USA > Massachusetts > Commonwealth history of Massachusetts, colony, province and state, volume 2 > Part 7
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EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES
In any attempt to estimate the responsibility for the events at Salem, it is well to bear in mind Murdock's injunction in his Life of Increase Mather, that one must fit oneself into the Puritan attitude and see matters from their standpoint before passing judgment. Even were this wholly possible, the prose- cutions of the witches, the methods employed in the accusations and the general social demoralization which ensued is not a chapter that even the participants could review with equanimity and satisfaction, much less their descendants.
Some partially redeeming features are observable in all the witchcraft persecutions in the colonies. Physical torture was not practiced to extort confessions; the victims were not burned at the stake; the test by water was very rarely used; and in all cases there was at least the semblance of an open judicial trial according to legal procedure as then recognized. The ministers and judges, with few exceptions, did their duty
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THE WITCHCRAFT EPISODE
fearlessly as they saw it. That they were mistaken and de- ceived was the fault of their intolerant theology and inherited psychology, for which they may not be held responsible. Ad- mitting all the extenuating conditions, it is still difficult to ac- cept Kittredge's dictum :- "The record of New England in the matter of witchcraft is highly creditable when considered as a whole or from the comparative point of view." With his further remark one may, however, wholly agree. "It is easy to be wise after the fact,-especially when the fact is two hundred years old."
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
BEARD, GEORGE MILLER .- Psychology of the Salem Witchcraft Excitement of 1692 (N. Y., Putnam, 1882)-Entertaining comparative study.
BURR, GEORGE LINCOLN .- "New England's Place in the History of Witch- craft" (Am. Antiquarian Society, Proceedings, New Series, Vol. XXI, pp. 185-217, Worcester, 1911)-An arraignment of our ancestors by an extreme student of European witchcraft.
DRAKE, SAMUEL GARDNER .- Annals of Witchcraft in New England and Elsewhere in the United States (Boston, Woodward, 1869)-An ad- mirable brief chronological statement of reported cases.
DRAKE, SAMUEL GARDNER .- The Witchcraft Delusion in New England (3 vols., Roxbury, Woodward, 1866)-A reprint of Cotton Mather's The Wonders of the Invisible World, and Robert Calef's More Won- ders of the Invisible World, with comments and footnotes by Drake; a classical contribution to witchcraft literature.
FISKE, JOHN .- New France and New England (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1909)-Chap. v. "Witchcraft in Salem Village," gives a succinct but not unprejudiced account.
HUTCHINSON, THOMAS .- The History of Massachusetts from 1628, until the Year 1750 (2 vols., Boston, Thomas & Andrews, 1795)-Earlier editions of the separate volumes had somewhat different titles. See Vol. II, pp. 22-63; an accepted authority on the persecutions, with a strong bias against the accusers.
HUTCHINSON, THOMAS .- The Witchcraft Delusion of 1692 (Privately printed, Boston, 1870)-MS. in Massachusetts Archives; edited by W. F. Poole. A valuable commentary on Hutchinson's original ac- count.
JAMES I, KING OF GREAT BRITAIN .- Daemonologie. Newes from Scot- land (London, Lane, and N. Y., Dutton, 1924)-Daemonologie (originally printed in 1597 and reprinted frequently) was much quoted in the Salem trials. Newes from Scotland has been ascribed to James Carmichael.
JANET, PIERRE .- The Major Symptoms of Hysteria (N. Y., Macmillan, 1920)-An enlightening medical viewpoint.
KITTREDGE, GEORGE LYMAN .- Notes on Witchcraft (Worcester, Davis Press, 1907)-Reprinted from Am. Antiquarian Society, Proceedings, Vol. XVIII, Worcester, 1907, pp. 148-212. An able defense of the conduct of the Puritans in the witch proceedings.
LECKY, WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE .- History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe (2 vols., N. Y., Appleton, 1914)-See Vol. I, chap. I, "Magic and Witchcraft"; one of the best accounts of the general subject with incidental reference to New England.
MATHER, COTTON .- Magnalia Christi Americana (London, Thomas Park- hurst, 1702; reprinted, 2 vols., Hartford, S. Andrus & Son, 1853- See Sixth Book, chap. VII; a narrative of cases, notably that of the . Goodwin children.
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
MATHER, COTTON .- The Wonders of the Invisible World (Boston, Sam. Phillips, 1693; reprinted in identical form by J. R. Smith, London, J. R. Smith, 1862)-An outstanding book, being an account of witch trials and the author's view on witchcraft in general. See also, above, DRAKE.
