USA > Pennsylvania > The Twenty-second Pennsylvania cavalry and the Ringgold battalion, 1861-1865; > Part 39
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* See Map, page 63.
" Our brigade had a skirmish with the enemy's cavalry near the Cedar Creek crossing of the Back Road driving them several miles beyond.
383
BATTLE OF FISHER'S HILL.
that for convenience, his ammunition chests were taken from the caissons and placed behind the breast-works."
* Our cavalry division (Averill's), which had halted for the night at Cedar Creek, moved forward to Lebanon Church, on the Back Road, very early next morning (21st) our regiment in ad- vance, where we waited for orders until 7:45 A. M.
Averill says: "Merritt's Division was now withdrawn from my left, and I was left alone with instructions to move on the Mid- dle and Back Roads until stopped by a superior force of the enemy, keeping up my connection with the right of the infantry line. As there is but one road besides the Pike leading by Fisher's Hill, with the exception of some blind lanes, I moved along the Back Road and across the country, driving the enemy's outposts until a line of rail and earth breastworks was reached, behind which the enemy had a strong line of infantry or dismounted men."
Averill informed Sheridan that the position was too strong to be taken without the aid of infantry. Sheridan rode over and inspected the line and directed Averill to keep up a strong show of cavalry before it, which Averill did during the day and following night, and on the morning of the 22nd, pressed the enemy as closely as possible with dismounted men.
Sheridan's quick eye took in the whole situation as soon as he arrived on the ground on the evening of the 20th. The enemy's po- sition was too strong to take by a direct assault without great sac- rifice of life, so he determined upon using a turning column against Early's left as he had done before Winchester on the 19th.
He says : " To this end I resolved to move Crook, unperceived, if possible, over to the eastern face of Little North Mountain, whence he could strike the left and rear of the Confederate line, and as he broke it up, I could support him by a left wheel of my whole line of battle. The execution of this plan would require per- fect secrecy, for the enemy, from his signal station on Three-top Mountain, could plainly see every movement of our troops in day- light. To escape such observation, Crook was marched during the night of the 20th into some heavy timber north of Cedar Creek, where he remained concealed throughout the next day. The same day (?1st) Wright and Emory were moved up closer to the Con- federate works, and the 6th Corps, after a severe fight in which Ricketts and Getty were engaged, took up some high ground on the right of the Manassas Gap Railroad. in plain view of the Confed- erate works, and confronting a commanding point where much of
· Sce Map, page 411.
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384 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
Early's Artillery was massed. Finding that the enemy was still · holding an elevated position farther to the right, on the north side of Tumbling Run, Wright attacked and carried this, which gave us an unobstructed view of the enemy's works and offered good ground for our artillery. The whole of the 6th Corps was moved up until our line was within less than half a mile of the enemy's works, while the 19th Corps moved up and joined Wright's left."
In the darkness of the night of the 21st, Crook was brought across Cedar Creek and hidden in a clump of timber behind Hupp's Hill till daylight of the 22nd, when, under cover of the intervening woods and ravines, he was marched beyond the right of the 6th Corps and again concealed not far from the Back Road.
After Crook got into this last position, Ricketts' right was pushed out until it confronted the left of the enemy's infantry. This brought Ricketts' right in conjunction with Averill's Cavalry, whose advance had been held in check by the enemy in their rail breast- works. As Ricketts advanced to this position, about 3 P. M., " he drove the enemy's skirmish line handsomely, aided by the three rifled batteries of the 6th Corps."
While Ricketts was attacking the enemy in front of Averill's left, the latter (our division of cavalry) charged in front, driving the enemy from his rail breastworks and back across the ravine to his works south of Tumbling Run. When the enemy observed this movement of Ricketts and Averill, he concluded that he was about to be attacked from that point and prepared for it.
While the attention of the enemy was thus occupied by Ricketts and Averill, Crook was enabled to continue his march unobserved. As he moved by our command, he rode up to General Averill and requested him to send an officer with him as guide. General Averill directed Colonel Greenfield to accompany him. General Crook, in
On the morning of the 21st, Averill's division advanced (as heretofore stated), and then fell back a short distance until noon, when another advance was made and the Confederate line in our front vigorously shelled. There was heavy skirmishing and a brisk cannonading most of the day. Under cover of the darkness, Averill made a short movement to the rear of the line he had held, and went into camp for the night. SERGEANT GEHIRETT, Co.K, 22nd Pennsylvania.
