USA > Massachusetts > Commonwealth history of Massachusetts, colony, province and state, volume 4 > Part 47
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THE SANITARY COMMISSION
A voluntary commission was formed of able physicians and experts like Dr. Howe, who was a member of this commission. They offered their services to the Government on May 22, 1861, and their offer was accepted on June 9. This was the Sanitary Commission, and it ably administered its work throughout the Civil War.
It guided and directed the societies by issuing requisitions for what was needed, and thus turning their zealous efforts into useful channels. The central agency of the Sanitary Commission for Massachusetts and northern New England was the New England Women's Auxiliary Association in Boston, and its labors were carried on in all the towns and cities of New England. This good and well directed work was soon going on all over the North.
The Sanitary Commission assumed charge of shipping and forwarding all supplies, collected from these numerous sources, to the destinations where they would do the most good. There is no need to emphasize the value of this means of coordinat- ing and systematizing the zealous efforts of those who were so eager to help the soldiers. In no other way could these ef- forts have accomplished so great results.
In the field, the administration of the Sanitary Commission was of value that cannot be stated too strongly. For the first time in war there was a powerful and authorized body of which the sole object was the health and comfort of the soldier. Not only did its agents minister to the soldier, but they taught him to take hygienic care of himself-and then helped him to do this.
For the hard worked Medical Department the Sanitary Commission was a Godsend. It made conditions healthier for the work of the surgeons. Its assistance was always a sup- port and a source of needed supplies. It was also a help and a stimulant to better standards of hygiene. In this last respect, it was of real benefit that it was an independent body,
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NEW CALL FOR TROOPS
acting with the Medical Department but not of it. The com- bination of the two working together obtained results that might not have been possible otherwise. The same was true of the Sanitary Commission working with the commissaries. There was the same good effect of raising the standard of healthful care of the troops.
To appreciate the value of the work of the Sanitary Com- mission, we must not think in terms of today, when its off- spring the Red Cross is so familiar to us all as an established institution. But in the sixties all this was untrodden ground, and it is a wonderful thing to realize that the people's zealous desire to be of help found, at the very beginning of the war, so intelligent a guidance and control that it accomplished this miracle of mercy. But Harte's poem, "How are you, Sani- tary," has recorded its place in the heart of the army. It was also a matter of record that the local Auxiliary Association received contributions from supporting societies in 301 cities and towns of Massachusetts. This fact was an index to show how the Sanitary Commission drew its being direct from the people of the North.
NEW CALL FOR TROOPS (APRIL, 1861)
Upon the new call for troops, Massachusetts was able to report that the required new regiments could be made up from the volunteer companies, which had already been organ- ized as described. This work of forming new volunteer units had been going on throughout the Commonwealth. Among the first to undertake to raise a regiment had been Fletcher Webster, the only surviving child of Daniel Webster. This he proposed at a large meeting on State Street, Sunday mor- ning, April 21, 1861.
The meeting was called to assemble in front of the Mer- chants Exchange, but the crowd was taken to the head of State Street, and Mr. Webster addressed it from the balcony of the Old State House. The gathering was deeply im- pressed by the stand of the son of the great champion of the Union. Mr. Webster cited his father's defense of the Union in the forum, and he declared himself ready to defend it on the field of battle. He announced that he proposed to raise a regiment for active service, and he called for volunteers.
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His proposal was greeted with great enthusiasm, and in response more companies were offered than he could accept. This regiment was organized for the three-months service, but, upon the new call, it immediately volunteered to enlist for three years. It was accepted, and served in the war as the Twelfth Regiment of Massachusetts Infantry. Colonel Webster, its gallant organizer, was killed in command at the Second Manassas, August 30, 1863. He thus gave his life for the cause of the Union, so ably advocated by his eloquent father.
THE THREE-YEAR VOLUNTEERS (MAY, 1861)
The President's proclamation of May 3, 1861, had been followed on the next day, by General Order No. 15, from Secretary of War Cameron, which set forth the number of regiments to be raised, and the scheme for organization. It stated that there were to be thirty-nine regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry. But there was nothing in the order that designated the proportion of men or regiments to be furnished by each State. This left Governor Andrew in a quandary as to what number he could accept of the many organizations in Massachusetts which were offering their ser- vices as volunteers for three years.
