USA > Pennsylvania > The Twenty-second Pennsylvania cavalry and the Ringgold battalion, 1861-1865; > Part 12
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108 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
CHAPTER IX. LEE'S INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA-GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. JUNE, JULY, 1863.
On the 28th of April, General Hooker, with the Army of the Potomac, had advanced and engaged Lee's Army for five days in the Battle of Chancellorsville, one of the bloodiest conflicts of the war, in which the losses of both armies were very great, the Con- federate General " Stonewall " Jackson being among the killed. Hooker was defeated and fell back to his former position on the north side of the Rappahannock, and Lee re-occupied the works and camps about Fredericksburg on the opposite side of the river.
Thus the two great armies lay watching each other during the month of May, the cavalry of each making extensive raids around the lines of the other.
Toward the close of May, General Hooker became convinced that his opponent was preparing for some great movement. From certain information that came to him, and from a close observation of all indications. he was led to believe that it would be another invasion of the North, and so advised the Department at Washing- ton. The latter did not agree with Hooker's surmise, but took the position that Lee's experience in the Antietam campaign of the pre- vious summer would deter him from another such movement.
Hooker's prediction proved to be correct, for just such a move- ment was being urged by the Confederate Government as a political expedient rather than as a wise military measure.
On the 3rd of June. General Lee began to draw his forces quietly toward Culpepper Court House, leaving Hill's Corps at Fred- ericksburg to disguise his movement. By the 8th of June, Ewell's and Longstreet's Corps were at Culpepper, well on the way to the Blue Ridge gaps opening into the valley.
FORTIFYING PITTSBURGH.
The War Department at Washington now began to get busy. On June 5th, General Halleck, of the War Department, ordered Captain Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, to "Repair to the City of Pittsburgh, Pa., and make preparations for the defense of that place again-t a possible Rebel raid."
On the next day, June 8th. Halleck ordered Brigadier General Barnard to " immediately proceed to Pittsburgh, Pa., and advise with
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INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA JUNE, JULY, 1863. 109
Captain Comstock, Corps of Engineers, in regard to the best means to be adopted for the defense of that place. It is not anticipated that any hostile demonstration will be made against Pittsburg, other than a mere raid, and as any projected works must be constructed by the voluntary labor of the citizens, the projected defenses should be of limited extent and of the most simple character-mere earthern bat- teries and rifle-pits. Captain Comstock is charged with laying out these works, and you will remain there only long enough to give him the benefit of your advice and experience, after which you will re- turn to Washington, where your presence is deemed necessary at the present crisis. Brigadier General Brooks has been appointed to the command of the Department of the Monongahela, of which Pittsburgh is the headquarters, etc."
The following letter explains the cause of the foregoing activity :
Washington, June 10, 1863, 10:45 A. M.
Maj. Gen. W. T. H. Brooks,
Monongahela House,
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Intelligence received this evening of the enemy's de- signs, makes it certain that you can not be too early or too busily at work, as Pittsburgh will certainly be the point aimed at by Stuart's raid, which may daily be expected. You should frankly inform the people of Pittsburgh that they must be at work.
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
This was a false alarm as Stuart was still on the Rappahannock, having fought the Battle of Brandy Station the day previous to Sec- retary Stanton's dispatch ; and thereafter was set to guard the gaps of the Blue Ridge to prevent any Union troops from crossing into the valley.
On June 10th, Ewell's Corps of the Confederate Army, fol- lowed by Longstreet's Corps, moved forward through the gaps of the Blue Ridge into the Shenandoah Valley, and marched directly for Winchester. Previous to this General Jenkins, with his brigade of cavalry, had been sent to Strasburg to co-operate with the in- fantry upon their arrival, and General Imboden had been sent to the South Branch of the Potomac in Hampshire County, with the fol- lowing orders :
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TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
Hdqrs. Army of N. Va., June 7, 1863.
Brig. Gen. J. D. Imboden,
Comdg. North Western Brigade.
