USA > New York > History of the state of New York, political and governmental, Vol. IV 1896-1920 > Part 13
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23New York Times, September 30, 1910.
24New York Times, September 27, 28, 1910.
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advancement. He finally consented on condition that the other candidates withdraw. They all did, except Sulzer, and accordingly Dix was nominated on the first ballot, receiving 434 votes to 16 for Sulzer. As the Republicans had nominated only one candidate for the Court of Appeals, leaving the second place open to be filled by the State committee with a candidate chosen by the Democrats, the convention accepted Vann and nominated Frederick Collin to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Edward T. Bartlett. Collin was indorsed by the Republicans and in October was appointed to the seat by Governor Hughes.25
In harmony with the opening speech of Parker attacking Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" the platform declared: "The party pledges itself anew to the old nationalism embodied in the Constitution." It also denounced the Payne tariff revision, complained of Republican extravagance, and dwelt on the corruption revealed by the Allds trial and the insurance investiga- tion. It favored a statewide direct primary, an Income Tax amendment, and the direct election of United States Senators.
The Republicans went away from Saratoga with forebodings of defeat. \Woodruff retired from the State chairmanship and was succeeded by Ezra P. Prentice. But Roosevelt himself was the dominating
25The ticket was: Governor, John A. Dix, Washington; Lieutenant- Governor, Thomas F. Conway, Clinton; Secretary of State, Edward Lazan- sky, Kings; Comptroller, William Sohmer, New York; Treasurer, John J. Kennedy, Erie; Attorney-General, Thomas Carmody, Yates; State Engineer, John A. Bensel, New York; Judges of the Court of Appeals, Irving G. Vann, Onondaga, and Frederick Collin, Chemung.
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figure of the campaign. The Republican party in the State suffered from more than a factional fight. The old leaders were used to the clash of interests and could easily reconcile differences with rivals who played the game of politics according to their rules. But the result at Saratoga spelled for them the passing of the old order and the conduct of politics by methods that they did not understand. They felt that Roosevelt's success would put them out of business and they gave only half-hearted support to his ticket. Still, the Republicans might have hoped to win if they had faced no difficulty but the indifference of discarded leaders.
The trouble lay deeper and was not confined to New York. Irreconcilable differences between the conserva- tives and radicals in the Republican party, held in check by Roosevelt's dominating personality, could not entirely be suppressed. Taft entered the White House hailed as the heir of the Roosevelt policies. Not less progressive in his attitude toward social and industrial advancement than his predecessor, his judicial tradi- tions and temperament alienated impatient radicals. Partly through circumstances beyond his control, partly through his own political inaptitude, the Presi- dent soon found himself ranked a reactionary in popular opinion. The tide, which since 1894 had stood so strongly in favor of the Republicans, had turned throughout the country. On the other hand, Roose- velt's assumption of leadership in New York gave opportunity to all the adversaries that he had accumu- lated through many years. The financial interests, which he had antagonized by his attempts to regulate
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railroads and curb trusts; the conservatives, who mis- trusted his attitude on the traditions of government; the politicians, who had necessarily followed him as President, breathed a sigh of relief when he departed for Africa. All were aroused to prevent the reëstab- lishment of his domination over the party. Against such a feeling, neither enthusiasm for the Hughes reforms, which he championed, nor fears of giving the State over to the rule of Tammany, could prevail. The idea that his campaign was the initial step to the third term candidacy and was hostile to the Taft administra- tion was so widely circulated as to draw from Elihu Root this solemn warning :
"A good many Republicans at this time seem to ignore all the grave and substantial issues which are before the people of the State, and intend to vote at the coming election upon no issue whatever, but simply as an expression of feeling against Mr. Roosevelt, whose course regarding national affairs they disapprove for one reason or another, and whom they desire to punish by defeating the party to which they belong, in which they believe, and which they have long loyally supported, because he holds a distinguished and potent place in the councils and activity of the party. . If it should happen that the administration cannot hold its own party together, the national convention would be quite likely to look for a Moses to lead them out of the wilderness and they might go to' Mr. Roosevelt, or they might go to one of the far more radical leaders who are now looming up in the political horizon of the north and middle west."26
Root defended the "New Nationalism," protested that Roosevelt's criticism of the ultra conservatism of courts was within proper bounds, and predicted that if Republicans through personal feeling defeated the
26Speech in New York City, October 28, 1910.
