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Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43
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GENEALOGY COLLECTION
ALLEN COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY 3 1833 01100 8882
E. P. Edvards.
C
METROPOLITAN BOSTON
A Modern History
Editor-in-Chief ALBERT P. LANGTRY Ex-Secretary of State of Massachusetts
VOLUME III
LEWIS HISTORICAL PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. NEW YORK 1929
COPYRIGHT LEWIS HISTORICAL PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. 1929
1247267 CHAPTER XIV.
PART I.
MILITARY RECORD-THE WAR WITH SPAIN.
In an earlier chapter of this work, the military history of Boston has been outlined from the first clashes with the Indians through the War of the States. There remains to be told the story of the city's soldiery and citizens, and the part they played in the modern wars in which our country has been engaged. There are but two which can be so classed as real, and both are what may be called "foreign" wars, one with Spain, and the other in Europe, when all the world raged with strife. Both can justly be rated as "humanitarian" as far as the purposes of the United States were concerned, since neither one was waged with any intent to acquire territory. For neither conflict was the Nation prepared, and through the twain the country "muddled" along for a while before it was ready to end successfully the fight it had taken upon its hands. The war with Spain was won because of what the Spanish could not do, rather than what America did. It was a blundering affair out of which the United States came a fortunate victor. None can say this of the World War, for however unprepared, however slow to rise in its might, our country was invincibly effective once it applied itself to the task confronting the Nation. As one looks back upon it, the Spanish-American War seems but a small affair, and comparatively it was. But when we were plunged into the larger and later event, who can say that the les- sons taught by the smaller event were not the very ones which enabled America to do so well and so quickly the larger task?
The Motives Back of the Spanish-American War-The Spanish-Amer- ican War has been mentioned as one entered upon from humanitarian motives, but there was far more than a good impulse behind the conflict. It was a measure of self-protection which this country had to take sooner or later, for Cuba had become a plague-spot, one altogether too close to the United States for safety. The Cubans had been for decades sorely oppressed ; the time had come when some nation must relieve the suffer- ings of this people. There was none other than our own to bring about such relief. But there were corollary conditions growing out of the history of Cuba which made it even more imperative that such a move should not be delayed. The management of the island by Spain had been such as to break down much of the decency and health of its inhabitants. Disease was rife, and it entered the States across the narrow channel which separates the two countries. The colonization of the island had
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been for revenue only, and by slaves. Slavery persisted in Cuba until little more than a decade before the war; the negroes at the time far outnumbered the whites. Ninety per cent. of its folk were illiterate, and half the population were illegitimates. And all this was at our very doors! We were afraid to have such things so close and so ready to infect our land. As well might we have an unconfined yellow-fever victim wandering through a city.
Spain a Natural Enemy-If one goes further into the causes of the war, one is led inevitably to a realization that Spain had always been a natural enemy, one with reasons for seeking revenge, and that the con- flict was but the climax of a race antipathy whose foundations had been laid centuries before. Spain had conquered the West Indies and parts of the mainland of both North and South America before what is now the United States had been settled. We had brought to an end, as early as 1759 when Wolfe took Quebec, the power of the French in America. A few years later our relations with England had been determined by a war in which the United States was left free to develop as a nation. But with Spain, there never was any accord in our forced associations ; trades, bickerings, strife, there were, but never friendship. In 1846, we had warred against the Spaniards of Mexico and taken California and Texas as our spoils. Meanwhile, nearly all the Spanish colonies in this hemisphere had won their independence, only Cuba and Porto Rico remaining of the vast empire in America that had once been Spain's. Neither of these two islands was profitable to the Spanish in spite of all the efforts, good and ill, that had been made for their exploitation. And the United States had interfered, as far back as 1823, when by the "Mon- roe Doctrine," it had made it impossible for Spain to pass Cuba and Porto Rico on to some other nation. There is little in the history of the American-Spanish relations that did not point to an eventual conflict. The "Cuban Question" was a perennial problem to Spain as it was to the United States; the war of 1898 was its solution.
