USA > New York > Organization of the Revolutionary movement in New York State, 1775-77 > Part 12
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1. Ibid., pp. 259-61, 273.
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three counties (Kings, Queens, Richmond) which the Tories largely con- trolled. Only eight of the congressmen were new members. 1
Since the Continental Congress had declared independence, the Fourth Pro- vincial Congress joined the other colonies in independence on the first day of its meeting, July 9. In accordance with its new status,. the Congress transformed itself into the Convention on July 10.
Thus opened the most difficult period in the history of the state's provisional governments. The Convention had to govern the
state, conduct the war, write a constitution and stay out of the hands of the British invaders, all of this in the midst of a series of major American defeats and retreats from southern New York in 1776-77. In this confusion the Convention appointed a committee of safety to assume its functions and the committee sat for most of the ten months of the 2 Convention's life, July, 1776-May, 1777.
The two years from May, 1775-May, 1777 witnessed the steady elaboration of congressional government. The Congress, of course, worked out specific policies and often depended upon the county and local committees to execute them. At the commencement of the first session Congress assumed the subordination of the local bodies to its authority when it directed the formation of committees where non-ex- istent to enforce the resolutions of the Continental and Provincial
1. Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 516-931; Edgar A. Werner, Civil List and Con- stitutional History of the Colony and State of New York (1888 ed.), pp. 408-09. Becker mistakenly states that about one-third of the Fourth Congress were new men. Op. cit., p. 274.
2. Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 579-824.
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1 Congresses . On numerous occasions the deputies created special committees to carry through their plans, but sometimes, when key men served on more than one committee, this practice precipitated a per- sonnel crisis. For example, Congress appointed Jay, R. R. Livingston and Robert Yates to a secret committee to obstruct the Hudson to the British, but in August also put them on the constitutional committee. Since the trio neglected the latter for the former, the constitutional committee Accomplished nothing for some time. 2 In this fashion Congress extended its authority over key areas of government. It exercised jurisdiction, for example, over raising, equipping and supplying the army, finance, suppression of the loyalists and seizure of their property, confederal relations and Indian affairs.
Military preparations naturally absorbed much of the time and energy of the delegates. Faising an army involved the organization of three types of units. The Continental Congress directed the for- mation of the regular units, the line regiments, but the colonies nominated their officers and actually recruited them. New York au- thorized the first recruiting campaign June 28, 1775. The fivo regi- ments that resulted participated in the ill-fated Canadian expedition 1775-76. Since the men's enlistments expired December 31, 1775, their
units underwent reorganization after the campaign. When the Congress prepared to raise four more regiments in January, 1776, the deputies differed over the selection of the officers. They resolved their
1. Becker, op. cit., p. 212; Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 18.
2. See below pp. 191-92.
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differences ty circularizing the counties, requesting the county com- mittees to nominate two persons for each position. In their first efforts in February to raise the regular regiments Congress worked out quotas for each county, bet in December they revised their pro- cedure. They appointed the officers, then assigned them recruiting 1 districts in each county.
The militia comprised the second component of the armed services. Although the Continental Congress advised New York in May, 1775 to commence planning its militia organization, the First Congress did no more than to appoint & committee to consider the situation. No t until August 9 did the much-revised committee hand in a report which Congress approved. Five days later the legislature published its de- tailed resolutions, governing the organization, training, discipline and pay of the troops. They set the strength of the basic unit, the company, at about 83 officers and men. Five to ten companies joined to compose a regiment, each county having one or more regiments. The
regiments combined to form the colony's six brigades, commanded by a major-general. In addition there were previously in being certain in- dependent formations (hussars, artillery, grenadiers) which retained their existing structures. The men chose their own officers below the rank of major, leaving to Congress the appointment of the field ranks. When the companies had organized, one-fourth of the company's number volunteered as minute men. These volunteers constituted minute
1. A. C. Flick, The American Revolution in New York, pp. 133-34 (here- after cited as An. Rev.); Jour Prov. Cong. I, 268-69, 306-07. 712-13.
