History of the state of New York, political and governmental, Vol. VI, Part 4

Author: Smith, Ray Burdick, 1867- ed; Johnson, Willis Fletcher, 1857-1931; Brown, Roscoe Conkling Ensign, 1867-; Spooner, Walter W; Holly, Willis, 1854-1931
Publication date: 1922
Publisher: Syracuse, N. Y., The Syracuse Press
Number of Pages: 610


USA > New York > History of the state of New York, political and governmental, Vol. VI > Part 4


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"1. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union accord- ing to their respective numbers of free persons, including those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed and all other persons.


"2. No new State shall be admitted into the Union by Con-


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1815]


gress, in virtue of the power granted by the Constitution, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses.


"3. Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States, in the ports or harbors thereof, for more than sixty days.


"4. Congress shall not have power, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation, or the dependen- cies thereof.


"5. Congress shall not make or declare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the concurrence of two- thirds of both houses, except such acts of hostility be in defense of the territories of the United States when actually invaded.


"6. No person who shall hereafter be naturalized shall be eligi- ble as a member of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, nor capable of holding any civil office under the authority of the United States.


"7. The same person shall not be elected President of the United States a second time; nor shall the President be elected from the same State two terms in succession.


"Resolved, That if the application of these States to the govern- ment of the United States recommended in the foregoing resolutions should be unsuccessful, and peace should not be concluded, and the defense of these States should be neglected as it has been since the commencement of the war, it will, in the opinion of this conven- tion, be expedient for the Legislatures of the several States to appoint delegates to another convention to meet in Boston, in the State of Massachusetts, on the third Tuesday of June next, with such powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous may require.


"Resolved, That the Hon. George Cabot, the Hon. Chauncey Goodrich, and the Hon. Daniel Lyman, or any two of them, be authorized to call another meeting of this convention, to be holden in Boston, at any time before new delegates shall be chosen as rec- ommended in the above resolution, if in their judgment the situation of the country shall urgently require it."


The States of Massachusetts and Connecticut sent


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[1815-16


Commissioners to Washington to urge adoption of the proposed constitutional amendments, but without re- sult; and the only effect made upon the country by the convention's doings was that of resentment. It was felt that whatever merit attached to any of the propositions was at best only representative of local prejudices, tem- porary sentiment, and factious desires-prejudices, sentiment, and desires which could not be acceded to without reopening very delicate constitutional questions and destroying all national harmony. Considered as a whole, the political program formulated was regarded as utterly narrow, and as affording a demonstration of the incapacity of Federalist leadership for anything but futile contention. Soon after the convention's adjourn- ment news was received of the signing of the treaty of peace, and the Hartford movement thereupon came to an abrupt end.


It is noteworthy that not one of the seven constitu- tional amendments proposed by the Hartford conven- tion has ever been adopted, or even seriously considered. In advocating restriction of representation to the num- bers of free persons the convention did not at all con- template emancipation for the slaves, but only sought to reduce the political power of the southern States by summary elimination of the "three-fifths" provision of the Constitution.


1816


In 1816 the Republican Congressional caucus, on March 16, nominated James Monroe, of Virginia, for President, by a vote of 65 against 54 cast for William H.


-


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1816-20]


Crawford, of Georgia; Daniel D. Tompkins, of New York, receiving the nomination for Vice-President. No nominations were made by the Federalists, but they united in supporting for the Presidency Rufus King, of New York. The only States that gave their Electoral votes to King were Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Delaware. In the Electoral College the result for President was: Monroe, 183; King, 34. For Vice- President the vote stood: Tompkins, 183; John E. Howard, of Maryland, 22; James Ross, of Pennsyl- vania, 5; John Marshall, of Virginia, 4; Robert G. Harper, of Maryland, 3.