They were ready, and were parading to show their readi- ness. The Governor wrote and telegraphed to Washington, but answer was delayed. The following will show his patriotic vision, that the war was to take on great dimensions. This was from a letter to Montgomery Blair of Lincoln's cabinet: "The whole matter has now assumed the broadest proportions, and we in Massachusetts are only anxious to be up to our whole duty; and it is my strong desire to receive from you every friendly and prompting hint, and to endeavor to follow it. At the same time, I wish you to aid in affording Massachusetts those full opportunities which become her services and her character."
It was not until May 22 that Governor Andrew received the following from the Secretary of War (dated May 15, 1861) : "I have the honor to forward to you enclosed herewith the plan of organization of the volunteers for three years, or during the war. Six regiments are assigned to your State,
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THE FIRST THREE YEAR REGIMENTS
making, in addition to the two regiments of three months' militia already called for, eight regiments.
"It is important to reduce rather than to enlarge this number, and in no event to exceed it. Let me earnestly re- commend you, therefore, to call for no more than eight reg- iments, of which six only are to serve for three years, or during the war, and, if more are already called for, to reduce the number by discharge. In making up the quota of three years' men you will please act in concert with the mustering officers sent to your State, who will represent this Department."
This hestitating policy of restricting enlistments showed that Governor Andrew's estimate of the situation was better than that of the War Department. Upon receipt of this letter, General Order No. 12 was issued by direction of the Governor, which stated that the quota of Massachusetts was "fixed at six regiments of infantry, to be organized as prescribed in General Order No. 15 from the War Department."
THE FIRST THREE-YEAR REGIMENTS
The organization of these new regiments was to be the same as that of the Regular Army. Each regiment was to be composed of ten companies, each with two lieutenants and ninety eight enlisted men. The regimental officers were col- onel, lieutenant colonel, major, adjutant, quartermaster, sur- geon. These were also the non-commissioned staff and a band of twenty-four musicians. This regimental organiza- tion remained unchanged throughout the war, with the exceptions that an additional surgeon was assigned to each regiment, and the regimental bands were dropped.
These six Massachusetts regiments were organized and sent forward, completely equipped, within four weeks after the Governor had been notified that they would be accepted. This result was due to the early organizations of volunteer com- panies which have been described. It is interesting to study the assembling of these first three-year regiments, as showing the activity throughout the state.
The First Regiment was organized at "Camp Cameron" in North Cambridge. It left for Washington June 15, and marched through Baltimore on June 17, the anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill. By that time public opinion had
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asserted itself in Baltimore, and Maryland was to remain loyal to the Union. This Massachusetts regiment was the first three-year regiment that came to Washington, another honor for the State due to the energy of Governor Andrew's administration.
The Second Regiment was gathered at "Camp Andrew" in West Roxbury, and left the State on July 8. The Seventh was recruited at "Camp Old Colony" in Taunton, and left for Washington on July 11. The Ninth Regiment was organ- ized on Long Island, in Boston Harbor, and left for Washing- ton June 24 on the steamer Ben De Ford. This regiment was notable for being raised at the request of Colonel Thomas Cass, who asked permission of Governor Andrew to form an Irish regiment. In accordance, this first Irish regiment was made up from enlistments all over the State, and it started for the front carrying an Irish flag with the National and State colors.
The Tenth Regiment was recruited in the western part of Massachusetts, and was organized in camp near Springfield. Before leaving the State, the Tenth was at Medford for a time, and left for Washington on July 25. The Eleventh Regiment was drilled at Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor, until it left for Washington on June 24. This regiment was known as the "Boston Volunteers," as it was recruited chiefly in Boston.
All of these Massachusetts regiments rendered notable service throughout the war, as was shown by the lists of their battles. From the colonels of these regiments came the fol- lowing who received generals' commissions : Cowdin, Gordon, Andrews, Quincy, Cogswell, Couch, Davis, Russell, Briggs, Eustis-an impressive list.
