USA > New York > Organization of the Revolutionary movement in New York State, 1775-77 > Part 5
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1. Estimates of the New York population in 1776 vary from 190,000 to 200,000 including slaves. Although the Continental Congress had ac- cepted the latter figure, the former figure is an estimate based on the rate of increase between 1756-71. Robert R. Livingston thought the total to be 190,000 in 1775. Greene and Harrington, op. cit., pp. 7, 91; Livingston to de la Luzerne, 24 April 1787, Robert R. Livingston Collection, NYHS.
Granting the greater validity of the American figures, it would be necessary to reduce them drastically to tailor them to fit into a white population of 169,000. On the other hand, if we increase the total white population much beyond 208,000, the growth between 1771-76 tends to become less credible.
2. Nevertheless, a very general approximation might be made on an arbitrary basis. Such an approximation might allow an error of 15,000 for all factors. Subtraction of this number from the American computation of 51,972 would leave 36,000. Thus the loyalists on this basis would have 16,000.
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placed the overall figure at 15,000, although the author warned that 1 he could not find some unit records. Troop returns by Howe and Clinton reveal that provincial forces ranged from 3,000 to 8,200 in 2 any one year, while those in Canada fluctuated around 2,400. A maximum of 25,000 would seem to be a reasonable appraisal of the total loyalist contribution. When assessed against this figure, it is
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highly improbable that New York's share 18 23,000. Second, many New York units consisted of men from other colonies as well as from New York. For example, one battalion of Delancey's brigade drew its
1. W. O. Raymond, "Loyalists in Arms, " New Brunswick Historical Society Collections, II, 220-21 (hereafter cited as "Loyalists").
2. After a year's occupation of southern New York Howe could only list 3.257 provincials from all colonies. Troyer S. Anderson, The Command of the Howe Brothers During the American Revolution, p. 314; Sir William Howe, A Schedule of Sir William Howe's Correspondence as Pro- duced to the House of Commons, p. 390 (hereafter cited as Corr.); Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville of Drayton House, Northamptonshire, II, 65, 212 (hereafter cited as Stopford Mas.); Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, ed. by William B. Willcox, p. 548 (hereafter cited as Am. Rebellion); Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., The Settlement of the United Empire Loyalists on the Upper St. Lawrence and Bay of Quinte in 1784. pp. 30-31.
3. Flick thought that the New York total was about half of all loyalists in British units. Loyaliam, p. 113.
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recruits from Connecticut. 1
Third, an unknown number joined the British army involuntarily. Howe himself admitted that his officers sought recruits among prisoners of war, offering such inducements as 2 "pay, liberty and pardon." The British employed another kind of
inducement of which the Continental Congress took note. Its Board
1. On Delancey see A. W. Eaton, "New York Loyalists in Nova Scotia, " The Grafton Magazine, February, 1910, p. 174. Roger's King's Rangers included enlistees from Quebec, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Nova Scotia and other colonies, although the British regarded it as a "New York" corps. Simcoe's Queen's Rangers began with ca.100 from Westchester, but the bulk of the unit were Europeans. Although Maclean raised one battalion of his Royal Highland Emigrants in New York, the other bat- talion comprised Nova Scotians. Indeed some of the men came out of Quebec's prison. The New York Volunteers first came from New England refugees and later from New York. Another Yorker regiment, the Royal Fencible Americans, had its origins in Boston in 1775. The King's
Royal Regiment of New York numbered men from. Canada, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Wilbur H. Siebert, "The American Loyalists in the Eastern Seigniories and Townships of the Province of Quebec," Royal Society of Canada, Proceedings and Transactions, Series 3, VII, Section II, 15,16; Jour. Prov. Cong., II, 317: E. M. Jackson, "Queen's Rangers and Their Contribution in the Years 1776 to 1784, " Canadian Historical Associa- tion, Annual Report, 1950, p. 13; H. M. Jackson, Roberts Rangers, pp. 183-88; Jonas Howe, "The Royal Emigrants, " Acadiensis, IV, 50-51; C. T. Atkinson, "British Forces in North America, 1774-81, " Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, XVI, 6, 9, 14, n. 26.
