USA > New York > Organization of the Revolutionary movement in New York State, 1775-77 > Part 16
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Writers on the religious question proposed freedom of conscience except for atheists. Every sect would have to finance itself by volun- tary contributions. Although "Independent Whig" conceded that the
1. Ibid., 7 March, 14 April 1776. He proposed also that the people elect the Continental Congress delegates.
2. Anon., "To the Freeborn Sons of America, " N. Y.P., 21 March 1776. He proposed popular election of local officials in order to "shut the door against the mean, wicked arts of bribery and corruption."
3. "Independent Whig, " N. Y. J., 29 February 1776.
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majority might enforce the sabbath as a sacred day, prohibiting business and pleasure, he discountenanced compulsory public worship. The use of force to win converts, he wrote, is not tolerable. The only method to resort to is the employment of "good sense, rational and scriptural arguments." In this fashion we would not give people cause to look to the British for religious protection and would attract Catholics to the defense of American liberty. 1
In a number of respects, where comparison with the committee drafts is possible, these ideas are more radical than the committee's. Whereas the latter conceived of a governor chosen by the £40 freeholders for a four-year term, the former proposed a governor chosen annually by all voters. 2 The committee first favored an upper house elected for four years by the 140 freeholders to operate as a check on the lower house, but some of the newspaper partisans simply dispensed with an upper house. 3 In the committee drafts the governor and legislature absorbed the appointive powers of the crown, but the pamphleteers urged 4
the popular election of all county and town officials. Lastly, the committee adopted the existing practice of legislative appointment of delegates to the Continental Congress, whereas the press argued for the
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right of the people to choose them.
However, they held at least
1. "Independent Whig, " no. 3, ibid., 14 March 1776; anon., N.Y.P., 15 August 1776.
2. In the last two drafte, B and Jay's, the committee raised the qualifi- cation to £100. Lincoln, Const. Hist., I, 524-25.
3. The last drafts raised the estate to £100. Ibid., 1, 516.
4. Ibid. , I, 531-32, 535. 536.
5. Ibid., 1, 536-37.
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three concepts in common, religious freedom, ballot voting, and equal
1 representation in the assembly. On one very important issue, the franchise, the committee assumed a more radical position than the press, permitting those paying state or county taxes to vote for assem- blymen. 2
Since the preparation of a constitution was a fundamental task of the Convention, the deputies engaged in extensive private discussion of the content to adopt. Evidence of this attention appears in the circulation among the members of no less than three plans unrelated to the committee's draft. Peter R. Livingston sent one of them to loyal-
ist William Smith for his comments. Happily, Smith copied it into his Memoirs. 3 Consisting of sixteen brief paragraphs, this constitu- tion represented a radical point of view. A council and house of deputies would share legislative authority, elected annually without regard to property by ballot by all taxpayers. The councillors would have executive functions also, which they exercised with a president. The latter officer, chosen by ballot out of the legislature in joint meeting, served three years. The executive branch enjoyed no veto on laws. 4 It did not possess, furthermore, much appointive power, unlike the colonial executive. The assembly would name all state officials to hold office during good behavior. Their constituents would elect
1. Ibid., 1, 506, 507-12. 541.
2. Ibid., I, 514.
3. Dillon, op. cit., p. 145; Smith, Memoirs, V, 14 October 1776, Smith Papers, NYPL.
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triennially all county and local officials. Even when this plan did award appointive authority to the executive, it did so in very re- stricted fashion. The assembly would recommend to the president and council the appointment of military officers. The president would combine the duties of commander-in-chief, chancellor and ordinary. By prohibiting assemblymen from holding salaried offices, this plan preserved the assembly's independence. Finally, the people would 1
elect the representatives to the Continental Congress. No wonder Smith "reprotated" the whole document, complaining to Livingston: The new Government will be intirely in the Hands of the Peasantry and the commercial Interests of the Capital derive no Safety from the petty Privilege of two members in the Council.
