USA > New York > Organization of the Revolutionary movement in New York State, 1775-77 > Part 13
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I have long been of your opinion on the subject of taxing, but I confess there are weighty difficulties in the way. The great stagnation of commerce, and the removal of the inhabitants out of this city were important reasons which induced my assent to delay that measure. If we had taxed, where should the rich men of this capital who have taken their flight be taxed? And how is the poor freeholder of it, to pay his, when he can receive no [ rent]? I was deter- mined & delayed the tax for these difficulties as the country members seem bent on saddling us with one third of the colony expence .3
It is worthy of note that these reasons gave Jay pause and he confessed 4 they had not occurred to him.
The colonial treasurer's position was an ambivalent one. When the Provincial Congress needed funds in May, 1775, it called upon Treas- urer Abraham Lott to lend the required money on the personal guarantee
1. See Becker, op. cit., p. 217; Cochran, Op. cit., p. 44.
2. Jay to McDougall, 23 December 1775, 27 March 1776, McDougall Papers, NYHS; Johnston, Op. cit., I, 40.
3. Jay Papers, CUL.
4. Jay to Mcdougall, 27 April 1776, ibid. and Mcdougall Papers, NYHS; Johnston, op. cit., I, 57.
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of the deputies. Although a royal official, Lott complied and this procedure obtained for a considerable length of time. Meanwhile, the First Congress appointed Peter Van Bruch Livingston as its treas- urer in July, 1775. The office proved too burdensome for Livingston, an elderly man, and he chose a deputy, Gerard Bancker, whom the Congress approved. Henceforth, Bancker bore the major burden of the office and in recognition Congress changed his title in January, 1777 to Vice- Treasurer. 1
When Lott presented a memorial to the legislature in March, 1776, he stimulated that body to action. The substance of his letter concerned the funding of the 1771 bills of credit of which one-tenth fell due in April. A committee recommended that the payment of the principal be suspended and that any sums paid in be loaned out again. Furthermore, the committee declared that Congress must "attend to the proper application of the public moneys now in the hands of the said Abraham Lott, Esquire." Lott evaded the directive but Congress did nothing. It is surprising that Governor Tryon did not instruct him to bring his papers out to the British warships in the harbor. In September, 1776 the Convention demanded an accounting and forbade Lott to act as treasurer. Whatever expectations the Convention may have entertained as to the funds in his possession, the final outcome dashed those hopes. Although the records demonstrated the existence of $25,000,
1. Flick, Am. Rev., p. 108; Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 216, 774. In November, 1776 Eancker wanted to give up his subordinate position, but neither Livingston nor the Convention would listen to him. When Bancker re- peated his intention on January 14, the Committee of Safety replied by making him Vice-Treasurer. Ibid., II, 316-17; Cal. Hist. Mss., I, 593.
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Lott possessed only $3,000 and the Convention labored in vain to ob- tain that sum. The treasurer had invested the large balance in the 1 Danish Islands.
The deepening rift between Whigs and Tories in the summer of 1775 posed one of the thorniest problems that ever confronted Congress, the disposition.of the Tories. Congress did not formulate a general policy for several months, leaving most action in the hands of the local committees. When a serious incident occurred, such as the en- listment of recruits for the British Army, Congress heard the evidence, then voted on the verdict. Those adjudged guilty might be imprisoned 2 locally or shipped off to Connecticut.
The activities of the Tories in Brookhaven early in August caused Congress to prepare its first overall measures against them. After much debate extending over three days, the deputies agreed upon several resolutions. The resolves defined sundry forms of opposition and actions as punishable by imprisonment, but placed their enforcement in the hands of the local committees. If the committees or militia apprehended any individuals in arms or enlisted in the British forces, 3 they would hold the prisoners for disposition by Congress.
1. Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 347, 350; Flick, Am ._ Rev. pp. 108-10. Flick confuses these events with a committee accounting with Livingston and Bancker in February.
2. Becker, op. cit., p. 216; Flick, Am, Rev., p. 210; Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 89, 93, 100, 127, 129, 135.