MASSACHUSETTS' EFFORTS FOR A LARGER ARMY
However, Governor Andrew saw clearly that the National Government was making a great mistake in limiting its call for troops. In Massachusetts the formation of the volunteer companies had already provided a personnel large enough to make up many more regiments. Governor Andrew was con- vinced that it would be wise to secure these for the Army as soon as possible. But for a time the Governor was not able
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EFFORTS FOR A LARGER ARMY
to induce the Secretary of War to authorize an increased num- ber of regiments.
At last, through General Walbridge of New York, the Governor had the question drawn to the personal attention of President Lincoln. In consequence, on June 17, the Governor received a letter which stated: "I am gratified to enclose you herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me by the Secretary of War, with the sanction of the President, in response to my application in favor of taking additional forces, authorizing me to notify you that ten additional regiments will be called from the loyal and patriotic State of Massachusetts in accor- dance with the terms stated in your letter to me of 12th inst."
Immediate orders were given to organize these additional regiments, and, from that time on, the wise course of Gov- ernor Andrew was justified by the constant demand made upon Massachusetts for all the troops that could be raised. With the exception of one lapse in 1862, the Administration was no longer to give any instructions "to reduce rather than enlarge," as the Civil War rapidly grew to a scale that had not been dreamt by anyone.
The first of these newly authorized ten regiments was the Twelfth, the regiment raised by Fletcher Webster, as de- scribed. The Twelfth was organized at Fort Warren, and left for Washington on July 23. It was always known as the "Webster Regiment." All of these regiments were raised with astonishing promptness and sent forward. Other regi- ments were also recruited, with the result that twenty-nine infantry regiments were sent to the front from Massachu- setts in 1861.
The First Regiment, Massachusetts Cavalry, was organized and sent forward in 1861. This was composed almost entirely of existing cavalry companies, including the Boston Lancers. Five batteries of artillery were also sent from Massachusetts in 1861.
Other independent companies were organized in 1861, which were given service. Mention should be made of the First and Second Companies of Sharpshooters. These were re- cruited in Lynnfield, and equipped with rifles having telescopic sights. They included many of the best marksmen in Massachusetts. The First was sent forward as an unattached
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company. The Second was attached to the Twenty-Second Regiment, and left the State with it.
The totals of the troops sent from Massachusetts in 1861 were 33,636.
EFFICIENT SERVICE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS PHYSICIANS
In its Medical Department, Massachusetts was fortunate in obtaining the most skilful personnel from the very begin- ning. Governor Andrew's call upon Dr. Lyman and Dr. Dale had put matters on the right basis at once. Dr. Dale was made Surgeon General, and Dr. Lyman was invaluable in consulting with the Governor, and giving him the benefit of his studies for the medical service with troops.
The medical profession of the State made it a matter of pride that their service for Massachusetts should be of the best. At the recommendation of some of the leading doctors, Governor Andrew immediately appointed a medical com- mission, which was charged with the responsible task of exam- ining all candidates for commissions and appointments in the medical service. This set a high standard, and insured well qualified and able surgeons for the Massachusetts regiments.
This medical commission also acted as a consulting board in all sanitary matters, and their services were of great value to the Surgeon General. They served voluntarily to the end of the war. With this organization, the Surgeon General soon was able to equip hospitals for the sick and wounded, which were especially needed before the Government established general hospitals. In order that the Surgeon General might act with official authority in conjunction with the United States Army, Dr. Dale was given an acting commission in the United States Army. Under the joint commissions, the Surgeon General furnished supplies, organized hospitals, re- ceived and cared for the sick and wounded. And the Massa- chusetts regiments were always provided at the front with an exceptional medical personnel.
Always associated with this efficient work of the physicians of Massachusetts, was the cooperation of the women, who volunteered in such great numbers as nurses for the sick and wounded. The hospitals, both in the field and in the cities, never lacked their generous response to every demand for
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THE SITUATION IN 1862
their services. The Civil War stands out as having revolu- tionized the care of soldiers in war, as has been explained. The origin of this was due to the women of America-and the accomplishment must also be attributed to them.