The conservatives, too, entered the contest for the deputies' votes and briefly sketched the main cutline of a constitution. The author of this draft simply modified the colonial establishment to fit an independent state. £ Governor, council and assembly would have the
1. Ibid.
2. He sent P.R. Livingston his detailed objections to the draft, objec- tions which could not fail to arouse misgivings amongst the great land- holders. For example, on the question of the franchise, he wrote: "It is dangerous to Society to admit Persons with very small Property to participate in your Councils. The richest Member of the Community under a Government elective, annually elective and that too by Ballot is put upon the same Term with one who has scarce a Farthing to lose. What Security from such a Legislature against an agrarian lav and all sorts of Rapine and Plunder! If every individual Legislator is not opulent, yet certainly they ought in general to be above the Temptations of Indigence. The Poor being the Majority ought not to refuse & Secur- ity to others against the Spoil of their Property. They lose Nothing by being obliged to elect Men of Substance attached to the Territory." Ibid.
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same powers each possessed under British rule. Contrary to past prac- tice the people would elect assemblymen annually by ballot, but only freeholders might vote. Members of the assembly could not serve in any other office. The assembly would select others or out of itself
a council of twenty to hold cffics during good behavior. Council eligibility depended upon the ownership of lands worth EIC, Coo. The plan required the assembly to meet at least once a year, but the gov- ernor could not adjourn, prorogue or dissolve it without the council's advice. Carrying the principle of indirect election further, the draft prescribed the choice of the governor from the councillors for a 1 three-year tern by joint legislative ballot.
Publication of this conservative plan of government provoked a direct rejoinder to it. This alternative would enfranchise all tax- payers and permit them to be candidates for any office. The govern- ment would consist of an assembly of one hundred, a council of twenty, a president and council of safety. The first two bodies constituted
1. This draft and the following one seem to be the products of the Suf- folk County delegation who divided sharply in their views. The con- servetive plan specified "Farons of Exchequer# among the judges to be created, but the other draft rejected any "Barons. " Although neither outline bears a date, it is likely that they were written in 1776, prob- ably between July and October. The production of a committee first draft in the latter month renders any later date unlikely. Cal, Fist. Mss., II. 117-18.
Robert Yates, twelve years after the event, declared that some dele- gates circulated this draft "to try ... the temper" of the members. It provoked a sharp off-the-floor debate, particularly over the suffrage qualifications. Yates affirmed that general agreement existed on the desirability of enfranchising the "middling" class, since rights and liberties were endangered by the two extremes, rich and poor. N.Y. J., 13 June 1788; Ford, Essays, pp. 257-314.
"Sydney, "
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the legislature, the latter two the executive which lacked any legis- lative authority. All voters would choose the legislature by ballet. Although the president and council of safety might convene the legis- lative houses on special occasions, the former could never dissolve the legislature. Otherwise, the legislators themselves controlled - their meetings. The people would elect the executive council yearly in the same fashion as the legislature, but the two houses would se- lect the president annually by joint tallot out of the council of safety.
Although there is a broad gulf between the conservative and radical concepts of fundamental law, there are a few places where they coincide. These -- ballot voting, ennual assembly elections, elimina- tion of placemen from the assembly - derive from their colonial, experi- ence. It is clear from the preceding information that the radicals among the Convention deputies not only had concrete proposals, but also had evolved a coherent, general draft.
Although few of the radical ideas won acceptance in committee, an examination of the generally analogous concepts in the drafts will clarify the extent of the radical influence. The chronological order
of the four drafts is A, C, B and Jay's. Draft A, and probably C, stipulated semi-annual meetings of the legislature, but B and Jay'. 2 lengthened the interval to one year. All versions adopted annual
1. Cal. Hist, Mas., II, 117-18.
2. Lincoln, Const. Hist., I, 501; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 834. Since the first four articles are missing from draft C, their substance is guess- work. However, the content of the succeeding articles in most cases does not differ radically from draft A. Min. of Conv., Yates Papers, NYPL.
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assembly elections, and A went so far as to authorize carving the counties into assembly districts. Since someone challenged this unorthodox step, the committee struck it out, adhering to the tradi- 1 tional county-at-large method. Although the committee elaborated a detailed procedure for the employment of written ballots which it ro- tained through the first three revisions, Jay cut off everything after 2 the opening paragraph, retaining only the principle. On the crucial issue of the electorate's nature, A and C set forth the payment of both state and county taxes as the prerequisite for assembly voting rights. The committee broadened the electoral base further in the
last two revisions, extending the ballot to those who paid either
1. Lincoln, Const, Hist., I, 505-06; Jour. Prov, Conz., 1, 834, 842,
- 884. Since A and B were practically identical, it is unlikely that C differed essentially.