The Spanish Oppression of Cuba-In 1868, the Cubans began a fight for freedom which was continued for a decade, only to end in failure. Shocking atrocities were practiced by both sides, with Spain putting in force the most severe repressive measures. The sympathy of the United States was with its neighbor, but the policy of our Government forbade any interference. This did not prevent the surreptitious giving of aid to the Islanders, arms, men, and ammunition finding their way into Cuba. Spain, as was natural, resented these infractions of neutrality, but feared intervention as greatly as it was hoped for by the Cubans. The gun- running "Virginius" incident in 1873, where a number of Americans.
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captured with the vessel, were summarily executed, seemed destined to draw the United States into war with Spain. But with a navy which had been left to rust and rot in our harbors since the Civil War, our country was in no position to enforce a protest. Unfortunately, the incident created the impression in Spain that whatever it might do, the United States did not dare to interfere.
Sinking of the "Maine"-By 1895, Spanish misgovernment in the Island had become so unbearable that another guerrilla struggle was begun. Cuba was laid waste; the Spanish general finally requiring the inhabitants of the island to gather in required places, where under the guard of Spanish troops they were starved to death by the thousands. American public opinion was stirred to a fever heat by the conditions existing in Cuba, a heat in no manner allayed by the contempt shown by Spain for our government. Then came the friendly visit of the war- ship "Maine" to Havana. In February, 1898, the "Maine" was blown up while anchored in a spot to which it had been assigned by port authorities. Two hundred and sixty men lost their lives. Although the responsibility for the destruction of the "Maine" was never placed, public opinion laid it at the door of Spain, and the demand for war was immedi- ate and insistent. For a time, President Mckinley tried to avert war by negotiations ; he was forced to lay the whole matter before Congress with the suggestion that American interference to stop the destructive conflict in Cuba was justified by humanity and by our national interests. On April 19, 1898, Congress declared the people of Cuba are, and of a right out to be, free and independent, and demanded that Spain at once withdraw from the Island. Spain treated the demand as a declaration of war and hostilities between the two countries soon followed.
The United States Unprepared for War-The historian may point out many logical and noble reasons why war was inevitable between Spain and America, and attempt to show why it had to occur just when it did. But after all is said and done, the United States went to war in 1898 because its people became fighting mad. We were unprepared, as usual ; a third of a century of peace not being the best preparation for war. There is no doubt that every effort was made by Congress to postpone a declaration of war until after the army and navy could show some signs of readiness for such an event. The army had been reduced to a mere handful, and the navy was a rusty untried weapon. Spain had in Cuba six times the number of men that we had in our whole enlisted force, and these men were armed with modern guns using smokeless powder, while America had the ancient Springfield rifle burning a powder that advertised to the enemy the location of the shooter. In the navy.
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Spain had 137 vessels in service, against 86 in the American service, and the strength of the Spaniards lay in her cruisers, the class of vessel most likely to be of use. Spain, too, was accustomed to making war, prac- ticed in the handling of men and ships, with the necessary organization to fit them and keep them in supplies. As students considered the situa- tion, America was so completely unready, that she was embarking on a war leading to inevitable failure. As far as the people of this country were concerned, they believed none of these things; or if they were true, our nation must make the most of it, for fight it must. Because we were so unprepared, the wealthy people of Boston believed a Spanish fleet would destroy the city. Scores of them took their valuables to Worcester and deposited them in the banks of that city.
Spain Proves Incapable-The figures in the case proved to be of little value as a means of forecasting future results. The Spanish troops, how- ever numerous, proved to be untrained, badly officered, weakened in morale by their life in the tropics and their failures against the Cuban rebels. The paper strength of the Spanish army proved to be only strength on paper when it came to actual conflict. The events of the war do not in any way change the fact that America was unprepared for it, nor lessen her temerity in entering upon such an adventure without an army, and with a navy untested, one without any apparent superiority to that of the enemy. But, as with the late World War, superiority in war is a matter of money, natural resources, manufacturing ability, intelli- gence and organizing powers, rather than individual bravery. As phrased by Hiram Maxim many years ago, "The complication of modern implements of destruction gives to the highly scientific and mechanical races, marked advantage over the untrained and unscientific nations."