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companies which might be called into action immediately. 1
The rules required each man to provide himself with "a good musket or firelock and bayonet, sword or tomahawk, a steel ramrod, worm, priming wire and brush, ... a cartouch box, to contain twenty- three rounds of cartridges, twelve flints and a knapsack .... " The militiaman had to supply his own ammunition, a pound of powder and three pounds of bullets. Having accoutered himself, the part-time soldier had to train one day a month for four hours. Since the larger units needed experience also, the regiments would mobilize "at least two days in every year." Penalties for disobedience and refusal to serve ranged from fines to imprisonment. Those who would not enlist 2 would suffer advertisement as enemies to their country.
Congress dispatched circular letters of militia instructions in August to the county committees and the latter commenced the task of actual militia organization. Since Congress did not vigorously press the matter, these activities proceeded at a very uneven rate. Suffice it to say that by the close of 1775, most of the counties had completed some part if not all of their assignment. Many problems arose and compelled the Congress to amend the militia law in December, 1775. Some of the regulations in respect to the election of officers, training, brigading and minute men underwent modification. This re-
1. Flick, Am, Rev., pp. 138-39; Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 16, 21, 69, 103, 104, 114-16.
2. Flick, Am, Rev., p. 139; Jour Prov, Cong., 1, 114, 115.
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mained the basic statute until June, 1776, when Congress again revised 1 it, abolishing the minute men.
The third component of the armed forces, denominated levies, did not have a separate organization. When the military situation demanded it, the government ordered a portion of the militia into the field for a specific period of time. These constituted the levies. If volunteers did not fill the quotas, the counties drafted the neces- 2
sary numbers.
New York did not neglect the other branch of service, the navy. The colony had no ships of the line, but it did encourage privateering. A clear picture of the privateers' operations cannot be found, but about a dozen of them took to the seas in the period under consideration. One of them, the Montgomery, captured eight prizes by 1777 with a total value of $11,000. 3
When Congress plunged into the intricate task of supplying and equipping the army, it encountered bewildering problems of every do- scription. Not only did the state lack manufactured goods essential to the prosecution of the war, but also it experienced great diffi- culties in procuring and transporting its abundant agricultural com- modities to the camps or supply bases. Furthermore, despite the heroic
1. Flick, Am. Rev., pp. 140-41; Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 135, 139, 152; Cal, Hist. Vss., I, 38, 61, 83, 84, 85, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 127. 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 158, 164, 169, 177. 193. 198, 261.
2. Flick, Am. Rev., pp. 141-43.
3. Ibid., pp. 145-47; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 859, 915.
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labors of devoted officials, a certain amount of peculation and specu- lation impeded the functioning of the supply services. Noting these circumstances, Schuyler remarked to Jay that military spending in the Northern Department alone ran at five times the annual rate of the 1 most expensive year in the previous colonial war.
Since the Provincial Congress failed completely to grasp either the magnitude or the nature of the supply problem, the delegates re- acted spasmodically, moved to action by especially urgent situations. Congress took the first step to create a commissariat at the direction of the Continental Congress. The latter body resolved to have New York furnish provisions and stores for the newly captured forts at Crown Point and Ticonderoga. On June 2, 1775 the revolutionary legislature offered the position of commissary to Peter T. Curtenius, New York merchant. The scope of the resolutions implied that Curtenius would 2 be employed to purchase other supplies as the Congress desired. For bis services the commissary received a 1-1/2 percent commission if he spent his own funds, or a one percent commission if he expended congres- sional funds. If he spent his own money, Congress would allow him law- ful interest for its use. Finally, Curtenius would obtain reimbursement for all expenses. 3 Having selected a purchasing agent, Congress, the next day, presented him with a large order which they directed him to
1. Schuyler to Jay, 1 February 1777, Jay Papers, CUL.
2. Jour,Prov, Cong., I, 27.
3. Flick, Am, Pev., p. 181; Jour. Prov. Cong., loc. cit.
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forward to Lake George. Among the items Curtenius set out to procure, 1000 pounds of oakun represented the largest quantity, but he also had to hire artificers and seamen for the same destination. 1
When occasion demanded, Congress by-passed their commissary and appointed a committee of their members to fulfill certain tasks. An incident of this nature arose during the first few weeks of Curtenius's -
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tenura. The Continental Congress instructed the New Yorkers with ad- monitions of secrecy to provide 5,000 barrels of flour for the army near Boston. Congress promptly chose Sears, Abraham Walton and Joseph 2 Hallet to carry out the project.
