USA > Pennsylvania > Philadelphia County > Philadelphia > Municipal government history and politics, Vol. V > Part 20
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The hold of the Federalists, which had gradually been growing weaker, was effectually loosened once and forever by the presidential election of 1800. Up to that time that party
1 Washington, Works, XI. 389.
2 Von Holst, I. 151, note.
3 Tucker's Blackstone, Philadelphia, 1803, I., Part 1, Appendix, p. 187.
4 The Jubilee of the Constitution, a discourse delivered at the request of the New York Historical Society on Tuesday, the 30th of April, 1839, being the fiftieth anniversary of the inauguration of George Washington as Presi- dent of the United States, New York, 1839, p. 55.
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had controlled the executive, the judiciary, and the Senate, although the House of Representatives had on several occasions contained an opposition majority. The accession of Jefferson to power was the death-knell of the Federalist party, and from 1800 until their final dissolution they were an ineffective and vacillating minority.
The downfall of the Federalist party explains in a great measure the security which the continuance of the Union enjoyed during the two following decades.1 The party which represented particularistic and nullifying tendencies was in power and had an overwhelming majority, both legislative and popular, behind it. But although the possibility of a disruption was thus very small, yet the essence of the internal struggle remained the same. Indeed its character was placed in a clearer light by the facts that the parts played by each party were changed, so far as the question of right was con- cerned, and that the opposition, in spite of its weakness, was not satisfied with wishes and threats of separation, but began in earnest to devise plans of dissolution.
These mutterings were first heard in connection with the purchase of Louisiana in 1803.2 The New England states especially opposed its consummation as affording to the south- ern states a source of power with which to become predom- inant in the Union for all future time; and they feared that the incorporation of the western territory into the Union and its economic development would prove injurious to their own commerce.
These two elements together had weight enough to draw from them the declaration that they would be forced to a separation from the Union. Plumer of New Hampshire declared in the Senate: " Admit this western world into the Union, and you destroy at once the weight and importance of the eastern states, and compel them to establish a separate
1 Hildreth, V. 414-418.
2 Von Holst, I. 183-187 ; Hildreth, V. 478-481.
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independent empire."1 And also Griswold of Connecticut, the acknowledged leader of the Federalists, declared in the House, October 25th, 1803 : "The vast unmanageable extent which the accession of Louisiana will give to the United States, the consequent dispersion of our population, and the distri- bution of the balance which it is so important to maintain between the eastern and the western states, threatens at no very distant day, the subversion of our Union."2 And although chronologically out of place, it will not be amiss to recall the speech of Josiah Quincy, delivered in the House of Represen- tatives, January 14th, 1811, on the bill "To enable the People of the Territory of Orleans to form a Constitution and state Government, and for the admission of such state into the Union."3 Mr. Quincy did not hold that a state had either a constitutional or a natural right to withdraw from the Union when it thought such a course best for its own interests ; but he did maintain that such a violation of the fundamental compact might be made that the moral obligation to maintain it ceased and the right of revolution attached. His words are : "-I am compelled to declare it as my deliberate opinion that, if this bill passes, the bonds of this Union are virtually dissolved; that the states which compose it are free from their moral obligations : and that as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, to prepare definitely for a separation amicably, if they can ; violently, if they must. ... Suppose, in private life, thirteen form a partnership and ten of them undertake to admit a new partner without the con- currence of the other three, would it not be at their option to abandon the partnership after so palpable infringement of their rights ? How much more in political partnership, where the admission of new associates, without previous authority, is so pregnant with obvious dangers and evils. . . This bill,
1 Von Holst, I. 187, note.
2 Von Holst, I. 187, note.
3 Hildreth, VI. 266.
·
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if it passes, is a death-blow to the Constitution. It may afterwards linger; but lingering, its fate will, at no very distant period be consummated." 1
Recollecting the date at which this speech was delivered, it will be noticed that it is of very great importance in connection with our subject, as showing that just previous to the outbreak of the war with Great Britain, such opinions, marking no real consolidation in the Union, were openly expressed on the floor of the National Legislature.