Dewey at Manila-Fortune favored the bold rather than the ready in the very first contest of the war. When hostilities were declared, Com- modore George Dewey was at Hong Kong with a small American fleet. He sailed at once to the Philippine Islands, Spain's chief possession in the Orient. On the night of April 30, Dewey slipped quietly into Manila Bay, much to the surprise of Admiral Montojo of the Spanish fleet. With the morning the attack was begun, and within a few hours the vessels of Spain had been destroyed without the loss of an American ship or man. Dewey could have taken the city had he chosen, but lacked men to occupy it. When later, troops were sent to him, Manila fell and with it came the end of Spanish rule in the islands. It is rather a strange coin- cidence that the first battle of the war was fought on the side of the globe the farthest away from the Island which was the reason for the struggle.
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While these stirring events were going on in a far quarter, the home fleet under Admiral Sampson instituted a blockade of the Cuban ports and was on the alert to meet the Spanish squadron reported to have sailed under Admiral Cervera from the Cape Verde Islands. In spite of the watch set, Cervera managed to get into the harbor of Santiago unobserved and was there blockaded. On June 3, Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson with six volunteers, made a hazardous attempt to bottle up the enemy fleet by sinking the collier "Merrimac" at the entrance of the harbor. The enterprise failed when the fire of the forts shot away the ship's controls and the tide drifted the sinking hulk to one side of the channel ; Hobson and his men being captured by the Spaniards.
Shafter at Santiago and the Destruction of the Spanish Fleet-General Shafter, with an army, was sent to take Santiago from the land side and thus drive out Cervera's fleet where it could be met by the American navy. Lack of readiness, and bad management of the army, delayed the expedition, but eventually about fifteen thousand men were landed east of the city. On July Ist, the Americans fought the Battle of Santiago, in which they captured El Caney and San Juan Hill. It was at the latter mentioned place that the "Rough Riders," a volunteer regiment of cav- alry under Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, won its spurs by the manner in which it fought. The net result of the battle was as hoped, to drive Cervera from the harbor. To escape capture he and his fleet slipped out of Santiago on the morning of July 3, leaving the city to its fate. The admiral's evident purpose was to outrun the American vessels and reach some neutral port. Within two hours, the Spanish fleet was destroyed in a brilliant running battle, almost as completely as had been Admiral Montojo's at Manila. Only the "Colon" escaped for a time, she being forced ashore and surrendered a few hours later. Again an American squadron had come through a notable affair almost unscathed; one man was killed and ten wounded. Of the 23,000 men on the Spanish fleet, three hundred and fifty lost their lives, the most of the rest being captured. The escaping squadron was about equal in number of ships to that of the pursuing fleet, but the American vessels were somewhat heavier in arms and armor. The victory, like that of Manila, was one of gunnery, and established a tradition for marksmanship which is still more than a romance in our navy and the inspiration of our sea forces. The Santiago engagement marked the end of actual warfare for the navy, little further part being taken by this branch of arms except in the assistance of the land forces.
Massachusetts Sends Her Troops-However colorful and interesting the record of the American navy, the story of the army more closely Met. Bos .- 48
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affected the nation at large, for, lacking a professional force, one had to be created from volunteer units. The United States from the beginning of hostilities and all through the conflict, had to depend greatly upon the local militia, and the Spanish-American war was the opportunity and the justification of the National Guard and its allied organizations. Massa- chusetts was called on with the other states, to supply its quota of men from its local troops, the intention of the Government at that time being to use the militia of the coastal states at home for the defense of the sea . border; those from the interior were to be sent abroad. Massachusetts, as always, was prompt to answer the call for defenders, and was first in the land to have organized troops ready. If the Commonwealth experi- enced any difficulty, it was in the reduction of her volunteers to the required number desired by the Government. Furthermore, the State was more nearly prepared than most, to equip its soldiery; one of her regiments was the first, and for some time, the only, regiment clothed in khaki.
