USA > Missouri > Centennial history of Missouri (the center state) one hundred years in the Union, 1820-1921, Volume I > Part 44
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The original idea of the Wabash was a railroad from St. Louis and St. Charles northwesterly along the dividing line between the Mississippi and the Missouri river valleys to the Iowa line and thence to Des Moines. The name
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was the North Missouri. This road was chartered in 1851 and reached Macon in 1859. Not until 1864 did the North Missouri take over the two shorter roads, the Chariton and the Missouri Valley and build through to Kansas City.
When Paramore built 700 miles of three-foot gauge road through Missouri and Arkansas and into Texas with only $12,000 a mile bonded debt, it seemed as if standard roads with larger indebtedness could not compete. There was much sentiment in St. Louis favorable to the narrow gauge idea. But it died out and the narrow gauge became standard. Samuel W. Fordyce, first receiver and then reorganizer of the Cotton Belt, as the road was called, worked out the rail- road problem demonstrating that a standard gauge was best.
Duty of a Railroad President.
While Stewart was president of the Hannibal and St. Joe his policy was to make the new means of transportation as popular as possible with Missourians. One night the president was traveling over the road,-it was before the era of the sleeping car,- when a baby set up an outcry which disturbed the whole coach. The mother tried in vain to quiet the little one. Stewart arose from his seat, went to the mother and said :
"Madam, my name is Stewart. I am president of this road and it is my duty to look after the comfort of the patrons. Hand that baby to me."
He took the baby in his arms and walked up and down the aisle until he put it to sleep.
The man who built the first railroad bridge across the Ohio river, who located and supervised the building of the famous Georgetown loop,-a master piece of railroad engineering,-who told the Union Pacific how to cross Great Salt Lake, chose the Ozarks for his declining years and rests in the cemetery at Oakland. The name of Jacob Blickensderfer is identified with the solution of so many railroad engineering problems as to make him an historic figure in his profession. President Grant selected him to adjust and complete the great public improvement contracts which redeemed Washington in 1870. Mr. Blickensderfer was identified with the building of the Oregon Short Line. He supervised the construction of the main line of the Union Pacific from Green river to Ogden. He built the bridge across Snake river. An early connection as chief engineer with the Frisco led to his appreciation of the Ozark country. When the years came on Mr. Blickensderfer made his home in Laclede county and lived there the rest of his life. Descendants of Jacob Blickensderfer are numerous in Missouri.
Railway Mail Service Originated in Missouri.
"The father of railway mail service" was General William A. Davis of St. Joseph. Senator Cockrell and Representative James N. Burnes assembled docu- mentary evidence of this paternity. General Davis left papers which embraced drawings of cars and similar data showing what he was planning as early as 1862. He was postmaster at St. Joseph at one time and for many years con- nected with the service. He took great pride in the efficiency of his office and when crowded with work used to go out on the railroads fifty or sixty miles to get that much additional time in sorting and arranging mail matter. This gave Vol. 1-26
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him the idea that much of the work then being done in the offices could be trans- acted en route, and that a great deal of time could be saved in the transmission of matter. On the 5th of August, 1862, Mr. Davis reported to the assistant postmaster general what was the practical beginning of railway mail service :
"I have the honor to report that in obedience to verbal orders received through Mr. Waller, special agent of the department, one of the clerks and myself left here on Satur- day, 26th, so as to be in Quincy on Monday, 28th ult., to commence the distribution of the overland mail on the Hannibal and St. Joe railway. Finding that the mail cars had not been arranged according to promises made to Mr. Waller, instead of going to Quincy I proceeded to Hannibal and succeeded in getting cars temporarily fixed, in which, though with some inconvenience, I think the work can be done until the new cars are ready. The distribution was commenced on Monday at Palmyra, and I assisted the clerk, going up as far as Clarence, at which place I turned back with the clerk who had come down to go up. On Tuesday assisted up to the same point and turned back, and dis- tributed the mail going up on Wednesday myself. We have now gotten through with a week's service, and can confidently report that when the accommodations are furnished that are promised by Mr. Hayward, superintendent of the road, the distribution can be done entirely to your satisfaction. The excuse given by the officers at Hannibal for not having cars ready was that they had been daily expecting both Mr. Hayward and Mr. Nettleton, neither of whom had arrived when I got there on Saturday. Mr. Hay- ward got home on Wednesday last and I saw him on Friday. He. promised to have the cars got up specially for the mail service, and have them run through to West Quincy. This will be all that is necessary to secure the entire success of the distribu- tion on the road, providing that we have competent men to do the work."