Not all loyalists came from the revolting thirteen colonies. Some had just arrived from Europe, some lived in Canada and Nova Scotia. Howe stated that a large number of his 3,609 provincials in May, 1778 were not Americans. There are indications that Scottish emigrants reached America only to be inducted into loyalist regiments. Narrative of Lieutenant General Sir William Howe in a Committee of the House of Commons on 29 April, 1779 Relative to His Conduct During His Late Command of the King's Troops in North America, pp. 52-53 (hereafter cited as Narrative); W. O. Raymond, "Roll of Officers of the British American or Loyalist Corps, " New Brunswick Historical Society Collections, II, 225, 226; Const. Gar., 30 December 1775.
2. Howe, Narrative, p. 52. Since the king had declared the Americans rebels, they might be threatened with execution. Howe's statement on "pardon" implies that the British did so threaten the prisoners.
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of War reported that the British commonly held new prisoners for three to five days without food, then tempted them to enlist in order 1 to avoid starvation. There is profuse testimony of British compulsion, particularly among the prisoners aboard the prison hulks in New York harbor where thousands died. 2 Lastly, contemporary correspondence
indicates that some loyalists deserted from the British. Unfortunately, 3 no figures are available and the scope of the movement is indeterminate. For these reasons the calculations of New York loyalist soldiers are tentative until someone evaluates these factors accurately.
1. N. Y, P., 26 February 1778. John Adams threw this charge at the British during the peace negotiations in 1782. He said the British starved the American prisoners taken at Fort Washington in order to force them to enlist in the British Army. Extract from John Adams' s Journal, 17 November 1782, American Daily Advertiser, Extra., 12 February 1794. See also the references to 1,821 privates in "dispute," presumably the Fort Washington prisoners, in David L. Sterling, ed., "American Prisoners of War in New York: A Report by Elias Boudinot, " William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XIII, 382, 384.
2. Depositions of Robert Troup, 17 January 1777 and Adolph Myer, 5 February 1777, Jour, Prov. Cons., II, 411, 412; testimony of Peter Wood, 19 February 1777 and deposition of Garret Luyster, 13 May 1777, NYHS Coll., 57:135, 283.
On the prison hulks, see David Ramsay, History of the Revolution, II, 372; William Gordon, History of the Rise, Progress, and Establish- ment of the Independence of the United States of America, II, 172; Henry Onderdonk, British Prisons and Prison Ships at New York, 1776-83, n. p., "recollections of General Jeremiah Johnson"; NYHS Coll., 57:39; American Citizen, 22 February 1803: Albert G. Greene, Recollections of the Jersey Prison-Ship, pp. 70-71 and n. 1.
Hobart relayed disturbing news about Tryon's recruiting tactics in Suffolk. The British governor threatened Huntington that "unless the young men do voluntarily take up arms against their country, an inveterate and disappointed soldiery will be let loose upon them." Jour ,Proy. Cong., I, 671.
3. John Henry to President, Council of Safety, 31 May 1777, 1bid., 11. 444; Assistant Commissioners for Conspiracies to Council of Safety, 4 December 1777, NYHS Col1., 58:445.
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There is still another element in any consideration of Tory strength. If the loyalists counted such large numbers of supporters as they themselves so frequently maintained, why did they not rally to the British standard when Howe arrived? Howe, for example, described the energetic, but futile, efforts of Delancey to bring his brigade to its authorized level of 1,500. Brigadier-General Delancey scoured not only the occupied counties, but also the American-held areas for volunteers. Despite these vigorous exertions, at the commencement 1 of the 1777 campaign Delancey's brigade numbered only 597 men. As a matter of fact, General Howe quickly perceived the fatal weakness of the Tories, for in September, 1776 he wrote to Lord George Germain from New York:
We must also have recruits from Europe, not finding the Americans disposed to serve with arms, notwith- standing the hopes held out to me upon my arrival at this port.2
Burgoyne put the loyalists to the acid test in 1777 and found them wanting. Some historians think he acquired a few thousand rein- forcements from the Tories, but reliable statements place the amount at 682 to 830. 3 Burgoyne extensively solicited loyalist aid before
1. Howe, Narrative, p. 52.
2. Stopford Msa., II, 41.
3. Flick opines "several thousand, " but Siebert reduced this to ca. 2,000. There is a difference in the official statement of the British lists, but Fortescue mentions the larger number, 830. The inconsistency of Siebert's estimate is his demonstration that the five loyalist units which had not surrendered with Burgoyne amounted to only 485 men in the winter of 1778-79. Flick, Lovalism, p. 110; Siebert, op. cit., VII, 11, 14; Sir John W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, III, 234n .; Jones, op. cit., 1, 678 (ed. notes on Burgoyne) .
