USA > Missouri > A history of Missouri from the earliest explorations and settlements until the admission of the state into the union, Volume II > Part 40
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47
345
THE TREATY OF SAN LORENZO
what is now Mississippi county, afterwards known as "Bird's Point," in order to have it understood that building this fort was the object of his journey. While here, Julian Poydras and Sarpy, coming down the river from St. Louis, landed and remained in camp with him for several days. But Power was greatly disappointed in his mission. Innes made some excuse and did not come, Nichols, being a lawyer of great practice, was absent on the circuit and Murray was constantly inebriated and therefore could not be trusted. Sebastian alone came down the Ohio with him and met Gayosa, and on his suggestion went to visit Carondelet in New Orleans, arriving there early in January 1796. Sebastian remained in New Orleans until spring and then sail- ed to Philadelphia with Power, carrying with him an elaborate plan to induce the western country to withdraw from the Union and form a separate government, and in return to receive aid and support in arms and money from Spain.
In the meantime the treaty of San Lorenzo, of 1795, was published. Under this treaty the free navigation of the Mississippi, below the 3Ist degree of north latitude, was reaffirmed, and it was stipulated that the people of the United States should be allowed "to deposit their merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, and export them thence without any other duty than a fair price for the hire of stores." The privileges conceded by this treaty were to exist for a space of three years and at the end of that time, were either to be continued or an equivalent establishment assigned on another part of the banks of the Mississippi River. It was further stipulated that the forts at Natchez and Chickasaw Bluffs were to be evacuated, and the boundary line between the United States and Spain established by actual survey. This treaty was secured by Pinckney because the Spaniards, then on the verge of war with Great Britain, feared that the Americans would unite with that power against Spain. The treaty allayed the existing discontent. Yet even after the treaty was made, the Spaniards for a time refused to carry out its provisions, and Carondelet continued to intrigue to separate the western people from the Union. Wilkinson and his associates, however, were wise enough to see that the Spanish scheme had become impracticable, and as soon as the provisions of the treaty became known, withdrew from all further negotiations. When Power returned to New Orleans, he so advised Carondelet and explained to him that the treaty gave the people of the western states all they desired.
346
HISTORY OF MISSOURI
Nothing now impeded the growth and development of the country west of the Alleghanies; and soon the valleys of the Tennessee, Cumberland, Scioto, and the Ohio swarmed with new settlers. They moved westward with a celerity that astonished the quiet Spanish officials on the west bank of the Mississippi. The river to New Orleans was filled with fleets of keel-boats and "broad horns," carrying the products of the country, to that great and impor- tant seaport. When in 1800, it was first rumored that Napoleon, by secret treaty had acquired Louisiana for France, the minds of the people were again filled with apprehension, although no open change of dominion took place. The treaty of 1795 had expired, but the Spanish officials at New Orleans had tacitly continued to carry out its provisions, and allow the right of deposit as stipulated. For some reason, however, Don Juan Ventura Morales, the Spanish Intendant, in 1802, suddenly imagined that such an indulgence might ripen by proscription into a claim of a right, and determined, by notice, to put an end to the enjoyment of this privilege. The proclamation to that effect was issued October 16, 1802. The uneasiness and excitement which it produced among the people west of the mountains, who from a few inconsiderable settlements had increased to over half a million, was great and universal. It was the general opinion that the right of deposit had been suspended in consequence of a demand of France,23 but the public mind was calmed, somewhat, when the Marquis de Casa Yrujo, the Minister of Spain, in a note dated March 10, 1803, officially declared that the Intendant had acted without authority, and that in conformity with the treaty another place of de- posit would be assigned.24
At this time, the forcible seizure of New Orleans again found numerous advocates. "France," said Governeur Morris, "will not sell this territory. If we want it we must adopt the Spartan policy and obtain it by steel, not by gold." And he further adds, "Put France in possession of New Orleans, and the time will soon come when those who cross the mountains will cross the line of your jurisdiction." The administration was charged with taking only feeble and weak measures, when decided action, was necessary. Although as early as February 26, 1801, in a secret session of the senate, the purchase of New Orleans was authorized, it was generally thought - and the idea had great weight - that
