USA > Massachusetts > Commonwealth history of Massachusetts, colony, province and state, volume 1 > Part 51
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Nevertheless negotiations with the agents were so hopeful at the time that the Lords recommended to the King the issue of a supplementary charter granting to Massachusetts many of the powers she had usurped, if in turn the Colony would recognize the controlling authority of king and parliament. To their great annoy- ance the colony again hedged about complying. Still de- nying the legality of parliamentary jurisdiction, the Gen- eral Court would go no further than to reenact the Navi- gation Acts as laws of the colony, thereby intending to indicate a cooperative spirit and at the same time not to surrender the principle. The colony would almost cer- tainly have lost its charter at this juncture but for the in- tervention of the Popish Plot of 1678. In England the Judges and Privy Council respectively were now deliber- ating on the validity of the charter and the legislation of the colony. The judges decided that the charter was valid and Mason's title was confirmed, but his rights to govern in the territory were denied. On his part, the Attorney General criticized many of the Massachusetts laws. Stoughton and Bulkeley were told that boundaries must be respected, that Massachusetts must obey the Navigation Acts, prepare to receive a supplementary
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GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS
charter and repeal the laws repugnant to those of Eng- land.
All this left the General Court where it must do some- thing and it now passed a half-way provision for obedi- ence to the Navigation Acts but nothing was done to meet the charges made by the Crown. The oath of alle- giance was not enforced, the franchise remained as it was. Massachusetts protested and persisted. A letter to the agents from the Court about the Navigation Acts, speaks of them as "an invasion of the rights, liberties, and prop- erties of the subjects of his Majesty in the colony, they not being represented in parliament, and according to the usual sayings of the learned in the law, the laws of Eng- land were bounded within the four seas, and did not reach America."
The time came when the Lords of Trade decided that the matter must be examined from top to bottom. This meant but one thing, to raise the question of the cancel- lation of the charter on the ground of violation of its terms by Massachusetts. In 1681 it was advised that quo warranto proceedings be taken and Randolph was ap- pointed collector of customs in New England. In the meantime, the Massachusetts agents made a private deal with Gorges and bought Maine at a bargain from him. Though Gorges had no legal power to sell his rights of government, Massachusetts proceeded to execise them. These facts did not help matters with the English author- ities. Massachusetts by 1678 did agree to administer the oath of allegiance and pass a law against treason, but that was all.
In 1679, Charles sent with the returning agents a let- ter to the General Court, in which he touched again on the subjects of religion, the franchise and the exercise of sovereignty. He again ordered the Court to send over agents. Agents were not sent over for three years and the difficulty went on fermenting. In 1681, Randolph presented a letter from the King to the General Court containing an intimation that he might take steps "to preserve our royal authority from being neglected." The agents were at length appointed, but had no power to
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THE QUO WARRANTO
handle any matters the issue of which might impair "the liberties and privileges" of the colony. "Avoid and pro- tract" was in full vigor.
THE QUO WARRANTO (1683-1688)
The instructions for the agents (Dudley and Richards) contained this clause: "4. Whereas, in our commission and power sent to you, one general limitation is the sav- ing to us the main ends of our coming over into this wil- derness, you are now principally to understand our liber- ties and privileges in matters of religion and worship of God, which you are therefore in nowise to consent to any infringement of."
Again, it is unwise to jump to conclusions. The clause certainly meant the retention of an illegally limited fran- chise. But it is just as plain that the determination to abide by the principles on which the colony had been founded is that idea which permeates the present United States to this day. The method adopted by these starched New Englanders was often quite wrong; their own peo- ple rebelled at it, and the method itself developed some of men's most pitiful weaknesses.
The King had made up his mind and the charter was to be cancelled, though when Randolph went over to Massachusetts with notice and the writ of quo warranto (in 1681) he had power to offer a withdrawal if the col- ony would submit. Nothing came of this, however, and the first quo warranto proceedings fell through from de- fect of parties. The proceedings had been in the King's Bench, and the next time the Crown moved it was by way of the stronger writ of scire facias and in chancery.