A perfect shower of lead met us as we advanced beyond their rail defences. Sev- eral horses in our company (C) were wounded, and William Cowen was shot in the cheek, the ball fracturing his jaw. Company C had been on the skirmish-line all the previous night and all this day .- Sergeant Donaldson.
In front of the 22nd, about one-eighth of a mile in advance of the Rebel works, were a number of hastily constructed defences, formed of rails and whatever other material could be secured, behind which the enemy's sharpshooters were concealed, who, by their effective fire, made it necessary that they should be driven out. We were ordered to make the charge, and completely routed the entire force, capturing quite a number and causing the rest to beat a hasty retreat. The new line formed was on the top of the hill, the Confederate trenches being on the hill opposite, a deep ravine between the two. We hastily threw up a slight breastwork and a steady fire was kept up on both sides .- Sergeant Gehrett, Company K.
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THE CHARGE AT FISHER'S HILL.
his report, tells how well the movement was executed. He says : " By marching in ravines and through woods, I arrived at the base of the mountain, unseen by the enemy. There I formed my com- mand in two columns, parallel with each other, and marched past the right flank of our lines, along the side of the mountain under cover of the woods, until more than half of the command had passed in the rear of the enemy's works, when I had them faced by the left flank, forming two parallel lines of battle . . . in this way I moved down the mountain-side. We had encountered the enemy's skirm- ishers some 200 yards before facing by the left flank, or our pres- ence on the side of the mountain would not have been known to them. As soon as we were discovered, they opened on the woods with artillery, doing but little execution, however. When within a half-mile of their batteries, the charge began with a shout. The intervening space between us and the open country was covered with rocks, underbrush and almost impenetrable cedar thickets, the ground being intersected and broken by numerous ravines, so that by the time we arrived at the foot of the mountain and emerged from the woods, our lines were completely broken, but without halt- ing to re-form, with cheer upon cheer, the charge was continued for a distance of four miles, up hill and down hill, across fields and through woods, after the disordered and rapidly retreating foe."
Colonel Greenfield, who had accompanied General Crook in his flanking movement, says: "I was riding with Crook as the com- mand emerged from the woods into a clearing of stumps and under- brush, in full view of the enemy, and exposed to a murderous fire from their artillery. He moved steadily into the open as though on review, until his command had cleared the timber, when he faced and charged. Our cavalry brigade charged at the same time and entered the enemy's breastworks simultaneously with the 8th Corps only a little to the left. I joined my own command and we pursued the retreating foe for several miles, until too dark to continue the pursuit, taking many prisoners. The prisoners and guns found in the fortifications were left to the care of the infantry, and our 2nd Brigade of cavalry, which Averill says he held in reserve by Crook's order."
Averill, in his report, says: "General Crook's Corps passed along a ravine in my rear and around my right, and assaulted the tnemy's extreme left, in conjunction with one of my brigades which (latter ) leaped the works and scattered the enemy in wild confusion."
.
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TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
(This was our brigade and the men of the 22nd Pennsylvania Cav- alry were foremost in this charge and among the first inside the enemy's works.)
* " More quickly than the story can be told, the divisions of Thoburn and Duval swept along the enemy's left flank, taking his line in reverse, and driving before them the astonished dismounted cav- alry of Lomax. ¡ In a few minutes, a brigade of Averill's Division and Ricketts' Division had joined Crook's left, and the remainder of the 6th Corps and the 19th, taking up the charge, descended into the ravine of Tumbling Run, with a headlong rush over fields, walls, rocks and felled trees, Making their way across the brook, they were soon scrambling up heights that it had seemed madness to attack, while Sheridan and his staff were on every part of the line, shouting "Forward! Forward, everything!" and to all inquiries for instructions, the reply was still, "Go on, don't stop; go on!" Formations, were little heeded in the rush; but the whole Con- federate line broke from its trenches, Lomax's dismounted cav- alry on the left giving way first, whereupon Ramseur and Pegram were routed in turn. In truth, between sundown and dark, every portion of the strong position at Fisher's Hill was carried, the action being so rapid that the enemy had not even time to get his guns out of position upon the Pike and sixteen of them were cap- tured."