23 Memoirs of Monroe, p. 7.
24 Marbois, History of Louisiana, p. 245.
347
LOUISIANA RETROCEDED
if Napoleon once obtained actual possession of Louisiana it could only be obtained from him at the expense of a war with France. Jefferson said, "There is one spot on the globe, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual. enemy. That spot is New Orleans. France, placing herself at that door assumes to us the attitude of de- fiance."
It was evident that some permanent remedy must be discovered. Nor does it appear that France was ignorant of the possible dangers of invasion threatening Louisiana, from the American people living north along the Mississippi. In a secret report, after the cession of the territory under the treaty of St. Ildefonso, M. de Pontalba speaking of the dangers that had at various times threatened New Orleans and the services rendered by General Wilkinson, says: "Four times between 1786 to 1792, preparations were made in Kentucky and Cumberland to attack Louisiana, and every time the same individual caused them to fail through his influence over his countrymen. I make these facts known to show that France must not neglect to enlist this individual in her service." Spain knew the aggressive character of the western people, and by retaining powerful and influential agents in the west, expected to some extent, to be forewarned and protected from the sudden forcible seizure of New Orleans and other Spanish possessions along the river.
The retrocession of Louisiana to France placed the country in the hands of a strong military power and the people realized the changed condition of affairs. Because the prosperity of the western country depended on the free navigation of the Mississippi, popular feeling naturally rose high. Accordingly, Senator Ross of Penn- sylvania introduced a resolution that the President be authorized to call into service not exceeding sixty thousand men in North Caro- lina, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee and Mississippi Territory to "secure the indisputable free navigation of the river, and a con- venient place of deposit for their products and merchandise on the island of New Orleans." This resolution was not adopted; but it evidenced the determination of the people. Instead of the resolu- tions offered by Senator Ross the proposal of Hon. John Breckenridge of Kentucky, offered by way of substitute, was adopted. Under this the President was authorized to organize, arm, and equip eighty thousand men, officers included, to perform such service as might be prescribed by law, and two million dollars were appropriated to cover expenses and to defray such other outlays as, during the recess of Con-
348
HISTORY OF MISSOURI
gress, the President might deem necessary for the security of the United States. The House of Representatives adopted the resolution offered by John Randolph, expressing the unalterable determination of the country to maintain the boundaries and right of navigation and com- merce through the Mississippi river, as secured by existing treaty.
Under instructions carefully framed by Jefferson and Madison, James Monroe was sent to Paris as Envoy Extraordinary in conjunc- tion with Robert R. Livingston, our Minister there, to treat with France upon the navigation of the Mississippi and the purchase of New Orleans.25 Jefferson fully realized the importance of the ac- quisition of the mouth of the Mississippi. His letter to Monroe, while paying that great man a merited tribute, demonstrated that his master mind conceived the plan to acquire by purchase, an outlet for the West. " If we cannot by a purchase of the country," he says, "insure to our- selves a course of perpetual peace and friendship with all nations, then as war can not be far distant, it behooves us immediately to be preparing for that course without, however, hastening it, and it may be necessary for you to cross the channel."
Up to this time no one had a thought of acquiring Louisiana. At most, it was thought that the island of New Orleans and the Floridas might be acquired by purchase. When, on January 11, 1803, Liv- ingston was sent as Minister to France, he was instructed to vigorously insist upon the possession of the "island of New Orleans," or some other "place of deposit for the products, commodities and commerce of the country." When Monroe arrived with more extensive powers, Livingston was already waiting to conclude terms with Barbè Marbois and Napoleon, for the purchase of upper and lower Louisiana, at a price so low as to be within the reach of our Treasury. Napoleon was then in need of money in order to prepare for the war with England, which he saw was inevitable. He also was too far-seeing not to ap- preciate the fact that in such a war, Louisiana, instead of being an aid, would be a burden to him. He thought that by a cession of the territory to the United States he would be aiding the commerce of France. He fully realized that the acquisition of Louisiana by the United States would vastly add to the material strength of the Union, and that by thus aiding the nascent power of the Republic, he was strength- ening a rival who would dispute with England the dominion of the seas. On Easter Sunday, April 10, 1803, he first advised his Prime Minister,
25 This appointment met with serious but unavailing opposition in the Senate and was finally confirmed by a vote of 15 to 12.
