 Illinois State Journal, August 19, 1864; Illinois State Register, August 19, 1864.
28 Ibid., January 25, June 16, 1864; Chicago Morning Post, January 29, 1864; Jacksonville Journal, June 16, 1864; Chicago Times, June 18, 1864.
29 Grant to T. N. Morris, January 20, 1864, Illinois State Historical Society, Journal, 8 : 592; cf. Chicago Times, January 6, 1864; Ottawa Weekly Repub- lican, January 30, 1864; Chicago Morning Post, April 12, 1864.
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by the soldiers. McClellan steadily gained strength through- out Illinois, although state democratic journals frowned upon this development. The Chicago Tribune claimed that McClel- lan's support came from the "bloated aristocrats of the demo- cratic party," "the money-brokers of Wall street and the great railroad corporations of New York and New England," on the one hand, and from the "great unwashed of the Celtic persuasion," on the other; nevertheless, McClellan stock con- tinued to climb.30
Inasmuch as General McClellan could not be charged with responsibility for any recent losses, the failure of the war was in August the most likely democratic rallying point. Accord- ingly, when the national convention met at Chicago, August 29, under the eye of fifteen thousand enthusiastic spectators, it nominated McClellan but permitted Vallandigham to draft a platform which declared the failure of the war and the need of peace. The immediate reaction was an outburst of enthusi- asm that boded ill for Lincoln's hopes of reelection.31
Republican leadership nearly collapsed at the signs of dem- ocratic unity and enthusiasm at Chicago. The withdrawal of both Fremont and Lincoln was suggested as a necessary pre- liminary to an effective reorganization of the republican cam- paign. Fremont's chances were known to be hopeless ; Lincoln's apparent strength when nominated was declared fictitious. "I write you to have you use your influence to have Lincoln's name withdrawn," an Illinois constituent appealed to Trum- bull. "Lincoln's course has not only dissatisfied but embittered many thousands of Republicans, particularly Germans, against him ; the Fremont party, and the Chase and Wade-Davis move- ment, and the anti-slavery dissatisfaction in New England, weakens him greatly; there is no enthusiasm for him, and can- not be." 32 Many, though tried by Lincoln's course, continued
30 Chicago Tribune, August 29, 1864; Chicago Times, August 18, 1864; Jonesboro Gazette, June 18, 1864; Cairo Democrat, August 17, 1864; John M. Palmer to Trumbull, January 24, 1864, Trumbull manuscripts; cf. Rhodes, History of the United States, 4: 507n.
31 Illinois State Register, September 1, 3, 1864; Chicago Times, September I, 1864; Gershom Martin to Trumbull, September 3, 1864, Trumbull manu- scripts. Even ex-Senator O. H. Browning, an old conservative supporter of Lincoln, commended the nomination of Mcclellan and declared that he should not feel at all distressed if he should be elected.
32 Gershom Martin to Trumbull, September 3, 1864, ibid.
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to feel that the country could not at such a time risk the up- heaval entailed by change of presidents-so supported him without enthusiasm. 33
Just at this crisis news arrived of Farragut's success at Mobile and, after a hard long struggle continued through weary months, of the capture of Atlanta by General Sherman. 34 The republicans became wild with sheer joy and spread the good tidings with enthusiasm. Then followed the report of a succession of victories by Sheridan in the valley of the Shenan- doah. Republicans became still more jubilant; enthusiasts began in the same breath to predict the prompt suppression of the rebellion and the election of Lincoln. President Lincoln capitalized these developments politically by proclaiming a special day of thanksgiving to be celebrated in the churches, navy yards, and arsenals.
The democrats had just declared the war a failure; here was proof that they were in the wrong. The platform became impracticable and untenable; republicans called it "unpatriotic, almost treasonable to the Union." 35 So McClellan in his letter of acceptance repudiated the peace article in the platform, declaring himself unconditionally for the union, even to coercion. All democratic planning for the campaign was upset and gloom settled down upon their camp.
Even now it was evident that victory could come only to a united republican party; and Fremont was still in the field. His withdrawal, however, was arranged as a result of a bargain, to which Lincoln was at least indirectly a party; Post- master-General Blair, a moderate, was sacrificed by the admin- istration and asked to resign. Fremont in withdrawing took occasion to declare: "In respect to Mr. Lincoln, I continue to hold exactly the sentiments contained in my letter of accept- ance. I consider that his administration has been politically, militarily, and financially a failure, and that its necessary con- tinuance is a cause of regret for the country." 36 Republican
33 G. T. Allen to Trumbull, October 4, 1864, Trumbull manuscripts.
34 Diary of Gideon Welles, 2: 135-140.
35 Ibid., 135; Cairo Democrat, September 13, 1864.
36 Fremont to George L. Stearns et al., a committee, September 21, 1864, McPherson, Political History of the Rebellion, 426-427.
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workers chose to forget the sting of this declaration and con- centrated attention on the canvass.