General: In view of operations in the Shenandoah Valley, I desire you to attract the enemy's attention in Hampshire County, and to proceed down to Romney or such other point as you may con- sider best calculated for the purpose. .. In attracting their attention and detaining whatever force they may have at New Creek, Cumberland, Cacapon, etc., you will, of course, do them all the injury in your power by striking them a damaging blow at any point where opportunity offers, and where you deem most practi- cable. It will be important, if you can accomplish it, to destroy some of the bridges so as to prevent communication and the transfer of reinforcements to Martinsburg. After accomplishing what you can in Hampshire, should you find it practicable or advantageous, you can co-operate with any troops that you may find operating in the valley. I desire you to move into Hampshire as soon as pos- sible. .
I am respectfully, etc.,
R. E. LEE, General.
It will be remembered that on the morning of December 23, 1863, two hundred troopers of the Ringgold Battalion, under com- mand of Captain John Keys, rode into the City of Winchester at one side, while the rear-guard of the enemy's cavalry hastened out at the opposite side.
Nine days later, General Milroy arrived with a considerable force of infantry and some cavalry and took command, relieving the Ringgolds, who returned to Romney. General Milroy had continued to occupy the place as an outpost, with a varying force, and had kept a vigilant watch on the movements of the enemy when they ventured north of Strasburg and Front Royal. The enemy's force maintained in the upper valley during the winter and spring under command of Generals Jones and Imboden, ranged from 2,000 to 3,000 men of all arms. The Union forces at Winchester were at all times large enough to resist attack by these combined forces.
General Halleck, of the War Department, had repeatedly ad- vised the evacuation of Winchester, urging that the maintenance of an outpost there was of little value. General Milroy thought other-
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INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA JUNE, JULY, 1863. 111
wise, and did not like to forsake the loyal people of the city, who looked to him for protection.
General Schenck, in command of that department, sent word to Milroy to send his supplies to Harper's Ferry for safekeeping, and be ready to quit the place at short notice. General Milroy replied that he could hold the place against any force that would probably attack him. He did not know that the whole Confed- erate army was moving against him. A reconnaissance sent up the valley on the 12th of June, returned and reported to General Mil- roy that the enemy was advancing in force. That evening, Milroy telegraphed for specific orders, but before the orders were sent, the Confederate advance had cut the wires and the orders were never . received.
Milroy's effective force at this time was something less than 2.000 men. Next day, General Ewell, with a large part of Lee's Army, invested the place. General Milroy occupied the forts. Dur- ing the 14th, the enemy attacked with great vigor, subjecting Mil- roy's forces to a terrific bombardment and making repeated assaults, capturing some of the outer works. At one o'clock that night, Mil- roy spiked his guns, drowned his powder, abandoned his stores, train and all his artillery, and silently marched out in retreat, but soon encountered a strong force of the enemy, through which he cut his way and escaped, losing nearly one-half of his force as prisoners.
WE FALL BACK TO THE RAILROAD.
On June 14th, twenty-four hours after the enemy reached Win- chester and while Ewell's cannon were raining shells into Milroy's forts, General Schenck issued the following order to General Kelley, who sent copies to each military post in his department :
" General Schenck orders all troops and stores west of Mar- tinsburg to Grafton. You will therefore move without delay to the point indicated."
Colonel Campbell of the 5-4th Pennsylvania Infantry who com- manded the post at Mechanicsburg Gap, where the Ringgold Bat- talion had been stationed since the 17th of March, received a copy of this order.
Imboden, with his Northwestern brigade, had appeared on the opposite (eastern) side of the South Branch Potomac, several days previous to this, and it was generally believed that his force was the advance of a much stronger force of cavalry about to make a raid upon the railroad, and probably into Western Pennsylvania.
112 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
The first intimation of Imboden's proximity seems to have reached camp on the 12th, when our wagon train, which had started for Green Spring Run, was recalled when it reached Romney. On the same day, part of the baggage was sent to New Creek.
Next day (13th) the tents were taken down and sent to New Creek with the wagon train. * " Was waked up at 3 o'clock this morning (June 14th) and went with a scout of forty men under command of Lieutenant McNulty, fifteen miles toward Moorfield, and returned at one o'clock. Another scout of thirty-five men in command of Lieutenant Gibson, went a like distance on the Win- chester Road. At four o'clock, orders were received to march; we were ready in a few minutes, but did not start until six o'clock. In the meantime, somebody set fire to the hay stockades of the winter quarters, making a dense smoke, under cover of which some rowdy soldiers raided the Sutler stores of the 54th Pennsylvania and 1st West Virginia. At six o'clock, the command moved; halted at Burlington and fed, then moved on slowly, the infantry in front, followed by the baggage train and artillery, while Company A formed the advance guard and the rest of our cavalry brought up the rear. At three o'clock next morning (June 15) halted one mile above New Creek Station; lay down and slept until eight o'clock, and then moved on down to the station, where we were ordered to take three days' rations and one day's feed and march to Grafton, and to send our baggage by railroad. We prepared to go; lay about until four o'clock, when the order was countermanded, and we were ordered to put up quarters."