John L. Bittinger, who was postmaster at St. Joseph following General Davis, wrote a letter:
"Mr. Davis had been in the service of the department for over forty years and knew cvery detail of the service, and had handled the overland mail from the start. The exigencies of the war rendered the operating of the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad exceedingly difficult, and almost every train would be behind time. As the overland mail coaches were expected to leave on their journey across the plains promptly, of necessity they frequently had to go without a great portion of the eastern mail. Mr. Davis conceived the idea of distributing the mail on the cars, and laid the plans before me. I was satisfied they were good, and urged him to go ahead and request authority from the department and experiment. He was granted the necessary authority, and, with clerks detailed from the St. Joe office, under his personal supervision the railway mail service between Quincy and St. Joseph was soon in successful operation. How credit ever came to be given to any other person than Mr. Davis for originating this service I never could conceive."
The assistant postmaster general at the time, A. N. Seevely, referring to the report and to the letters of Maj. Bittinger and others, said: "These letters have revived recollections of my conversations with Mr. Davis and personal observations which I had the opportunity of making in 1863 at St. Joseph, and on the cars between that place and Hannibal, and I now feel quite well satisfied that Messrs. Bittinger and others truly state the facts concerning Mr. Davis' work in connection with the postal car service. I talked with Mr. Davis in St. Joe during my visit there, preparatory to a trip on the overland stage, and believe that the idea of assorting mails on the cars, instead of delaying them for that purpose in the distributing post office in St. Joseph was entirely original with himself."
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Many years afterwards the United States government prepared a history of the railway mail service from its inception in 1862 and gave the credit of it to another man in whose honor a statue was erected. When the manuscript copy of this history was examined it appeared that red ink lines had been drawn through the name of William A. Davis and the mention of his connection with the first organization.
The Right to Regulate.
Of the millions for which the state became responsible through aid of rail- road construction, Missouri, after years of legislation and waiting, got back about two-fifths. But the state also acquired the conceded right to regulate rates on freight and passenger traffic. To the statesmanship of Governor Fletcher, Missouri owes this wise reservation of the right to regulate. That Missouri did not pioneer the way to partnership by the state in the profits of railroad operation was because the lawmaking power ignored a second sugges- tion of the governor. In the same message that urged the provision for rate regulation, Governor Fletcher said: "The present is perhaps also the best occasion for requiring (in all cases where it may be legally done) of all rail- roads a small annual tribute to the state, which could be so insignificant in amount as not to interfere with the profitable operation of the roads, but which would in the aggregate ultimately grow to be a sum sufficient to carry on the state government without the levy of any taxes on the people for state pur- poses."
When in 1865 the Fletcher administration entered upon the solution of the railroad problem in Missouri there were 826 miles of road in the state. When in 1868 the last of the foreclosures and sales were completed there were 1,394 miles and on the Southwest Branch, which the state had operated, 2,000 men were making the dirt fly. Fremont, who was dispossessed of the Southwest Branch, had been the head of the Republican ticket for the presidency in 1856 Fisk, who succeeded Fremont, to successfully demonstrate railroad operation by the state, was to become a national standard bearer of the Prohibition party. The roads which state money built and on which the state expended about $20,000,000 are today the trunk lines of the Missouri Pacific, the Iron Mountain, the Wabash, the Frisco and the Burlington system in Missouri. They are the main stems of 7,000 miles of railroad valued at more than $350,000,000 within the limits of the state.
