USA > New York > New York City > New York panorama : a comprehensive view of the metropolis > Part 36
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53 | Part 54
M
349
CITY IN MOTION
us tra Meanwhile, plans for subways were being proposed. In 1868, the New n froiork Central Underground Railway Company was incorporated to build is wet line from City Hall to the Harlem River. It built nothing. In the same sequen:ar, the Beach Pneumatic Transit Company was formed to carry parcels underground by means of compressed-air tubes, the terms of the incorpo- train.tion being broadened the following year to include transportation of Seconjassengers. On February 26, 1870, the Beach Company completed and edulepened to the public an eight-foot brick tunnel under lower Broadway, Stredet ween Murray and Warren Streets, as a one-block sample of the subway proposed to construct under Broadway and Madison Avenue.
rough durin
The experimental run with a car propelled by compressed air was suc- aily essful, but engineers at that time regarded a railroad beneath the streets ties ils unsound, and laymen lampooned the project in a popular song of the les, ay. Beach and his subway were soon forgotten. Years later, when the first trainf the present systems was proposed, no less a figure than Russell Sage, 1 54hillionaire Wall Street operator, declared: "New York people will never ftietlo into a hole to ride. . . . Preposterous !"
Cable traction for surface routes was introduced in 1885 on the 125th er ittreet and Amsterdam Avenue lines, and this form of motive power was halfridely adopted within the next few years. The year 1885 also witnessed tterjonstruction of the Broadway street-car line, after severe opposition had empreviously defeated the scheme. Work progressed rapidly, so that cars were rapideing operated over the entire line from Bowling Green to Union Square meby June 21, 1885; and omnibuses, which had been running on Broadway fofor many years, were now withdrawn-a situation that was to be reversed ¡I years later.
Rec In 1891, a State legislative act created the Board of Rapid Transit Rail- wayDad Commissioners. Three years later, this act was amended to provide for senunicipal ownership and construction of a rapid transit line, if the people whapproved such a move-as they did by a large majority. Soon thereafter, .Inhe commissioners laid out routes, despite opposition that included a test verscase to determine the constitutionality of the Rapid Transit Act. In its decision of July 28, 1896, the Appellate Division of the State Supreme oneCourt declared the act constitutional.
the Four years later, after continued legal and other opposition, the first ghsubway contract was awarded to John B. McDonald. This contract was for ingthe IRT route from City Hall northward through Manhattan and into the of Bronx. It was dated February 21, 1900, about five months after the first electrification of street railways had been effected on the Third Avenue
350 TRANSPORT
line, between Sixty-Fifth Street and the Harlem Bridge, as a forerunne ven of city-wide electrification. Even increased speed, however, did not solv fera the problem of congestion, which was indicated by New York's amazin puth passenger traffic as far back as 1903, when the number of street car an I elevated passengers exceeded the total for all trunk line railroads in Nort jeve and South America. eci
On March 24, 1900, ground was broken for the first subway at Cit llar Hall Park. On July 21, 1902, bids for the Brooklyn extension were openebay, and the contract awarded to the Belmont-McDonald syndicate, which watruc already building the original subway. In 1904, this original subway wa opened from Brooklyn Bridge to 145th Street and Broadway on Octobe lina 27, to 157th Street on October 12, and to West Farms on November 26 In 1905, it was extended farther northward to 180th Street in the Bron: via the Harlem River tunnel, and southward from Brooklyn Bridge tall Bowling Green. In 1906, it moved northward in Manhattan as far as 22IS ere Street. Two years later, the southward extension was completed to Boroug]for Hall, Brooklyn, in January, and to Atlantic Avenue in May; while north fra ward progress was made from 22Ist Street to 242d Street and Broadway in the Bronx, present terminus of the IRT's West Side line. las U
Although these subway developments added materially to the city's rapi tse transit facilities, they were still not sufficient to keep pace with a constantl increasing population. The so-called "dual contracts" for further subwayng construction, signed on March 19, 1913, provided for a total trackage o: 620 miles, as against 296 miles then in existence. The new or added fax( cilities were to be built by the original subway company (the Interbor the ough) and the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company, this latter being the operator of the elevated railroads in Brooklyn and Queens. By 1916, sub way congestion was such that 1,200,000 passengers were sometimes being transported daily by lines with a rated capacity of only 400,000 passenger: a day. This congestion was noticeably reduced by southward extension of the IRT lines to Utica, Flatbush and Nostrand Avenues, Brooklyn, ir 1920; by another extension to New Lots Avenue in 1924; and by com pletion of the Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit Corporation's new lines.