1820


The reelection of Monroe and Tompkins in 1820 was wholly undisputed. Even the formality of placing them in nomination was dispensed with, the Congres- sional caucus called for that purpose being attended by only a few members and deciding that no action was necessary. Monroe received 231 of the 232 Electoral votes. The solitary Elector opposing him, William Plumer, of New Hampshire, voted for John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts, not on party grounds, as Adams was a Republican, but for personal reasons and in protest against the arbitrary requirement that the Electors were obliged to obey party orders. The Vice- Presidential votes at this election were: Tompkins, 218; Richard Stockton, of New Jersey, 8; Daniel Rod- ney, of Delaware, 4; Robert G. Harper, of Maryland, 1; Richard Rush, of Pennsylvania, 1.


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1824


With Monroe terminated the line of illustrious and venerated Fathers who, identified successively with the struggle for American independence, the early endeavors of the States to administer their affairs, and the adoption of the Constitution and foundation of the Federal government, had been elevated to the Presi- dency for their preëminent historical fitness. His two administrations constituted the so-called "era of good feeling," with party lines so entirely obliterated that there existed in fact only one party, the Republican. During these years there were no indications of any plans, or even conceptions, in the direction of new party organization. The remarkable and exciting Presiden- tial campaign of 1824 was shaped and fought without the least reference to party alignment, except in the particular of full and zealous conformity to Republi- canism on the part of each of the candidates.


Preparations for the contest were begun in 1822, when Andrew Jackson was placed in nomination by the Legislature of Tennessee, and Henry Clay by that of Kentucky. Other States followed with nominations variously of Jackson, Clay, John Quincy Adams, and William H. Crawford. It was apparent from the outset that no candidate could control a majority of the party nationally, and efforts were concentrated toward securing State commitments and emphasizing the respective claims of the aspirants. The supporters of Crawford, however, undertook to invoke the authority of "regular" action, and a call was issued for a Congres-


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1824]


sional caucus. A meeting was held accordingly, Feb- ruary 14, 1824, in the hall of the House of Representa- tives at Washington, but only 66 of the 261 members of the two houses attended. Agreeably to prearrange- ment, Crawford was nominated for President, with Albert Gallatin, of Pennsylvania, for Vice-President, and a resolution was adopted commending the candi- dates to the favor of the Republicans of the nation. Conscious of the somewhat farcical character of the proceedings in the circumstances, the meeting added to the resolution the following explanation, which proved to be the valedictory of the institution of the caucus as President-maker :


"That in making the foregoing recommendation, the members of this meeting have acted in their individual characters as citizens; that they have been induced to this measure from a deep and settled con- viction of the importance of union among the Republicans throughout the United States, and as the best means of collecting and concentrat- ing the feelings and wishes of the people of the Union upon the important subject."


In the campaign no one paid any attention to the "measure." The rule of King Caucus had forever ended. To the Presidential canvass of 1824 has been given the inelegant but perfectly descriptive name of "the scrub race." Jackson received 99 Electoral votes, Adams 84, Crawford 41, Clay 37.1 Several of the States showed considerable indecision and promiscuity in


1Previously to 1824 there was no record of the popular vote for President. In 1824 eighteen of the twenty-four States chose their Electors by direct popular vote of the people, the rest through the Legislatures. Popular vote so far as recorded :- Jackson, 155,872; Adams, 105,321; Clay, 46,587; Crawford, 44,282.


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[1824-8


their preferences; for example, New York, which distributed its votes among all the candidates, giving 1 to Jackson, 26 to Adams, 5 to Crawford, and 4 to Clay. No one having a majority in the Electoral College, the House of Representatives again, as in 1801, made the decision, balloting this time under Amendment XII to the Constitution, which limited the choice to the three foremost candidates. Clay was thus eliminated. Pur- suant to his advice, the Representatives favorable to him went to Adams, who was consequently elected on the first ballot. Concerning the Vice-Presidency, no action by the Senate was necessary, John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina, having won in the Electoral College, which gave him 182 votes against 30 for Nathan San- ford, of New York; 24 for Nathaniel Macon, of North Carolina; 13 for Andrew Jackson; 9 for Martin Van Buren, of New York, and 2 for Henry Clay.