Captain Greenfield commanding the outpost at Springfield, also received orders on the 14th to proceed with his command to New Creek via Green Spring Run and Cumberland. He joined the rest of the battalion at New Creek on the 16th.
Next day, 17th, General Kelley arrived at New Creek from Harper's Ferry. On his arrival he submitted the following report:
New Creek, June 17, 1863.
H. W. Halleck,
General in Chief.
Arrived at Cumberland at 8 :30 this morning. Left for this place at & by train. Found track ten miles from Cumberland torn up. Re- turned to Cumberland and found place invested by Imboden with two regiments of cavalry and a battery. On the outside of the town,
· Sergeant Donaldson's Diary.
INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA JUNE, JULY, 1863. 113
I met Lieutenant (James P.) Hart, of the Ringgold Battalion, with fifty cavalry, under whose escort, I, with staff, came here. Find the troops between Martinsburg and Piedmont concentrated here, and learn that a portion of General Averill's command is on the way from Grafton.
.
B. F. KELLEY,
Brig. Gen.
* "On the 18th of June, I was ordered by General Kelley to scout to Cumberland and beyond, if possible, and report as to Im- boden's command and movements. On arriving at Cumberland, found that Imboden had evacuated the place, except a small rear- guard, which made a hasty retreat upon my approach. We pur- sued them some distance and captured two prisoners ; but dark com- ing on, we returned to Cumberland. The most of the citizens seemed delighted to see us, as they feared a reprisal or demand for money from them by Imboden, who had notified them he would return the following day. Mr. Shriver, President of the bank, treated us to a nice supper. I sent a courier to General Kelley at New Creek, re- porting my occupation of Cumberland, and, as I believed, Imboden retreating with a force of from 1,500 to 2,000 men, composed of two regiments of cavalry, one of infantry and a battery. I had less than 200 cavalry. I informed him that I would cross the river in the morning and make a reconnaissance of Patterson's Creek, Frank- fort and Springfield, which I did, capturing a few prisoners. Im- boden had retreated to French's store, having torn up the railroad and destroyed the bridges."
On receiving Captain Greenfield's report, with the statement that Imboden threatened to return to Cumberland next day, General Kelley, on the morning of the 19th, sent the First West Virginia and Second Maryland regiments of infantry with two guns to Cumberland.
" On the evening of June 14th, after the order to pack up and be ready to march had been issued, William Holland and myself (H. B. Hedge of Co. A) were deatiled to look for some loose horses the quartermaster had turned out to pasture on the river bottom. Before we returned, the command had moved out some distance with our company (A) in advance. We soon overtook the rear-guard and marched with them until eleven o'clock, when we obtained permission to go forward and join our own company in the advance. When we were on the ridge just above Patterson's Creek, we were halted. We were not alarmed, as we supposed it was our own men, but it did not take more than a minute to convince us that they were Confederates, for a man on either side held his gun against us, while another caught our horses and ordered us to dismount. This we did and were rushed through a gate into a strip of woods and disarmed. Their squad was under command of Sergeant Schrieber, who was just on his way back from Camp Chase. We had captured him with others at Moorfield, and Lieutenant Hart took them to Camp Chase. They kept us until about midnight and then let us go, as they seemed to care little for anything except our horses and arms. They spoke in the highest terms of the treatment they received from Lieutenant Hart. We pressed a horse and buggy into the service and reached camp at New Creek next day.'
· Colonel A. J. Greenfield.
W - We
114 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
THE REBELS ENTER PENNSYLVANIA.
While Ewell and Early were besieging Winchester, Rodes' divi- sion of infantry and Jenkins' brigade of cavalry pressed on and reached Martinsburg on the 14th, where they were opposed by a small force which was soon driven off; they then pushed on to the Potomac at Williamsport. By this time it became evident that the enemy intended to invade Pennsylvania, and the telegraph wires were flashing the startling news to the towns and villages throughout border counties of that State, causing intense excitement and alarm. Citizens began to remove their animals to the counties farther north and to hide or bury their treasures.