Here the Crown did what in the New Englanders it would have loudly condemned as pettifogging. It made the return to the writ so short that it was impossible to appear and plead. Hutchinson concisely puts the posi- tion of the General Court as to the writ, "The time for their appearance at Westminster was over before it was received in Boston." When the agents of the colony rep- resented that they were without power of attorney to plead and so save a default, the Lord Keeper answered
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GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS
that all corporations ought to have attorneys in court at all times. This was nonsense and moreover the Lord Keeper was well aware of what was toward. To be sure, in those days, a "corporation" did not mean what it does now, but Francis North, a brilliant and able man, knew well enough that Massachusetts lay over the water and had a royal patent.
Judgement was handed down against Massachusetts in 1684 that "the aforesaid Letters Patent so as aforesaid to them the said Governor and Company made and granted and the Inrollment thereof be Vacated Cancelled and an- nihilated and into the said Court restored there to be cancelled." Charles died soon after and in 1685 James II caused an exemplified copy to be served on the Gene- ral Court.
Such were the obsequies of the charter of 1628-9 and of the project for Massachusetts isolation. Charles had some good qualities; James, for all practical purposes had none and was without his brother's wits. Under the fourth Stuart King, as under the third, the progression both of the empire and of the colony of Massachusetts was not to be arrested. It cannot be said that the colony had not received in all these years full warning that it could not be independent and protected at the same time. Years earlier the Puritan, Lord Say and Sele, wrote Winthrop, "The Church being wholly spiritual, can sub- sist with any form of outward government;" and in one form or another, such warnings had been repeated. But the group in power was stubbornly resalved to abate not a jot more than they were forced and the consequences were what we have seen, a loss of what they might have preserved. At the last, the magistrates were for sur- render according to Randolph; and it was the deputies who stood out for resistance. At last what had been an over-seas theory was now become a condition; and Massa- chusetts for seven years more must make the best of it.
THE COLONIST POINT OF VIEW (1685)
It is not difficult, looking through a vista of more than a quarter of a thousand years, to find reasons to sympa-
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COLONIAL VIEWPOINT
thize with those who supported the old regime and those who supported the new. The Puritan Commonwealth had been built by the sacrifices and vigor of the pioneers. The original emigrants had not all left the scene and the bulk of the freemen had been born into these families at a time when the foundings of Massachusetts were re- alities and not traditions.
These fathers had crossed the sea to make what they could not build at home, a government for themselves in which the Puritan Church should have a dominant part. If any men by blood and sinew had earned a right to carry on under the form of government they wished, it seemed as if they had. They had not sought liberty for others, but for themselves. Yet they could not claim to be independent of the nation they had left. The English flag was their flag. If England had claimed no rights in their colony or had been unwilling to protect those rights some other nation undoubtedly would have filled the va- cancy. The Puritans knew that they could claim that English protection in any time of stress.
The commercial Englishman could not be expected to be satisfied to yield entirely to the Puritan yoke in ques- tions either of trade or government; and sometimes it was a yoke indeed. It is never easy to live among God's anointed when they take themselves with bitter serious- ness, or to bear the insolence of office and the assump- tion that despite the same racial heritage, you are a lesser man. Though one's ventures may be entirely com- mercial and not at all altruistic, still one must fret under such conditions even as did the traders.
One circumstance must always be considered, upon which hinge practically all the struggles since the Refor- mation down to what, in the vista of history, is compar- atively recent time. That was the belief of sincere reli- gionists that theirs was the only path to Heaven and that all other paths led directly to Hell-a very literal and terrible Hell of unceasing torments. When this belief is honestly held toleration is impossible. Nay, toleration becomes a crime, a yielding of one's fellow to a fate more terrible than the human mind can comprehend. What
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GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS
was the brief suffering in this world even of lash or flame compared with that of eternity? The history of religious persecution cannot be comprehended without taking into account the stern honesty of these beliefs.