3. Ibid., I, 105. 127, 129, 131-32; Becker, op. cit., pp. 223-24.
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Since these first steps did nothing to quell the Tories in regions which they dominated, such as Queens, the Provincial Congress voted additional measures. The local Whigs lacked the numbers and force to take effective action and pleaded with Congress to intervena. By December 1775 the open defiance of the revolutionuries by Queens and Richmond Tories constrained the Second Congress to strike at them. Fearing bombardment by the British warships, the Provincial Congress . instructed its delegates in Philadelphia to ask the Continental Congress for ald. The latter obliged, ordering Jersey troops to Queene .to dis- arm the Tories and apprehend the ringleaders. About six hundred rest-
dents surrendered their weapons and nineteen their persons. Early in February the New Jersey Congress complied with a request from New 1 York to perform a similar sweep on Staten Island.
The Second Congress (in the form of its Committee of Safety) prompted by a resolve of the Continental Congress, adopted an addi - tional measure against the Tories. It instructed the counties to dis- 2 arm the "disaffected, " employing, if necessary, the militia.
The Third Congress had scarcely organized in May, 1776, when Washington exerted pressure on it to take vigorous action against the To- ries. The Commander-in-Chief took the congressmen into his confidence, re- vealing to thema intelligence of a Tory plan to unite the disaffected on Long Island and adjacent Connecticut and to join the British. Congress spent most of May 19 and into the night of the twentieth discussing the evidence and remedies. It seems to have concluded its deliberations
1. Ibid., pp. 238. 244-45.
2. Ibid., p. 262; see above, pp. 106-08.
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by referring the whole business to & committee headed by John Alsop. 1
When the committee reported May 21, Congress ordered the secretaries to transcribe a fair copy. £ After three days of inter- mittent but prolonged debates, the deputies approved the lengthy re- port which recommended that Congress cooperate with Washington to round up the most dangerous of the opposition and that the county committees apprehend not only all civil and military crown officials, but also all those suspected of hostility to the American cause. 2
The following day, May 25, the congressmen charged a committee of Scott, Jay, Morris, Faring and Remsen to draw up enabling resolu- tions, but Congress did not approve the draft until June 5. The com- mittee submitted its report on May 28 and Congress immediately commenced consideration of it. Other affairs intervened, preventing final dis- position until a week later. The heart of the "laws" approved com- prised those sections creating & committee to seize, try and punish Tories. The committee consisted of seven men: Gouverneur Morris, John Ten Broeck, Henry Remsen, John Haring, Thomas Tredwell, Lewis Graham and Joseph Hallett. Among the other resolutions, Congress conferred similar powers on the county committees and authorized the local committees to arrest and hold any suspects until the county com- mittee met to dispose of the cases. The resolutions directed the congressional committee to arrest about a hundred of the leading Tories 3 in the city, Richmond, Kings, Queens and Westchester.
1. Nettels, Washington, p. 290; Jour, Prov, Cong., 1, 450, 453.
2. Ibid., I, 456-57, 459-50, 461.
3. Ibid., I, 461, 464, 476-78.
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After some delay the "secret committee" set about its labors on June 15 with a slightly altered cast, the most important changes being the addition of Jay and Philip Livingston. Over the next two weeks the "inquisitors" examined numerous suspects, heard witnesses, and disposed of cases. In arriving at decisions, the committee voted in accordance with the voting rules of Congress, not by individual. Most of those summoned, if convicted as no "Friend to the American 1 cause, " secured their release on parole or posted bond.
Scarcely had the secret committee begun hearings when Washington imparted fresh intelligence to Congress which halved the committee's membership. On June 17 the legislators chose Jay, G. Morris, and Philip Livingston a "secret committee" to confer with the Commander- in-Chief relative to this information and "take such examinations ...
as they shall think proper." Thus began the unraveling of the cole- brated Tory plot, a plot intended to unleash operations against Wash- ington's army on the arrival of the British Army. Governor Tryon planned to have Tories strike at ammunition stores, sabotage cannon, and destroy Dykeman'a Bridge across Kingsbridge Creek which linked Manhattan with Westchester and New England. Three days thereafter Congress granted this second secret committee power to apprehend and secure certain persons in "such manner as they may think most prudent." The trio worked closely with Washington in rounding up the ring, but whether they tried the prisoners, or entrusted that task to the first 2 secret committee (of which they were members) cannot be determined.