349
NAPOLEON
Talleyrand, that he expected to sell Louisiana. He did not under- estimate the value of the vast domain, nor the precarious nature of his position. "I can scarcely say," so he remarked, "that I cede it to them, for it is not yet in our possession. If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies I shall only transmit an empty title to those Republicans whose friendship I seek. They only ask of me one town in Louisiana, but I already consider the colony as entirely lost; and it appears to me that in the hands of this growing power, it will be more useful to the policy and even to the commerce of France than if I should attempt to keep it."
Marbois strongly concurred in this policy. So when Monroe ar- rived, Marbois, without any concealment of the true intention of his government, directly asked the sum he and his colleague would be willing to pay for Louisiana. Thus the largest real estate sale of the world began. Napoleon wanted fifty million francs; Monroe and Livingston offered thirty million and Marbois named one hundred and twenty five million. The price finally agreed upon was eighty million francs. Napoleon urged that the business be closed at once. Marbois thought that the people of Louisiana, ought to be consid- ered, but Napoleon cut him off short by sarcastically saying, "You are giving me in all its perfection, the idealogy of the law of nature and nations; but I require money to make war on the richest nation in the world. Send your maxims-to London; I am sure they will be greatly admired there, and yet no great attention is paid to them when the question is the acquisition of the finest regions of Asia. Perhaps it will also be objected to me, that the Americans may be found too pow- erful for Europe in two or three centuries, but my foresight does not embrace such remote affairs. Besides we may hereafter expect riv- alries among the members of the Union. The Confederations that are called perpetual only last until one of the confederating parties finds it to its interest to break them, and it is to prevent the danger to which the colossal power of England exposes us, that I would provide a remedy.". Such being the sentiment of Napoleon, who ever had but little regard for the will or wishes of the people, and the possession of the country being of paramount importance to the people of the Uni- ted States, the negotiations were rapidly closed, terms and boundaries fixed and conditions speedily adjusted. On the 30th of April, 1803, twenty days after Napoleon first advised Talleyrand of his in- tention to sell the Louisianas, the treaty and two conventions accom- panying it were engrossed in French and signed, dated April 30, 1803.
350
HISTORY OF MISSOURI
The actual signing, although of that date, being four days later, this delay being caused by translating into English the original treaty.
The whole of this tremendous transaction was concluded within two months after Monroe had sailed from New York. Marbois thus records the conclusion of this memorable treaty: "The authors of those solemn instruments, that regulate the lot of nations, can not be insensible to the honour of having done acts useful to their country. A sentiment superior even to glory seemed to animate the three min- isters, and never perhaps did negotiators taste a purer joy. As soon as they had signed the treaty they rose and shook hands, when Living- ston, expressing the general satisfaction, said, we have lived long, but this is the noblest act of our whole lives. The treaty which we have just signed has not been obtained by art or dictated by force; equally advantageous to the two contracting parties, it will change vast soli- tudes into flourishing districts. From this day the United States take their place among the powers of the first rank; the English lose all exclusive influence in the affairs of America. * * * The instru-
ments which we have just signed will cause no tears to be shed; they prepare ages of happiness for innumerable generations of human creatures. The Mississippi and Missouri will see them succeed one another and multiply, truly worthy of the regard and care of Provi- dence, in the bosom of equality, under just laws, freed from the error of superstition and the scourges of bad government."26 When Na- poleon heard that the treaty had been definitely concluded, he tri- umphantly said : "This accession of this outlet strengthens forever the power of the United States; and I have just given to England a mari- time rival that will sooner or later humble her pride."