The statement not infrequently made, that at the time of the Louisiana purchase there were no serious thoughts of a disrup- tion of the Union is untrue. In the letters of the Federalists we find not only that wishes to that end were expressed, but that formal plans were devised. It is admitted that they had no prospect of success ; yet the fact that they were so seriously discussed is another link in the chain of cumulative evidence · to prove that the Union, so-called, was really no Union at all.2
Later, in 1806, when it seemed as if the north and the south had begun to close the breach between them, came the embargo question to tear open the old sores and create new ones.3 And in this case, at least, the opposition acted not from sentiment alone, for the embargo touched the pockets of a great part of the country. "The planters' staple articles, principally tobacco and cotton, remained unsold, but the planters themselves suf- fered relatively but little damage. Their products would keep and they were sure of finding a market again as soon as the harbors were open. The farmers sold a considerable portion of their products in the country itself, but the rest was a total loss. The productive industry of the New England fishermen,
1 An abstract of this celebrated speech and an account of the circumstances attending its delivery will be found in the "Life of Josiah Quincy," by his son, Edmund Quincy, Boston, 1867. Pp. 205-218.
2 Von Holst, I. 193-199.
3 Von Holst, I. 201-217.
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ship-builders, ship-owners, importers and exporters, and all who were dependent on them, ceased almost entirely." 1
" In this dispute also it is impossible not to recognize a division of parties arising from diverse interests produced by geographical position, and every struggle in which this played any part became in consequence doubly bitter. The South, which held the balance of power in the reigning party and so was primarily responsible for the embargo, would have least to suffer from it. The powerless minority of the New England states, the consideration of whose interests, it was pretended, dictated the measures of the administration, had greatest cause for complaint. The middle states occupied a position betokened by their name; their interests unquestionably inclined them more toward the North, but they wavered from one side to the other."2 Nowhere here do we see any disposition to consult each other's interests as if the good of one were the advantage of the whole. No such advanced idea of the national unity then existed.
The investigation of the information bought by Madison from the British spy, Henry,3 discloses still further the fact that at this time secession was regarded as the panacea for all real or fancied oppressions. Henry's mission confessedly was to find out and report to his chief, Sir James Craig, Governor of Canada, how far the Federalists would feel inclined to look to England for support in case of a disruption of the Union. One of the most distinguished sons of Massachusetts was of opinion that Henry would find support enough for his opera- tions, if the Administration's policy was not changed. As early as November, 1808, John Quincy Adams expressed the fear that this might lead to civil war. Later he claimed to have unequivocal evidence to prove that there was a systematic
1 Von Holst, I. 209. Cf. Benton, Ab. Debates of Congress, III. 692; IV, 64.
2 Von Holst, I. 209, 210.
3 Von Holst, I. 221, 222; Hildreth, VI. 284-287, 390.
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attempt making to dissolve the Union. In his opinion New England would have undoubtedly made sure of the assistance of Great Britain if the Administration had made civil war inevitable by an effort to overcome the resistance to the embargo by force or by extending it farther.1
In this hasty glance at the salient points in the history of the country from 1789 to 1811, in so far as it bears upon our subject, we find nationalization nowhere, decentralization every- where. Secession, so far from being regarded as unconstitu- tional or unjustifiable under any circumstances, was the club with which every minority on any important question strove to beat the majority to terms. It mattered not what opinions as to ultimate sovereignty the parties held. Such considera- tions as this were lost sight of in the strifes of sectional preju- dices and the clash of material interests. "Judged from an impartial standpoint, the fact that the possibility of civil war or a division of the Union were so frequently and on relatively insignificant occasions, thought of on both sides, may be fairly taken as a measure of the degree of consolidation which the Union had attained at that time. The actual condition of affairs presented so unusual a complication of positive and negative factors so peculiarly grouped, that it was no easy matter to determine their sum total."2 It is interesting to read here the following words, uttered in 1828 :3 "It is a melancholy reflection-a subject that excites our best and inmost feelings-that projects or speculations as to a dissolu- tion have been so frequently indulged. That leading men in Virginia looked to a dismemberment in 1798-9, when the armory was built; that Burr and his confederates had an eye to the establishment of a western government in 1805-6; that many contemplated a building up of the 'Nation of New England' from 1808 to 1815, seems to us undoubted ; but