MATHER, INCREASE .- An Essay for the Recording of Illustrious Provi- dences (Boston, Joseph Browning, 1684)-Concerning matters pre- ternatural, demons, and apparitions.
MOORE, GEORGE HENRY .- Bibliographical Notes on Witchcraft in Massa- chusetts (Privately printed, Worcester, 1888)-A critical discussion of the literature. Also several other controversial papers regarding legal matters against Abner G. Goodell, Jr.
NEAL, DANIEL .- The History of New England (2d ed., 2 vols., London, A. Ward, 1747)-Originally issued in 1720. See Vol. II, chap. XII, for a readable review of the Salem outbreak.
NEVINS, WINFIELD SCOTT .- Witchcraft in Salem Village in 1692 (Salem Press Co., 1916)-One of the best of the smaller books; well indexed.
PUTNAM, ALLEN .- Witchcraft of New England Explained by Modern Spiritualism (Boston, Colby and Rich, 1888)-A spiritualistic inter- pretation.
TAYLOR, JOHN METCALF .-- The Witchcraft Delusion in Colonial Connecticut 1647-1697 (N. Y., Grafton Press, 1908)-A scholarly summary of the situation in Connecticut from 1647 to 1697.
UPHAM, CHARLES WENTWORTH .- Salem Witchcraft (2 vols., Boston, Wig- gin and Lunt, 1867)-Detailed and authoritative account of the whole matter.
WENDELL, BARRETT .- "Were the Salem Witches Guiltless?" (Essex Insti- tute, Historical Collections, Vol. XXIX, pp. 129-147, Salem, 1892)- A consideration of the relation of witchcraft to spiritualism.
WINSOR, JUSTIN .- "Literature of Witchcraft in New England" (Am. Antiquarian Society, Proceedings, New Series, Vol. X, pp. 351-373, Worcester, 1896)-A comprehensive bibliography.
CHAPTER III
EXTERNAL RELATIONS (1689-1740)
BY ARTHUR H. BUFFINTON Assistant Professor of History, Williams College
ELEMENTS OF THE CONFLICT (1689-1740)
With the outbreak of war with the Abnaki, or Eastern Indians, in 1688, came to an end the long period of peaceful development, broken only by King Philip's war, which Massa- chusetts had enjoyed since the beginning of settlement. Dur- ing the succeeding twenty-five years the colony was almost continuously at war with the French and Indians; and even after the conclusion of peace with the French it was another decade and a half before their Abnaki allies were completely pacified. Nominally there was peace from 1698 to 1702, and from 1713 to 1722; but these periods were in reality but un- easy truces, filled with alarms, acrimonious controversy, and hostile demonstrations ; during which complete resumption of the normal activities of peace was impossible.
The effects, both material and moral, of this prolonged con- flict were incalculable. The eastern frontier was driven back from beyond Pemaquid to Wells; the western frontier was unable to expand. Trade and the fisheries were harassed by French privateers. Some thousands of the inhabitants of the province lost their lives in the struggle. The province was able to meet the heavy expense only by the issue of quantities of paper currency, and the financial loss was enorm- ous. Such was the stormy adolescence of the Commonwealth.
No less pronounced were the mental and moral effects. Hatred of the Frenchman and the Indian became a New Eng- land tradition. A new crop of heroes and martyrs replaced the founders of the Commonwealth who had fled from the persecution of Strafford and Laud. The scars of the torch,
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EXTERNAL RELATIONS
the tomahawk, and the scalping knife were visibly imprinted on the bodies and souls of multitudes of New Englanders. On the frontier scarce a family but mourned its dead, while some lamented no less for those who had gone into captivity and had there embraced the faith and manners of the alien. About the conflict grew up a body of folklore; and at many a New England fireside the long winter evenings were en- livened by tales of the heroic defence of some garrison house, the successful pursuit of some marauding party, the patient en- durance of incredible suffering| on some winter's march through the snow-covered forest to Canada, the miraculous escape from a savage and merciless foe.
When the Indian war began in the summer of 1688, Andros was still governing the Dominion of New England. The causes of the outbreak speedily became the subject of contro- versy. Andros and his sympathizers attributed it to the land- grabbing policy of the former government, and to wanton acts of aggression by the frontier settlers. Defenders of the old regime attributed it to the policy of English officials like Dongan and Andros, who had asserted English claims to the whole eastern country as far as the St. Croix, and had backed up their assertions by seizing the property of St. Castin, the chief French resident of the disputed country, who had unlimited influence over the Penobscot branch of the Abnaki.