Jefferson was startled by the marvelous success of these negotia- tions. He called a special session of Congress to meet in October following, to ratify the treaty. Many objections were made. For instance, it was contended that France only conveyed a mere quit claim, because it did not appear that France had complied with the conditions on which alone Spain had agreed to cede Louisiana. The treaty of St. Ildefonso, it was argued, was not itself a cession, but merely an agreement to cede under certain circumstances, and that the country was still in possession of Spain. In support of this posi- tion reference was made to the fact that the Spanish Minister at Wash- ington had entered a caveat or protest with our Government against the transfer as invalid. In this protest the Marquis de la Casa Yrùjo
· 26 Marbois, History of Louisiana, p. 31I.
35I
TREATY HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
gave publicity to the fact, that by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, Napoleon had agreed for the French Government, that Spain should have the preference in case France, in her turn, should be disposed again to cede Louisiana, and further that one of the express conditions upon which the King, his master, had transferred the country to France, was that the latter power should obtain from all the courts of Europe the acknowledgment of the Duke of Parma as King of Etruria, and that these engagements not having been fulfilled the treaty of cession was null and void. Spain, however, was not in a position to assert her undoubted rights, and although still in possession of the country, was not able to maintain herself both against France and the United States. In an ordinary real estate transaction a fraud such as Na- poleon perpetrated would not avail the purchaser. But this was no ordinary real estate transaction. When nations deal with each other might often seems to make right, national advantage prevails over justice, fraud sometimes becomes patriotism. However, on the 10th of February 1804, in a letter to Mr. Pinckney the Spanish Minister, denied that he had been instructed to oppose the transfer of Louisiana, and declared that "his Majesty thought proper to renounce his pro- test against the alienation of Louisiana by France."
Public men were not troubling themselves seriously about the equities between Spain and France, but the great and serious difficulty pointed out by Jefferson himself, so far as the United States was con- cerned, was that the acquisition of any territory whatever under the obligation to admit such territory, as a state, to the Union, was not warranted by the Constitution. The Constitution, it was contended, was formed for the government of a certain known and defined terri- tory called the United States, and could not be extended to another territory without the consent of each of the states. Nevertheless, the treaty was ratified, - yeas, 24; nays, 7, including all the Federalists present.
During the debate the unconstitutional character of the treaty was admitted by many, and particularly by Taylor of Virginia, who "confessed that the treaty was a violation of the Constitution; but declared that he would ratify it and throw himself on the people for pardon, and on Heaven to absolve him of the violation of a trust he had sworn to maintain." Griswold of Connecticut said, "The Union of the States is formed on the principal of a co-partnership, and it would be absurd to suppose that the agent of the parties, the gen- eral government, who had been appointed to execute the business
352
HISTORY OF MISSOURI
of the compact in behalf of the principals, the states, could admit a new partner without the consent of the parties themselves. The treaty therefore, so far as it stipulates for such an incorporation, is void." Plummer, a Federalist Senator from New Hampshire , called on President Jefferson while the treaty was pending, and during the course of the conversation Jefferson inquired what his opinion was respecting the treaty. Plummer answered that he thought the Senate "had no constitutional authority to make and execute the treaty ;" and to this Jefferson replied that was precisely his opinion. John Quincy Adams also thought that an amendment to the Consti- tution ought to be proposed to ratify the purchase. "The Constitu- tion," says Jefferson in one of his letters, "has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign na- tions into our Union. Congress will be obliged to ask from the peo- ple an amendment to the Constitution, authorising their receiving the province into the Union, and providing for its government." In a letter to Senator John Breckenridge he further says: "The executive in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances the good of his country has done an act beyond the Constitution." He also said that it was his wish that this act might be ratified. The draft of such an amendment was actually prepared by Madison, but never formally proposed, because it was doubtful if it would be adopted by the requisite number of states.