With due allowance for racial characteristics and slow progress toward civilization, one may justly say: "As in the days of Torquemada so in the days of the Math- ers." The Puritan church-civic authorities would permit no other church than theirs. Not with their consent would a broad gateway to perdition be maintained in Boston. On the other hand the commercial class including some established churchmen were unable to open their own gateway to Heaven for their children.
PLAN OF CONSOLIDATION (1684-1686)
The Lords of Trade would doubtless not have entered on the controversy with Massachusetts at this time had they not believed the downfall of the theocracy would be welcomed by large numbers of people in the colony who would be glad to throw off its yoke. On this class the Lords counted for support of the royal government which must now take the place of the old. Prominent men in all the New England colonies had for a long time believed that for purposes of defense, a comprehensive trade pol- icy and settlement of intercolonial disputes, a governor general was needed. Their reports to the Lords of Trade were perhaps the strongest factor in the decision of that body to clear out the underbrush of conflicting institu- tions in New England and train colonial government in the right direction. Investigation revealed that the com- plaints of these pro-English colonists were founded in fact, and since they petitioned for a royal government, the time seemed propitious for its establishment.
Royalizing Massachusetts was not, however, completely a satisfactory solution of the problem, for there were still three almost independent little colonies on the South which could not be counted upon to cooperate in the in- terests of imperial trade and defense. New England was a natural economic unit and any attempt to control commerce in Massachusetts would be difficult as long as
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THEOCRACY AND BUSINESS
these colonies were unrestricted. They could not be forced to share in the defence of the frontier unless their own towns were actually menaced, Nor would there be any arrangement for the settlement of intercolonial dis- putes.
The Lords of Trade decided that a better solution would be to consolidate all of the New England colonies into one large royal province. Nothing stood in the path of such a scheme except the charters of Connecticut and Rhode Island. Maine, purchased by Massachusetts from the Gorges heirs was forfeited to the King upon the dis- solving of the corporation. New Hampshire had been a royal province since 1679. Plymouth although an inde- pendent colony, had no patent except the New England Council grant. As for Connecticut and Rhode Island, it was not difficult for the eagle eye of Randolph to detect wherein they had violated their charter terms. When threatened with quo warranto proceedings, foreseeing the outcome, they voluntarily submitted to regulation.
THEOCRACY AND BUSINESS (1684)
This period of governmental conflict was not only a battle for supremacy between England and a stubborn colony, but also a party contest in New England between the champions of the old order of things and the advo- cates of a rapprochement toward the mother country. Many of the pillars of the theocracy had at the outset of the colony's career been very dubious over the demo- cratization which they seemed unable to prevent. Men of godly lives but very little estate had been made free- men and were as proud of their power of voting as any arbitrary ruler. These were enthusiastic supporters and willing followers of the clergy who were increasingly in- terested in building a theocratic state, and who thought the patent of Charles I of less importance as a basis of government than the "Grand Charter in Genesis."
At the same time that one element in the colony was growing more rigid, another was becoming more moder- ate in politics and religion. These latter were chiefly the sons and grandsons of those who had prospered in com-
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merce and landed estate. In the early days of the colony the government had often rewarded the public-spirited of- fice holder with gifts of land, at first worth very little but by the latter part of the seventeenth century of consider- able value. The heirs receiving these properties were de- veloping them with an eye to profit. Many such land- holders were also merchants on a large scale, owning their own ships, their wharves and warehouses, their business backed by security in land. Between these men and the petty shop keeper, there was a great social gulf, yet all were interested in the commercial development which was bringing prosperity to the colony and to them.
There was little besides background to distinguish these large-scale native merchants from the English gen- tlemen who came across the sea to make their fortunes in trade. That background however, played its part in guiding the interests of each. For the English-born the home ties were very much stronger and the appreciation of the imperial problems greater. Their methods of busi- ness were those of the Restoration merchants at home, as is seen by their interest in trading companies and mon- opoly grants. These men made a real contribution to colonial development because they brought to regions not yet awakened from frontier provincialism, visions concerning expansion of trade and its organization on a large scale.