Greatest of all aids to improvement of the situation was the municipally constructed, owned and operated Independent system, the trunk line 01 which was opened on September 10, 1932, from 207th Street to Fultor Street in Manhattan. On February 1, 1933, the Independent's trunk line had been extended southward to Jay Street, Brooklyn, via the Cranberry Street tunnel; on October 7, 1933, it was carried to its terminus at Church
351
CITY IN MOTION
ovenue, Brooklyn; and on April 9, 1936, Independent trains began to solv erate publicly through the Rutgers Street tunnel from Manhattan to zinuth Brooklyn.
In 1938, the Independent system was actively concerned with a large or velopment designed to provide additional underground rapid transit, es- cially in Brooklyn. In Manhattan, construction of the Sixth Avenue line, Canned to run from Eighth Street to Fifty-Third Street, was well under enemy, adding one more link to the world's largest municipally owned, con- w ucted and operated rapid transit railroad.
nancial and Political Imbroglios
Underground rapid transit was not easily won in New York. The so- alled traction lobby, representing the street car and elevated railroad in- 2IS ests, fought the idea vigorously, as it had fought other advances for ore than half a century. Since 1832, when the introduction of horse- the ray pid awn street cars on metallic rails had demonstrated the possibility of prof- in large-scale passenger traffic for a small per capita fee, the moneyed iss had looked upon transportation as a matter to be handled between elf and the politicians. The latter, suddenly finding themselves in a posi- on to grant or withhold a privilege for which certain interests were will- vay g to pay a high price, developed what might charitably be termed the rgaining instinct. This was not surprising, for the idea that charters fa- ight be worth anything to the city itself did not develop for many years. n the contrary, transit operators were looked upon as benefactors, since ey furnished cheap transportation in a period when that commodity was arce.
The idea that private interests should pay to the city part of the profits ey reaped as the result of charters took hold eventually, although even hen the traction lobby defeated the purposes of bills introduced to that id by inserting the word "net" before "proceeds" and letting bookkeep- 's do the rest. This era of private ownership was at its height between 365, when the first rapid transit bill was passed by the legislature, and 380, when the elevated railroads were completed. The next 15 years- 380-95-have been termed "the era of public ownership" by James Blaine Talker, an authority on the subject. "During that time," Mr. Walker points out, "the perpetual and gratuitous franchise was abolished and the ght of the public to build, pay for, own and if necessary operate street tilroads was successfully asserted."
b- ngi ers of
n
h
W oba 26 on
352
TRANSPORT
The change in sentiment toward municipal ownership did not dism the traction lobby, which continued its obstructionist tactics. As far back Ny 1873, it had defeated a bill introduced in the legislature to authorize tl city to build and operate a rapid transit railroad; and in 1888 it killed c Mayor Abram S. Hewitt's idea for a rapid transit set-up substantially tl same as that later incorporated in the act passed by the legislature on M et 22, 1894, after the voters had emphatically approved municipal ownershi In the 68 years from 1832 until 1900, when the people finally got the way, the graft in New York City rapid transit paralleled the legislati corruption of steam railroad financing in the State. pus t
In 1894, the Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners was give luc State legislative authority to utilize the city's credit and to proceed on t! basis of municipal ownership of the proposed subway. This aroused tl street car and elevated railroad interests, whose lobby had already eng (n neered legislation so drastic that only those able to command tremendo the Ih lu le financial resources could hope to submit a bid on subways. Such actic eliminated virtually all interests except those in control of-or in syr pathy with those who controlled-the existing street railway and elevat properties.
The rapid transit commissioners were unquestionably honest men, b they were also conservatives who thought in terms of private enterpriff and were not sympathetic toward the new-fangled notion of "municip ownership." For six years after the rapid transit act had been amended 1894, the commissioners were parties in fact, even against their wishes, Ra the time-killing tactics employed by street car and elevated railroad inte ests. Neither of these factions wanted an increase in transportation faci dee ties. "The more congestion the bigger the dividends" was then a demo strated fact, and the private capital that controlled the situation did n relish the idea of seeing its highly profitable congestion reduced by ne facilities. Every possible obstruction was thrown in the way of the ne legal machinery designed to put an end to, or at least to lessen, the co to the gestion.