2. Lincoln, Const. Hist., I, 507-12; Min. of Conv., pp. 11-17, Tates Papers, NYPL; see above p. 199 n. 5, and p. 203 n. 1. Robert Yates advanced an interesting hypothesis for the popularity of the secret bal- lot. Its origins arose out of the political battles prior to 1775 when both Delanceyites and Livingstons expected that eventually the British would convert the governor's council into an hereditary house of lords. Therefore, election victory became mandatory, if the anti-Delancey faction vere to share in the spoils. The latter despaired of winning because the practice of voice voting enabled the Delanceyites to pressure their tenants to cast their votes for them. The secret ballot was thus en- visaged as the key to success and the "outa" worked assiduously just prior to 1775 to win adherents to the idea of ballot reform. It was this opin- lon which forced the inclusion of the written ballot in the draft consti- tution. As to the reasons for its deletion on the floor of the Conven- tion, Yates is disingenuous. He suggested that either the proviso vas too lengthy, or the elimination of the Tories as a political faction made it unnecessary. Of course, had there been no political differences among the Whigs, it might have been deemed superfluous, but as Yates, a member of the drafting committee, well knew, the differences were many. "Sydney, " N. Y. J., 13 June 1788; Ford, Essays, loc. cit.
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state or county taxes. All four drafts confined candidacy to free- holders. 1
Unlike the radical view, the committee envisaged the senate as a check for the great landowners on the popular assembly. As first conceived in A and C article IX conferred the senatorial ballot on the 140 freeholders, but the conservatives narrowed this right in B and Jay's draft to the £100 freeholders. They opened candidacy, however, to all freeholders.
2 Unanimity prevailed in the drafts on the four- year term of office, but on the matter of the number of seats there were disagreements that had their origin in dissimilar means of elec- .
tion. £ In its initial version, the committee grouped the counties into four roughly equal districts, each district having four senators. Dissatisfied with this solution, the members discarded it in favor of an indirect choice. Increasing the number of seats to twenty-four, the new provision directed the selection by county of electors who
chose the senators. Still not content with this device, the committee retraced its steps in the last two revisions to the principle of direct voting as in A, but did not adopt the latter's distribution of seats. Carrying over the additional six members from C, the committee redis- 3 tributed the twenty-four senators unequally among four districts.
1. Lincoln, Conet. Hist., I, 505, 507, 514; Min. of Conv., p. 17, Yates Papers, NYPL; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 836, 843. 867.
2. Lincoln, Const, Hist., I, 516; Min. of Conv., p. 18, Yates Papers. NYPL; Jour. Prov. Conz., I, 843. 1
3. Lincoln, Const. Hist., 1, 517-21; Min. of Conv., pp. 18, 22-25. Yates Papers, NYPL; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 843.
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The striking fact about the governor is his weakness, a con- spicuous contrast with the colonial governors. All the drafts specifi- cally confined legislative power to the senate and assembly, excluding the governor from any voice in legislation. The suffrage restrictions for senator in A and C, both as to voting and candidacy, became valid for the governorship. When the committee revised upward the property requirements for senator in the B and Jay drafts, they applied the new 1 yardstick also to the chief magistrate. The nominal parallel be- tween governor and senator extended in all copies to the term of office, four years. Although A and C did not confer prorogation powers on the governor, the later revisions invested him with authority to pro- 2 rogue the legislature not more than sixty days in one year. As a further limitation on his executive power A and C established a council of state to assist the governor in the administration of the state. The council of state was to consist of five freeholders chosen for five-year terms by joint ballot of the legislature. When the con-
mittee revised C, they accepted the new organ, but then struck it out. 3 The earlier versions distributed the appointive power between the legis- lature and the governor and council, Although the governor could only nominate civil officers to the legislature, he could appoint military
1. Lincoln, Const, Fist., I, 501, 525; Min. of Conv., p. 19, Yates Papers, NYPL; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 834, 870, 871.