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marching south from Canada. He sent agents into New York to collect provincials. When the campaign began, he issued proclamations, ap- pealing to the loyalists to enlist and promising to support them if 1 they rose against the Whigs. By August Burgoyne became convinced of the minority status of the loyalists. In & communication to Germain, he complained:
The great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congress, in principle and zeal; and their measures are executed with a secrecy and dispatch that are not to be equalled.2
Subjected to examination by Parliament on his defeat, Burgoyne was called upon to explain why he did not attempt a rapid advance to reach Albany. Re retorted:
Would the Tories have risen! Why did they not rise round Albany and below it, at the time they found Mr. Gates's army increasing ...? Why did they not rise in that populous and as supposed well affected district, the German Flats at the time St. Leger was before Fort Stanwix? A critical insurrection from any one point of the compass within distance to create a diversion would probably have secured the success of the campaign. 3
There can be no doubt that a rising of several thousand loyalists would
have created a critical situation for the Americans.
1. Siebert, op. cit., VII. 7; A Broadside by John Burgoyne, Esq., 2 July 1777, Broadsides, NYHS; Proclamation, 29 June 1777; Diary, 17 January 1794: Philip Skene to Dartmouth, 30 August 1777, Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-83, Vol. 18, no. 1665; Morris to Council of Safety, 16 July 1777, Jour, Prov. Cong., II. 511.
2. Burgoyne to Germain, 20 August 1777, John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada as Laid Before the House of Commons, appendix, x171.
3. Ibid., pp. 151-52.
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A comparison of the loyalist reaction with the American re- veals the validity of Burgoyne's strictures. Governor Clinton ad- viaed Washington of the alacrity with which the militia responded to 1 the mobilization order. At the height of the campaign in September, Clinton related to Duane that New York had eleven militia regiments from the region south of Poughkeepsie on active duty and had dispatched to Gates every other regiment in the state except two in Tryon and one 2
in Schoharie.
The testimony of two other men strongly sustains the preceding evidence . Galloway, when questioned in Parliament, conceded that the New York loyalists could not defend themselves without the British army, even though the British might fully arm and organize them. General James Robertson, who had served in New York from 1765 to 1777, made a 3 similar Admission.
Although the Tories possessed the advantage of an extensive governmental machinery, they lacked the capability of halting the burgeoning revolutionary sentiment and went down to a series of po- litical defeats throughout the colony in 1775. Tryon, Gage and Dart- mouth admitted the loss of royal control in New York as the consequence
1. 9 August 1777, Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York, II, 195-97 (hereafter cited as Clinton Papers).
2. Ibid., 11, 344. Nickerson put the total number of militia with Gates at 12,000; some were from New England. Both Patterson and Ward under- state the militia units. Hoffman Nickerson, The Turning Point of the Revolution, pp. 326-27, graph opp. p. 384; Samuel W. Patterson, Horatio Gater, p. 167, n. 5: Christopher Ward, War of the Revolution, ed. by John R. Alden, II, 529.
3. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 311, 315.
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of the unpopularity of the government. Having lost the confidence of the people, the royal government could only maintain itself by arnas. Endeavors to form loyalist associations and to arm the friends of government proved fruitless in the long run. So long as the Tories constituted a minority of the populace, they had little chance of re- 1 gaining a position of supremacy.
1. Hamilton, writing to Jay about the impending assembly election early in 1776, commented, "for the Whigs, I doubt not, constitute a large majority of the people ." Hamilton to Jay, 31 December 1775, Jay Papers, CUL; Henry P. Johnston, ed., Correspondence and Public Papere of John Jay, I, 41.
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CHAPTER III
CRYSTALLIZATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT
Although opposition to the measures of the North ministry had proceeded on the premise that the Whigs could compel Great Britain to yield the desired reforms, the events of the latter half of 1775 and early 1776 made that premise more and more untenable. The increas- ing resort to muskets and cannon had a dispiriting effect upon the moderate and conservative leaders in New York. Furthermore, the cam- paign against the imperial government posed a delicate internal problem for the revolutionary party. Slogans of no taxation without representa- tion and demands for constitutional liberties had a dangerous potential in a province where the great landholders frequently manipulated their tenants' votes. Notwithstanding the caution of the great landholders, some of the revolutionary ferment seeped down to the tenantry, express- ing itself in pressure for more favorable land leases. Writing from Dutchess County, Henry B. Livingston conveyed the attitude of the aris- tocracy when he condemned the renters: "The Tenants here are Great Villains. Some of them are resolved to take advantage of the times 1 and make their Landlords give them Leases forever. ...
