USA > New York > Organization of the Revolutionary movement in New York State, 1775-77 > Part 9
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1. Becker, op. cit., p. 262 interprets this letter as evidence that "the order had scarcely been attended to at all." However, comments in the Journal and other evidence indicate that arms had been seized in New York City, Queens, Dutchess, Ulster, Westchester, Suffolk and Albany. Moreover, the lack of inventories is no proof of committee inaction as the heretofore cited cases show. Jour, Frov. Cong., I, 411, 415, 417. 420; Force, op. cit., 4th Ser., V, 1469, 1487; Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence, 1775-78, 1, 403 (hereafter cited as Min. Albany Com.).
2. Exhorting Albany to carry out the resolution without delay, the Com- mittee complained that it "expected" that Livingston had delivered their resolve "long since." Jour. Prov. Cons., I, 424,425.
3. Becker, op. cit., p. 262 concludes that the Second Congress did not make "any serious effort to deal with loyalist opposition in a systematic of effective fashion."
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Lloyd of Queens Village, Queens. Lloyd went to Boston to join General Hove, leaving his property in the hands of his nephew, John Lloyd. The Committee of Safety ordered an accurate inventory of all his property. Although the Committee entrusted the property's care to John Lloyd, it forbade the nephew to transfer or sell any part of it unless by order of the Provincial Congress. While acting gingerly, the Committee had exercised sovereign power in placing limits on the use of the property. 1
The second matter came to the reconvened Congress's attention the day before its life expired. A committee recommended the levying of a fine on all male disarmed Tories, ages 16 to 50. Since these Tories could not serve now in the militia, the committee proposed to penalize them five shillings for every mustering of the militia. Instead of rejecting the plan outright, the Congress voted to refer 2 it to the Third Congress which would meet in five days.
Notwithstanding the caution of the New York Provincial Congress, factors outside the colony could precipitate distasteful dilemmas for
it. As with the loyalist predicament, the Continental Congress posed another knotty problem for the New Yorkers when it recommended in May the suppression of the crown's authority and the formation of new govern- ments. However much the provincial body might have preferred to defer consideration of the topic, it could not escape its own constituents.
1. Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 428-29.
2. Ibid., 1, 440. .
.
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Since January widespread public debate had occurred over the cognate questions of independence and a new internal government. "Salus Populi" in February declared that in the face of the crisis the people practically had abolished the old forms of government and substituted temporary ones. This fact was a potent argument for more permanent change?
Does not this shew evidently, that the forms we have hitherto lived under are by no means equal to the task of preserving our literties, and that without such re- forms as will enable them to withstand attacks we can never be safe?
Pointing in admiration to Connecticut and Rhode Island which had an elected executive, he wrote,
That form of government alone can give us security which puts all the servants of the public under the power of the people.1
A handbill in the form of a petition to the Committee of Safety signed by "A Free Citizen" first appeared on the city's streets and then re- appeared in one of the newspapere. Motivated by fear of military government on the one hand and the "ungovernable fury of a mob" on the other, "A Free Citizen" pleaded with the Committee of Safety to apply to the Continental Congress "for liberty" to establish a suitable govern- 2 cent. An unsigned piece in May dismissed reconciliation as a "painted
1. He warneu, "He who has the giving of all places in a government will always be master, if the constitution were in other respects the most perfect in the world." Const. Gaz., 14 February 1776. Another un- named author urged Connecticut's form as a model. "To the Freeborn Sons of America, in General, and of Connecticut in Particular," N.Y.P .. 21 March 1776.
2. "A Free Citizen" still hoped for a reconciliation "upon constitutional principles." Const. Gaz., 24 April 1776.
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dream" and made the question of government one of timing. Which would be more advantageous, to draw up a constitution amidst the con- fusion of war or to wait until peace is won? We must chose the former alternative because "there is nothing so conducive to vigour, ex- pedition, foresight, secrecy, and everything advantageous in war, as a well regulated government." Moreover, after we have triumphed over Britain, if we have no sound government, we may have to face the twin evils of a Caesar (or Cromwell) or "mobile frenzy." Read dill- gently England's history after 1649, he admonished his readers, so we may not "run the risk of having our constitution finally determined 1 by the sword."