The traction interests were successful. Indeed, they were too successfi for they finally overreached themselves and produced that rare phenom to non-a thoroughly aroused public opinion. This was the result of thr ba moves. First, the Metropolitan street railway interests asked bluntly for perpetual franchise. Second, Mayor Van Wyck, who had been doing ever thing he could to help the street railway and elevated people, introduc pan. an innocent-looking resolution before the rapid transit board, asking ffes
pla ple
353
CITY IN MOTION
mower to contract for construction and operation of the proposed subway ką private capital instead of on a municipal ownership basis, as then pro- thded by law. Third, a bill was introduced in the State legislature to take dunicipal ownership out of the transit act and to give the rapid transit mmissioners power to grant to the Metropolitan interests, without com- Matition, a perpetual franchise for a subway, with the privilege of charging hiten-cent fare on express trains. Oddly enough, this bill was not noticed hej en by civic organizations until well on toward the end of the legislative fission. When it was brought to light, however, the voters who had previ- isly approved municipal ownership at the polls staged mass meetings vel the th ch as New York had seldom seen before, and convinced the rapid tran- commissioners that New Yorkers didn't intend to be put off any longer. This result, however, by no means ended the efforts of powerful groups id individuals to manipulate New York's transportation necessities for od eir own private gain. The development of underground rapid transit iduring the early years of the present century was attended by much shady aling on the part of financiers, contractors, and politicians; as was also, ough on a smaller scale, the development of motor bus transportation the 1920's.
isForts Toward Unification
After the original subway was completed and opened, the Interborough apid Transit Company-which had withdrawn from a series of confer- ices with the Public Service Commission and the special Transit Commit- je appointed by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment to cooperate ith the PSC-reentered the picture on February 12, 1912, with a new an for city-wide rapid transit development. This reentry of the IRT dis- leased the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company, which had no subways at et at time but was making application to the State and city conferees for e instruction and operation of the proposed new lines. The issue was fur- her sharpened by the fact that the Board of Estimate had formally noti- ed the Public Service Commission that it would approve construction ontracts on the proposed subways for operation by the Brooklyn com- 1 any; and the BRT had signified its intention to operate the lines now be- ig reconsidered for the IRT.
Thereupon a handsome battle-royal was staged between the two com- anies. For more than a year they fought to gain public support of their espective proposals. Finally, on March 19, 1913, the so-called dual con-
:
p
bu
e
354
TRANSPORT
tracts were executed, certain lines being apportioned to the Interborou P others to the Brooklyn company. Under these contracts the city was to get among other things: (a) rentals from the companies; (b) taxes, etc .; (135 12 percent of revenue for maintenance exclusive of depreciation ; and (* compensation for depreciation at the rate of five percent from the IRT a E three percent from the BRT. Five cents was stipulated as the fare to 30 charged by both companies.
Almost from the day they were executed, the dual contracts, und which subway facilities were considerably expanded, have been a subj iny of bitter debate. This has resulted in the drafting of four major "unifie tion plans" since 1931, all designed to "recapture" the subways for 1hn city and to retain the five-cent fare. These plans differed so sharply in «Hay tail that agreement between the three parties concerned was virtually ip possible.
de
"Unification" is a convenient term intended to describe the idea of ple ting all subways and elevateds, with their related properties, under c operating system. In 1937 there were two operating companies, the Il and the Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit Corporation. Transfers between t trains or stations of one carrier and those of the other, or even betwe subway and elevated properties controlled by the same parent compar could not be effected without payment of an additional fare. Under un cation, all lines would constitute one system and, as some proposals su gest, transfers to all lines would be possible at stated points on a sing fare. Millions of words of testimony by experts have been recorded this subject; but even the experts disagree among themselves, thus maki it extremely difficult for the layman to understand the situation.
The first step, of course, is that the city must make arrangements to F for the private holdings at once instead of at the stipulated expiration da of contracts under which these holdings are being operated by private i terests. Today, the price to be paid depends upon the willingness of t private interests to terminate the operating contracts before the legal dat set therefor, at a price and under conditions that must be approved n only by the companies and the city but by the Transit Commission as we So far, it has been impossible to secure agreement among these thr parties.