MASSACHUSETTS IN THE NAVY
As Massachusetts was closely associated with the sea, it was natural that a large proportion of the necessary increase of the United States Navy came from the Bay State. At the outbreak of the war, the authorized strength of the United States Navy was only 7,600. At the end of the war, its strength was 51,500. In the course of the war 101,207 sailors and marines were furnished by all the States for the United States Navy. Of these, Massachusetts provided 19,983 -- nearly one fifth. Of the 7,500 volunteer officers in the Navy, 1,757 were from Massachusetts. These figures will show the important part taken by the Commonwealth in manning the Navy.
There were no separate State organizations for the Navy, as for the Army. All commissions and enlistments were in the National service, although the distinction remained be- tween Regular and Volunteer. Consequently the Navy was less prominent in the public eye. But there was a very real need for the rapid increase of the Navy, because the blockade of the long Atlantic coast line, and the control of the Missis- sippi and Ohio, were two of the most urgent problems of the siege of the Confederacy, which eventually won the victory. Massachusetts had been prompt in an early response to the call of the Navy, as the records of the receiving ship at the Charlestown Navy Yard showed that 7,658 men from the Bay State entered the Navy in 1861.
THE SITUATION IN 1862
The beginning of 1862 found the North in a state of fever- ish impatience. No one yet realized the tremendous task that was implied in the effort to subdue the Confederacy. It was the time of the popular clamor for something to be done that would end the war at once. The fact was, this military inactivity, while forces were being gathered, was all in favor
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of the North. The Confederates were strongest at the start, and their only hope of success lay in active use of this early strength. Inactivity meant that the North was assembling its superior forces about the borders of the Confederacy, and these superior forces would soon begin to cut away its terri- tory and constrict the Southern armies.
For this reason, it was the South that should have worried over the inactivity of armies-not the North. But this was not apparent at the time, as at first the South seemed to be maintaining its independence, although, in reality, it was being shut in by constantly increasing Union forces. The process of constricting the South was to be long-but its effects were inexorable. It is not surprising that, in the early months of 1862, the Southern public did not realize the deadly meaning of these Union forces which were already hemming in the Confederacy. Still less did the Northern public appreciate the true situation, and the cry was, "On to Richmond."
That increasing clamor was an expression of the prevail- ing erroneous opinion that one decisive campaign would end the revolt. Of course this now seems insane. But it is a fact that, when the Army of the Potomac was first sent against Richmond, the War Department assumed there were troops enough in the United States Army, and on April 3, 1862, all recruiting was ordered stopped-this, with a strenu- ous campaign in prospect! But the ensuing campaign soon showed how great a mistake it was to allow any lull in recruit- ing troops.
In the first six months of 1862 Massachusetts sent out, in its new three-year organizations, 4,587 men. In the same six months' period, there were also sent from the Common- wealth more than 3000 recruits to fill the ranks of the regi- ments already in the field, where Massachusetts troops were arrayed from the Shenandoah to Louisiana.
CALL FOR THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (JULY, 1862)
However, the experience of the first Richmond campaign, in which the two opposing armies comprised 200,000, had provided the Government with a much needed object lesson as to the great numbers of troops demanded by the war, and on July 4, 1862, President Lincoln issued a call for 300,000
RENEWED ACTIVITY IN RECRUITING 531
men, to serve for three years or to the end of the war. In response, Governor Andrew issued General Order No. 26, stating that "a call has been made upon the Governor of this Commonwealth, by the President of the United States, for fifteen thousand volunteers, to form new regiments, and to fill the ranks of those of the Commonwealth now at the seat of war."
For this call, Adjutant General Schouler suggested the idea of giving to each city or town a statement of the number of recruits it should furnish in order to contribute its share of the troops required. This suggestion was approved by Gov- ernor Andrew, and accordingly, with General Order No. 26, there was sent to each city or town the figures of its desig- nated quota of troops. The object of this was to bring home to each community the realization of what it must do to play its part in the effort of Massachusetts.
RENEWED ACTIVITY IN RECRUITING (1862)
This had a widespread good effect, as local pride was aroused, to spur on each city or town to show itself ready to perform its share of the task. The local authorities made every effort to encourage patriotic zeal. Special town meet- ings were held, and special committees were formed to assist in recruiting. All over Massachusetts these aroused a re- newed enthusiasm to carry on the struggle.