1. Flick, Am. Rev. p. 213.
2. Nettels, Washington, pp. 290-91; Jour. Prov, Cons., I, 497, 500.
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The British arrival disrupted the work of the committee and prevented consideration by Congress of the committee's report. on June 28 Jay requested and obtained leave from Congress for the com- mittee to continue sitting, since it had not finished its task. He presented a report of his board's activities with the supporting evi- dence, but the delegates deferred even receiving it "as the House is very much engaged in other necessary business." The house did not return to the business because Sir William Howe's appearance disrupted the proceedings. Before Congress closed its session, it gave Washing- ton power to "take such measures for apprehending and securing" danger- ous persons "as he shall think necessary." 1
When the Fourth Congress or Convention assembled on July 9, it merged the two "secret" committees. The Convention specifically repealed the broad powers to seize suspects Washington had received from its predecessor, resolving that "it would be unreasonable longer to burthen the General with matters for which this Congress ought to provide .... " Having taken this precaution to safeguard civil author- ity, the deputies instructed their committee to proceed in a manner "most agreeable to the dictates of justice and humanity, and "most advancive of the public good, the oath which they have taken notwith- standing." Just how this committee functioned is not clear, since the Convention itself heard numerous cases and prescribed punishments. Late in August the Convention directed the county committees to exercise their discretion in releasing minor loyalists whom the Convention had
1. Cal, Hist. Mas., I, 341, 348; Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 509, 512.
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arrested, but not to liberate any person confined for "treasonable 1 practices."
The deteriorating military situation and increased activity of the loyalists caused the Convention on September 19, 1776 to take a new look at its loyalist policy. During the subsequent debates the members hammered out more drastic resolutions, establishing a standing committee of seven with broad powers for "inquiring into, detecting and defeating all conspiracies." Jay, William Duer, Pierre Van Cortlandt, Leonard Gansevoort, Charles DeWitt, Zephaniah Platt and Nathaniel Sackett
composed the committee. The committee had troops at its command, either militia or special ranger companies, its own intelligence net- work and express riders. During the four months of its existence this committee presided over perhaps 500 cases. Many prisoners incurred 2 sentences of banishment to New Hampshire jails.
When Carleton in October, 1776 advanced down Lake Champlain toward Ticonderoga, the Committee of Safety established a new committee in response to Schuyler's appeal for reinforcements. £ The Committee of Safety hoeded his call by detailing a special committee to repair to Albany to cooperate with Schuyler. The new committee possessed practi- cally a blank check which included authority to call out the militia of the northern counties. However, this special committee devoted an important portion of its time and energy to the apprehension of loyalists. It is
1. Flick, Am. Rev. , p. 218; Jour. Prov. Cong., 1, 633, 634, 637-39.
2. Flick, Am. Rev., pp. 218-19; NYHS Coll., 57:3-5; Jour. Prov. Cong .. I. 693.
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highly unlikely that the labor of this committee of "arrangement" duplicated that of the committee to defeat conspiracies. The Com- mittee of Safety's correspondence indicates that the other committee did not lack for business elsewhere. Where circumstances warranted it, the house resorted to special committees to supplement the work 1 of the existing committee on conspiracies.
Driven by the pressure of innumerable problems, the Convention devised every conceivable stratagem to maintain adequate attendance. On 11 February 1777 the Convention dissolved the committee on con- spiracies and replaced it by a commission of three non-legislators who drew 12s. per diem for their service. The deputies picked three men from Dutchess to fill the new posts: Egbert Benson, chairman of the county committee, Colonel Jacobus Swartwout of the militia, and committeeman Melancton Smith. The commission seems to have inherited the rights of its predecessor, although the Journal does not specifi- cally state that it did. When the Convention resolved on 7 March 1777 to offer political prisoners an act of grace and thereby clear the jails, it inundated the commission. The act's terms extended to all offenders except those who had taken up arms against the United States, those who had recruited for the British or had supplied them with provisions, and those who had conveyed intelligence to them. This meant that the com- mission interrogated not only those imprisoned in New York, but also those incarcerated in other states. The prisoners' discharge depended upon their taking a special oath of allegiance. Failure to comply
1. Ibid., I, 684, 693, 694-95, 700, 910-11; Cal, Hist. Mas., I, 525.
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entailed banishment within the British lines or imprisonment as "open enemies." Although the Convention dissolved 13 May 1777, the suc- ceeding Council of Safety continued the commission. Similarly, when the Council of Safety expired 10 September 1777, a Convention of members of the senate and assembly authorized the commission to proceed as 1
before.