Even though his staff grew commensurately, Curtenius's responsi- bilities multiplied so rapidly they exceeded his ability to discharge them effectively. He had under his direction one agent, three deputies, seventeen subcommissaries, eight commissaries of purchases and numerous storekeepers and clerks. Although the supply service had become com- plicated, Congress did nothing to simplify its organization until events forced the legislators to do so. When General Charles Lee arrived in February, 1776 to fortify the city, apparently he or his staff "sug- gested" that the Committee of Safety appoint a special issuing military commissary to have charge of all army stores in New York County. The Committee complied and instructed Curtenius to transfer such stores to 3 Richard Norwood whom they appointed to the new post.
1. Ibid., I, 28. Flick, Am. Rev., p. 182 refers to a later order as the earliest.
2. Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 39-40.
3. Ibid .. 1, 290.
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When New York and Continental troops began to pour into the city in February, 1776, the Congress requested Curtenius to supply the necessary rations, but the commissary declined. Accepting Curtenius's explanation of the pressure of his duties, the legislature turned to Abraham Livingston to fill the gap. Livingston operated under a con- tract with the Congress, but his duties did not carry through until the end of the provisional government. Since the state's militia operated under the command of the Continental commander in New York City and similarly later in the Northern Department, most of the victualling contracts came under the jurisdiction of the Continental Arny. When the militia remained under the state's authority, one of 1
the numerous commissaries contracted for the rations.
The difficulty of supplying the troops with adequate clothing provoked the Committee of Safety to take steps ultimately to reform that aspect of the service. Prior to this time Curtenius and others bought semi-finished and finished goods. Late in 1776 the Committee initiated tentative steps to establish a state clothing store, but its organization did not reach fruition until the appointment of John Henry 2 as State Clothier in February, 1777 at a salary of 10s. per diem.
The Convention further modified the system in May, 1777 when it charged John Lasher with complete authority over all military stores. To the rank of colonel the deputies attached a salary of $200 per annum and expenses and empowered him to impress teams and carriages if necessary.
1. Ibid., I, 303, 315. 360, 362, 365, 367, 388, 405, 436, 761.
2. Flick, Am, Rev ., p. 187; Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 695, 698, 807.
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At the same time they chose David Currie to furnish the troops with items not supplied by the commissariat. In this category fell wine, beer, sugar, chocolate, coffee, tobacco and staples. The Convention 1 allowed Currie three dollars a day and expenses.
The acute shortage of guns, cannon and ammunition compelled the Congress frequently to resort to various expedients to procure desired quantities. The state had few skilled gunsmiths upon whom to rely, but did contract with these few to manufacture specific quan- tities. Congress sought to import arms and powder, appropriating ৳4,000 for the purpose in September, 1775. Driven to seek other
alternatives by the continuing shortage, Congress in March, 1776 re- solved to loan ₺200 without interest to anyone who would produce the greatest number of gunlocks and to give a premium of 4s. on each piece to the producers. Similarly, the delegates sought to stimulate the
manufacture of gun barrels and bayonets.
Exertions to secure light
and heavy cannon encountered similar obstacles. On one occasion, de- spite the pressing need, Congress rejected a contract for brass cannon because the price of 48. a pound was too high. On the other hand, lack of skilled labor, and uncertainty as to the needed quantity caused the Committee of Safety to forego the employment of Robert Livingston, Jr.'s foundry for casting heavy cannon. Exorbitant prices did not always deter the Congress from accepting a contract. A critical lack 2 of grapeshot caused the legislature to pay double the market price.
1. Flick, Hist. N. Y., IV, 133; Jour, Prov. Cong ., I, 920.
2. Flick, Hist. N. Y., IV, 135-36; Jour, Prov. Cong., 1, 148, 268, 307, 358, 363-64; Force, op. cit., 4th Ser., V, 278-79.