By that time great battles had been fought, and their heavy losses had taught all Americans the tragic realities of war. These losses, which had been felt throughout the State, proved to be another stimulant for recruiting. It was true that homes had been made desolate, but mourning in the communities only increased the determination of the people. The result was never in doubt. Within three months from the receipt of the call from the President, Massachusetts had provided all the troops asked from her.
In this short time the Commonwealth furnished its con- tingent of 15,000 men, by sending to the front nine new regi- ments and two batteries, all fully armed and equipped, and more than 4,000 men to fill out the old regiments already in the field. But, in the midst of recruiting for this call of July 4, the President issued another call for 300,000 troops.
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This new call added greatly to the cares of the Governor and the State authorities. The enlistments were to be for nine months, and it was specified that the men were to be raised by "draft, in accordance with orders from the War Department, and the laws of the several States." The quota assigned to Massachusetts was 19,090.
Preparations for apportioning the men subject to draft were so complicated, and involved so much labor, that Gov- ernor Andrew appointed a second Assistant Adjutant General for this special task (Major William Rogers). The appor- tionments made by this new office, for quotas from the different towns and cities, remained a basis for the proportions to be furnished throughout the Civil War. But on this occasion a draft was avoided, as Massachusetts soon furnished the al- lotted contingent by voluntary enlistment. Governor Andrew, and the State and loyal authorities in Massachusetts, were opposed to a draft, and did all they could to avoid it as long as possible.
The Governor wrote to President Lincoln, in this regard (August 8, 1862) “. . we can answer the call, in great part, without a draft, by sending our militia regiments already organized, and being filled up, and by recruiting new ones. The iron is hot; strike quick. Drafting is mechanical; the impulse of patriotism is vital and dynamic." In this the Gov- ernor rightly interpreted the fervor of Massachusetts at the time, as was shown by the success of enlistments. But the draft was to be necessary later on.
CRISIS OF THE CIVIL WAR (1862)
1862 was the decisive year of the war, and its vicissitudes had caused waves of excitement in Massachusetts. The raid of Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley had been exaggerated into an emergency, partly because General Banks of Massa- chusetts was one of the leaders of the discomfited Union troops. For the actual effect of this campaign, in May, 1862, was not a menace to Washington, as was feared at the time. It had the result of diverting Union forces and allowing Jackson to join Lee, which gave Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, for the only time in the Civil War, a strong superior- ity in numbers over the Army of the Potomac.
Courtesy of Halliday Historic Photograph Co. JOHN A. ANDREW
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CRISIS OF THE CIVIL WAR
This was a very real danger, which was only averted by McClellan's skilful change of base to the James River, culmi- nating in the defeat of Lee at Malvern Hill. This successful battle had placed the Union army in the one right position for operations against Richmond, as was conclusively proved by the subsequent campaigns of the war. But the Administra- tion made the grave mistake of withdrawing the Union troops from the James River to form an army for a campaign in the country north of Richmond, under the command of General Pope. Pope was helplessly incompetent, and he al- lowed his army to drift into a position where it was badly cut up in the defeat at the Second Manassas.
After Pope's disaster there was again a panic for Wash- ington. In this emergency, Lincoln, for the only time in the Civil War, assumed personal command of the Army. On his own responsibility he went to McClellan at his breakfast table (September 2, 1862), and gave McClellan the command of the defeated Union forces.
This act of Lincoln saved a most dangerous situation. The real danger was not the loss of Washington, as the Con- federates did not intend to attack the capital. Lee's actual plan meant something worse. In fact, it was the greatest men- ace to the North of the whole war. Lee, according to Long- street, was convinced that he had paralyzed the Union forces, and that here was his opportunity to invade the North-for "President Davis to join him and be prepared to make a pro- posal for peace and independence from the head of a conquer- ing army." Lee felt sure that this would bring about recognition of the Confederacy by Great Britain. Lee was right in this, for a meeting of the British Cabinet had been called for that purpose.
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