1 Von Holst, I. 222, 223.
2 Von Holst, I. 220, 221.
3 See Niles' Register, XXXV. p. 210. 2
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the lengths to which either party proceeded rest very much on conjecture or depend on opinion. .. . But whatever have been the designs of individuals, we have always believed that the vast body of the people have ever been warmly attached to the Union." In view of our discussion the last sentiment, however desirable, certainly seems unwarranted, and at the declaration of war in June of 1812 we have the spectacle of a government composed of eighteen1 sovereign integers, each looking to its own interest alone, never consulting the general weal, and claiming the right and the duty to secede from the so-called Union whenever such a course might seem most favorable to its individual interests. What effect the war with Great Britain was to have upon the consolidation of the Union, we can now understandingly inquire.
Into a detailed account of the course of events abroad which brought about the war of 1812 we must not here enter. But we must examine the causes and character of the war in so far as they have a direct bearing upon parties and sections in the United States.
The beginning of 1808 saw the Berlin and Milan decrees of Napoleon and the Orders in Council of England all in force,2 and Jefferson, his second term nearing its close, at the helm of state in the United States. To his Administration five courses of action were open, some one of which must be adopted as its own and worked out to its logical conclusion. This choice lay between (1) doing nothing and allowing the individual ship-owners to help themselves as best they might; or (2) attempting a further negotiation with England; or (3) sus- pending all commerce with the outside world ; or (4) granting
1 In addition to the original thirteen states the following had been admit- ted into the Union : Vermont, March 4th, 1791 ; Kentucky, June 1st, 1792; Tennessee, June 1st, 1796; Ohio, November 29th, 1802; Louisiana, April 8th, 1812.
2 Hildreth, VI. 32-35. The Berlin decree was dated November 21st, 1806, and the Milan decree, December 17th, 1807. The Orders in Council were of the date of May 16th, 1806 and November 11th, 1807, respectively.
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letters of marque and reprisal to American ship-owners; or (5) declaring war upon England immediately. Of these pos- sible lines of policy, entrance upon the fourth or fifth was precluded, for a time at least, by a wholesome fear of the British navy ; the first was shut off by a feeling for the national honor; the third was the choice of the Administration; but the second had recommended itself as the most natural and as having precedents in the country's history. Indeed it had been tried, resulting in the treaty which was agreed upon in December, 1806, but to which Jefferson had refused his assent without ever submitting it to the Senate. This step having thus failed, the Administration had been free to pursue its chosen policy, and to the Tenth Congress, October 26th, 1807, the President recommended an embargo.1 His recom- mendation was dutifully accepted by his party followers in Congress, and the embargo became a law before the end of the year. The Federalists upon whose New England constitu- encies the measure bore heaviest, opposed the measure both on economic and on constitutional grounds, and their discussion of this question presents us with what was destined to be but one of many mortifying exhibitions of the old party of the Constitution. But on the constitutional objection it was over- matched and was forced to fall back to the vantage ground of the economic argument. And this in turn was little heeded by the party in power, so long as it did not come directly home to themselves. But when it began to touch their own pockets, as it did a few months later, then human nature proved to be too strong for party sentiment.2 So evident did this become that Nicholas, of Virginia, the Administration leader on the floor of the House of Representatives, himself introduced, January 25th, 1809, a resolution favoring the repeal of the embargo and the defence of our maritime rights against all belligerents.3 After some haggling as to the date on which