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Insufficient quantities of two other products closely asso- ciated with munitions, lead and powder, plagued the revolutionaries. Congress directed Curtenius to collect the lead window weights of private dwellings, promising later compensation. In this manner Curtenius received more than 100 tons. The state promoted the search for, and working of lead mines, but none of these attempts proved
fruitful. Bounties and loans produced a more favorable situation
in regard to powder.
Venturous individuals erected a number of
powder mills, but at first the mills could not manufacture rapidly
because of the scarcity of sulphur and saltpeter. Again the state intervened to promote the location of sulphur deposits and the pro-
duction of the latter. Both efforts succeeded. Sulphur mined in Tryon County became the mainstay and saltpeter from small shops and 1 households tended to relieve the shortage in that article.
The state looked to its own resources for adequate supplies of hemp, flax and wool. Under the advice of the Continental Congress, New York in April, 1776 pleaded with its farmers to increase the acre- age of hemp and flax and to increase and improve the breed of their sheep. Even prior to this action, Congress had voted b1,333 to hire the poor of the city to spin flax. In October, 1776 the Convention selected a committee to provide work in weaving and spinning for the New York City refugees. Such improvisations produced a considerable
1. Fick, Hist, N. Y., IV, 138-41. Measures to import powder en- countered price difficulties and occasional congressional reluctance to pay extravagant prices. See the case of Nicholas Low, Jour. Proy. Cong., 1, 235, 241, 254, 340, 502.
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quantity of cloth. The state imported hempseed in large quantity and 1 distributed it to the farmers without charge.
Given the scope of the task and the inexperience of officials, it is no surprise that confusion and waste loomed large. A large portion of the provisional government's expenditures for 1775-77 want to pay for the huge quantities of these supplies discussed above. In 2 these two years Congress spent at least $500,000 for all purposes. It is to the credit of the government that it managed to achieve what , it did.
From the outset the revolutionary government contended with two deficiencies, guns and funds. The preceding discussion outlined the problems of the former, but did not touch upon the question of finances. When the need for funds arose, the congressmen pledged their personal wealth as security. Obviously, the delegates would not bankrupt themselves to finance revolutionary operations, so they had to find an alternative. The financial question thrust itself to the fore on the second day of the First Congress, May 23, 1775, when the delegates read a letter from the Continental Congress urging the removal of arms and stores from Fort Ticonderoga. After debating the
In its matter, the delegates referred it to a committee for study. report the committee the next day suggested the appointment of a com- mittee "to consider of ways and means for providing moneys" to accomplish the Ticonderoga task. Congress approved this report, but did not choose
1. Flick, Am, Rev. pp. 184-85; Jour . Prov. Cong ., I, 414-15.
2. Treasurer's Accounts, 1775-78, NYHS.
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a committee of ways and means. . The inaction was not equivalent to a death sentence, however. It would seem probable that private dis- cussion continued because on May 26, without a recorded motion or discussion, the house selected a committee to prepare a report on a 1 Continental paper currency. Simultaneously, the members drafted & letter to their representatives at Philadelphia, in which they stated that they had the financial question under study .
The letter and the later committee report are important, since they throw some light on attitudes toward taxation. The letter made
two basic points. Considering the drift to war, the authors declared "an uncommon levy" of money would soon be a necessity for the Continental Congress and, therefore, the latter body would probably discuss the feasibility of paper currency . As to taxation, they wrote, "it is clearly impossible" to raise the requisite funds by this means. The committee reiterated this view in its report on May 30, insisting that the Continental Congress would have to issue some form of paper, and providing that each colony would have to sink its own share. Sig- nificantly, the house approved the committee's recommendations unani- 2
mously.
There the matter rested for two months, when rapidly rising expenditures induced another plea to the men at Philadelphia. Nev York, the Congress asserted, had spent a large sum for Continental purposes and an equal amount for the province. Taxation, therefore,
1. Jour. Prov. Cong., 1, 9, 10, 14.
2. Ibid., 1, 14, 19, 20.
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had become a necessity, but "prudence or policy" dictated the adoption of that mode which would be least liable to arouse "popular disgust or perhaps, opposition." The letter proposed an alternative which would have achieved two objectives. They asked that the Continental Congress repeal the bar on tea consumption, set a maximum price on it, and tax the vendor Is. a pound. Since New York tea merchants had "a considerable quantity" of smuggled Dutch tea on hand, the ban's re- peal would release their capital for investment in the importation of direly needed Dutch goods. Moreover, the brunt of this tax would fall. on those who violated the Association, the "obstinate consumers" of the brev.