Having instituted measures against the persons of Tories, Congress soon felt obliged to appropriate their property. The house embarked on & confiscation policy on 1 September 1775, when it voted seizure of the personal property of those who joined the British army or took up arms against America. The local committees assumed trustee- chip of such personalty, but the people tended to interpret the resolu- tion as authorizing confiscation. The Declaration of Independence spurred some of the committees to wholesale confiscations of personal ty and in some localities the committeemen sold the property. Later the Convention instructed the committee on conspiracies to sequestrate the 2 effects of loyalists who broke their parole.
The military situation in Westchester helped to precipitate further confiscations. A Convention committee cooperating with the army in Westchester pleaded with the parent body to dispatch 600 to 700 militia reinforc. ments to hold the lower part of the county. William Duer, chairman, pointed out that if New York called in Connecticut troops, these would probably seize the property of loyalists who have fled or
1. Flick, Am, Rev., loc. cit .; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 803, 807, 827, 1061. 2, Flick, Am, Rev., p. 220. -
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Joined the enemy army. Two days afterward, 22 February 1777, the Committee of Safety ordered the public sale of Westchester loyalist personalty. The next month the Convention applied the Westchester action to the whole state. The resolutions created three commissioners in each county to dispose of the personalty of absentee loyalists by public sale, alloting to their families their apparel, furniture and three months supply of food. Income from the sales went to the state treasury "to be hereafter paid to the respective owners thereof, or otherwise disposed of at the discretion of the legislature .... " Ål- though the Convention marketed personalty, it did not deal with realty
in the same fashion.
All houses and estates seized with personalty
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remained in trust until further disposition by the legislature in 1779.
Since the distribution of powers between the Continental Congress
and the states was not defined until the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, the Provincial Congress's interpretation of these rela- tionships is difficult to ascertain. New York seems to have accepted without question Continental primacy in the direction of the war, but from time to time it challenged the Continent or its agents on specific issues.
Although the New York Congress depended in its relations with the Continental Congress upon delegates chosen from among its members, opposition to this method of determining representation cropped up in the spring of 1776. Sentiment for having the people elect the Conti- mental deputies arose in New York City, Orange and Ulster Counties. In
1. Ibid., p. 221; Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 808, 811.
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the city the mechanics sought to rouse popular support for direct election but with indifferent success. The inhabitants of Goshen district, Orange County, deprix __ neir provincial representatives. of the power to choose Continental delegates. A serious. dispute occurred in Ulster on this question, but the county committee ad- bored to the current practice. Jay defended Congress's position in tas matter, arguing that all the colonies choose their delegates to the Continental Congress in this fashion. Furthermore, since the people gave their deputies that specific power in the elections for the Third Congress in April, 1776, Jay did not comprehend how the exercise of this power would injure the people's "right of election. " 1 After this incident, no further challenge developed.
The question of continental-state relations arose early in the First Provincial Congress. In May. 1775 Isaac Low, seconded by Gouverneur Morris, presented a resolution:
Resolved, As the opinion of this Congress, that im- plicit obedience ought to be paid to every recom- mendation of the Continental Congress, for the general regulation of the associated colonies; but that this Congress is competent to and ought freely to deliberate and determine on, all matters relative to the internal policies of this colony.
After much debate, the opposition, led by Scott, carried a motion to table. Only Richmond County voted against tabling. Whatever the delegates may have said about the propriety or substance of Low's proposal, they did not entertain any idea of subordinating the colony
1. Pecker, op. cit., pp. 256-57, 259; Jour, Prov. Cong., 1, 460, 467. 499. II, 199-200; Jay to McDougall, 11 April 1776, MeDougall Papers. MYHS: N. Y. J., 4 April 1776.
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to the authority of the Continental Congress. May 24, the day after this discussion, the house approved a letter to the Connecticut govern- ment in which they promised "that in this and all other matters, we will pay the highest attention to every recommendation of the Grand Continental Congress .... " This language hardly qualifies as uncon- 1 ditional acceptance of Continental supremacy.