1 Hildreth, VI. 55, 56.
2 Hildreth, VI. 96-106.
3 Von Holst, I. 214; Hildreth, VI. 125-130.
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the Embargo Act should expire, March 15th, 1809, was agreed upon as a compromise and the resolutions were passed. This virtually threw the United States back to the position in which it was when confronted by five possible courses of action, while two of the five,-those by further negotiation and cutting off all intercourse with the outside world-proved useless by the failure of the treaty and of the embargo. The prospect of an amicable solution of the difficulty by a further treaty was poor indeed, if we consider the spirit of the British Government and the hostility of the Republican party to everything British. In Great Britain Mr. Fox was dead and a new Administration had come into power strongly retrograde in policy and having George Canning for its soul. Great Britain was determined to recover her commerce and to take back her seamen, and the United States had no alternative but to submit or fight. The resumption of commerce and its defence, referred to in the Nicholas resolutions, must then be by war.
The Eleventh Congress at its first session voted the con- tinuance of the non-intercourse Act with Great Britain, and then two years passed during which the latter continued the execution of her offensive orders and decrees against neutral commerce. But when the Twelfth Congress assembled in November, 1811, it was felt that some decisive action would soon be taken.1 The leadership of the dominant party had been assumed by younger and more impetuous men; and with Clay as Speaker of the House, Calhoun standing second on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Crawford and Grundy acting with them, war was certain within the year.2
The move was quick and emphatic. On November 29th Calhoun's committee reported a resolution declaring "For- bearance has ceased to be a virtue. . . . The period has arrived when in the opinion of your committee it is the sacred
1 For the personal and party constitution of the Twelfth Congress, see Hildreth, VI. 259, 260.
2 Von Holst, I. 226.
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duty of Congress to call forth the resources and patriotism of the country."1 In addition the committee recommended that the standing army be increased by 10,000 men and that the President be authorized to call 50,000 volunteers under arms. This was all acceded to without any delay by an overwhelm- ing majority.
But such resolutions were inoperative without the coopera- tion of the President, and he was for peace. Fortune, how- ever, favored the war party. A presidential election would take place in the following autumn and Madison was anxious for a second term. In this the leaders of the war faction saw their opportunity. They waited upon Madison and plainly told him that the condition sine qua non of their support in the coming campaign was his acceptance of their war policy. Madison knew very well that both Monroe and Gerry were ready and willing to accept the presidential nomination on a war platform. This determined his action, and he gave in his adherence to the war party.2
On April 3rd he wrote to Jefferson that the action of the British government in refusing to repeal the Orders in Council had left the United States no option but to prepare for war, and that an embargo of sixty days duration had been recommended.3 This recommendation had already been sent in on April 1st. It was acted upon by Congress, but the war party could not wait. They drove Madison on, and on June 1st he sent in his mes- sage recommending a declaration of war.4 Two days after- ward Calhoun reported on it from his committee, and the declaration was carried in the House by a vote of 79 to 49. The Senate was more deliberate, and after two weeks' delay it passed the declaration, June 17th, by a vote of 17 to 13.
An analysis of this vote is interesting as showing the sec- tional character of the war party and of the opposition to it.