The plan to keep the Massachusetts soldiers in the coastal fortifica- tions broke down almost with the declaration of war. Troops from the interior states proved, for the most part, numerically weak, badly equipped and poorly drilled. Because the Commonwealth's companies were better armed, better clothed, better trained, they were taken first and saw more of service in the West Indies than those of any other State. Six regiments and a naval brigade were mustered in from Massachusetts alone. One regiment was used for coast defense, the First Heavy Artil- lery, which had been trained particularly for just that work. And of the four summoned on the first call of the Nation, all saw foreign service and three active service, a record not equalled by any other State. In every regiment there were representatives from Boston, and many com- panies were made up almost entirely of Bostonians. As the capital of the State, the city was the center of most of the martial arrangements, the headquarters of the officers, and the point of departure for the south- ern camps and the front.
Chronology of the War-A bit of war chronology will aid in showing conditions in the State at the outbreak of hostilities. On April 15, the Legislature of the Commonwealth appropriated $500,000 for local defense · and the equipment of her troops. All through the month, the command- ers of the various military organizations in the State tendered the serv- ices of their troops. On the 23d, President Mckinley called for 125,000 volunteers. On the 25th, Governor Wolcott received the notification from the Secretary of War regarding the quota to be furnished by Mas- sachusetts. Four infantry regiments were requested and one of heavy
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artillery. The commanders of the Second, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth met in Boston on April 28 to confer with the Governor. Meanwhile the First Artillery had assembled in the city (April 26) ninety-nine per cent. com- plete, was reviewed by the Governor, and by noon had reached its sta- tion. The Sixth arrived in camp at Framingham on April 26, while the Eighth arrived at the same destination a few days later. Whatever may have been the conditions in many of the States, Massachusetts was ready well before preparations had been perfected by the central army author- ities to use her troops. May saw the mustering in of volunteer troops from all over the United States and their establishment in the camps of the different southern States, where they were prepared to be sent to such parts of the field of war as the exigencies of the moment determined. On May 25, President Mckinley called for 75,000 additional volunteers, and upon that same date, the first military expedition started from San Francisco for Manila.
In Cuba-Early in June, preparations were made for the transporta- tion of 25,000 men under General Shafter to attack Santiago. About half this number was landed at Baiquiri on June 22, and after a bloody skirmish at Las Quasimas, moved on to El Caney. July ushered in the best fighting of the war done by the Spanish near the little village where they held back an American army under General Lawton of ten times their number. One of the serious difficulties growing out of the unpre- paredness of our country manifested itself in this battle. The Second Massachusetts, which shared in the attack, was equipped with the obso- lete Springfield rifle using non-smokeless powder. So clearly did the smoke of their firing outline their position to the enemy that it was plain murder to both themselves and those located near them, so that they had to be withdrawn. Thus through no lack of valor on their part, the members of the Second Massachusetts had to be withdrawn and used as a reserve force. Their losses in killed and injured exceeded any other regiment.
San Juan Hill-The battle of San Juan followed on the same day. Lawton had been given two hours to dislodge the troops at El Caney, after which he was to join in the attack upon the Hill. His delay deprived the Americans of needed support; the hilly terrain with its narrow for- ested roads prevented the bringing into position of the heavy artillery ; there had been no careful reconnaissance of the ground on which the Spaniards were strongly entrenched. All of which made for a blunder- ing attack, which, although successful cost too high a price. The casual- ties in this affair were the heaviest of the war, 151 killed and more than 1,000 wounded. The troops of Kent and Wheeler bore the brunt of the
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battle, and suffered the severest losses in getting in a position from which they could attack. Kent took Fort San Juan; the part played by Colonel Roosevelt and the Rough Riders in the capture of San Juan Heights, has been told too often to need repetition. Although in rather a precarious position, a bold demand was made for the surrender of Santiago, and the audacity of the move brought results. Cervera and his fleet left the harbor and was destroyed; General Toral surrendered the city and Province of Santiago on July 17, thus virtually bringing to an end the active warfare against Spain.