Having blocked the attempted definition of spheres of interest, Scott counter-attacked on May 25 with a resolution "to fully approve of the proceedings of the LFirst Continental] Congress." This motion did not win approbation either, since the house tabled it without a formal division. However, a day later the members approved the General Association, signed it, and circularized the county committees to have every inhabitant sign it. . One clause in the Association pledged the deputies to "adopt and endeavour to carry into execution whatever measures may be recommended by the Continental Congress or resolved upon by this Provincial Congress for the purpose of preserving our Con- stitution, and opposing the "execution of the several arbitrary and 2 oppressive acts of the British Parliament. .. *
Friction arose in January, 1776 when Washington ordered General Charles Lee to New York to fortify the port against a possible British attack. Fear that Lee might precipitate hostilities with the British men-of-war in the harbor, drove the Yorkers to protest the expedition.
1. Becker, op. cit., p. 212; Jour Prov. Cong., I, 8, 11. .
2. Becker, loc. cit .; Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 13, 15; Cal. Hist. Mas., I, 86.
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Hearing of the New York reaction, the Continental Congress, under the prodding of the New York delegates, dispatched a committee to the city to investigate the expediency of the operation and to exert supervisory authority over it. The Committee of Safety assigned Scott and. McDougall to wait upon the Continental committee and to bring back a report. The committee informed the two Yorkers that the General came to take measures and consult with the Continental members for the defense of the city and not to commence e battle. The Continental committee also re-
quested supplies and barracks for the first contingent of the troops which would arrive that evening. In the course of the debate which the request provoked, Comfort Sands moved that the troops be halted until the Committee conferred with the Continental emissaries. Sands's motion lost by a vote of 4 to 3 with Scott voting in the negative and
McDougall in the affirmative. Scott then advocated that the troops be admitted upon condition that the Committee of Safety control them until a conference of the Yorkers with the Continental committee and General Lee and until "further order to be taken thereon, with the con- sent of this Committee ... or further direction of the Continental Congress." 1 This motion carried by 5-2 with MeDougall shifting to support Scott. The Committee of Safety achieved nothing by this last maneuver. The Continental committee rejected these conditions on two grounds. First, that its instructions from Congress precluded their acceptance and second, the assurances first given by it to Scott and McDougall
1. Becker, op. cit., pp. 246-47; Jour, Prov. Cong., I. 275-77. Becker attributes the situation to nationalism vs. sectionalism.
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rendered the conditions superfluous. Furthermore, Colonel David Waterbury, commander of the Connecticut units en route to the city, who was there beforehand, practically defied the Committee of Safety. He refused to submit the troops to the Committee's command and in- sisted he would "march then into the barracks." In the face of this resistance the Yorkers asked the congressional committee for an im- mediate conference. Taking refuge in a technicality, the Committee of Safety argued that since General Lee would not accompany the first contingent and since the troops entered the city without any particular order of Congress, the Committee of Safety ought to have command of them. The congressmen silenced the Yorkers by producing their in- structions from Congress which gave them authority over Lee's forces. The Committee of Safety yielded because they had no alternative. The issue lay not so much over the question of local command, since Stirling's succession to Lee's authority in March brought no protest from the Pro- vincial Congress. Rather they apprehended that Lee's rashness might 1 induce him to attack the British ships.
Before quitting the scene, Lee stirred the wrath of the New Yorkers by ordering the imposition of test oaths on the Long Island
Tories. He first hinted at the desirability of an oath on March 4, but the Provincial Congress did not reply. On March 5 Lee ordered his adjutant general, Isaac Sears, to offer a test oath to a list of Tories and to arrest those who refused to take it. On the seventh the General asked Congress for a reply to his proposal on the Tories, but
1. Ibid., 1, 278-79.
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the provincial body ignored the request. Sears carried out his orders, but the Provincial Congress made no official protest, perhaps because Lee handed over his command to Lord Stirling on March 8. On March 12, Daniel W. Kissam of the Great Neck Committee, Queens, presented himself before the house to complain of Sears's conduct. These proceedings, Kissam asserted, "tend to convert whigs to be tories." After hearing Kissam's account of these events, Congress entertained a motion to summon Sears before it to explain his authority for his undertaking. The Journal notes that the house expended a "considerable time" in debating the motion, but came to no decision. Although the deputies postponed the business to the next day, they did not revive the matter. This seeming oversight in connection with the test oath may have derived from action in the Continental Congress. The New York delegates in Congress heard of the affair and on March 8 won Approval of a resolution condemning the imposition of test oaths by military officers. Their letter to New York on the subject implied a rebuke to the province for not having protested to the Continental Congress, 2 since the military had encroached upon the civil authority.
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