The sharpening lines of conflict and the consequent Whig
1. H. B. to R. R. Livingston, May, 1775, Unpublished Corr. R. R. Livingston, no. 30.
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reaction have given rise to the view that a loyalist reaction had sot 1 in. This interpretation rests on several considerations: the delays in the election of deputies to the Second Provincial Congress and in their attendance; and Tryon's maneuver to convene a new provincial assembly. Whig timidity, however, is another pertinent fact, the examination of which will precede that of the previous elements.
Vacillation grew among the Whigs in consequence of events in July and August, 1775. In July the Continental Congress published its justification for taking up arms and virtually rejected Lord Forth's conciliatory motion. Immediately thereafter word came from Britain that both king and Parliament had rejected the provincial assembly's overture on conciliation. Since bullets flew near Boston and units gathered at Albany for an invasion of Canada, the prospect of peace receded visibly. The practical meaning of these occurrences came home literally with the crash of cannon when the warship Asia clashed with a party removing cannon from the fort on the night of August 23. Fear of the cannonading set in motion a general exodus of the popu- lation which continued in sporadic fashion until the practical evacuation of the city in June, 1776. Haunted by their fear of loss of life and property, many Whig leaders became visibly less belligerent when Tryon and the Tories reminded them of the possibility of a general bombardment of the city.
In fact, some radicals had anticipated such an eventuality back in July and had proposed the seizure of the governor as hostage for the
1. Becker, op. cit., pp. 221-52.
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good behavior of the ships. The plan did have much to commend it. It would have spared the people. It would have mitigated the growing fear within the Provincial Congress and reduced the spread of confusion among the general populace. It might very well have put a halt to the arming of the Tories on Long Island. However, seizing the king's personal representative would have put New York in the same position as Massachusetts and placed the members of Congress in the same
category as the Adamses and Hancock.
1
The plan had its inception
when Sears returned to the city from a visit to the Continental Congress and conferred with Schuyler. Schuyler, characterizing the idea as "rash" and "unjustifiable," argued that the Continental Congress would disapprove. Sears replied that he had discussed it with a number of the delegates who had approved. Only when Schuyler stated that he had written orders from General Washington against it did Sears reluctantly agree to drop the proposal. Schuyler hastened to assure councillor William Smith that he supported the "Magistracy in all cases but where they opposed the Common Defence." The General,
while refusing Smith permission to warn the governor, did have the councillor draw up a proclamation for the protection of Tryon. Schuyler incorporated it in a letter of orders to General Wooster, 2 commander of the Connecticut detachment in the city.
1. Tryon transmitted at this time lists of names of Whigs and Tories to Dartmouth. Tryon to Dartmouth, 5 January 1776, NYCD, VIII, 651.
2. William Smith, Memoirs, IV, 3 July 1775, MYPL; Schuyler to Wooster, 3 July 1775, Benson J. Lossing, The Life and Times of Philip Schuyler, I, 346.
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It seems probable that the clash with the Asia on August 23 hastened the adjournment of the Provincial Congress, which handed 1 discomfited the Whigs when he arranged to have Mayor Hicks inform the Committee that Tryon had word from Dartmouth pertaining to fresh orders for naval commanders. British captains would adjudge towns to be in a state of rebellion where they raised troops, erected fortifications or removed His Majesty's stores. Actually
over temporary power to a Committee of Safety on September 2. Tryon
2 Admiral Graves sent Captain Vandeput of the Asia similar but more limited orders at the same time. If the city prohibited intercourse with the ships or molested them, Graves ordered Vandeput to open fire. The admiral directed the captain to destroy Sears' house, the houses of other known rebels and burn all shipping in the barbor. Although
3 the Committee strove to obtain an extract of the letter from the governor or its "exact purport," their Journal does not refer to the matter again. Two days later, however, Rivington's Gazetteer carried the substance of a part of the letter which conveyed the same 4 information Hicks had given the Committee of Safety. If Tryon intended to immobilize the Provincial Congress, he very nearly succeeded.