1828


John Quincy Adams was destined, like his father, to hold the Presidential office for but one term, and to lose it under circumstances of extraordinary political convulsion. Originally a Federalist, he had come over to the Republicans during Jefferson's Presidency. In his changed affiliation neither his conduct nor disposi- tion had ever been considered exceptionable from the party point of view ; and there was nothing in the spirit or policies of his administration to be discomposing to even the most orthodox Republicans. He much desired a reelection, and in that natural ambition had the sin- cere interest of Clay, his Secretary of State, who, while


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1828]


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eager for the Presidency, loyally intermitted his own seeking. But Adams had adventured upon changing times, and despite his forceful intellectuality, elevated character, and admirable virtues was not the man to stem the personal tide which, almost from the day of his inauguration, set in against him. The cause of General Jackson, sustained in the contest of 1824 by considerably the largest group of Presidential Electors, as well as by a marked plurality of the popular vote, appealed more and more to the country, and was deter- minedly promoted by the General himself. It was widely felt that the casting of the Clay votes for Adams represented, to say the least, an ill-chosen discrimina- tion, which Clay should have refrained from encour- aging in deference to the superior favor shown Jackson by the people; and Adams's appointment of Clay as Secretary of State was by many considered not merely a reward in questionable taste, but-as the result proved- a move for the interest of a union of forces to control the next election. Jackson joyfully accepted the issue thus palpably drawn, and with all his vehement passion and enormous energy threw himself into the fight, swearing that it should cease only with the utter anni- hilation of Adams and Clay. In consequence the Republican party was riven asunder, the supporters of Jackson becoming known as Democratic Republicans, and those of Adams and Clay as National Republicans, It presently accorded more with the liking of the Jack- sonians to call themselves plain Democrats, but several years elapsed before the National Republican organi- zation took the official name of the Whig party. No


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[1828


national nominating assemblage was held by either faction in 1828, as the rival candidatures of Jackson and Adams were predetermined by the course of events and endorsed in the States without dissent. Adams was overwhelmed, having only 83 Electoral votes against 178 for Jackson; and on the popular vote also Jackson was given a large majority.1 Calhoun (Democrat) was reelected Vice-President, with 171 Electoral votes against 83 for Richard Rush (National Republican), of Pennsylvania, and 7 for William Smith (Democrat), of South Carolina.


For fundamental and permanent historic importance the Presidential election of 1828 transcends any other from the time of the establishment of the government until 1860. It introduced into national politics, for the first time, a biparty system calculated to endure on account of the adaptation of both the resulting parties to American popular conditions, their alertness and virility in competing with one another, their fertility and facility in constructive matters and also in criticism, and their ability to stand defeat. It directly led to an ordered discussion of public questions and affairs by the formulation of political issues under the supervision and discipline of national party organizations, which, in turn, came out into the open arena of popular debate and action instead of basing themselves upon the "general agreement" of a few dignified chiefs or the extemporized authority, and consequently despotic command, of a caucus.


1Popular vote :- Jackson, 647,231; Adams, 509,097.


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The acquisition of power by the popular party as the result of Jefferson's triumph in 1800, says Carl Schurz,1 brought a realization of the truth that the government belonged to the people, and not to "a limited circle of important gentlemen." This it was that afterward made it always so easy for the Republicans to beat the Federalists. The Federalist party was far too select. At heart, and often avowedly, it held to the essential ideas of "curbing the unruly democracy" and resisting demagogic demands, overlooking the stubborn fact that the democracy comprised vastly the major part of the population as well as a host of most brilliant, masterful, and sincere leaders-men who were as un- selfishly patriotic as any Federalist, and who largely, moreover, compared not unfavorably with their critics for character, breeding, and probable capability of understanding the public welfare. Disfavoring char- acterizations of the democracy as such, and of its quali- fied advocates, incur naturally a vigorous, and, what is more serious, a mass, resentment; they have in general been avoided (publicly at least) by the more practiced politicians of later days. But the Federalists, even with the advance of time and the accumulation of distressing misfortunes, forgot nothing and learned nothing. Their failure to develop into a resourceful force of opposition to the Republicans proved fatal to themselves and was not well for the country. For it became consequently quite unnecessary for the Re- publicans to observe any particular circumspection in their own course, or to show progressiveness or fore-


1Life of Henry Clay, vol. i, p. 40.


