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IX
THE PREDICTIONS
Hamilton and De Tocqueville OF
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
HERBERT B. ADAMS, Editor
History is past Politics and Politics present History - Freeman
FIFTH SERIES
IX
THE PREDICTIONS
OF
Hamilton and De Tocqueville
BY JAMES BRYCE, M. P.
BALTIMORE PUBLICATION AGENCY OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SEPTEMBER, 1887
COPYRIGHT, 1887, BY N. MURRAY.
JOHN MURPHY & CO., PRINTERS, BALTIMORE.
THE PREDICTIONS
0F
HAMILTON AND DE TOCQUEVILLE.
A student of American institutions who desires to discover what have been the main tendencies ruling and guiding their development, may find that the most dramatic and not the least instructive method of conducting his inquiry is to exam- ine what were the views held, and the predictions delivered, at different points in the growth of the Republic, by acute and well-informed observers. The contemporary views of such men as to the tendencies which prevailed in their own day and the results to be expected from such tendencies have a value that no analysis made by us now, with our present lights, our knowledge of what has actually followed, could possess, because we cannot help reading into the records of the past the results of all subsequent experience.
To do this with any approach to completeness would be a laborious undertaking, for one would have to search through a large number of writings, some of them fugitive writings, in order to gather and present adequate materials for determining the theories and beliefs generally prevalent at any given period. I attempt nothing so ambitious. I desire merely to indicate, by a comparatively simple example, how such a method may be profitably followed, disclaiming any pretensions to have sought to exhaust even the obvious and familiar materials which all students of American history possess.
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For this purpose, then, I will take two famous books-the one written at the very birth of the Union by those who watched its cradle, and recording incidentally, and therefore all the more faithfully, the impressions and anticipations of the friends and enemies of the infant Constitution; the other a careful study of its provisions and practical working by a sin- gularly fair and penetrating European philosopher. I choose these books not only because both are specially representative and of rare literary merit, but because they are easily accessible to European readers, who may, by referring to their pages, supply the omissions which want of space will compel me to make, and may thereby obtain a more complete and graphic transcript of contemporary opinion. One of these books is the Federalist-a series of letters recommending the new Con- stitution for adoption to the people of New York, written in 1788 by Hamilton, Madison and Jay. The other, which falls almost exactly half-way between 1788 and our own time, is the Democracy in America of Alexis de Tocqueville.
I. THE IDEAS AND PREDICTIONS OF 1788.
I begin by briefly summarizing the record which the Feder- alist preserves for us of the beliefs of the opponents and advocates of the Draft Constitution of 1787 regarding the forces then at work in American politics and the probable future of the nation.
To understand those beliefs, however, we must bear in mind what the United States then were, and for that purpose I will attempt to recall the reader's attention to some of the more salient aspects of the Federal Republic at the epoch when its national life began.
In 1783 the last British soldier quitted New York-the last stronghold that was held for King George. In 1787 the present Constitution of the United States was framed by the Convention at Philadelphia and in 1788 accepted by the requisite number of States (nine). In 1789 George Washing-
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ton entered on his Presidency, the first Congress met and the machine began to work.1 It was a memorable year for Europe as well as for America-a year which, even after the lapse of a century, we are scarcely yet ripe for judging, so many sor- rows as well as blessings, πολλά μέν εσθλά μεμίγμεν, πολλά δε Àvypá, were destined to- come upon mankind from those elec- tions of the States-General which were proceeding in France while Washington was being installed at Philadelphia.
All of the thirteen United States lay along the Atlantic coast. Their area was 827,844 square miles, their popula- tion 3,929,214, less than the population of Pennsylvania in 1880. Settlers had already begun to cut the woods and build villages beyond the Alleghanies ; but when Kentucky was received as a State into the Union in 1792, she had a population of only 73,677 (census of 1790). The population was wholly of English (or Anglo-Scotch) stock, save that a few Dutch were left in New York, a few persons of Swedish blood in Delaware, and some isolated German settlements in Pennsylvania. But in spite of this homogeneity the cohesion of the States was weak. Communication was slow, difficult and costly. The jealousies and suspicions which had almost proved fatal to Washington's efforts during the War of Independence were still rife. There was some real conflict and a far greater imagined conflict of interests between the trading and the purely agricultural States, even more than between the Slave States and those in which slavery had practically died out. Many competent observers doubted whether the new Federal Union, accepted only because the Confederation had proved a failure and the attitude of foreign powers was threatening, could maintain itself in the face of the strong sentiment of local independence animating colonies which after throwing off the yoke of Britain, were little inclined to brook any external control. The Constitution was an experiment, or