1. Congress's mood was not necessarily the people's mood. The indignant reaction of the populace to the August 23 incident caused Congress to arrange an alternative method of supplying the ships which would keep the crews out of the city. Jour. Prov, Cong .. I. 126.
2. Ibid., I, 152. 153.
3. Admiral Graves to Vandeput, 10 September 1775, Cal. H. O. Papers, p. 464.
4. Riv. Gaz., 21 September 1775.
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The Whigs did not take the threat of bombardment lightly. Nevertheless, there is strong ground for believing it to have been a bluff. As long as the governor remained in the city, he was, in effect, a hostage who guaranteed the peaceable behavior of the war- ships. Moreover, the Tories and their property stood in a similar position; in a general cannonading they would suffer as much as the Whigs. The British weighed other factors. A pitched battle in the port might very well raise the political temperature of the province to fever pitch which would render the position of the Tories impossible. The Yorkers would appeal to the Continental Congress and neighboring colonies, and troops would pour into the city. The combination of these factors would drive the ships out of the harbor, and the destruction wrought by the cannon might end 1 the city's usefulness to the British as their headquarters.
News of the impending arrival of Continental troops commanded by General Charles Lee stirred new fears in the city. Tryon ander- eccred his September warning in mid-December with the distribution of a handbill which reprinted a letter from the captain of the Phoenix to the governor. Captain Parker stated that he had orders to treat the town as in open rebellion against the king, if the people resorted to violent acts. £ When General Lee prepared to march into New York in January, 1776 to fortify the city against an expected British attack, the Committee of Safety reacted with alarm. Eliphalet
1. Nettele, Washington, chap. XI.
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Dyer, Connecticut delegate to the Continental Congress, described the atmosphere as he passed through the town homeward bound:
New York appears empty and desolate; you would scarce ses any person or but few in the streets carts and waggons all employed in carrying out goods and furniture, the men- o-warr lying broadside against the town and near the wharfs sails bent and prepared at a moment's warning. Their present constirnation in New York arises from the near approach of Gen'l Lee.
Notwithstanding the tension, a broadside signed "Sentinel" urged the people to isolato the british ships. The city, declared the author, "becomes more and more the scoff and wonder of America." He concluded with an appeal to the people's patriotism: "Are you so callous and dead to every sense of honour, as to disregard the taunts 1
and scoffe of your brethren in the neighbouring Colonias?"
During his brief tenure in New York, Lee sought to checkmate
the British. £ He countered the menace of bombardment with a threat to retaliate against the Tories, a challenge which the British did not choose to accept. The general charted a bold course when he ordered all communication with the ships halted and removed cannon and stores from the fortifications. Even though Tryon had advance information concerning Lee's plans, the ships did not intervene when the people hauled away the cannon in broad daylight. Complaints from the cautious Yorkers, however, forced Lee's transfer; but in April Washington rebuked the Provincial Congress for tolerating contract between the people and the ships. The Congress thereupon interdicted the traffic and the British made no move to retaliate.
1. Ibid .; Becker, op. cit., op. 246-50; Parker to Tryon, 18 December 1775, N.Y.G., 25 December 1775; Dyer to Samuel Adams, 28 January, 27 February 1776, Samuel Adams Papers, NYPL; To the Inhabitants of New York, 27 January 1776, Broadsides, NYPL.
Tryon, informing the Colonial Secretary, George Germain of the inter -.. diction, wrote:
The destruction therefore of the city where there were so many friends to Government, with the loss of all their property, & the consideration of preserving the town for the King's army was thought to be too great sacrifices to make for only retarding the removal of the artillery and stores Which even after such sacrifices could have been carried off by the Jersey and Connecticutt troops.
The Committee of Safety did little more than to further the measures already set in motion by the parent body. At one point, indeed, when a combination of some moderates and radicals sought to move vigorously against the Tories, the Committee lost its nerve. Driven by the critical shortage of arms, the Committee had voted to impress all weapons and recompense their owners. Word from Queens soon reached the Committee not only that the Tories refused to hand in their arms, but also that they disarmed Whigs and that the Colden family directed these proceedings. McDougall presented a motion to dispatch to Queens a battalion from his regiment, then raising, to compel acquiescence in the impressment action. After considerable 2 discussion the Committee defeated the proposal. Hesitancy of this kind characterized the Committee's life.
This timidity in dealing with the Tory problem provoked disgust within the army. Colonel Rudolph Ritzema demanded that
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