1 This overture came to naught because the Yorkers failed to rally any other colony to their view.
Without waiting for a reply to their tea tax application of July 28, the delegates on August 5 voted another committee on ways and means to study financial measures. The Albany delegation informed its county committee that many congressmen favored an immediate tax, but it added that it could not say whether a levy would carry. Although the house listened to the committee's statement on August 11, it postponed a decision until August 15. It seems possible that the committee recommended a levy up to $30,000, but when recorded in the Journal weeks 2 later, the report specified a minimum of $15,000. Since Congress did not discuss the matter again, despite its intention, until August 30,
1. Becker, op. cit., p. 217; Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 583; Jour. Prov. Cong., 1, 92.
2. Becker, op. cit., p. 218; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 101, 105. The Albany delegates, writing home immediately after the action of August 11, de- clared that the tax would raise a sum "not exceeding $30,000." Min. Altany Com., I, 185, 196.
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perhaps growing opposition to the levy caused its proponents to compro- mise on the lower figure.
Led by Gilbert Livingston, the opponents successfully amended the report. They substituted an emission of $45,000 in paper for the tax, committing Congress to fund by taxation one-third of the total each year over the next three years. Upon reconsideration the house voted to reduce the funding period to two years. The resolution di- rected the creation of the necessary tax officials, providing for super- visors, assessors and collectors. It granted the collectors authority to collect from defaulters by "distress upon the goods and chattels" thereof. Since the measure distributed the tax among the counties on a quota basis, the members sought to bargain for the lowest quota. The endless maneuvering brought on a deadlock which the First Congress never resolved. 1
It is difficult to interpret the significance of the paper money triumph solely on the basis of the voting record. The counties cast unit votes and it is impossible to determine from the Journal how the members voted within the delegation to decide their county's ballot. Even though Albany, Ulster and Richmond voted against the bills of credit, it is questionable to conclude therefrom that these delegations 2 represented creditor groups. If we accept the sincerity of the deputies avowed intention to fund the debt, then the problem resolves itself into one of timing. We should note also that by decreasing the funding span
1. Cochran, op. cit., p. 28; Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 128, 133-34.
2. Cochran, op. cit., p. 44 and n. 5. New York County divided evenly.
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to two years, the house increased the tax funds for each year to £22,500, whereas the original committee recommendation had advocated a $15,000 levy.
Having wet their feet, as it were, in the paper ocean, the congressmen were not loth to return for another dip. Congress voted two more emissions in January and August, 1776 which amounted to £255,000. These proved to be final, so that New York had mortgaged itself for $300,000 in all. Both of the last issues indicated the
deterioration of the strength of the proponents of taxation. Al though the January resolution laid down a three year funding plan, it made no reference to the tax quotas essential to carry it out. By August even the funding operation disappeared from the resolution and Congress drew up a substitute:
That the public faith of this State to pledged for the redemption of the said bills of credit, and that this Convention, or some future Legislature of this State, will make effectual provision for that purpose.]
Fortunately for the prosecution of the war, New York could borrow from the Continental Congress. When the latter organ struck off Conti- mental paper, it dispatched some $150,000 to the Provincial Congress, 1775-77. In addition to this source, the Congress borrowed from indi- 2 viduals to an undetermined amount.
Whatever the reasons for Congress's hesitation to lay a tax,
the creditor-debtor relationship and the fear of political opposition
1. Ibid., p. 38; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 223, 316, 326, 330, 336, 338, 339, 540, 560, 571.
2. Treasurer's Accounts, 1775-78, NYHS; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 116; Flick, Am, Rev., p. 114.
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are not sufficient explanations. 1
Jay long criticized the paper policy, prodding McDougall occasionally to seek a change. On 27 March 1776 Jay adverted to the political effects of taxation in these words:
There is much money in the Province, the Produce of the Country retains its Price & a moderate Tax would be borne without a Murmur.2
McDougall revealed something of the situation's complexity in his reply of April 16 to Jay:
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