The violation of the Constitution acquiesced in on account of the evident advantage of the acquisition of Louisiana, was considered, in 1819, sufficient authority for the purchase of the Floridas, by treaty ; th ' annexation of Texas by resolution; the incorporation of large portions of Mexico by conquest and purchase; the acquisition of Alaska by treaty; and in more recent times the annexation of Porto Rico by conquest, as well as the Philippine Islands in Asia, seven thousand miles away. A precedent so established, conceded at the time to be without constitutional sanction, and held by Jefferson to be in violation of the Constitution, has been made the basis to add to the Union territories much more extensive than the original states. Great as was the advantage of this acquisition, dazzling as was the prize, intoxicated as were the people, Jefferson never lost sight of the violation done the Constitution by the purchase. Twenty-five years afterwards, shortly before his death, he said, "I still think the ratification of that treaty was the most direct and palpable violation of the Constitution of which Congress has ever been guilty."
-
353
FEARS
This purchase not only received the approval of a vast majority of Jefferson's own countrymen, but it was approved by England, and Lord Hawkesbury, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on being advised of the treaty of cession, wrote Mr. King, then Minister of the United States at the Court of St. James, "I have received His Ma- jesty's command to express to you the pleasure with which His Majesty has received this intelligence."27 The English govern- ment, although anticipating war with France, also rendered essential service in these negotiations for the purchase of Loui- siana by interposing no objections to the propositions made by the great houses of Hope of Amsterdam and the Barings of London to make loans to any amount to the United States at the usual rate of interest to facilitate the purchase. The knowl- edge of these offers inspired the government of France with confidence that the stock or bonds of the United States to pay for the province could be converted into cash at a fair price, for it should be remembered that the credit of the United States was then not well established. That England would have seized Louisiana as soon as war began, is certain. Napoleon disposed of the country none too soon. His foresight was fully justified, for when the English ministers were advised of the mission of Monroe, they realized that the conquest of Louisiana could only be attempted with the concurrence of the United States, and they therefore pro- posed to our envoy at the court of St. James, that if the conquest of Louisiana was made, the province would be retroceded to the United States. But from all these complications we were happily saved by the purchase, for the retrocession of the country to the United States, if once in the power of England, may well be con- sidered problematical.
Many leading statesmen of the time thought that the acquisition. of Louisiana would lead to a dismemberment of the Union. At the time of the purchase this was not an uncommon opinion. "Our country," said Fisher Ames , October 6, 1803, "is too big for Union." Rodgers Griswold of Connecticut stated October 15, 1803, in the House of Representatives, "The vast and unmanageable extent which the acquisition of Louisiana will give the United States; the consequent dispersion of the population, and the destruction of that balance which is so important to maintain between the Western and Eastern States threatens, at no distant day, the subversion of our 27 See 4 Jefferson's Works, p. 62.
354
HISTORY OF MISSOURI
Union." Jackson, of Georgia said, February, 1804, "The settle- ment will affect, what I much deprecate, a separation of this Union." Drayton, of New Jersey, February 2, 1804, declared, "If upper Loui- siana is settled, the people there will separate from us; they will form a new empire and become our enemies." Stone, of North Carolina, on the 16th of February, said, "The acquisition of Loui- siana will produce one of two things; either a division of the Union or a very different government from what we now have." Plummer, of New Hampshire, thought October 20, 1803, that "The ratification of this treaty, and the possession of that immense territory will hasten the dissolution of our present government. The constitution never contemplated the accession of a foreign people or the extension of our territory. * Adopt this Western world into the Union, and you destroy at once the weight and importance of the Eastern States, and compel them to establish a separate and independent Empire." And John Quincy Adams, on December 28, 1828, at that time Presi- dent of the United States, tells us that a dissolution of the Union was actually planned by the Federal party of Massachusetts " in the winter of 1803 and 1804 immediately after, and as a consequence of the acquisition of Louisiana."
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.