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POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK


thought in dealing with existing matters or shaping policies for the future; they had but automatically to defeat the Federalists at every election, and meanwhile be exceedingly well content under the wise and benef- icent guidance of their great men.


Several factors of highly conservative influence in their nature and operation contributed to the simplicity of national politics during the early career of the gov- ernment. One of these was the limitation of the suf- frage (especially on the basis of property qualification), which so generally prevailed from the beginning and was relaxed only with great caution. With but a restricted number of the body politic entitled to vote, no elaborate party machinery was required, and the methods of appeal for popular support were of the most elementary kinds. Another very effective deterrent to the development of national party action and expression along the lines of issues and coordinated consultations of the public at large, was the long persistence in many States of the practice of appointing the Presidential Electors by the Legislatures, thus debarring the people from directly stipulating their preference for Presi- dent.1 But the most potent and pervading of the cir- · cumscribing factors to which we have alluded was the


1In practice, however, the system of appointing the Presidential Electors by the Legislatures operated fairly to reflect the popular choice; there was al- ways great party activity in the individual States, which well assured con- formity by the Legislatures to the predominating sentiment. The objections to the method were its indirection and the legislative assumption of a power which it was felt should reside in the people. As late as 1824 six of the States-Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, South Carolina, and Ver- mont-adhered to the old plan of legislative selection of the Electors; but in 1828 it had been abandoned by all except South Carolina.


THOMAS JEFFERSON


Thomas Jefferson, 3d president; born at Shadwell, Va., April 13, 1743 ; lawyer; member of colonial house of Burgesses, 1769- 74; chairman of committee which drew Declaration of Independ- ence, signed August 2, 1776; governor of Virginia, 1779-81; member of state house of representatives 1782; minister pleni- potentiary to France 1784; sole minister to the king of France for three years from March 10, 1785; secretary of state of United States from September, 1789 to December 3, 1793; vice president, 1797-1801; president from 1801 to 1809; died at Monticello, Va., July 4, 1826.


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1828]


primitiveness of the times-with but few newspapers, no railroads or telegraphs or cheap postage, and only the merest beginnings of school instruction for the masses of the people.


It was the powerful personality of General Jackson, and the ardent partisanship in his behalf matched by an equally ardent opposition to him, that wrought the radical change in party foundations, conceptions, and methods. Aside from the popularity that he enjoyed as the "hero of New Orleans," his tremendous resoluteness and absolutely uncompromising attitude on every ques- tion and matter made him an ideal man to found and lead a great party. Though lacking in literary educa- tion and deficient in training to statecraft, these acci- dents of the circumstances of his life were regarded by his followers as needing no apology in view of his com- manding traits of character-his indisputable greatness as a man. On the other hand, his critics who were inclined lightly to esteem his capacity for public affairs and to look for his collapse accordingly, erred most egregiously ; never was there a President who more completely dominated the government, or retained a stronger hold on the people both throughout his service in office and after. Under his leadership the Demo- cratic party absorbed the principal following, numeri- cally, of the old all-powerful Republican organization -that is to say, the "rank and file" of the voters in the nation generally, with important State exceptions, which exceptions, however, did not at all indicate a merely sectional preference so long as the opposition to the Democrats was conducted by the National Repub-


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[1828


licans and their successors, the Whigs.1 It became at once the reproach and pride of the Democratic party that the poor and struggling, those of obscure position and meager advantages, and the naturalized citizens, gravitated naturally to it.