1 Von Holst, I. 226-227; Hildreth, VI. 262-265.
2 Von Holst, I. 230-232; Hildreth, VI. 289-291.
3 Hildreth, VI, 291-294.
4 Von Holst, I. 232, 233; 'Hildreth, VI. 303-306.
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Louisiana, making the eighteenth state, had just been admitted, and the House contained 177 members apportioned in the ratio of one to every thirty-five thousand inhabitants. There were 36 members of the Senate, thus making a total of 213 in both houses, not including the Vice-President who was presiding in the Senate. The New York delegation of 27 was then for the first time more numerous than that of every other state. Pennsylvania was second with 23 members, and Virginia third with 22. The members from New Hampshire, most of those from Massachusetts (which then included what is now the state of Maine), those from Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey and Delaware, with several from New York, some from Virginia and North Carolina, one from Pennsylvania and three from Maryland, opposed the war. The members from Vermont, some from New York, all but one from Pennsylvania, most of them from Maryland, Vir- ginia and North Carolina, all from South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Louisiana, supported it. New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, and Delaware were represented by senators who opposed the war. Massachusetts and Maryland were divided, while Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Louisi- ana were represented by senators who supported the war. Of the large sea-board cities, Boston and New York were represented by members found in the minority. The dele- gations from Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, and New Orleans were with the majority. The eastern states as a rule opposed the war; the western states were all for it, with the southern and middle states divided. The practical feature was that the war administration could command a majority of nearly forty votes in the House and one of four or five votes in the Senate.
Taking the reasoning portion of the community as the judge, probably the declaration of war was mostly condemned; but the instinctive patriotism of the young men of the country enthusias-
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tically maintained it. Few denied that sufficient cause for the war existed, but the time and mode of its declaration were con- demned. Defensive though the war appeared to be, yet it was offensive in that it was voluntarily undertaken by the United States to compel Great Britain by the invasion and conquest of her North American dependencies, to respect our maritime rights as neutrals.
A united sentiment on the part of the people, more espe- cially those from whom men and money must principally be drawn, would have excused in a great measure the haste and lack of preparation with which the war had been declared and would soon have filled up the ranks of the army and the coffers of the treasury. But any such unanimity was entirely wanting. The policy of the old Republicans, with the exception of the small class of Francomaniacs, as well as of the Federalists, had been alike neutrality and peace. But however peaceful might have been the intentions of Jefferson and his close followers, there had always been a faction, more or less large, which was determined to bring about a war with Great Britain. This faction had served as the nucleus about which various forces and tendencies had caused the now trium- phant war party to crystallize.
But that the war was a party one was too evident to be denied even by its warmest advocates. In the first place we have the important address tò their constituents by thirty- four members of the minority in the House of Representa- tives.1 This address held, in substance, that the United States was a nation (sic) composed of eighteen independent sovereignties united by a moral obligation only. It went on to say : "- above all, it appeared to the undersigned from signs not to be mistaken, that if we entered upon this war, we did it as a divided people; not only from a sense of the inadequacy of our means to success, but from moral and political objections of great weight and very general influ- ence." These " moral and political objections " were con-
I Niles' Register, II. 309-315.
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sidered by the authors of the address to have the greatest weight, and to their words the next presidential election gave a peculiar emphasis. The war was the live issue of the cam- paign and the result showed more plainly than had been done in many years before, the geographical separation of parties. All the New England states excepting Vermont, together with New York, New Jersey and Delaware cast their elec- toral vote solidly for De Witt Clinton. Maryland was divided, while Pennsylvania and all the southern and wes- tern states voted unanimously for Madison.1 Aside from what such a separation as this too plainly indicates, the proof that the war was a sectional one is cumulative. Six months before the declaration was made, Macon of North Carolina, one of the most distinguished of the war party, said : " And here, sir, permit me to say that I hope this is to be no party war, but a national war. . Such a war, if war we shall have, can alone, in my judgment, obtain the end for which we mean to contend, without any disgrace."2 And two years later Webster in his forcible rhetoric declared : "The truth is, sir, that party support is not the kind of sup- port necessary to sustain the country through a long, expen- sive, and bloody contest ; and this should have been considered before the war was declared. The cause, to be successful, must be upheld by other sentiments and higher motives. It must draw to itself the sober approbation of the great mass of the people. It must enlist, not their temporary or party feelings, but their steady patriotism and their constant zeal. Unlike the old nations of Europe, there are in this country no dregs of population fit only to supply the constant waste of war and out of which an army can be raised for hire at any time and for any purpose. Armies of any magnitude can be here noth- ing but the people embodied ; and if the object be one for which the people will not embody there can be no armies."3
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