Porto Rico-General Miles with troops, for the most part from Mas- sachusetts, was now sent to Porto Rico to subdue the island, and in little more than two weeks had taken a third of its territory with a loss of only three men killed and forty wounded. After a few more minor engagements, a peace protocol was signed, August 12, and hostilities ceased. Meanwhile, General Merritt arriving in the Philippines secured the formal surrender of Manila with 13,000 prisoners of war besides quantities of arms supplies, and a public fund of $900,000. By the terms of peace, Spain renounced all sovereignty, ceded Porto Rico and one of the Ladrone Islands to the United States; the "possession" of the Phil- ippines was to rest with America. The United States, to save the face of the Spanish peace commissioners, donated $10,000,000 for the Philip- pines. The treaty was signed on December 10, 1898, and upon this coun- try was piled the "white man's burden" from the troubles of which it is not, even yet, free.
Results of the War-As we look back at it now, the Spanish War was but a small affair, but none the less important. As Frederick Palmer sums up a few results of the conflict: "The Eagle spread his wings for a new flight. A new vision was opened to us. It gave us a new world ; led to the building of the Panama Canal; wiped yellow fever out of the American continent ; set us up as a first class power ; and made Theo- dore Roosevelt President of the United States." He might have added that it was the acid test which proved the courage and readiness to enlist of American citizens in a time of need. There was but one really big battle of the 1898 campaign, San Juan Hill. Yet the wild utterly reck- less boldness with which poorly trained and poorly equipped soldiers crashed their way through swamp jungle and stormed up the Hill, has for sheer bravery never been excelled in national history. The courage of a hundred men or a million is of the same quality; and the strong- heartedness of our troops was shown as clearly in that July battle as ever it was in the Argonne Forest. As the foreign military observers wit- nessed the events of San Juan Hill, they exclaimed: "Extraordinary-
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they did it! Each man like a tiger, on his own." And to the nations whose expectations, and perhaps hopes, were with the Spaniard, notice was served that the soldiery of this country had an initiative, a boldness, and effectiveness never suspected.
To our own people came a lesson, soon forgotten, of the penalties of unpreparedness. It is true that troops were sent to Cuba in an unusually short time after the declaration of war. Too soon, in fact; the losses incurred in the Cuban campaign were mostly of the preventable, losses brought about by the lack of equipment and care. The total number of deaths more or less due to gun-fire was but 230. More than that number died from disease within two weeks after surrender of Santiago and the virtual ending of the war. Duffield's Brigade, of which one of the Massa- chusetts regiments was a part, although never numbering more than 3,500 men at one time, lost by death 266 men, and only a very few of these fell in battle. At home in the training camps more than 20 men out of every 1,000 lost their lives. The loss in the training camps in the World War was 7.5 in 1,000, an altogether too large a proportion, but explainable by the influenza epidemic which raged, and, of course, to the unpreparedness of the Nation for the event. Massachusetts was more fortunate than many states in the question of losses. Six volunteer regi- ments were sent by the State into service, a total of 6,500 men. Of these 300 never returned, and of the dead, only 19 were slain in actual warfare.
The "Ninth Massachusetts"-The experience of the regiments which went from the Commonwealth are typical of the Spanish War, in that the greatest battles were those fought against disease and neglect. They were the pick of the National Guard, equipped at the start better than most. They were admitted to camps only after passing rigid physical and med- ical examinations. A lusty, vigorous, selected lot, they went forth to fight ; one of the most heart-rending sights was the return to Boston of some of these units. Take the story of the "Fighting Ninth," a regiment made up almost wholly of Bostonians. It was one of the smallest of the regi- ments, never a thousand; the one which spent the second shortest period in service, seven months. But it was the one which served in Cuba for the longest period, and the regiment which suffered the greatest losses, 124, or thirteen per cent. Although it was in the attack on San Juan, and was in the trenches for sixteen days before Santiago, not one of its members was killed in battle.
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