A typical example of this class was Richard Wharton, who had migrated to Boston early in the Restoration Period, and was chief promoter of most of the big mer- cantile and land enterprises of his age in New England. He first tried to organize a company for evaporating salt out of sea water, which should have monopolistic privi- leges of production in Massachusetts. Next he founded a company for developing naval stores and sought from the Confederacy of the United Colonies exclusive privi- leges of production in all New England. His most im- portant venture was a mining scheme whose stock was subscribed in England as well as in New England. For this enterprise he petitioned the King for a charter incor- porating the investors into a joint stock trading com-
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THE MODERATES
pany. That these schemes did not succeed was due largely to the fact that New England was not yet ready for such elaborate business organization.
Wharton, after building up a considerable fortune at commerce, proceeded to establish for his family a landed estate. He purchased large tracts from the Indians in the Nipmuck country and in Maine where he hoped to establish a colony. He was a member of the Atherton Company and of the "Million Purchase" schemes for land speculation, the one in the Narragansett country and the other on the Merrimac. He was a typical promoter, a man with business vision who saw in the colonies, as he himself expressed it concerning New York, "a fair foun- dation to build a most glorious empire upon."
THE MODERATES (1684)
These two groups, the English colonial and the moder- ate native New Englander found the narrow local policy of the theocracy somewhat cramping. To neither group was religion the most important thing in the life of the colony. One evidence of this is the actual existence of their alliance, for the Englishmen were usually Anglicans while the native moderates, though not so warmly inter- ested in the Congregational Church were either within the fold or at least not defiantly out of it. This moderate party, if one might so call these two groups which merged because of similarity of interests, preferred a more intimate and amicable relationship with the mother country because thereby trade would be promoted. With- out the support of this party England would doubtless never have considered the drastic reforms now attempted.
In spite of the fact that only the church members among them could be freemen, this group often controlled the majority vote in Council, as the theocrats dominated the House of Representatives. A typical example of the deadlock often produced by party conflict was shown in 1683 upon arrival of news of the King's order in council for issuing a quo warranto writ. The moderates wished to surrender the charter peacably since the King had promised in such case to respect private interests
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GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS
and regulate the charter liberally. The theocrats under the guidance of the clergy voted against it and employed an agent to defend the charter at law.
PRESIDENT DUDLEY (1685-1686) 1
While plans were being completed for the final estab- lishment of Dominion government, the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay continued to rule as formerly. Edward Randolph, indefatigable in the King's interests, protested against the delay because until a royal government was established, he was powerless to enforce the Navigation Acts. At his suggestion a commission was issued to Joseph Dudley, (May 1686) one of the moderate party, for the administration of a temporary government over Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Plymouth and the Narragansett Country.
Randolph thought such an arrangement would have the advantage not only of ending charter rule, but also of bridging over the gap from theocracy to royal province under an English governor. Contrary to his suggestions the new commission delivered the entire power to a President and Council. One unfortunate result of this consolidation of power was the immediate alienation of many who might otherwise have supported the new ad- ministration. Among these were Simon Bradstreet and his son Dudley who were named members of the council but refused to serve. Stoughton, Winthrop and others of the immediate party accepted.
Joseph Dudley was the son of the sturdy old Puritan, Thomas Dudley, who had been Governor of the Massa- chusetts Bay Colony on five different occasions, first suc- ceeding John Winthrop in 1629. The elder Dudley, a member of the famous English family, first settled in Ipswich and soon moved to Roxbury where the son was born. He was an old man of seventy at the birth of Joseph and died when the boy was five years of age.