It is hard to find a single constructive forward-looking issue in this campaign. The question of reconstruction, includ- ing the possibility of a thirteenth amendment abolishing slav- ery, might have been such an issue; indeed, some democrats, because of the troubles reconstruction had already caused the administration, did urge that it be made the momentous issue. Another possible issue, though not essentially constructive, was the question of the approval or disapproval of the Lincoln administration. For this the democrats were more ready than the republicans. The latter did not dare to indorse everything Lincoln had done-they could select certain features only and for the rest rely on his generally good intentions. The impor- tance of the labor vote suggested another available issue, for it was in the Civil War period that modern labor problems had their beginning. Many republicans, therefore, wanted the president "to make the issue before the country distinctly per- ceptible to all as democratic and aristocratic;" 37 the whole purpose of the rebels, said they, was the establishment of an aristocracy of blood and of wealth. The administration, how- ever, after its delay in assuming the same ground in dealing with the property of rebel leaders, was in no position to press this point. Besides, the republican party of 1864 was not that democratic force it had been in 1856: the fiscal needs and financial transactions of the government had not only drawn to its support but thrust into a prominent place in the party the representatives of another aristocracy of wealth-bank- ers, manufacturers, and government contractors. The demo- crats, moreover, as an opposition party, were able to make considerable progress with the argument that the industrial and laboring classes had been compelled to pay the greater portion of the taxes.38 Legislation, they said, had been enacted on the old aristocratic policy that makes the rich richer and poor poorer. But the republicans in reply charged the democratic party with being an aristocracy
37 Diary of Gideon Welles, 2:43, 141-142; Jonesboro Gazette, July 16, October 1, 1864; Champaign County Union and Gazette, October 14, 1864. 38 Joliet Signal, July 19, 1864.
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which had no place for "tailors, rail-splitters, mechanics, and laborers."
No republican argument on any topic, however, was com- plete without the illogical but effective declaration that under the best of circumstances democrats were copperheads if not traitors.39 The Chicago platform was proclaimed unpatriotic - almost treasonable to the union. The issue was whether or not a war shall be made against Lincoln to get peace with Jeff Davis. A vote for McClellan would be a vote for slavery at a time when that crime had plunged the country into the sor- rows and waste of war. It would be a vote for the rebellion at a moment when the rebellion was about to fail. It would be a vote for disunion at a moment when the union was about to be restored. All the south was hoping and praying for the success of the peace candidates. Had not the democrats im- ported as their leading campaign speaker the notorious Ohio disloyalist, Clement L. Vallandigham ? 40
Some of the democrats answered invective with invective. Could there be any real enthusiasm for the "widow-maker," for the "man of drafts," they asked. The American people, insisted the State Register, would never again commit the great blunder of placing " an abolitionist and a buffoon" in the presi- dential chair. Lincoln's three greatest generals were general taxation, general conscription, and general corruption. Evi- dence was offered that the republican campaign committee was collecting a large " corruption fund " by assessments upon office- holders; the formal demand for a quota of $67.44 from Cap- tain Melancthon Smith, provost marshal for the second con- gressional district, was published with the news of Captain Smith's refusal. The authorities were charged with preparing to use the troops and returned soldiers to intimidate voters in the democratic strongholds; the warning was issued that union leagues were arming and organizing along military lines and that the free elective franchise was thereby threatened.41
The more levelheaded democrats concentrated on the argu-
39 Koerner, Memoirs, 2:434-435. Koerner enlisted as a campaign speaker but found his audiences entirely unwilling to listen to sober political analysis.
40 Chicago Tribune, October 22, 31, 1864; Aurora Beacon, November 3, 1864 41 Illinois State Register, September 4, 8, 25, October 6, 9, 15, 1864; Cairo Democrat, August 16, 1864.
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ment that "our liberties are in danger through the action of the government in its efforts to put down the rebellion." They talked of martial law, of arbitrary arrests, of suppression of the press. They held that they, more truly than the repub- licans, were the real champions of "the Constitution as it is, the Union as it was."
The democrats were demoralized by the defection of prom- inent members of their party who as war democrats had sup- ported the Lincoln administration and who now urged his reelection. General John A. Logan, at the suggestion of the administration, returned from the front to participate in the canvass on the republican side. He was welcomed to Spring- field by his former political opponents with a salvo of artillery and the music of a band; he and Governor Yates then made addresses at the statehouse in support of Lincoln.42 Logan took the stump actively against William Joshua Allen, who was seeking reelection to Logan's old seat in congress, and denounced him as the traitor who had tried to carry the south- ern half of Illinois into the southern confederacy.43 General James D. Morgan, a lifelong democrat, was cited as having refused to indorse McClellan's candidacy because its chief strength lay among traitors. General John A. McClernand's name was often published as a supporter of Lincoln, but Mc- Clernand because of his disgust at the treatment he had received from the administration finally cleared up his position in a letter unequivocally in favor of McClellan.44
The wild enthusiasm inspired by the victories of Farragut, Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant had turned the political tide against the democracy. The army news discredited all proph- ets who proclaimed that the war was a failure. This was the undoing of the democrats; it was also a potent force to heal republican divisions. Radicals who had sworn never to repeat their 1860 votes for Lincoln buried their oaths in the republican celebrations ; the German-American voters marched to the polls
42 Illinois State Register, October 5, 1864; Dawson, Life of Logan, 86-87.
43 Chicago Tribune, October 25, 1864; Illinois State Journal, October 29, November 1, 1864.
44 Illinois State Register, October 7, 1864; Chicago Times, October 11, 1864. The republicans received another shock when Judge J. D. Caton of the state supreme court entered the campaign on the democratic side. Aurora Beacon, October 13, 1864; Chicago Tribune, October 26, 1864.
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