Moderate opinion in the revolutionary party in April veered toward the idea of a more stable government. Jay confided to McDougall that the colony must look to the establishment of a firm government and suggested that the Second Congress begin to think about the problem. Having committed himself thus far, Jay hastered to remark that the ex- pectation of British peace commissioners would probably delay the matter 2 Citing the drafting of governments in the Carolinas, of constitutions.
3 William Floyd expected New York to take similar action soon. Writing to Jay from Philadelphia in May, R. R. Livingston voiced the hope that the New York Congress understood the necessity of erecting a new govern-
1. N. Y. J., 9 May 1776. See also "Spartanus, " ibid., 30 May 1776. 2. Jay to McDougall, 11 April 1776, McDougall Papers, NYHS.
3. Floyd to Mckesson, 9 May 1776, Force, op. cit., 4th Ser., V, 395.
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ment. 1 Congressman Ezra L'Hommedieu of Suffolk assured his colleague General Nathaniel Woodhull that "most people" approved the idea of a 2 new governmental forn. On the other hand, conservatives like Duane contended that the defeat of most of the New York City radicals in the April elections for the Third Congress and city Committee demon- strated the lack of popular support for the radical position. There- fore, Duane declared, Congress should not be "too precipitate" in raising the constitutional issue; rather, it should delay and see what 3 course the other middle colonies adopt before it moves.
Duane's interpretation of the April balloting, if correct, is of considerable importance. It meant that public opinion opposed supplanting the revolutionary committee system. An examination of the city elections, therefore, is necessary to determine the validity of Duane's claim. Your tickets were submitted to the inhabitants. The four slates carried many of the candidates in common, but the ex- ceptions gave the election its tone. The city Committee headed its list of April 13 with the men who represented New York in the Conti- nental Congress (Jay, Philip Livingston, Francis Lewis and John Alsop). but it excluded the fifth delegate, Duane. £ That same day a broadside
1. Livingston to Jay, 17 May 1776, Jay Papers, CUL; Johnston, Op. cit., 1, 60.
2. L' Hommedieu to Nathaniel Woodhull, 2 June 1776, Force, op. cit., 4th Ser., VI, 684.
3. Duane to Jay, 18 May 1776, Johnston, op. cit., I, 61. Duane also miscalculated the situation in Virginia in this letter. He implied that Virginia would be against changing the government, but at that very moment word was on the way to Philadelphia instructing the Virginia representatives to move for independence.
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by "Sentinel" circulated about town which substituted seven new choices (Alexander McDougall, Thomas Marston, John Ray, Adrian Rutgers, Robert Ray, Abraham P. Lott and Eenry Remsen) for an equal number of the Com- mittea's ticket. "Sentinel" deleted the names of the four Continental delegates and three radicals (John Broome, Peter Pra Van Zandt and James Alner). Two other tickets appeared in rapid succession.
On April 16 the Mechanics Committee produced a modified slate. It approved "Sentinel's" excision of the Continental delegates' names and accepted his substitutes for them. However, it could not permit the loss of Broome, Van Zandt and Alner whom it added to its ticket, sacrificing "Sentinel's" selection of Mcdougall, Marston and John Ray. In addition the Mechanics ruled out Comfort Sands and Thomas Randall, both of whom appeared on the other two lists, to make room for Isaac Sears and William Malcolm. £ All three slates had one thing in common; none of them named Duane. Still another handbill appeared, this time without signature, which adopted the whole city committee bloc but substituted Duane for Almer, a member of the Mechanics Committee.
At the height of the campaign a broadside by "A Sober Citizen" practically presented an ultimatum to the voters. He stated as if it were fact that the Continental delegates, if defeated, would withdraw from the revolutionary movement and would seek pardon from the British to save themselves. Facing the probability of an invasion, the city could not afford the possible diaruption of the revolutionary organi- zation which might ensue from these defections. "Sober Citizen" ac- companied this advice with a diatribe against the Mechanics' candidates whom he regarded as the principal opponents of the Continental delegates.
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The Mechanics' nominees, he warned, possess no property or virtue and, if elected, will bring both colony and continent into contempt.