Early fled in disorder, under cover of the darkness, through Woodstock to a point about four miles bevond, called "Narrow Passage," just north of Edenburg. Sheridan pushed after him all night with Devin's Brigade of Merritt's Division, and the 6th and 19th Corps, but the darkness made the pursuit unavailing. Midway between Fisher's Hill and Woodstock, where there is some high ground. the enemy with two pieces of artillery, attempted to stay us, but his attempt proved fruitless and, notwithstanding the darkness, the guns were soon captured.
The chase was then taken up by Devin's Brigade as soon as it could be passed to the front, and continued until after daylight 2
The guerrillas were busy with Crook's rear, picking up his stragglers; my remain- ing brigade protected it, pursuant to a request from General Crook, and guarded our own and the captured artillery, collecting prisoners and property. The Second Brigade captured 110 prisoners, 175 horses, 14 wagons, 8 ambulances, 4 guns, 4 caissons and 2 battle flags .- General Averill.
"In that charge of the Sth Corps were two future presidents of the United States-Rutherford B. Hayes, Colonel 23rd Ohio Infantry, commanding division, and William McKinley, Captain and A. A. A. G. on Crook's staff."
* The Shenandoah Valley in 1864.
t See Map, page 411.
387
THE BATTLE OF FISHER'S HILL.
the next morning, but the delays incident to a night pursuit made it impossible for Devin to do more than pick up stragglers.
Sheridan says: "Our success was very great, yet I had an- ticipated still greater results. Indeed, I had high hopes of cap- turing almost the whole of Early's army before it reached New Market, and with this object in view during the maneuvers of the 1st, I had sent Torbert up the Luray Valley with Wilson's Division and two of Merritt's Brigades in the expectation that he would drive Wickham out of Luray Pass by Early's right, and by crossing the Massanutten Mountain near New Market, gain his rear. I was astonished and chagrined on the morning of the 23rd at Woodstock, to receive the intelligence that he had failed to drive Wickham and had fallen back to Front Royal. Had General Torbert driven this cavalry and reached New Market, I have no doubt but that we would have captured the entire Rebel army. I feel certain that its route from Fisher's Hill was, such that there was scarcely a company organization held together."
Colonel Wells, of the 8th Corps, commanding a brigade, says, in his report :
" I omitted to mention in its proper connection, that just as we were leaving the first work captured on the left, Powell's Cavalry swept by our right in splendid style."
This was not Powell's Brigade, but the mounted part of our brigade. The charge of our men, mentioned by Averill, was that of the men dismounted, who had previously taken and were hold- ing the rail breastworks. Sheridan relieved Averill next day and assigned Powell to command our division, which accounts for Wells calling our brigade Powell's Cavalry.
Sheridan says: "We reached Woodstock early on the. morn- ing of the 23rd, and halted there some little time to let the troops recover their organization, which had been broken in the night march which they had made. When the commands had closed up, we pushed on toward Edenburg in the hope of making more cap- tures at Narrow Passage Creek, but the Confederates, too fleet for 115, got away ; so General Wright halted the infantry not far from Erienburg until rations could be brought the men. Meanwhile, I, having remained at Woodstock, sent Devin's Brigade to press the enemy under every favorable opportunity and, if possible, prevent him from halting long enough to reorganize. Notwithstanding Devin's efforts. the Confederates managed to assemble a consid- erable force to resist him, and, being too weak for the rear-guard,
388 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
he awaited the arrival of Averill, who, I had informed him, would be hurried to the front with all possible dispatch, for I thought that Averill must be close at hand. It turned out that he was not . near by at all, and that without good reason, he had refrained in taking any part whatever in the pursuit, and, in fact, had gone into camp and left to the infantry the work of pursuit.
" It was nearly noon when Averill came up, and a great deal of precious time had been lost. We had some hot words, but hoping that he would retrieve the mistake of the night before, I directed him to proceed to the front at once, and in conjunction with Devin, close with the enemy. He reached Devin's command about three o'clock in the afternoon, just as this officer was pushing the Con- federates so energetically that they were abandoning Mount Jack- son, yet Averill utterly failed to accomplish anything. Indeed, his indifferent attack was not worthy the excellent soldiers he com- manded."