1 North Carolina did not ratify the Constitution till November, 1789; Rhode Island not till May, 1790.
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rather a bundle of experiments, whose working there were few data for predicting. It was a compromise, and its very authors feared for it the common fate of compromises-to satisfy neither party and to leave open rents which time would widen. In particular, it seemed most doubtful whether the two branches of the Legislature, drawn from so wide an area and elected on different plans, would work harmoniously, and whether general obedience would be yielded to an executive President who must necessarily belong to and seem to repre- sent one particular State and district. Parties did not yet exist, for there was as yet hardly a nation ; but within a decade they grew to maturity and ferocity. One of them claimed to defend local self-government, the rights of the people, demo- cratic equality ; the other, the principle of national unity and the authority of the Federal power. One sympathized with France, the other was accused of leaning to an English alliance. They were, or soon came to be, divided not merely on burning questions of foreign policy and home policy, but also-and this was an issue which mixed itself up with every- thing else-as to the extent of the powers to be allowed to the central Government and its relations to the States-questions which the curt though apparently clear language of the Con- stitution had by no means exhausted, though by specifying certain powers as granted and certain others as withheld, it had supplied data for legal argument on points not expressly dealt with as well as on the general theory of the Constitution.
Slavery was not yet a leading question-indeed it existed to some slight extent in the Middle as well as in the Southern States, but the opposition of North and South was already visible. The Puritanism of New England, its industries and its maritime commerce gave it different sentiments as well as different interests from those which dominated the inhabitants of the South, a population wholly agricultural, among whom the influence of Jefferson was strong, and doctrines of advanced democracy had made great progress.
There was great diversity of opinion and feeling on all
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political questions in the America of those days, and the utmost freedom in expressing it. Over against the extreme democrats stood an illustrious group whose leader was cur- rently believed to be a monarchist at heart, and who never concealed his contempt for the ignorance and folly of the crowd. Among these men, and to a less extent among the Jefferson- ians also, there existed no small culture and literary power, and though the masses were all orthodox Christians and ex- cept in Maryland, orthodox Protestants, there was no lack of scepticism in the highest circles. One may speak of highest circles, for social equality, though rapidly advancing and gladly welcomed, was as yet rather a doctrine than a fact : and the respect for every kind of authority was great. There were neither large fortunes, nor abject poverty : but the working class, then much smaller relatively than it is now, deferred to the middle class, and the middle class to its intellectual chiefs. The clergy were powerful in New England : the great colonial families enjoyed high consideration in New York, in Pennsyl- vania, and above all in Virginia, whose landowners seemed to reproduce the later feudal society of England. Although all the States were republics of a hue already democratic, every State constitution required a property qualification for the holding of office or a seat in the legislature, and, in most States, a similar condition was imposed even on the exercise of the suffrage. Literary men (other than journalists) were rare, the universities few and unimportant, science scarcely pursued, philosophy absorbed in theology and theology dryly dogmatic. But public life was adorned by many striking figures. Five men at least of that generation, Washington, Hamilton, Franklin, Jefferson and Marshall, belong to the history of the world ; and a second rank which included John Adams, Madison, Jay, Patrick Henry, Gouverneur Morris, James Wilson, Albert Gallatin, and several other gifted fig- ures less familiar to Europe, must be mentioned with respect.
Everybody professed the principles of the Declaration of Independence and therefore held a republican form of gov-
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ernment to be the only proper, or at any rate the only possi- ble form for the central authority as well as for the States. But of the actual working of republican governments there was very little experience, and of the working of democracies, in our present sense of the word, there was really none at all beyond that of the several States since 1776, when they broke loose from the British Crown. Englishmen and Americans are more likely than Continentals to forget that in 1788 there was in the Old World only one free nation and no democracy.1 In Europe now there remain but two strong monarchies, those of Russia and Prussia, while America, scarcely excepting Brazil and Canada, is entirely (at least in name) republican. But the world of 1788 was a world full of kings-despotic kings-a world which had to go back for its notions of popular govern- ment to the commonwealths of classical antiquity. Hence the speculations of those times about the dangers, the merits, the characteristic tendencies and methods of free governments under modern conditions, were and must needs be vague and fanciful, because the materials for a sound induction were want- ing. Wise men when forced to speculate, recurred to the gen- eral principles of human nature. Ordinary men went off into the air and talked at large, painting a sovereign people as reck- less, violent, capricious on the one hand, or virtuous and pacific on the other according to their own predilections, whether sel- fish or emotional, for authority or for liberty. Though no one has yet written the natural history of the masses as rulers, the hundred years since 1788 have given us materials for such a natural history surpassing those which Hamilton possessed almost as much as the materials at the disposal of Darwin exceeded those of Buffon. Hence in judging the views of the Federalist writers2 and their antagonists, we must
1 The Swiss Confederation was scarcely yet a nation, and the few demo- cratic cantons were so small as hardly to come into account.