The election results indicate that the electorate heeded the admonition of "Sober Citizen, " for the Continental delegates and Duane
won seats.
Indeed, almost the whole of the city Committee's ticket
of 21 ran successfully.
Alner and Prince, the exceptions, lost out
to Dunne and Remsen. Therefore, the principal men on the Mechanics' ballot, with one exception, suffered defeat. Henry Remsen, alone of their substitutes, won a seat, but he also had "Sentinel's" support. Furthermore, two radicals on the city Committee's and Mechanics' slates, Broome and Van Zandt, defeated two of "Sentinel's" moderates. Even McDougall did not win. £ The balloting, therefore, did not so much express a rejection of the moderates and radicals, as it did a fear 1 of disunity in the face of the enemy. Duane's interpretation of these events perhaps reflects more his desire to prevent change than it does factual evaluation.
The Whigs transformed opinions into deeds on May 24 when the Kew York Congress took up the subject of government as recommended by the Continental Congress. Unable to evade the issue, some deputies sought refuge in further delay advocating another polling of the people. Taking a different tack, Gouverneur Morris pleaded in a lengthy speech 2
for the election of a special constitutional convention. Since this
1. Becker, op. cit., pp. 257-58; "A Sober Citizen," 16 April' 1776, Broadsides, NYPL.
2. Jour Prov. Cong., 1, 460.
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would have meant by-passing Congress in which the moderates and con- servatives prevailed, one author has said that "Morris undoubtedly 1
represented the more radical views .... " No doubt many moderates and conservatives wished to prevent the writing of a radical charter and they believed Congress to be the means of maintaining their po- litical supremacy. Morris, however, had carefully reassured the members on this point, when he said:
Nor do I think it quite proper for us all to abandon the Senate House and leave the business to entire new men, while the country continues in its present danger- our situation.2
Thus the election of a convention would not open the floodgates to the radicals. Practically, of course, Morris's procedure guaranteed post- ponement of any labor on a draft constitution until June or July, since 3
the election would consume a month or more.
1. Becker, op. cit., p. 267. This judgment was probably influenced by Sparks's quotations from the speech which argued that the colonies were independent in fact and Congress should acknowledge that fact. Despite this plea Morris's subsequent behavior was at variance with these ideas. For example, when the Mechanics' Committee presented a petition to Con- gress on June 4 urging it to instruct the Continental delegates to move for independence, Congress rejected the plea without recorded dissent. Although Morris was present, there is nothing to indicate that he favored such instructions or even that he raised the subject of independence during the discussion of the petition. Again, when on June 5 Congress entertained the Virginia Convention's crucial letter on independence, Morris did not attempt to compel a debate, even though Congress named himand Jayacommittee to draft a reply to the Virginians. The com- mittee's draft, which Congress approved without dissent, was polite but evasive. If Morris disagreed with these sentiments, he did not bother to express his disapproval. Moreover, even after his return from a visit in the middle of June to Philadelphia where the fateful debate had begun and been postponed to July 1, Morris did not raise the matter on the floor of Congress. Jour, Prov. Cong., I, 474ff.
2. Sparks, Morris, I, 106.
3. Under the modified plan actually adopted, the colony held elections in June and the new Congress met in July.
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Actually Scott's plan represented the radical approach, but Scott did not contemplate democratizing the colony's political structure. His proposition was radical because it proposed that the existing legis- lature should draw up the constitution. Once having the matter under consideration, Congress could not shunt a question of such major im- portance into obscurity and forget it. This procedure, therefore, would minimize delay. The united mechanics' association welcomed Scott's interpretation of Congress's authority and expressed "astonish- ment" that any doubt should arise about the power of the house to frame 1 the charter. The record does not show that any disagreement existed over the basic question of whether the Whigs should form a government; rather, both groups assumed the necessity of so doing, but differed over timing and, thereby, procedure.