2. Lincoln, Const. Fist., I, 525; Min. of Conv., p. 19, Yates Papers; Jour. Prov. Cong., 1, 870, 871.
3. Lincoln, Const. Rist., I, 525, 528; Min. of Conv., pp. 21-22, Yates Papers.
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officers with the advice and consent of the council of state. With the deletion of the latter body from the B and Jay drafts, the governor 1
held the sole exercise of military appointment. A major exception to the governor's appointive authority was the state treasurer. Under the provisions of drafts A and C the assembly chose the treasurer by ballot. , He remained in office "during their will and pleasure." In the succeeding revision the committee modified this method so that the assembly nominated the treasurer and appointment was by act of the legislatura. 2
In most of the examples cited above the committee adopted a more conservative position. A major exception was the shift to in- direct election of senators which it dropped ultimately. Since the committee had boosted the voting qualification for senator from the 140 to the £100 freeholder, it did not need further restrictions. .
Although the committee in later drafts had revised key sections to check popular influence in the government, the Convention modified some clauses further. The deputies basically altered the provisions relating to the qualifications of the assembly electors and voting procedures. Under the new requirements three classes of voters emerged. First, the voter must possess a freehold valued at £20 above and beyond all debts thereon. Or, second, he must rent land
1. Lincoln, Const. Bist., I, 531-32, 535-36; Min. of Conv., pp. 25-26. Yates Papers; Jour. Prov. Cong .. 1, 873, 874, 877, 882.
2. Lincoln, Const. Hist., I. 531; Min. of Conv., pp. 20, 25, Yates Papers; Jour. Prov. Cong., I, 871.
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whose annual value is at least 40s. Or, third, he must be a freeman of Albany or have obtained freemanship in New York City on or before 14 October 1775. Having reduced the number of electors, the Conven- tion went on to circumecribe the exercise of the suffrage. The first amendment on voting that the Convention approved dropped the secret ballot for the colonial voice vote. Upon second thought, the deputies provided for a trial of the written ballot after the war. The experi- ment would govern assembly elections only, but the legislature might ] revoke it by a two-thirds vote.
The Convention did not deem it necessary to restrict further either senatorial or gubernatorial suffrage. It did shorten, however, the governor's term from four years to three. On the other hand, the more conservative members pushed through amendments which strengthened the governor's powers. Whereas the Jay draft had practically excluded the governor from the appointment power, the Convention relented and created a council of appointment which consisted of the governor and four senators, but in which the governor could only cast a tie-break- ing vote. £ The governor might fill positions "with the advice and
consent" of the council. In a second major respect, the Convention reversed its committee and granted the governor a voice in legislation It did not clothe him with an absolute veto, but established a council of revision which consisted of the governor, chancellor and judges of the supreme court. The governor had a full vote in this body which decided on a veto by majority vote. The legislature might override
1. Lincoln, Const, Bist., I. 512-15.
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the council's veto by a two-thirds vote of those present. 1
These changes obviously represented a compromise between the group who de- sired a strong legislature and a weak governor and those who aimed at a strong executive.
Although the conservatives cast their lot with the other inde- pendent states in July, 1776, they were not eager to carry out the people's mandate to formulate a new basis of government. Having control of the revolutionary committee machinery, they did not wish to imperil their leadership by engaging in a battle of political ideas, except on their own terms. Exercising their political and social influence, they campaigned tirelessly and successfully to delay Con- Vention action on a constitution. Notwithstanding the articulateness of radical opinion in and out of the Convention, the radicals lacked both the organization and prestige necessary to triumph in the house. In the hands of the committee the draft went through five versions and as presented to the Convention in March, 1777 would have introduced 2 significant democratic reforms.