2 Of these writers Hamilton must be deemed the leading spirit, not merely because he wrote by far the larger number of letters, but because his mind was more independent and more commanding than Madison's. The latter
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expect to find the diagnosis often inexact and the forecast fanciful.
Those who opposed. the Constitution of 1787, a party both numerous and influential in nearly every State, were the men specially democratic and also specially conservative. They disliked all strengthening of government, and especially the erection of a central authority. They were satisfied with the system of sovereign and practically independent States. Hence they predicted the following as the consequences to be ex- pected from the creation of an effective Federal executive and legislature.1
1 .. The destruction of the States as commonwealths. The central government, it was said, would gradually encroach upon their powers; would use the federal army to overcome their resistance; would supplant them in the respect of their citizens ; would at last absorb them altogether. The phrase " consolidation of the Union," which had been used by the Convention of 1787 to recommend its draft, was laid hold of as a term of reproach. "Consolidation," the consolidation of the States into one centralized government became the popular cry, and like other plausible catchwords, carried away the un- thinking.
2. The creation of a despot in the person of the President. His legal authority would be so large as not only to tempt him, but to enable him to extend it further, at the expense of the liberties both of States and of people. "Monarchy," it was argued, "thrown off after such efforts, will in substance return with this copy of King George III, whose command of the federal army, power over appointments, and opportunities for intriguing with foreign powers on the one hand and corrupting
rendered admirable service in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, but afterwards yielded to the (in the main unfortunate) influence of Jefferson, a character with less purity but more vehemence.
1 I take no account of those objections to the Constitution which may be deemed to have been removed by the first eleven amendments.
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the legislature on the other,1 will render the new tyrant more dangerous than the old one. Or if he be more open to avarice than to ambition, he will be the tool of.foreign sovereigns and the means whereby they will control or enslave America." 2
3. The Senate will become an oligarchy. Sitting for six years, and not directly elected by the people, it " must gradu- ally acquire a dangerous preëminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy." 3
4. The House of Representatives will also, like every other legislature, aim at supremacy. Elected only once in two years, it will forget its duty to the people. It will consist of "the wealthy and well-born," and will try to secure the election of such persons only as its members.4
5. The larger States will use the greater weight in the gov- ernment which the Federal constitution gives them to overbear the smaller.
6. The existence of a strong central government is likely, not only by multiplying the occasions of diplomatic intercourse
1 See Federalist, No. LIV.
2 Federalist, No. LXVI, p. 667. "Calculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, the writers against the Constitution have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the intended President of the United States, not merely as the embryo but as the full grown progeny of that detested parent. They have to establish the pre- tended affinity, not scrupled to draw resources even from the regions of fic- tion. The authority of a magistrate in few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a Governor of New York, have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives. He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendour to those of a King of Great Britain. He has been shewn to us with the diadem sparkling on his brow and the impe- rial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a throne sur- rounded with minions and mistresses, giving audience to the envoys of foreign potentates in all the supercilious pomp of majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene. We have been taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering janizaries, and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio."
3 Federalist, No. LXII.
Federalist, Nos LVI and LIX.
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with foreign powers, to give openings for intrigues by them dangerous to American freedom, but also to provoke foreign wars, in which the republic will perish if defeated, or if victo- rious, maintain herself only by vast expenditure, with the addi- tional evil of having created an army dangerous to freedom.
That some of these anticipations were inconsistent with others of them was no reason why the same persons should not resort to both in argument. Any one who wishes to add to the number, for I have quoted but a few, being those. which turn upon the main outlines of the Philadelphia draft, may do so by referring to the record of the discussions in the several State Conventions which deliberated on the new Constitution, known as Elliott's Debates.
I pass from the opponents of the Constitution to its advo- cates. Hamilton and its friends sought in it a remedy against what they deemed the characteristic dangers of popular gov- ernment. It is by dwelling on these dangers that they recom- mend it. We can perceive, however, that, while lauding its remedial power, they are aware how deep-seated such dangers are, and how likely to recur even after the adoption of the Constitution. It is plain from the language which Hamilton held in private that he desired a stronger and more centralized government, which would have approached nearer to that British Constitution which he regarded as being, with all its defects, the best model for free nations.1 And in a remarkable letter written in February, 1802, under the influence of dis- appointment with the course events were then taking, he calls the Constitution he was "still labouring to prop" a "frail and worthless fabric."