Morris's speech and motion on May 24 opened the proceedings on the great question. 2 Although Scott delivered a long counter- argument, he closed his speech on an indecisive note which weakened
1. N. Y. G., 17 June 1776; Force, op. cit., 4th Ser. VI, 895-98.
2. According to the Journal Morris made two long speeches, the latter being his rejoinder to Scott. Sparks copiously quoted a fragment of one of them in Morris, I, 97ff. Unfortunately, Sparks omitted sections and altered phraseology without indicating the changes. This portion is in the Gouverneur Morris Papers, CUL, and may represent one-half the original, since its pages are numbered five through eight. Their theme is that New York is already independent in everything but name. that the Congress is in fact a legislature and that only an open avowal of independence can guarantee peace and security. Since the nature of the argument is such, it is questionable that Morris could have intended it ag a rebuttal to Scott's contention on Congress's powers. It is more likely a part of the first address which preceded Scott's.
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his position. When he argued for Congress's constitution-drafting power, he put it negatively, "at least, it is doubtful whether they have not that power .... " Having conceded the existence of doubt, Scott recommended that the house refer this point to committee. Since Morris had moved previously for the appointment of a committee to draw up instructions for the election of a constitutional convention, Comfort Sands submitted an amendment that the suggested committee "take into consideration the Resolutions of the Continental Congress of the 15th May instant, and report thereon with all convenient speed." This substitute motion, which Scott seconded, carried with only two counties and Morris voting against. Congress chose Scott, Jay, John Haring, Francis Lewis, Henry Remsen, John Broome and Jacob Cuyler as the com- 1 mittee.
Referral of the motion transferred debate on the general question to the committee. If Scott expected the committee to limit itself to the single formulation he had proposed, he misinterpreted Sands's amend- ment. The general phraseology of the motion placed no stipulations on the committee's labors. In the committee the opposing viewpoints accepted a compromise which sacrificed Morris's special convention, but salvaged the all-important time element. Perhaps the congressmen's desire to be both legislators and constitution drafters may have figured in the abandonment of the constitutional convention. If they adopted Morris's plan, the Congress would have to recess until after the con- vention had completed its work. That might entail the absence of any
1. Jour. Prov, Cong., 1, 460.
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legislative body for several months in a period of rapidly increasing danger. If Congress remained in session, the members could not serve in the convention. In order, therefore, to keep the reins in their own hands and to still the misgiving's they themselves had raised, they recommended the election of a new congress whose members would specifically have the people's mandate to form a new government. Naturally the polling process would delay any constitutional action until the end of June or early July.
In its report to the house on May 27 the committee presented & series of conclusions on which it based its recommendations that new elections be held. £ This report is of the utmost importance be- cause there is a major difference between it and the final resolutions. The fourth clause of the report summarized the events that dissolved the royal government and concluded,
whereby, it hath become absolutely necessary for the good people of this Colony to institute a new and regular form of internal Government and Police ....
Clauses seven and eight repeated this clear and unequivocal determina- tion to replace the government. Clause seven called on the people to declare the present members "competent for the purpose of establishing such new form of internal police and government" or to choose others "with express authority to institute and establish such new and internal form of government." £ Clause eight reiterated the phrase, "with express
1 authority to institute" a new government. Having approved the report without any modification, Congress accepted, therefore, the concept that
1. Ibid., 1, 462-63.
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the mode of governing must be changed. Congress would not debate whether any change should be made. The house committed the report to Scott, Jay and Haring to convert it into formal resolutions. 1
When the report emerged from the committee on May 31, the key ideas expressed in sections four, seven and eight had undergone subtle but substantial modification. The resolves consolidated these sections into a single resolution which ran:
That it be recommended to the electors ... either to au- thorize (in addition to the powers vested in this Congress) their present Deputies, or others ... or either of them, to take into consideration the necessity and propriety of in- stituting such government as in and by the said resolution of the Continental Congress is described and recommended. And if the majority of the Counties by their Deputies in Provincial Congress, shall be of opinion that such new government ought to be instituted and established, then to institute and establish euch a government as they shall deem best calculated to serve the rights, liberties and happiness of the good people of this Colony .... 2
Did the resolution mean that the newly elected congress would proceed immediately to the task of drafting a constitution? Or did it mean that the newly elected congress would proceed immediately to debate 3 whether or not they should draft a constitution? The phraseology