The second Dudley was therefore one of the old stock but he had become impregnated with the new ideas. He was a man of more than average ability. His private morals were impeccable and he had considerable personal
From the portrait in the Massachusetts Historical Society
PRESIDENT JOSEPH DUDLEY
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THE COUNCIL
charm of manner. It is certain that in spite of his heri- tage, he had little attachment to the theocratic Puritan Commonwealth. Fiske tells us that his suppleness and sagacity went along with a moral nature that was "weak and vulgar." Be that so or not he certainly had the dis- position of courtier, perhaps a throw-back to his English ancestry, a famous kinsman of the previous century being the Earl of Leicester. He had moreover an almost un- controllable avidity for office holding.
Dudley's presidency stands at the inauguration of the effort by the English government to institute a central- ized province out of the contiguous colonies, which was later to be more definitely established for a short time. It marked the centralization of the government as well as enlargement of territory. While the President and the Council had in this temporary scheme no powers to enact laws or provide for taxation, they were comparable in their other functions to the former Governor and Assist- ants. But they were all appointive; their responsibility was to the King and not to the people; the English the- ory being that the colonies as mere Crown lands admitted of no other sort of government than his Majesty's plea- sure vouchsafed.
THE COUNCIL (1685-1686)
This Council was made up of representatives of the various provinces thus joined. It seems on the surface that the representation of the Massachusetts of the former charter by the former Governor and six former assist- ants, proved the policy to be conciliatory; the fact re- mains that they all were members of the moderate party and that only three of them had been returned at the last election under the charter.
The government took over its functions on May 17, 1686. Dudley with his councillors entered the chamber of the general court. He addressed the court civilly as "considerable gentlemen of this place and inhabitants of all parts of the country." He then exhibited the copy of the judgment against the charter and the commission for the new government. Danforth, the Lieutenant Gover-
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GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS
nor replied that he supposed Dudley expected no reply from the Court, to which Dudley made answer, in effect that no Court now legally existed.
When he and his councillors retired the members had opportunity to consider what they ought to do. Some were for protest, others for passive acquiescence in pres- ent conditions. Finally, three days later, the Court re- solved on its reply. It stated that the commission made no adequate provision for the administration of justice and that the colonists were abridged in their liberties as Englishmen, being denied a voice in legislation and in levying of taxes; and that all their privileges as subjects were taken from them and put into the hands of the President and the Council.
The Court asked if such a commission was safe, either for them or for the members of the present administra- tion, a question sufficiently open to sinister interpreta- tion to anger Dudley; "but," continued the document, "if you are so sattisfied therein as that you hold your- selves oblejdged thereby, and do take vpon you the government of this people, although wee cannot give our assent thereto, yet hope we shall demeane ourselves as true & loyall subjects to his majty, and humbly make our addresses vnto God, &, in due time, to our gracious prince, for our reliefe."
This was irritating if non-resistant; and it was ordered in the Council that Rawson who as secretary had signed the document, be examined concerning the "libellous paper." No record shows that this was done. It is probable that when wisdom ameliorated anger, Dudley was content to let well enough alone. Certainly from his standpoint it was well enough, for no other protest was made, no further action taken. The General Court ceased to function, and the former colonial governor took his quiet place as a councillor to his ascending brother-in- law. So, for the time, ended popular government in New England. It had ended with the assumption by Joseph Dudley of an executive office with which the pop- ular will had nothing to do and the heirs of the Puritans never forgave him.
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TEMPORARY GOVERNMENT
REORGANIZATION (1684-1686)
Dudley had undoubted administrative talents and the government was not tyrannical. He soon came into Randolph's bad graces. With all the reprobation which has been poured on Dudley's head for his ambition and time-serving, it ought to be remembered in his favor that Randolph, the persistent Englishman who was largely responsible for Dudley's appointment, Randolph, who, with some reason esteemed himself, so far as the attitude of the King's government was concerned, a sort of un- official overlord of the Provincial governments, now re- ported him a man of "base, servile, and anti-monarchical principle." The men of Massachusetts might have granted the President a little toleration for the enemies he had made.
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