We may therefore legitimately treat his list of evils to be provided against by the new federal government as indicating the permanently mischievous tendencies which he foresaw.
1 Though he, like other observers of that time had not realized, and might not have relished, the supremacy, now become omnipotence, which the House of Commons had already won.
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Some of them, he is obliged to admit, can not be wholly averted by any constitutional devices, but only by the watch- ful intelligence and educated virtue of the people.
The evils chiefly fearcd are the following :
1. The spirit and power of faction, which is so clearly the . natural and necessary offspring of tendencies always present in mankind, that wherever liberty exists it must be looked for.1
Its causes are irremovable ; all you can do is to control its effects, and the best prospect of overcoming them is afforded by the representative system and the size of America with the diversities among its population.
2. Sudden impulses, carrying the people away and inducing hasty and violent legislative measures.2
3. Instability in foreign policy, due to changes in the exec- utive and in public sentiment, and rendering necessary the participation of a comparatively small council or Senate in the management of this department.
4. Ill-considered legislation, " facility and excess of law- making,"3 and "inconstancy and mutability in the laws," 4 form the "greatest blemish in the character and genius of our gov- ernments."
5. The Legislature is usually the strongest power in free governments. It will seek, as the example of the English Parliament shows, to encroach upon the other departments ; and this is especially to be feared from the House of Repre- sentatives as holding the power of the purse.5
6. The States, and especially the larger States, may over- bear the Federal government. They have closer and more
1 Federalist, No. X (written by Madison) and in other letters.
2 Federalist, No. LXII.
3 Federalist, No. LXI.
4 Federalist, No. LXXII.
5 " The Legislative Department is everywhere (i. e., in all the States) ex- tending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. ... It is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the People ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions." Federalist, No. XLVII.
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constant relations with the citizen, because they make and administer the ordinary laws he lives under. His allegi- ance has hitherto belonged to them and may not readily be acquired by the central authority. In a struggle, should a struggle come, State power is likely to prevail against federal power.
7. There is in republics a danger that the majority may oppress the minority. Already conspicuous in some of the State governments, as for instance Rhode Island, this danger may be diminished by the application of the federal system to the great area of the Union, where "society will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the lights of individuals or of the minority will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority."1
8. Another source of trouble is disclosed by the rash expe- riments which some States have tried, passing laws which threaten the validity of contracts and the security of property. As there is unwisdom in these, so there are signs of weakness in the difficulty which State governments have found in rais- ing revenue by direct taxation.2 Citizens whose poverty does not excuse their want of public spirit refuse to pay ; and the administration fears to coerce them.
Not less instructive than the fears of the Federalist writers are their hopes. Some of the perils which have since disclosed themselves are not divined. Some institutions which have conspicuously failed are relied on as full of promise.
The method of choosing the President is recommended with a confidence the more remarkable because it was the point on which the Convention had been most divided and had last arrived at an agreement.
" The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its
1 Federalist, No. L.
* Federalist, No. XII.
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opponents. . .. If the manner of it be not perfect, it is at - least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advan- tages the union of which was to be wished for. ... The process of election affords a moral certainty that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any one who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State, but it will require other talents and a different kind of merit to establish him in the confidence and esteem of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the dis- tinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say that there will be a constant proba- bility of seeing the station filled by characters preeminent for ability and virtue."1
It is assumed that America will continue an agricultural and (to a less extent) a commercial country, but that she will not develop manufactures ; and also that the fortunes of her citizens will continue to be small.2 No serious apprehensions
1 Federalist, No. LXVII. In A. D. 1800, twelve years after Hamilton wrote this passage, the contest for the Presidency lay between Jefferson and Aaron Burr, and Hamilton was compelled by his sense of Burr's demerits to urge his party to vote (when the choice came before the House of Rep. resentatives) for Jefferson, his own bitter enemy. What he thought of Burr, who, but for his intervention, would certainly have obtained the chief magistracy of the nation, may be inferred from the fact that he preferred as President the man of whom he thus writes: "I admit that his (Jeffer- son's) politics are tinctured with fanaticism; that he is too much in earnest in his democracy, that he has been a mischievous enemy to the principal measures of our past administration, that he is crafty and persevering in his objects, that he is not scrupulous about the means of success, nor very mindful of truth; and that he is a contemptible hypocrite, But, &c." (Letter to James A. Bayard, Jan. 16, 1801.)
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