1. Ibid. Becker, op. cit., p. 269 incorrectly places Remsen on this committee.
2. Jour. Prov. Conz., I, 469. Underscoring mine.
3. Becker, op. cit., p. 269 considers the ambiguity to be in the sentence beginning "And if the majority of the Counties" and implies that this election was to be a referendum in which the possibility of a "no" vote existed. Taking the phrase in the context of the preceding sentence, it is apparent that the "majority of the Counties" referred to is the majority of county delegations voting on this question in Congress. It is not a majority of the electors instructing their deputies. Moreover, Jay, for example, had no doubt whatsoever that the people would grant the requested power to Congress. Jay to R. R. Livingston, 29 May 1776, Unpublished Corr. P. R. Livingston, no. 25; Johnston, op. cit., I, 65.
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implies that congress would consider first whether it ought to es- tablish a new government, The drafting committee, therefore, had re-opened the question, but Congress passed the resolution without 1 discussion and without a recorded vote. In whatever manner the people interpreted this recommendation by Congress, they seem to have 2 assumed that a new government would replace the committee system.
After Congress published these resolves, public protest arose, but it did not strike out against the authority requested nor the pro- cedure laid down. The sole organized criticism came from the Mechanics Committee which sent to Congress a discursive but provocative letter which throws some light on the political thinking of the lesser merchants,
tradesmen, mechanics and laborers. 3
Admittedly, open opposition to the resolutions by the Mechanics might offer a lever to the "indefati- gable" emissaries of the British or might confuse numbers of the people and dangerously weaken popular support of the revolutionary cause. But the Mechanics explained that they risked these consequences because they conversed daily "with numbers who have been deceived" by the mis- interpretation of the resolutions. Many believed that Congress would not submit a new charter to the people for ratification.
1. Jour, Prov. Cong., 1, 469.
2. Tro penmen, "Spartanus, " letter II and "Columbus, " R. Y, J., 13 June 1776, exhibit no doubts. The former comments, "As we are to assune a new mode of Government, I think it ought properly to be new. " The latter says, "The subject upon which we are now to deliberate ... is the election of proper persons to form a new mode of Government for this Colony."
3. See Becker, op. cit., p. 270.
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They are terrified at the consequences, although a sincere zeal for the general cause inspires them to suppress their remonstrances, Jest the common enemy should avail himself of that circumstance to under- mine your [i.e., Congress's] authority .1
"Impressed with a just fear of the consequences" which flow from this misconception, the Mechanics pleaded with the Congress for a "full and timely explanation" to put an end to the "groundless jealousies" of their "patriotick Resolve."
Having justified their right to evoke the question, the Me- chanics entered into a detailed exposition of the people's "inalienable right" to ratify a constitution. This was the "birthright of every man" which God had given to him. Although every individual did not possess the prerequisites for constitutional labors, God-given common sense would enable him to determine "what degree of safety and what advantages he is likely to enjoy, or be deprived of" under any pro- posed constitution. Should the people delude themselves into & re- nunciation of their right to ratification, such an "impious and frantick act of self-destruction" would cast them into "absolute slavery" and would destroy the Congress's "lawful power" over them. Of this dual outcome the Committee commented
It might probably accelerate our [i.e., the people's] political death; but it must immediately cause your ovn.
Since the congressional resolutions did not refer to ratifica- tion, the letter quoted the section that had created these fears. The
1. N. Y. G., 17 June 1776; reprinted in Jour. Prov. Cong., II, 241-43; Force, op. cit., 4th Ser., VI, 895-98.
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"obnoxious clause" was the key resolve partially quoted above. The ambiguity of the language did not trouble the Mechanics, but the im- plication that Congress would establish the new government without submitting it to the people for confirmation did. The Committee chose to believe, however, that since the Congress had stated the right of the people to determine existing doubts of constitutional authority, it could not have intended to obtain a surreptitious re- nunciation of that right:
Human nature, depraved as it is, has not yet, and we hope never will, be guilty of so much hypocrisy and treachery.
On the contrary, the Mechanics deemed the questionable resolution to · be "perfectly consistent with the liberal principles on which it is
introduced." In support of their interpretation they quoted a much- elided version of the clauset
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