After the election of 1828 Clay sprang to the fore as the leader of the National Republicans, or anti-Jack- sonians. His remarkable brilliancy and attainments, fascinating manners and address, persuasive but at the same time reasoned eloquence, and perfect equipment as both a statesman and political chieftain, combined with the prestige of his distinguished services in the Senate, the Speakership of the House, and the office of Secretary of State, seemed to give him and his enthusi- astic partisans every justification for expecting a favor- able outcome in the gigantic struggle to wrest the Presidency from Jackson in 1832. Added to his personal qualities was the high character of the mem- bership of the National Republican party, which embraced citizens of influence, affairs, substance, and cultivation to a notable degree. There was nothing, however, in the new organization-its spirit, proposals, or manner of operations-to be in fairness regarded as assimilating it to the Federalist party of melancholy but unregretted memory. It sprang from the body of the genuine Republican party of Monroe, Madison, and


1During this period New York and Pennsylvania were among the most reliable supporters of the Democratic party, going against it only in the elections of 1840 and 1848. Illinois and New Hampshire nearly always went Democratic. Ohio was changeable. Massachusetts, Vermont, Kentucky, and Delaware were Whig strongholds. The strictly southern States were mainly Democratic, but the Whigs were strong in all of them.


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Jefferson, of which it claimed to be the legitimate suc- cessor. This claim was scornfully resented by the Democrats. To attempt a decision upon the merits of the controversy would be profitless. The late deceased party left no testament. It had never adopted a decla- ration of principles or policies with which to compare the contrasting positions of the Democrats and National Republicans on the issues that now arose. Neither did its record concerning matters of legislation afford a sure test, as it had been on both sides of important questions according to expediency and the balance of opinion from time to time. Probably it would be most nearly correct to say that both the disputants were undoubted true successors. The National Republicans inherited most of the select elements of the parent organization, the Democrats most of the votes.


At an early period of the development of the National Republican party two basic issues were defined as expressive of its creed-in favor of first, a protective tariff, and second, internal improvements. Previously, these matters, though considered and acted on at times as public measures, had not represented any determinate party action or course. The protective policy had already been well established, especially in the tariffs of 1816, 1824, and 1828; Jackson had ap- proved the principle ; even the southern States had been not without leanings toward it. As for internal im- provements, their desirability had been recognized by Presidents Monroe and Madison, with, however, the


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qualification that a constitutional amendment would be necessary.


Clay presented these two party issues as cardinal and permanent political doctrines. A third, and, for the time, even more insistent issue, favoring the recharter of the Bank of the United States, was added as the result of President Jackson's opposition to that policy. The existent charter was not to expire until 1836, but the President's announced hostility to its extension caused Clay to precipitate the issue as opportune for the campaign of 1832. This action, comments his biog- rapher, Mr. Schurz, was a strange blunder in political tactics; "he believed he could excite the enthusiasm of the masses for a great moneyed corporation in its contest against a popular hero like Jackson-a most amazing infatuation."


The general position of the Democratic party con- cerning all matters and questions of government and politics was that of its own established authority. It considered itself the legitimate ruling power, the inheritor of the accepted and settled traditions of American government and institutions, impregnable to attack because of its strength with the people and the resistless leadership of Jackson. In full control of the government, it was supplying, and would continue to supply, the required materials for public discussion and decision; and it therefore had no issues to create in other ways.


Thus were the parties constituted and led, and the principal questions between them defined, in prepara- tion for the great contest of 1832, in which the funda-


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1820]


mental devices and methods of organization and strategy that have come to be regarded as the essentials of our American political system had their genesis. There were other questions, relating specially to the partisan acts of the Jackson administration. In par- ticular, the National Republicans viewed with much indignation the new "spoils" doctrine so uncompromis- ingly proclaimed and remorselessly applied by Jack- son.1 The slavery issue was not at that time a serious subject of party consideration ; it was still believed that the Missouri Compromise had afforded a satisfactory settlement.




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