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party they "would regret it hereafter." His warning to conservatives, however, fell on deaf ears. On the evening of election the Union League Club, of which Roosevelt was a member, was thronged with men who openly rejoiced at every return indicating Democratic victory, in other States as well as New York, and, as they supposed, the shattering of Roosevelt's political power. The victory of the Democrats was widespread. They elected Governors in Maine, Connecticut, Massa- chusetts, Ohio, and New Jersey, and won control of the new House of Representatives. In New York Dix won by a plurality of 67,401, but his victory was less a result of Democratic strength than of Republican weakness; for he received 45,000 fewer votes than had been given to Chanler. The vote was: Dix, 689,700; Stimson, 622,299; John J. Hopper (Independence League), 48,470; Charles Edward Russell (Socialist), 48,529; T. Alexander MacNicholl (Prohibition), 22,295 ; Frank E. Passanno (Socialist Labor), 5,717.
Dix's associates were elected by pluralities ranging from 1,873 for Lazansky to 29,884 for Conway. The Democrats elected 23 of the 37 Congressmen and carried both houses of the Legislature. The Assembly stood : Democrats, 85; Republicans, 63; Independent Democrats, 1; Independence League, 1. The Senate stood : Democrats, 29; Republicans, 21; Independence League, 1. A constitutional amendment increasing the number of Judges of the Court of Appeals and giving them additional compensation was defeated by 292 votes, and a bond issue of $2,500,000 for the Palisades Park, to enable the State to perform its part of the
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agreement by which it took the great tract of land given by Mrs. Edward H. Harriman, was authorized by a plurality of 63,371.
In this year of struggle between the old and the new in politics came the deaths of the two men who, though they had outlived their political power, were still, as they had been for nearly thirty years, the personification to the public mind of the traditional forms and methods of political management in New York. Thomas C. Platt died on March 6, just as his old-time followers were choosing a successor to Allds. David B. Hill died on October 21, just as his party, for the first time since he sent it to defeat with Maynard, was to be returned to power.
HORACE WHITE
Horace White, 40th governor; born in Buffalo, N. Y., Oc- tober 7, 1865; graduated Cornell university; admitted to the bar and practiced law in Syracuse, N. Y .; state senator, 1896- 1908; elected lieutenant governor, 1908; became governor Oc- tober 8, 1910 upon the appointment of Governor Hughes as justice of the U. S. supreme court and his consequent resigna- tion as governor.
IRVING GOODWIN VANN
Irving Goodwin Vann, judge; born at Ulysses, Tompkins county, January 3, 1842; graduated from Yale, 1863 and the Albany law school, 1865; practiced law at Syracuse, N. Y., beginning in 1865; mayor of Syracuse, 1879; justice of the supreme court, 1882-1896; appointed to the court of appeals December 31, 1895 in place of Rufus W. Peckham, resigned ; elected for full term in 1896; reelected in 1910 and served until he retired on the age limit, December 31, 1912; died at Syracuse, N. Y., May 22, 1921.
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CHAPTER XII THE DEMOCRATS TAKE CONTROL
1911
1 HE Democratic victory almost immediately brought into open hostility two elements of the party, which had suppressed their differences during the campaign. On the one side stood those of reform and anti-machine views and associations, who had inspired the formation of the Democratic League, and on the other Murphy with the compact forces of Tammany Hall. Although Murphy had clearly domi- nated the Rochester convention and had not fully met their wishes, the reformers had great hope of Dix. He had been in sympathy with them and they looked to him to show the same independence in dealing with their party's bosses that Hughes had shown in dealing with the Republican machine. Nevertheless, they themselves adopted a conciliatory attitude toward Murphy and were desirous of harmony. The first of the disputes came over the election for Senator to suc- ceed Depew. The reformers, led by William Church Osborn and Thomas Mott Osborne, both of whom went into office under Dix, brought forward Edward M. Shepard. Shepard's high intellectual gifts and the purity of his character made a strong appeal to inde-
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pendent sentiment. He was a distinguished lawyer, a student of statecraft, a subtle dialectician, kindly with- out being a "good mixer"; but his inability to get hold of men prevented his ever proving the constructive power as an executive or legislator that a group of ardent friends believed he possessed. He had no hold upon the politicians, but it was thought that the oppor- tunity to place in the Senate one of the party's leading thinkers to match Root would appeal to the practical wisdom of the organization. Just as the Shepard movement seemed to be making good progress, William F. Sheehan appeared as a candidate, to the dismay of the reformers, who discovered that he had quietly been at work before election and earned the gratitude of many Democratic legislators by helping them in their campaigns. He had a strong following in Buffalo, his old home, and enjoyed the friendship of many aggres- sive organization Democrats, including most of the Tammany leaders. The New York Times attacked him as an unworthy candidate, who had grown up in a bad school of "smart" politics and been one of the most daring of Hill's lieutenants.1
Sheehan's friends answered that he had outgrown the political standards to which the circumstances of his early career, as well as the unswerving loyalty of his nature, had restricted him in bygone times, and that in character, as certainly in ability, he fairly represented his party. He was a successful lawyer at the metropol- itan bar (having removed to New York from Buffalo),
1New York Times, January 1, 1911.