Later in the afternoon, when Sheridan learned that Averill had withdrawn and gone into camp near Hawkinsburg, he promptly relieved him of the command and assigned Colonel William H. Powell to succeed him.
Colonel Powell took command, had the division formed and the following order of General Averill read:
HEADQUARTERS 2ND CAVALRY DIV., DEPT. OF WEST VA. In the Field, Sept. 24, 1864.
GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 33.
In accordance with Special Orders No. 41 .. .. of this date, I hereby relinquish the command of this division. In doing so, I request the officers and men to accept sincere thanks for the uni- form obedience and respect they have shown to my orders and the personal kindness they have always extended to myself. I shall never forget what I owe to you, my comrades. Whatever of repu- tation or rank I have gained during the last year was given to me by this command.
The next morning at daylight, the 2nd Brigade having joined us, we moved on to Woodstock, where we found Sheridan. Devin's brigade of cavalry having pushed on toward Mount Jackson, Averill was ordered to hurry forward. We found Devin engaged with a strong force of the enemy a short distance from the town. Averill attacked at once with our division and drove the enemy through the town, taking a number of prisoners. Beyond the town, we discovered the enemy in strong force. They made a bold front moving out and attacking us with a large force of infantry and a battery. Averill brought forward a section of, artillery and engaged them for a time, but receiving information that a force of the enemy's infantry was moving around our right, fell back beyond the town and encamped for the night. Next morning, 24th, Sheridan issued an order relieving General Averill and assigning Colonel William H. Powell to the command of our division .- Colonel Greenfield.
7
N
389
AVERILL RELIEVED OF COMMAND.
Since the 1st of May, we have marched over 1,800 miles. Five hundred comrades who have fallen in twenty battles attest the de- votion with which you have done your duty; and 7 battle-flags, 13 cannon, and over 1,500 prisoners captured from the enemy exhibit some of the results of your work. My associations with you will hereafter be among my most cherished memories, and I shall read the record of your deeds from day to day with eager interest. My. regret in severing the ties that bind us. is somewhat lessened by the knowledge that I am leaving you in the hands of that tried and trusty soldier, Colonel W. H. Powell, in whom the utmost confidence may be placed. I would rather serve in your ranks than leave you, but I am only permitted to say farewell.
W. W. AVERILL, Brevet Maj. Gen.
After the reading of this order, General Averill rode along the line and bade us "good-bye " amid the hearty cheers and regrets of the officers and men of the division.
" The removal of Averill was but the culmination of a series of events extending back to the time I assumed command of the Mid- dle Military Division. General Grant, fearing discord on account of Averill's ranking Torbert, authorized me to relieve the former officer, but I hoped that if any trouble of this sort arose, it could be allayed, or at least repressed, during the campaign against Early, since the different commands would often have to act separately. After that, the dispersion of my army by return of 6th Corps and Torbert's Cavalry to the Army of the Potomac, would restore mat- ters to their normal condition; but Averill's dissatisfaction began to show itself immediately after his arrival at Martinsburg on the 14th of August, and except when he was conducting some inde- pendent expedition, had been manifested on all occasions since. I therefore thought the interest of the service would be subserved by removing one whose growing indifference might render the best laid plans inoperative."-P. H. Sheridan.
General Averill, in his report, makes a vigorous defense of his action on each occasion where censured. He asserts that in the dis- patches of the Major General commanding, due credit was with- held from him and his command, his successes being barely men- tioned. " It was, I believe, admitted on the 19th of September, by both sides, that our cavalry attack was the key to the victory which we won, and I think it was obvious that the success of that attack,
390 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
as to time and place, was mainly attributable to the exertions of my division, yet, although I was the ranking officer making the attack, the mention of my name in the dispatches was studiously avoided.
" An officer who has served the Government nine years, who has suffered from wounds in battle, cannot, without any assigned cause or pretext, be suddenly relieved from the command of a division whose record tells of nothing but success and victories, without having his sensibilities outraged and his reputation jeopardized."
Sheridan's losses at the Battle of Fisher's Hill were only about 400 men, while Early's loss was between 1,300 and 1,400. At Winchester, on the 19th of September, owing to the fact that the Union army was the attacking force, while the Confederates were on the defensive, part of the time protected by defenses thrown up at a former period, our losses in killed and wounded were much in excess of the Confederates ; in the two battles, however, the losses of the opposing armies were about equal.