At one o'clock A. M. on the 15th, Thomas A. Scott, Superin- tendent of the Pennsylvania Railroad, arrived at the War Depart- ment in Washington. During the next hour, while Milroy's forces in the dead of night were marching out of the forts at Winchester, and cutting their way through the enemy's lines north of that place, Scott was in conference with Secretary Stanton and his advisors.
At the close of the conference, he sent the following telegrams : War Department, June 15, 3 A. M. ('63).
Hon. Thomas M. Howe,
Pittsburgh.
* The President issues proclamation this morning for 100,000 men, 50,000 of them from Pennsylvania to serve for six months unless sooner discharged. The general Government will provide for them fully. The danger is imminent and the people must be aroused and come forth promptly to prevent invasion. The Rebels are moving north in large force.
THOMAS A. SCOTT.
He sent a similar dispatch to Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania, who immediately replied, when Scott sent the following:
Hon. Andrew G. Curtin,
Harrisburg.
Get up a strong proclamation, calling on our people to rise at once. There is not a moment to be lost. The Rebels are moving in large force, and invasion can not be checked except by immediate action. The President's proclamation has been sent out and
. Among the troops who responded to this call of the President were four companies of cavalry, recruited mostly from the border counties of Pennsylvania, and who, at the expiration of this term of service, re-enlisted for a term of three years, and became the " New Battalion " of the Twenty-second Pennsylvania Cavalry.
INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA JUNE, JULY, 1863. 115
your proclamation should be sent out before daylight. The advance column of Lee's army is now at Martinsburg.
THOMAS A. SCOTT.
General Jenkins, with his brigade of Confederate cavalry crossed the Potomac and marched into Pennsylvania on the 16th, reaching Chambersburg late in the night. Next day, his scouting parties covered the country thereabout, gathering in all the horses and cattle they could find, and kidnaped fifty negroes which they re- garded as property, and drove them off into Virginia with the " other stock."
Imboden with his "North Western Brigade " of cavalry and artillery, who had arrived at the South Branch Potomac a few days previous, as heretofore mentioned, entered Cumberland, Md., on the 16th, and in obedience to his instructions from General Lee, pro- ceeded to destroy the railroad bridges and property between Cum- berland and Little Cacapon, to prevent General Kelley's troops at New Creek and westward from being hurried east to resist the Con- federate forces.
Rodes' division of infantry crossed the Potomac at Williams- port on the evening of the 15th, where he remained until the 19th, when he moved on to Hagerstown, Md.
General Early's forces crossed at Shepherdstown and moved north, while the other bodies of Lee's Army kept moving north- ward, keeping a sharp watch, however, on the Army of the Potomac.
* " By skillful movements, he (Lee) kept the Army of the Po- tomac in doubt, in the vicinity of Washington, while Ewell's corps crossed the river (Potomac) at Williamsport and Shepherdstown, advancing on Hagerstown, then on Chambersburg, and a few days later, moving on in two columns, Rodes pushing through Carlisle to Kingston within thirteen miles of Harrisburg, while Early's division marched up the eastern side of the South Mountain range through Emmitsburg, Gettysburg and York to the banks of the Susquehanna at Wrightville opposite Columbia, levying contributions on the people and destroying the bridges along the line of the Northern Central Railway, which connects that region with Baltimore."
* Lossing.
" At Carlisle, Chambersburg and Shippensburg, requisitions were made for supplies, and the shops were searched. many valuable stores being secured. At Chambersburg, a "ain was loaded with ordnance and medical stores and sent back. Near 3,000 Head of cattle were collected and sent back by my corps." --- General Ewell's Report.
General Lee ordered his troops to pay in Confederate money for all supplies secured but Early and many others did not even go through that formality. General Farly leavied a money contribution on the citizens of York, and secured in Federal currency $28,800, all the town could raise.