Soon after the Civil war the governor of Missouri, Thomas C. Fletcher, addressing a special message to the legislature, said :
"I suggest in any disposition you make of this road there be reserved the right of the state to regulate the charges for carrying freight and passengers, and that a penalty be annexed for exceeding such rates. It is not an inappro- priate occasion to add, in this connection, that so far as you have power over the several railroads, by existing circumstances, this right ought to be reserved to the legislature, and thus as fully as possible provide for the protection of the people from exorbitant charges on the part of these corporations, which have a monopoly of a business that might be used to the great detriment of the people."
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CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF MISSOURI
At that time the state practically owned every mile of railroad in Missouri. Of one road the governor had taken actual possession; he was operating it. The other roads, while being operated by companies, belonged to the state by virtue of long existing default on the bonds which the state had issued to the companies to aid construction. Foreclosures were impending in all of these cases. Nothing stood in the way of seizure save the question of future policy. Should the state take charge of the roads which its money had built and run them? It may seem strange but the fact is that not even minority sentiment supported the affirmative. Several sessions of the legislature were required to work out the problem.
The roads were uncompleted. Only one of them had reached the western border of the state. Millions had been absorbed in construction. Large sections of the state were entirely without the expected facilities. Of the first consid- eration in the adjustment were terms which would insure more construction. For what had been spent the legislators and the public gave only secondary thought. In driving bargains the state endeavored to recover something of what had been invested, if that word may be used, but the amount of money was not deemed of so much importance as the condition of future building.
In the foreclosure of the state's lien and in the sale of the road to the new company, as each settlement was made, was found the opportunity to which this far-sighted governor drew attention. The experiment of railroad owner- ship is an historical fact. Of greater significance, perhaps, is the regulation feature which was made part of the readjustment of relations with the rail- roads of Missouri.
The Original Charters.
When the recommendations for foreclosure and sale were made Missouri had no rate power over railroads. Charters granted from 1847 to 1857, the period of railroad beginning and construction, authorized the companies to fix their own passenger and freight rates. These charters, in specific terms, ex- empted the railroads from the operation of the statutes on the subject of rate regulation. Like some other western and like some central states, Missouri, yielding to the strong popular desire to stimulate railroad construction, granted charters with extremely liberal provisions. But, as was not the case in many other states, Missouri, through the disastrous effect of the Civil war, found the opportunity to amend radically her relations with the railroads.
Urged repeatedly by Governor Fletcher, the general assembly, as one rail- road after another was foreclosed and sold, inserted in the bills which became acts a provision subjecting the roads to rate regulations. This provision the railroad companies opposed but were compelled to accept. The only concession . made was that the right of regulation by the state should not become effective until ten years after the passage of the act by the legislature of 1868. An amendment cutting out the provision for rate regulation was defeated by a vote of sixty-four to forty-two. Those opposing the rate regulation provision were about equally divided between the Republican and Democratic parties. At that time, shortly after the close of the war many residents of the state were disfranchised. The Republicans had a majority in the legislature. By the
Charles G. Warner
S. H. H. Clark
1
D. R. Garrison
A. A. Talmage
A GROUP OF MISSOURI RAILROAD MANAGERS OF A PAST GENERATION
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series of acts the right of rate regulation after ten years was not only stipu- lated by the legislature but was formally accepted by the reorganized railroad companies as one of the conditions upon which they regained their properties.
An Experiment in State Ownership.
Missouri's experiment in state ownership of railroads was not of popular choice. It resulted from circumstances chief of which was the Civil war. Con- ditions at the time seemed most disastrous. They prompted legislation which gave the state a commanding position toward the railroads, which made Mis- souri the successful pioneer in the field of government control of common car- riers. In actual possession and operation of railroad property the state had an experience novel and interesting, although not very important in the light of the railroad management of these times. The governor of Missouri became a railroad manager. He established rates, ran trains, maintained the tracks, even added betterments to the property, and showed balances on the right side of the ledger. The governor was proud of the record of railroad management by the state. He gave the people the facts in his messages to the general assem- bly. But he did not advise continuance of state ownership of railroads. In fact, he told the legislature and the people that "the paramount want" of the state was completed railroads. In that view popular sentiment coincided. State ownership found no advocates, notwithstanding the experiment on a scale some- what impressive for those days was entirely encouraging.