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had the respect of able and honorable men, and pos- sessed lovable traits that endeared him to his associates. Directly after the election Parker's name was suggested, but he declined and supported Sheehan, who was his law partner. Other men, such as James W. Gerard, J. Sergeant Cram, Herbert P. Bissell, D-Cady Herrick, and Daniel F. Cohalan received passing mention, but before the Legislature met the prize apparently lay between Sheehan and Shepard and its destination depended on Murphy, who refrained from committing himself. Gaynor declared for Shepard, and as late as January 6 Osborne felt sure of Murphy's decision in favor of Shepard.2 Four days later John H. McCooey, Murphy's Brooklyn lieutenant, announced that Kings county would be solid for Shepard, and the reformers rejoiced. But on the same day Murphy in the Grand Central Station, as he was about to take the train for Albany, declared that the New York organization was opposed to Shepard, adding, "His only friends and advocates are men who generally vote the Republican ticket and only occasionally vote for a Democrat."3 Murphy, however, did not at once commit himself to Sheehan. He had some difficulties with his own organization; J. Sergeant Cram opposed him and declared that he would resign as secretary of the Tammany county committee if Sheehan was sup- ported.4 It became evident before the caucus, on Janu- ary 16, that Tammany had determined on Sheehan.
2New York Times, January 11, 1911.
3New York Times, January 12, 1911.
4New York Times, January 14, 1911.
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Dix was asked to take an active hand in favor of the re- formers, with whom he evidently sympathized, but he refused to exercise his influence or even announce his preference. The most he would say was that he wanted every man "to vote according to his own conscience" and "untrammeled by coercion from any quarter." When it was seen that the caucus would surely nomi- nate Sheehan, twenty-five of the Democratic legislators refused to attend it. In the caucus the vote was: Shee- han, 62; Shepard, 22; Herrick, 7. Shepard received the promised Kings county vote from men who had no expectation of nominating him, "the program having been prearranged," as Shepard afterward wrote, "that their formal vote for me should be followed instantly by their effective vote for Mr. Sheehan." Two Assemblymen, Chanler and Shortt, refused to make the nomination unanimous. The Republican caucus renominated Depew by a vote of 65 to 2 for Roosevelt. In the session the next day, twenty-six Democrats refused to support the caucus nomination. The ballot was : In the Senate-Sheehan, 25; Depew, 20; Shepard, 2; Gerard, 1; Littleton, 1; Herrick, 1. In the Assembly-Sheehan, 66; Depew, 59; Shepard, 12; Gerard, 1; Littleton, 1; Herrick, 1; Parker, 6.
Though Dix held aloof, his successor as State chair- man, Winfield A. Huppuch, came out for Sheehan and urged the insurgents to abide by the caucus.5 Ballots were taken from day to day without material changes until the middle of February, when the insurgents tried to concentrate on John D. Kernan. A few days later
5New York Times, January 26, 1911.