CHARACTER OF THE CONFLICT (1689-1740)
These two theories of the cause of the war illustrate well the dual character of the conflict, for it was both local and imperial. It was a struggle by the people of Massachusetts to preserve and extend their settlements in the disputed area beyond the Kennebec, to carry on their trade without interrup- tion, and to exploit the Acadian fisheries without molestation. It was also a conflict of the English and French nations for the stakes of empire; for the fisheries which were more valu- able, so one Frenchman wrote, than the mines of Peru; for the fur trade on which depended the very life of French Canada ; and for lands valuable for naval stores and the prod- ucts of the soil.
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FIRST WAR MEASURE
Had the conflict been mainly an imperial one there is every reason to believe that the people of Massachusetts would not have concerned themselves with it; and Parkman has blamed the French for not realizing that Massachusetts desired only to be let alone. To let the English alone, however, meant to abandon to them the coast of Maine at least as far as the St. Georges River ; and to permit them to enrich themselves with- out challenge from the fisheries on the coast of Acadia. So far were the French even from considering such a policy that when the war opened they were contemplating plans for the conquest of all the northern English colonies. Unable even to attempt such an enterprise, however, the French were forced to rely for the accomplishment of their objects mainly upon their Indian allies; and the resentment of the Abnaki at real or fancied wrongs at the hands of the English made them will- ing tools of French policy in the New England area of con- flict.
The use of these Indian allies largely determined the charac- ter of the war, for it was one of forays and raids, of the de- struction of unfortified villages, the burning of isolated farm- houses, the slaughter or captivity of peaceful settlers. For this the French have been severely blamed by English his- torians ; but in extenuation of their conduct the French argued that the English were responsible for similar, and quite as destructive, raids from which Canada had long suffered at the hands of the Iroquois; and furthermore that, if they did nothing to support and encourage their allies, the latter would desert them, and Canada itself would fall a prey to the Eng- lish. The latter argument was something more than a pretext, for when Frontenac initiated the raiding policy, Canada seemed on the verge of destruction.
FIRST WAR MEASURES (1688-1689)
Andros had taken vigorous measures to end the Indian war, so that at the time of his overthrow, in April, 1689, the Indians were quiet. It is the contention of his defenders that but for the Revolution, and the weak policy of the new govern- ment, the war would have ended then and there. Such argu- ments are untenable. The establishment of William of Orange
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EXTERNAL RELATIONS
on the English throne in place of James Stuart made war between England and France inevitable. That the French would permit the Indians to remain quiet is unthinkable; that Andros, or any other, could have reduced the Indians to terms so long as they were supported by the French and their strength was unbroken is equally so.
It is true, however, that the abandonment by the new govern- ment of certain forts established by Andros and the weakening of others gave the Indians an opportunity to gain the maxi- mum results from their renewed attacks. With the sack of Dover in late June, 1689, the war was resumed; and after the capture of Pemaquid early in August the settlements east of Falmouth (Portland) were abandoned.
In this crisis no aid could be expected from England, where the government was fully occupied with the French war and the Irish rebellion. The Massachusetts government, therefore, turned to its neighbors and to the Five Nations for assistance. The latter were too busy with their own raids upon Canada to assist New England by attacking the Eastern Indians, and their friends, the Albany fur-traders, unable to secure assist- ance from the Leisler government at New York because of the refusal to recognize its authority, sent a counter-appeal to New England for aid. The New England colonies, how- ever, with the exception of Rhode Island, showed a praise- worthy willingness to help. To aid in the prosecution of the war the New England Confederation was virtually renewed in enlarged form, New Hampshire joining with Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut to consult upon measures for the common defence.
ATTACK ON ACADIA (1690)
As the French saw in the conquest of the English colonies their chief hope of unrestricted development, so there were plenty of people in New York and New England who believed that there could be no security until the French were removed. The Indian raids confirmed this belief, and the argument was reinforced in the autumn by an attack upon the fishing fleet. Definite news of the declaration of war arrived at this time, and the government of Massachusetts planned to attack Acadia.
. INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY IN 1713 AS LATER ESTABLISHED
COLONIAL BOUNDARIES AS EVENTUALLY ESTABLISHED
8
QUEBECS
CHIGNECTO
PORT
MONTREAL
ROYAL
-7-
---- 10-
FORT
1- 1690 PHIPS
DUMMER
2-1690 PHIPS
ALBANY
3-1691 NELSON
4-1692 CHURCH
5-1694
6-1696 CHURCH
7-1696 NEWPORT GALLEY
8-1704 CHURCH
9 -1707 MUIR
10-1710 NICHOL SON
11 - 1723
GENERALIZED MAP OF PRINCIPAL OFFENSIVE MOVEMENTS OF MASSACHUSETTS TROOPS, 1690 TO 1723
-11-
BOSTON
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ATTACK ON ACADIA
For weeks the project hung fire. The treasury was empty; the government was preparing to send Andros and his fellow- prisoners to England; and the General Court was unable to decide whether the expedition should be undertaken by volun- teers or at public expense. John Nelson, the nephew of Sir Thomas Temple, and the leading trader with Acadia, offered to raise a volunteer force for the conquest; but he was dis- trusted, says a contemporary, by the country deputies, as a merchant and an Episcopalian.
It was the earliest of Frontenac's raids, the terrible massacre at Schenectady in February, 1690, which galvanized the colony into action. Letters from Albany pointed out that unless some- thing was done the Iroquois might desert the English cause, and the colonies would be faced with destruction. It was therefore decided to undertake an expedition against Acadia at public expense. A committee was appointed with power to impress men and ships, and the people of Albany were ad- vised, the better to insure their safety, to submit to the control of the Leisler government at New York. To concert measures for the common good the Massachusetts government also sug- gested a general intercolonial congress to be held at New York.
Energetic and experienced as the Massachusetts Council was, it contained no commanding personality such as the crisis demanded. This lack was now supplied by the sudden rise to prominence of Sir William Phips. Devoid of the tact necessary for the successful politician, Phips possessed the native vigor and courage of the born leader of men; and this quality it was which, combined with the support of the Mathers, pushed him to the front in this crisis. Though a rank outsider from the viewpoint of men who had held almost a life tenure of the magistracy, Phips now won their gratitude by offering to command the Port Royal expedition ; a perilous honor which two leading citizens had already declined.
The expedition, which sailed late in April, 1690, gained a speedy, though not an enduring success. Within five weeks Phips was back in Boston, having reduced all the French settlements in Acadia to submission; and having set up at Port Royal a Council, chosen by the inhabitants, to govern the country. The impermanency of the work, however was shown by the fact that Phips had been gone less than a month when a
1
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EXTERNAL RELATIONS
French vessel appeared at Port Royal, and without difficulty persuaded the people to repudiate their oath of allegiance to the English King.
OPERATIONS IN NEW YORK (1690)
Meantime the first intercolonial congress, including colonies outside New England, assembled at New York, where it was agreed to undertake an expedition against Canada. Contin- gents from the several colonies were to gather at Albany for an attack upon Montreal and Quebec by the Champlain route; and if possible Massachusetts was to send a force up the St. Lawrence.
This offensive, designed to end once for all the French and Indian menace, experienced the difficulties which usually beset joint operations by unmilitary governments. Leisler of New York, who took charge of the land expedition, had an open quarrel with Fitz-John Winthrop of Connecticut, the rightful commander, and with the people of Albany. Owing to the capture of Falmouth by the French, Massachusetts diverted her promised contingent, and that of Plymouth, to the eastward. A small force of New York and Connecticut men with a few Indians advanced as far as Wood Creek, in north- ern New York, and then turned back because of lack of canoes and provisions, and the failure of the Iroquois to appear in force. Even as a diversion the expedition was a failure, for Winthrop began his retirement within ten days after Phips left Boston, and nearly two months before he appeared at Quebec.
ST. LAWRENCE EXPEDITION (1690)
Meantime Massachusetts had prepared a sea force to pro- ceed up the St. Lawrence. According to one contemporary the magistrates hesitated to undertake such an enterprise, but were pushed on by the overconfident populace, flushed with the easy victory in Acadia, Canada est delenda, was the cry, and early in August, Phips sailed from Boston with a force of thirty-two vessels and over two thousand men. Despite the lateness of the season, the difficult passage up the St. Lawrence was made without incident.