Missouri did not yield readily or extravagantly to the early agitation for railroads. In 1836 and the years following there were importunate advocates of state aid of railroads. Mass meetings were held. Conventions were organ- ized. Ringing resolutions were adopted. Illinois was contributing millions of dollars of state aid for railroads within her borders. The influence of this boom of the nearby neighbor was felt on the west side of the Mississippi. It did not, however, result in action by the Missouri legislature. Partly owing to inherent conservatism, partly because of the waterway facilities, Missouri moved slowly in the building of railways.
State Policy in 1850-60.
The policy of state aid to railroads began in Missouri in 1851. Charters were granted and bills were passed authorizing the issue of bonds, guaranteed by the state, to construct railroads. The condition attached to the aid was that the railroad company must put up $50,000 of its own funds for each grant of $50,000 bonds by the state. This policy was given free trial until 1855 when the people of Missouri made the disagreeable discovery that the state had authorized the issue of $9,000,000 bonds ; that the railroad building was progres- sing very slowly; that the cost was twice or three times the original estimates : that these bonds which had commanded a premium when issued were below par and selling at an alarming discount. A change in the policy was imperative. but the change that took place seems inexplicable to this generation which can- not realize the railroad mania of that decade before the war. The railroad com- panies admitted that they were at the end of outside resources. They had raised and spent all that could be obtained in subscriptions from counties, cities and
-
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CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF MISSOURI
individuals. They made the, astounding proposition that the state authorize the issue of $10,000,000 more in aid bonds, $19,000,000 in all. They asked . that this aid be made available to them as they contributed, not dollar for dollar as before but one dollar of their money for two dollars of state bonds. Fine promises were made that with this aid the roads would be pushed through to the western and southern borders of Missouri. Strange to tell, the legislators were convinced by the reasoning that with this additional $10,000,000 the roads would be completed and that without it the state might lose what had been put in. The bill passed, authorizing the issue of $10,000,000 to be applied in the proportion of two dollars of state money to one dollar of railroad subscriptions.
Governor Price's Veto.
Governor Sterling Price vetoed the bill and in doing so he said to the general assembly : "The bill is tantamount to a measure to bankrupt the treasury and ' to blast the reputation of the state." He charged that the companies in bad faith had sold aid bonds and used the proceeds to pay interest upon previous issues instead of for construction. But, the assembly passed the bill over the veto. During two years the bonds were issued on the new basis of two dollars of the people's money for one dollar of the railroad money. The railroad building went on slowly through Missouri.
In 1857 came the financial crisis. The issue of aid bonds was suspended. Tempted again by the hope of a spurt which might rush the roads to completion the legislature authorized large issues of bonds on condition that the railroads expend small sums, practically giving to the companies these issues. Beginning with 1859 the companies, one after another, ceased paying interest on the aid bonds. The state, to maintain its credit, was compelled to issue and sell addi- tional bonds to meet the defaulted interest. In the spring of 1861 came the war. The companies stopped building railroads. The state stopped paying interest on the bonds. The results of the ten years' policy of aid to railroads showed state bonds issued as follows :
Pacific railroad
$ 7,000,000
Southwest branch
4,500,000
Iron Mountain
3,501,000
Cairo and Fulton
650,000
Platte county
700,000
North Missouri
4,350,000
Total
$20,701,000
The discount and commission for the selling of these bonds were $2,713,826. The net cash to the railroads was $17,927,174. And not one of the railroads was completed. Cities and counties had contributed through subscriptions $7,- 200,000. The state aid had been $2.61 for every dollar put in from city, county and private subscriptions. Of private subscriptions to stock the companies had obtained only $1,500,000. Of the $27,917,000 put into Missouri railroads in the decade before the war, $26,400,000 was public funds, or about $17 of the peo- ple's money to every dollar raised by the railroad companies from private in- vestors. St. Louis county and city lost $5,450,000.