As previously stated, four major unification plans have been propose In June 1931, Samuel Untermyer, special counsel to the Transit Comm: sion, proposed a gross purchase price to the private interests of $489,80.
355
CITY IN MOTION
proud to g In December 1931, the Transit Commission submitted its own tenta- plan, the gross price being set at $474,500,000. On November I, 5, Samuel Seabury, special counsel to the Board of Estimate, and A. A. d le, Jr., Chamberlain of the City of New York, submitted to the Board Ta Estimate the so-called Seabury-Berle report, proposing a gross price of to 60,751,000, together with a "Memorandum of Understanding" between mselves as representatives of the Board of Estimate and "committees und the various classes of securities of Interborough Rapid Transit Com- ubjny and Manhattan Railway Company." This understanding did not bind nif in d city and the private security holders, but merely cited terms and condi- or ths upon which final negotiations might be approached or based. On y I, 1937, John J. Curtin, special counsel to the Transit Commission, y forted to the commission on the Seabury-Berle Definitive Plan and the morandum, and submitted his own alternative recommendations, fixing P: gross price at $343,469,000.
As of June 30, 1937, the total stake of the city in privately operated ways owned by the city, as against the total stake of the private com- nies, was as follows:
wel an inil SU
IRT BMT
City $180,890,000 208,313,000
Private Interests $188,953,000 69,535,000
ng
389,203,000
258,488,000
In addition to the total of $389,203,000 shown above, the city also had 29,193,000 tied up in its own municipally-operated subway-the Inde- ndent System. Thus New York City's grand total stake in all subways s $1, 118,396,000.
1 Analysis of rapid transit traffic in New York for the 12-year period of 25-36 (selected because its sharp variations in economic conditions pro- n th atf de a fair average) shows that the total of 1,898,104,385 passengers for 036 was nearly six percent more than the yearly average for the period, ith the Independent's gain of about 65 percent over its 1932-36 average counting for the general increase. In other words, rapid transit continued be the chief agent of passenger movement within New York in 1936, rrying more persons in that year than surface railways, buses and taxi- bs combined, and showing a three-to-one lead over its nearest competitor.
P
356
TRANSPORT
Street Cars
This competitor, the street car, dominated all transportation facilit le st within the city's present corporate limits from shortly after 1832, wł. Ab the crude forerunner of today's streamlined car was first run on flat met dans lic rails, to about 1915. In 1860, the passenger total of street surface ra rta ways was more than 50,000,000; in 1900, it exceeded 600,000,000; and Jess late as 1915, subways and elevateds combined were carrying fewer Pot th sengers than the street cars. Seven years later, though rapid transit n held first place, the street surface railway total exceeded one billion. I
sp leve effect of motor bus transportation was not seriously felt by the street c until 1930; but thenceforward the descent was rapid, the number of p sengers carried in 1937 being fewer by nearly half a billion than in 19: dus Chiefly responsible for this tremendous loss was a carrier that had be R little more than a minor item in the 1925 totals. Insignificant then, t om motor bus steadily increased in importance until in 1936 it was litera T pushing the once-mighty surface railways off the streets that they h ve- dominated for so many years. lin Street cars are apparently doomed in New York. In one borough, Ric mond, they were completely superseded by buses in 1934. In Manhatta opt uat street railway passenger totals dropped from more than 345,000,000 hre 1925 to less than 85,000,000 in 1936. In Brooklyn, where street cars ha per played an enormous role, the 1936 total was about 135,000,000 less th tor in 1925, while Queens slumped more than 50 percent from its 1925 tot ect Only in the Bronx did 1936 fail to show a decided loss as compared wi the figures for 1925.
Further indication of the swift decline of the once-mighty street car to be found in statistics of the number of passenger cars owned or leas by all common carriers within the city. In 1900, street surface railwa operated 81 of every 100 such cars; in 1930, 38 of every 100; in 193and 17 of every 100. The decline is still further evidenced in the loss of trac den age. In 1919, when the "emergency" buses first began to operate on a fiv cent fare, street car tracks extended over the city's five boroughs to a totmil of 1,344.37 miles. By 1937, this total had been reduced to 811.07-a lo of nearly 40 percent within seven years.