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Martin W. Littleton announced himself as a candidate with the object of breaking the deadlock. On February 26 Shepard retired from the contest, attacking Tam- many as a "voting trust" and predicting that Sheehan would soon withdraw."6 The next day Murphy replied, taunting the insurgents with their conciliatory attitude when they thought that the "voting trust" might favor them. He said: "I hesitate greatly to believe that Mr. Shepard or any of his friends would have found any fault with the support of Tammany Hall if they had succeeded in their efforts to secure such support for him for Senator-any more than they would have been put out with it if Mr. Shepard had succeeded in being nominated for Governor at Roches- ter, instead of Mr. Dix."7
The withdrawal of Shepard simply left the insur- gents to scatter a little more than they had before. Dix, finally aroused by the fear that the deadlock would wreck his legislative program, urged the Democrats in the Legislature to drop Sheehan, since, after a reason- able opportunity to convert the dissenters, he was clearly unable to win.8 But Sheehan declared that he would not withdraw as long as he remained the nominee of the party caucus. Repeated attempts were made to arrange a new caucus, but Sheehan on the one hand would not retire and the insurgents on the other would not enter it without assurance against encountering a solid phalanx of Tammany votes thrown for Sheehan
6New York Times, February 27, 1911.
7New York Times, February 28, 1911.
8New York Times, March 4, 1911.
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or some other candidate at Murphy's dictation. They began to talk instead of joining with the Republicans to elect some independent Democrat, and Brackett, the Republican leader in the Senate, declared for such a combination. In the hope of preventing this a new caucus was held on March 27, though the 25 insurgents still refused to enter it.9 Sheehan still persisted in his candidacy, but received only 28 votes. Augustus Van Wyck received 7, John J. Fitzgerald 6, Isidor Straus 5, John D. Kernan, Daniel F. Cohalan, and Theodore Sutro 4 each; while 28 votes were scattered. The Tammany vote itself was no longer concentrated. The caucus adjourned from day to day without any results until, at the end of March, Barnes advised the Repub- licans that they ought to help elect an independent Democrat and the insurgents let it be known that unless Murphy compromised they would join to elect Kernan. The insurgents presented a list to Murphy from which he might choose a Senator. On it were the names of Herrick, Gerard, Straus, Glynn, Littleton, Van Wyck, Parker, Kernan, Herman Ridder, John N. Carlisle, and Victor J. Dowling. Murphy insisted that they must put on the list Cohalan, one of his most intimate advis- ers, and Morgan J. O'Brien, but they refused. Then Murphy proposed James A. O'Gorman, a loyal Tam- many man, whose judicial position had preserved him from the antagonisms of politics. Under urgency from Dix, fourteen of the insurgents, led by Franklin D. Roosevelt, went into the caucus, and there the vote was :
9New York Times, March 27, 28, 1911.
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O'Gorman, 63; Sheehan, 23; Straus, 5; Herrick, 4; Kernan, 3; Van Wyck, 1; Sulzer, 1; Parker, 1.
On the last day of March O'Gorman was elected, receiving the full Democratic strength of 112 votes, to 80 for Depew. The insurgents had beaten Sheehan, but their final compromise was most unwelcome to reform Democrats. The New York Times described the result as the "surrender of the insurgents" and said : "We have been told that the insurgents were fighting for a 'principle.' Mr. Murphy also was fighting for a 'principle,' the principle of Murphy rule. He has won his fight."10
The Senatorial deadlock made havoc with Governor Dix's legislative program. It not only caused delay but started factional bitterness and revealed the Gov- ernor's lack of the leadership necessary to realize his own good intentions. A serious fire in the Capitol on March 29 also interfered with the progress of legisla- tion, so that the first session did not end until July 21. Murphy so far sacrificed to public opinion at the begin- ning of the session as to set Grady aside from the nominal leadership of the Senate and make Robert F. Wagner President pro tem. Cobb's disposition to com- promise with reform had alienated the Republican organization in the Senate, which chose Brackett leader over Hinman, the candidate of the Hughes men. Daniel D. Frisbie of Schoharie was elected Speaker, and the Republican leadership of the Assembly naturally fell to Merritt, since the Roosevelt defeat threw the organization back into the hands of the "Old
10New York Times, April 1, 1911.