1. Ibid., 1, 526, 529, 532-34; Jour. Prov. Cong., 1, 894, 896. 4 2. John Adams thought his letter to Wythe on Virginia's constitution influenced the Yorkers. Adams to Jefferson, 17 September 1823, quoted in Flick, Bist. N.Y., IV, 156; Charles F. Adams, ed., Works of John Adame, X, 410.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Although the British ministry at the opening of 1775 might have looked with equanimity upon the political situation in New York, sub- sequent events would have shattered that equanimity. Tvo positivo factors for the North government were the colonial administrative machinery which pervaded the province and the firm adherence to the administration of the most powerful political faction. Attentiveness, however, to the clash over the cargo of the James in February and to Sears's successful flaunting of authority in April should have awakened misgivings in the official mind, especially since these reverses con- trasted sharply with the government's victory in the preceding December in the affair of the Lady Gage arms shipment. The inception of revo- lutionary government in the city, then, came as a logical consequence of heightening opposition to the crown. £ Tacitly acknowledging their loss of public confidence, Colden and his council deliberated upon the use of force. - But the British garrison numbered only 100 and the .
city's militia was mostly Liberty Boys. Reduced to impotence, offi- cialdom could do nothing but stand aside and watch the Committee of Sixty govern the city.
Although the preceding events occurred in New York City, affairs elsewhere in the province afforded small comfort to the royal government. Even the colonial assembly seemed likely to vote against the adminis-
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tration in early 1775 and the Tories won the day only by proposing another petition of grievances to Britain and probably by exerting pressure on the members to vote with the Delanceyites. Among other measures the assembly declined to send a deputation to the Second Continental Congress and thus compelled the Whigs to organize the election in March of a provincial convention which would select delegates for the Congress. Having specific orders from Lord Dartmouth to forbid the people to send representatives to Philadelphia, Colden and the council conferred on the advisability of promulgating a proclamation on the subject. They decided against it on the ground that it would consolidate opinion in suport of the revolution- eries. If the countryside opposed the Whigs, the government night have used the local police power to prevent the illegal elections. Obviously the administration had no such faith. When the Tories sought to marshal their forces into loyal associations, they failed. By the end of 1775 Governor Tryon admitted that only 6,000 British regulars and three or four regiments of loyalists could restore his authority in the province.
If bearing arms is an indication of political attachment, then the computation of men serving in both armies re-enforces the preceding interpretation. Those who served in the Revolutionary Army, regardless of the brevity of that service, numbered perhaps 36,000 whereas the loyalists contributed perhaps 16,000. The latter figure is subject to revision downward, since many of the New York loyalist corps contained. men from other colonies, Nova Scotia, Canada and Scotland, Another unknown quantity which also would decrease the loyalist total is the number of Americans who enlisted under British
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compulsion. Both Howe and Burgoyne complained of the lack of Tory recruits for their armies, and even the redoubtable Galloway granted that the New York loyalists could not stand without the protection of the British Army.
When the prospect of conciliation grew more improbable in the latter half of 1775, the First Provincial Congress wavered uncertainly in measures of resistance to the crown. Debate was being superseded by war and the congressmen had not decided yet whether they were willing to pay the price for life, liberty and property. £ Dread of the penalty for unsuccessful rebellion made them timid and induced them to resort to half-hearted policies which encouraged the Tories. The ultimate conclusion of this indecision was the dissolution of the Congress without formal adjournment and without the choice of a committee of safety to manage affairs until the Second Congress should convono.
Since only ten of the fourteen counties elected deputies for the Second Provincial Congress, some historians have said that this was a time of loyalist reaction. When one takes into account the isolation of the countryside, communication uncertainities, the Vermont controversy, and factionalism in Cumberland and Charlotte Counties, it is apparent that these factors rather than loyalisn blocked elections. Furthermore, both counties did eventually send
representatives to Congress. Queens and Richmond Counties fell into the loyalist camp, but this did not represent an abrupt change of face since both had been centers of toryism. These elections at the close of 1775 do not furnish any evidence of a general revulsion
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against the Whigs.
If a swing of opinion to the Tories had occurred, the Smiths' efforts to detach New York from the confederation in December, 1775 might very well have succeeded. Thomas Smith might have found a majority for his conciliatory propositions and the cautious Second Congress would not have had the determination to defy public opinion. Since the contrary was the case, Smith might have carried the day if his resolves had not conveyed the impression of rendering the British view of the colonial controversy. The mistake proved fatal to the
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