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The Railroad Problems of 1865.
With the return of peace in 1865, Missouri faced a railroad problem that required four years for solution. It held first liens on the roads. Principal and interest of this railroad aid debt reached $31,735,000, before the policy of set- tlement had been fully carried out. No advocacy of permanent state owner- ship was developed. Popular sentiment almost universally demanded comple- tion of the roads across the state. Under such conditions of public feeling Governor Fletcher recommended and the general assembly passed measures which at the same time foreclosed the liens and transferred the roads on con- ditions intended to expedite construction and to save as much as possible on the bonded debt. Each road presented a problem somewhat different from the others. One road which gave the state most trouble and which prompted the experiment in railroad operation by the state was known then as the Southwest Branch; it is now a part of the main stem of the Frisco system. Of this road the state took actual possession under circumstances which Governor Fletcher explained to the general assembly in a special message in January, 1868, as follows :
"The Southwest Pacific railroad was disposed of to General John C. Fremont who offered for it, under all of the circumstances, a very liberal price. He was then repre- sented and believed to be wealthy and able to influence a large amount of capital for such an enterprise. He united it with the Atlantic and Pacific railroad, a corporation which was organized under an act of Congress with power to build a railroad from Springfield, Missouri, to the Pacific ocean, with a grant of land for that purpose exceed- ing in quantity and value any grant ever made to a corporation in America. He paid $325,000 to the state, as required by the terms of sale. The Atlantic and Pacific Railroad company laid down the track and extended the road to Little Piney, a distance of about twelve miles from its former terminus, built one or two bridges, and partially constructed one across the Gasconade and did some grading west of that point. On the expiration of one year from date of sale I was satisfied that the sum of $500,000 had not been ex- pended in the work of 'graduation, masonry and superstructure of the extension of the road' as required by the contract. The contractors and laborers were not paid. But little work was being done. The means and credit of the company appeared to be ex- hausted. All of its operatives and employes were unpaid. And no reasonable ground remained for hope of a compliance on its part. Under the power given me by law I took. possession of the road and appointed General Clinton B. Fisk, agent, to operate it until the general assembly shall otherwise dispose of the same for the purpose of foreclosing the state's lien or mortgage."
The Southwest Branch Experiment.
A report of about six months operation of the road by the agent of the state show receipts to have been $118,970.83. The expenditures for the same period were $112,006.38. General Fisk retained the working organization of the road. As the receipts exceeded expenses, he paid the officers and employes the salaries and wages past due, applying in this way during the six months the sum of $18,535.29. The report further shows the purchase out of the receipts of several thousand ties. An engine house was built at Little Piney. A tank house at Sullivan was added to the equipment. The report concludes: "Extensive re- pairs have been made on engines and cars and the track has been placed in most excellent condition."
In a special message the governor recommended that road be given away to
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secure its completion. Legislation paved the way for the organization of a com- pany which guaranteeed extension. The agent of the state, General Fisk, as- sisted in the organization of the company, continuing to operate the road at a profit over running expenses until the company was ready to give the guaran- tees required and to take over the property.
The strongly controlling motive which prompted the state administration in the policy toward the railroads during the reorganization period is very well shown in the message which Governor Fletcher sent to the legislature upon the foreclosure and sale of the Iron Mountain. He said :
"It is my opinion that this road should have brought a larger sum, but the para- mount want of the southeast, of St. Louis, and of the state was the completed railroad, and not the contingency of a few thousand dollars more from its sale, which, if ob- tained, would be no adequate compensation for delay, or even risk of delay, in the long deferred enterprise. The owners of this road are now citizens of and property holders in St. Louis. They have obtained possession of it at a price which they can afford to pay. The state has constructed railroads which have built up the commerce of St. Louis until that commerce is strong enough to build railroads. So short a line as this and one which will redound so materially to the benefit of every interest of the city will surely find St. Louis capital, enterprise and energy to build it."
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