Sheridan's victories had been won with a loss on his part only equal to the enemy's, while the guns, the flags, the military positions . and the moral effect were his prizes. The total loss to each army in these two battles was about 5,000 men, which was a much more serious loss to the South, owing to the fact that all their men liable to military duty were already in their army, while in the North there were yet millions of civilians liable to military duty.
The greatest value of these two great victories was their wholesome moral effect in restoring confidence and hope to the loyal people of the North, while at the same time, practically silencing the blatant, disloyal element, that with tongue and pen, and in every other way possible, had been striving to defeat the cause of the Union. Grant, who had ordered a salute of 100 guns over the victory of September 19th, again ordered a salute of 100 guns to be fired in honor of the victory of Fisher's Hill, while Sec- retary Stanton ordered a salute of 100 guns to be fired at each of fifteen military departments, a salvo of 1,500 guns for Fisher's Hill.
General Early smarted sorely over his defeats and tried to blame them on his cavalry. He says: "The enemy's immense su- periority in cavalry and the inefficiency of the greater part of mine. has been the cause of all my disasters. In the affair at Fisher's Hill, the cavalry gave way, but it was flanked. This would have been remedied if the troops (infantry) had remained steady, but a panic seized them at the idea of being flanked, and without being defeated, they broke, many of them fleeing shamefully. The ar-
391
. PURSUIT OF THE ENEMY.
tillery was not captured by the enemy, but abandoned by the infantry. My troops are very much shattered, the men very much exhausted and many of them without shoes."
CHAPTER XXVIII. PURSUIT OF THE ENEMY. ADVANCE UP THE VALLEY. DESTRUCTION OF CROPS AND SUBSISTENCE. BATTLE OF WEYER'S CAVE OR MOUNT VERNON FORGE.
Early fell back from Mount Jackson and took position on Rude's Hill, where he bivouacked for the night. Next morning, 24th, our infantry, 6th and 19th Corps, advanced, and, with the cavalry, occupied Mount Jackson and drove the enemy's skirmishers back across the river to their main force on Rude's Hill. The 8th Corps, which had remained at Fisher's Hill to bury the dead, now came up after a long day's march and joined the pursuers. Devin's Brigade of cavalry on our left pushed forward to flank the enemy's right; Powell's Division ( formerly Averill's) on our right was sent up around the enemy's left, while the infantry advanced along the Pike and crossed the river in front of the enemy, our artillery briskly shelling them in the meantime.
Sheridan says: "As soon as my advance began, the enemy rapidly retreated in line of battle up the Valley through New Market, followed closely by Wright and Emory, their artillery on the Pike and their columns on its right and left. Both sides moved with celerity, the Confederates stimulated by a desire to escape and our men animated by the prospect of wholly destroying Early's army. The stern chase continued for about thirteen miles, our in- fantry often coming within range, yet whenever we began to deploy, the Confederates increased the distance between us by resorting to a double quick, evading battle with admirable tact. While all this was going on, the open country permitted us a rare and brilliant sight, the bright sun gleaming from the arms and trappings of the thousands of pursuers and pursued.
" Near New Market, as a last effort to hold the enemy. I pushed Devin's Cavalry-comprising about 500 men-with two guns right up on Early's lines, in the hope that the tempting opportunity given him to capture the guns would stay his retreat long enough to let my infantry deploy within range, but he refused the bait and.
392 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
after momentarily checking Devin, he continued on with little loss and in pretty good order."
On the morning of the 24th, our regiment, with Powell's Division, moved forward on the right, across the country to the Back Road. We soon overtook the rear-guard of the enemy's cavalry composed of the commands of Generals Imboden, John- son and McCausland, and drove them some distance, when we found them in line of battle. They showed some fight, but we soon had them on the run and drove them right along before us toward Harrisonburg, killing 15, capturing 18 prisoners, 14 wagons and a large amount of ammunition. Our loss: 1 man wounded. It is strange that we suffered no loss, as we charged them several times. Marched on through Parisville and Chambersville and halted for the night, twelve miles from Harrisonburg.
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