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TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
For some days, neither General Hooker nor the War Depart- ment at Washington were able to determine what Lee was aiming at, whether it was to sweep around and strike Baltimore and Wash- ington, or to capture Harrisburg and Philadelphia. Hooker was held in leash, somewhat, by the War Department and the President, . who were ever urging the safety of Washington as paramount. While Lee had been marching the main body of his army down the Shenandoah Valley to the Potomac, Hooker was swinging the Army of the Potomac northward, also " on a much smaller circle. He was covering Washington until he could see what Lee was intending to do." As Lee's two reserve corps were crossing the Potomac into Maryland and Pennsylvania, the Army of the Potomac, under Hooker was crossing the Potomac into Maryland at Edwards Ferry, thirty miles above Washington.
On June 27th, Hooker was at Frederick City, Maryland, with the main body of his army in that vicinity. Lee had halted at Cham- bersburg with Longstreet and Hill's corps nearby, while Ewell was advancing on Harrisburg and Early striking for York and the Sus- quehanna.
The fortifications about Harper's Ferry in General Schenck's department were manned by 11.000 troops under General French. General Hooker asked that this position be evacuated, as it was of no stategic value at this time, and that the 11,000 troops be added to General Slocum's Twelfth Corps, augmenting that body to 20,000 men, which force he proposed to send to operate in the rear of Lee's army to destroy his communications.
General Halleck objected to the evacuation of Harper's Ferry and refused the request. Hooker repeated his request and was again refused, when, in anger, he asked to be relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac. The President accepted his resignation and promptly appointed General George G. Meade to the command. This was on the ?Sth of June, just three days before the opening of the Battle of Gettysburg. It was a great surprise to General Meade. He well knew that the Army of the Potomac must fight a great battle within a few days, and he fully appreciated the tremendous responsi- bility of the appointment, as well as the tremendous disadvantage he would be at in conducting such a battle, unfamiliar as he was with the present organization of the army, and without time to study the situation and formulate plans of campaign. His strong sense of duty and intense loyalty forbade all thought of shirking the unwel- come responsibility. He assumed command, issuing a modest ad-
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INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA, JUNE, JULY, 1863. 117
dress to the army, in which he paid a handsome tribute to his pre- decessor.
On the next morning, (June 29th) the Army of the Potomac, under its new commander, moved out northward ·by severel parallel roads, flanked on the right by the cavalry division of General Gregg, and on the left by the troopers of General Buford's division.
On the evening of this day, Lee received the first reliable in- formation that the Army of the Potomac was advancing into Penn- sylvania to give battle. He immediately sent out couriers in great haste to Ewell and Early, ordering them to fall back with all possible speed and join his forces in the vicinity of Gettysburg.
Next day, (June 30th) the Army of the Potomac pushed on at a rapid gait. Buford's cavalry scouts over on the left along the headwaters of the Monocacy, discovered large bodies of Confed- erates coming eastward through the mountain passes from the Cum- berland Valley and advancing toward Gettysburg. .
When this was reported to General Reynolds, commanding the two corps forming the left column, he ordered Buford to move to Gettysburg and hold it. Buford proceeded to Gettysburg, and occu- pied the ridge about the Seminary, where he bivouacked that night, throwing out pickets on all roads and sending messengers to Rey- nolds seven miles away, and to Meade at Taneytown, that the enemy was in his front, and that he was expecting to be attacked at any time.
During the night of June 30th, General Meade issued orders to the different corps commanders, assigning them to the position they were to occupy in the line. The Confederate forces were converg- ing to the north and west of Gettysburg, and General Lee was arranging his lines for the expected battle.
During the next three days, July 1st, 2nd and 3rd, was fought the great Battle of Gettysburg, in which the two great armies en- gaged in deadly conflict, upwards of 5,000 giving up their lives on the field, and upwards of 15,000 were wounded, many of them disabled for life, " in a great civil war, testing whether this nation, or any nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal, can long endure."
" The invasion of the North was over; the great battle which was to bring about the independence of the Confederacy. its recogni- tion as a nation by France and England, had been fought and lost."
Lee fell back to the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling Waters. The Union cavalry had destroyed his bridge; the heavy
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TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
rains had raised the river above the fording stage and the Confed- erate army was unable to cross.
Lee immediately intrenched and fortified his position here, expecting to be attacked. He proceeded to construct a bridge, which required more than a week's time. Meade had won a victory at great cost, and hesitated to attack Lee in this intrenched position. He de- cided to pursue by the enemy's right flank, striking him as opportu- nity offered and covering Washington as had been done in the ad- vance north.
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