Motor Buses
sea
More than a century ago, horse-drawn stages and omnibuses were tran porting passengers over fixed routes, precisely as motor buses do toda he
hit th
inge
en Gat 1
357
CITY IN MOTION
t they rapidly disappeared after the introduction in 1832 of horse- wn street cars running on metallic rails; and from about 1860 to 1915 street car was the undisputed leader in interborough traffic totals.
About midway in this period, however, a company was organized to nsport passengers once more by bus. This was the Fifth Avenue Trans- rtation Company, Ltd., incorporated October 29, 1885, and still in busi- 's as the Fifth Avenue Coach Company. The Fifth Avenue buses did threaten the street car's supremacy, since they carried and still carry pecial class of traffic, necessarily limited because of the ten-cent fare. vertheless, this pioneer in the revival of bus transportation did a large siness, and as late as 1925 it carried 67,700,517 of the 68,713,208 pas- Agers credited to all buses in that year. The effect of the "emergency" s lines inaugurated in 1919 did not begin to be decidedly evident in bus ffic totals until 1926. This was 19 years after the Fifth Avenue Coach mpany had introduced the first gasoline-motor buses in New York.
The gradual city-wide replacement of street cars by buses operating on a e-cent fare began in 1919, when the New York Railways Company ob- ned legal permission to abandon four of its crosstown trolley lines in Ric atta 00 pulous lower-Manhattan districts, thus leaving those areas without ade- ate transportation facilities. The city's Department of Plant and Struc- es thereupon obtained buses from neighboring cities, which it placed in eration under temporary revocable permits issued to owners and oper- thars. As the result of court actions brought against the city in this con- totaction, many of the bus lines were stopped and the purchase of buses by wife city was enjoined. But the authorities went ahead with other "emer- ncy" operations, gradually spreading out to boroughs other than Man- ar ttan.
aset The tremendous development of motor bus transportation in New York way evidenced by the total of 587,595,507 passengers carried during the year 93hiding June 30, 1937. This total represents a gain of more than 28 per- acknt over the figures for the previous year, when 45 major companies were ivberating 2,763 vehicles over about 170 routes totaling more than 785 otailes in length.
los Buses have brightened the streets up a bit. They differ in color and in terior appointments. Some, for example, are upholstered in a smooth ather-like material, while others have brightly colored fabric coverings. [any are automatically ventilated, and all are infinitely less noisy than the Afreet car. This latter advantage has contributed to a rise in real estate val- ayes, as has also the removal of street car tracks, largely by WPA workers,
eet of 1 192 d be en, itera y h
facili 2, wł t met ace ra ; and ver På sit n.
358 TRANSPORT
an improvement that gives an appearance of greater width to the str and provides a smooth-surfaced roadway from curb to curb.
Hacks and Hackmen
The advantages of bus operation, including the highly important fi cent fare, have cut heavily into the passenger totals of taxicabs, N York's fourth largest carrier. The hackmen once enjoyed a heavy busin transporting people to and from the comparatively isolated sections 1 served by crosstown trolley lines. Now bus routes are so frequent that th passengers have access to many districts hitherto served only by ca Cabs are not passing from the picture; although the 1936 total of ab( 73,000,000 passengers was far below the yearly average of about 13 000,000 for the period from January 1, 1926, to March 31, 1937. Duri this period, the number of cabs decreased from an average of 26,504 : the whole period to 13,555 on March 9, 1937, or about 48 percent; 1 number of drivers dropped from an average of 67,660 for the whole 1 riod to 40,871 on March 31, 1937, or about 39 percent.
Back of today's huge taxicab fleets stands the memory of October 1907, when motor cab service was inaugurated in New York by 35 brig red four-cylinder Darracqs, which appeared before leading hotels and out to compete with the old hansom cabs. From that day on, taxicabs ha been a perpetual source of discussion, first as to their desirability in t horse-and-buggy era, later as to the number necessary for the city's nee The latter question has often been before the Board of Aldermen, who last attempt at control, before the Board went out of existence on Janua I, 1938, was the ordinance signed March 9, 1937, by Mayor La Guard This gave the Police Department discretionary power to fix the number cabs as of that date, the total then being 13,555.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.