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EFFORTS TO HOLD ACADIA
Parkman has lent the weight of his authority to the opinion that had Phips arrived a week earlier Quebec must have fallen for lack of men; had he stayed a week later it would have surrendered for lack of provisions. It is clear, however, that against a defending force half again as large as his own force, occupying one of the most easily defensible positions on the continent, Phips had little chance of success. Having used up most of its scanty supply of ammunition in a vain bombard- ment of the upper town, the fleet returned to Boston. The losses, considering the lateness of the season, were surpris- ingly small; but the colony was completely exhausted by its efforts, and to pay the soldiers was forced to emit an issue of bills of credit, the first of many such.
Meantime, following the loss of Falmouth, the eastern frontier had been abandoned as far as Wells, and French privateers had begun their depredations along the coast. Some encouragement was afforded by the fact that in late November the Indians made a truce to last until the following May, but the situation was gloomy enough. The least discouraged person in the colony was Phips who betook himself to England to secure assistance for the completion of the task he had undertaken.
Although the Massachusetts government professed its wil- lingness to undertake another expedition against Canada with English assistance, the failure of 1690 threw the colonies definitely and permanently on the defensive. A spirit of par- ticularism took the place of the spirit of co-operation which had been evident during the first year of the war. Massa- chusetts expected and demanded aid of the other New Eng- land colonies for the defence of her own frontier and that of New Hampshire, which was too weak to defend itself. New York began to clamor for assistance from New England, although its frontier was small and well protected by the Iroquois.
EFFORTS TO HOLD ACADIA (1691-1696)
The most ambitious enterprise undertaken in 1691 was the attempt to garrison and hold Acadia. The people of Port Royal were dependent upon Boston for their supplies and had long traded with the English. In an exposed position and too
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EXTERNAL RELATIONS
weak to resist, they were at the mercy of any passing armed vessel, whether French or English, and were thus forced into that course of tergiversation which ended only with the tragedy of removal in 1755. Ambitious to retain its conquest, the Massachusetts Council, in the early summer of 1691, agreed to a proposal made by Nelson, John Alden, and other traders to the eastward, to garrison Port Royal at their own expense in return for a monopoly of the trade.
Unfortunately the French government had recently despatched a new governor, Villebon, to repossess Acadia. When, therefore, Nelson and his company attempted to carry out their part of the agreement, their vessel was captured by the French with all on board, and the enterprise was ruined. Despite this success, however, Villebon dared not establish himself at Port Royal, but built a fort some distance up the river St. John's, where he yearly received supplies from France and presents to distribute among the Abnaki. Acadia, though partially reoccupied by the French, became a derelict, whose fate would depend upon the eventual outcome of the war.
In recognition of the conquest made by Massachusetts the English government included Acadia within the chartered limits of the province, and during the remainder of the war, the province made sporadic efforts to assert its authority there. Trade with the Acadian French continued until the General Court, late in 1696, prohibited it, because the people of Port Royal permitted French privateers to find asylum there. As early as 1694, however, the General Court began to petition the English government to assume the defence of Acadia, thus confessing its inability to govern and defend a territory stretching from Narragansett Bay to the St. Law- rence. At the peace of Ryswick, in 1697, no attention was paid to the protests of Massachusetts at the return of Acadia to French control.
PHIPS AND THE WAR (1692-1693)
The old government left office in May, 1692, under the most gloomy auspices. York had been pillaged the preceding January, and at every point the frontier was being assailed by the elusive savages. The French and Indians were daily gain-
71
PHIPS AND THE WAR
ing confidence, and hoped shortly to drive the English beyond the Piscataqua. On his return as Governor, in May, 1692, Phips breathed new energy into the conduct of the war. The heroic defence of Wells early in June by Captain Converse marked the turning of the tide, and the recession of the frontier was stayed. In accordance with instructions Phips rebuilt the fort at Pemaquid, while the Indian villages on the Kennebec and Penobscot were raided by a force under the veteran Church. Phips also tried to interest Fletcher, the new governor of New York, in a scheme for another inter- colonial congress, and a joint appeal to the English government for an expedition against Canada.
The admirable energy of Phips was unfortunately counter- balanced by his violent and contentious disposition. The re- sulting quarrels with neighboring governments were not wholly his fault, but it is to be noted that they ceased after he was superseded as Governor by Stoughton. Rhode Island and Con- necticut were irritated by his attempt to assume command of their militia according to the terms of his commission. Con- necticut was persuaded to provide a few men for the defence of the western frontier, but Rhode Island would do nothing to aid Massachusetts. Usher, the lieutenant-governor of New Hampshire, complained incessantly that Phips was slack in aiding his province. With Fletcher of New York, whose co- operation was necessary if anything was to be accomplished, Phips quarreled bitterly.
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