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Guard." Prentice resigned the chairmanship of the State committee in January, and Barnes was elected to succeed him without serious opposition. Dix put forward a program of economy, abolition of State com- missions, ballot reform, and direct primaries. He also favored the Federal Income Tax amendment, disre- garding Hughes's objection to its form, and on his advice the Legislature ratified it and likewise memor- ialized Congress to pass a constitutional amendment for the popular election of the United States Senators. In the guise of abolishing unnecessary commissions, the Legislature put through several measures denounced by the Republicans and reform Democrats as "Ripper bills," designed merely to seize office. The Highway commission gave way to a board composed of a Super- intendent of Highways, the Superintendent of Public Works, and the State Engineer. A Conservation com- mission superseded the Forest, Fish and Game depart- ment, the State Water Supply commission, and minor boards.11 The Court of Claims was superseded by a Board of Claims having the same functions, for the sole purpose of providing party patronage. The Levy Election law attempted to extend personal registration to the rural districts, and also to prevent any candidate's name from appearing in more than one place on a ballot, thus handicapping fusion movements in the interest of Tammany, but the Court of Appeals declared both these provisions unconstitutional.
Throughout the long session Tammany hampered the Governor's efforts to meet in good faith the
11New York Times, July 22, 1911.
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demands for direct nominations. Dix finally sent special messages urging the passage of the Blauvelt- Ferris bill, which Franklin D. Roosevelt and other insurgents declared he had formerly condemned, and which they pronounced a fraud on the people, intended to fasten the control of the bosses on the parties. This measure provided for the direct nomination of Con- gressmen, members of the Legislature, and local offi- cers, but retained the State conventions to nominate Governors and other State officers. The reformers espe- cially objected to it because it gave the candidates designated by the party committees a preferential place on the primary ballot and the use of the party emblem, leaving candidates designated by petition at a disad- vantage. It also allowed the party committees to use the party funds to promote the nomination of their candidates as against candidates put forward by peti- tion, thus turning the machinery of the whole party to the service of the "organization" leaders. The Legis- lature adjourned without passing even this bill, but reassembled again on September 6 to reapportion the Congress districts in accordance with the new Federal law, which increased New York's representation from thirty-seven to forty-three. Then, when the insurgents threatened to join with the Republicans and pass a modified form of the old Hinman bill, the Democrats adopted the Blauvelt-Ferris bill, and the Governor accepted it as the best he could get.
The Governor was no more fortunate with his appointments than with his legislation in holding the favor of the reformers who had hoped for so much from
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him. He was forced to name Cohalan to succeed O'Gorman in the Supreme Court, in order to obtain Murphy's delayed consent to the confirmation of George C. Van Tuyl for Superintendent of Banks.12 He made J. Sergeant Cram, the secretary of the Tammany county committee, and Huppuch, the chairman of the State committee and his private business associate, Public Service Commissioners, and later gave to his own brother-in-law, Curtis N. Douglas, the same office. He appointed Civil Service Commissioners without inquiry into their disposition toward the law, and they so opened the door to spoilsmen that the New York Times, which had started out an ardent supporter of Dix, said : "It begins to look as if there was nobody in the State quite so careless about the success and the reputation of Governor Dix's administration as the Governor himself."13
Tammany pushed through a Three Platoon Police bill for first and second-class cities, despite its home rule principles, but was forced to amend it to exempt traffic squads. It attempted to pass a new charter for New York City, but a controversy, chiefly provoked by a provision giving the Mayor an ultimate veto on railway contracts, which the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company felt would be inimical to it as Gaynor was believed to favor extension of the single Interborough system, caused its defeat.14 On the other hand, Dix deserved credit for preventing much bad legislation. He vetoed
12Myers, History of Tammany Hall, p. 354.
13New York Times, February 8, 1911.
14Statements to the writer by Ray B. Smith and Robert Cumming, counsel to the Charter Revision commission.
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more than one hundred bills. After signing at the first session a law establishing a Boxing commission, under which almost unrestrained prize-fighting was carried on, he courageously reversed his attitude and sought a repeal, but without avail, and then forced his own appointees in the commission to reform their admin- istration. In September he removed Lawrence Gresser, the Borough President of Queens, on the report of Samuel H. Ordway, who had been appointed by Governor Hughes to examine into charges that had been made the year before. Mayor Gaynor's influence was exerted to save Gresser. The removal, however, was agreeable to Murphy, for it strengthened the faction in Queens, led by Joseph Cassidy, with which Murphy was allied.
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