USA > Pennsylvania > The Twenty-second Pennsylvania cavalry and the Ringgold battalion, 1861-1865; > Part 16
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* R. E. Lee to J. Davis, Jan. 2, 1564.
I have sent Early with two brigades of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, under Fitz Lee to Hardy and Hampshire Counties to endeavor to get some cattle that are reported within the enemy's lines. .
RINGGOLD BATTALION, PETERSBURG, JAN., 1864. 149
report that the Federal intrenchments were protected by abattis and too strong to attack without artillery. General " Fitz " then turned his attention to the Federal line of communication with the base at New Creek.
Early in the morning (January 1st) Captain Work with a de- tachment of thirty-two cavalry, rode into Moorfield, chased a few Rebels and captured two, but found no force. On the 2nd, rumors of the enemy advancing reached camp, but none could be seen, and the information was unreliable. On the 3rd, Colonel Thoburn, Captain Work and Lieutenant Welch, with a small party of cavalry went out on a reconnaissance through the gap, when they were fired on and driven back. They dismounted some of the men and went through the gap again, but the enemy had disappeared. When the reconnaissance returned to camp, they first learned that the train was captured.
A train of forty wagons, guarded by detachments of infantry, had started from Petersburg early that morning (January 3, 1864) bound for New Creek. The wagons were mostly empty, the only freight they carried being some hides and the artillery ammunition of Captain Rourke's Battery, which was being sent to Tennessee.
General Fitz Lee was informed of the departure of this train. Leaving the cavalry commands of Major Gilmer and Captain Mc- Neill to watch the " gap " and protect his rear he started after the train with a strong force of cavalry.
About noon, when the train was near the junction of the Greenland Gap Road, the mail squad from Petersburg to New Creek overtook it, and passing on up to the advance, dismounted. Sergeant H. B. Hedge, one of the mail guards, wrote in his diary, " We had orders not to dismount during the entire journey of forty- two miles-a precautionary measure against surprise and capture. Taking advantage of the protection the train afforded, we halted, fed our horses and made ourselves some coffee as the train pulled by -- a stop not exceeding twenty minutes; as the rear of the train came up, we mounted and pushed on. After we had passed some distance beyond the train, we met our mail-squad from New Creek with the mail for Petersburg.
The latter mail-squad was accompanied by Sergeant Sam Don- aldson of Company C, in whose journal we find the following :
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We met the train near the junction and had gone about half- way along, when a strong force of Rebel cavalry came out the Old Moorfield Mountain Road and attacked the rear-guard ; then another large body of cavalry came out of the woods on the side of the moun- tain and attacked the side of the train near the advance. The be- numbed drivers forsook their teams and took to the brush, while the infantry guards, surprised and overwhelmed, also scattered."
The entire train was captured and some of the guards taken prisoners, but most of them escaped capture.
General Fitz Lee's report says: "Although not an object of the expedition, it was determined to cut the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at New Creek Depot ; so marched to Ridgeville and camped at that place on the night of the 4th instant. Marched at 4 o'clock next morning in a hail-storm, and though a point was reached within six miles of the depot, on account of the sufferings of my men and the impassability of the mountain passes to my smooth-shod horses, was unable to proceed farther, so counter-marched and passing through Romney, returned to Harrisonburg."
When Colonel Thoburn at Petersburg learned something of the strength of the enemy in his vicinity, he naturally expected to be attacked at any time, and made every preparation to receive them. As night came on, the light of the burning block-house at Greenland Gap indicated the probable location of the enemy. Just after dark, a detachment of 100 men from the Ringgold Battalion under com- mand of Captain Chessrown was sent in that direction to make a reconnaissance, Colonel Thoburn sending his aide-de-camp, Lieuten- ant McIlvaine, along. As they approached within a mile or so of the block-house, they came upon a blockade of logs and rails across the pike. Clearing this away, they had advanced but a short distance until they were ordered to halt. In reply, one of the boys, Joe Ham- ilton, fired in the direction of the voice, the night being very dark. This caused the Rebel pickets to get back for a short distance where the main body could be heard forming. the commands being given in
*"Two of the mail-guards up, who were slightly intoxicated, had been running their horses, and were so far in advance that they escaped the attack entirely. Sam Turner, who had the mail sack, took! the back track for Williamsport and saved the mail. Corporal Woodburn, who was riding with me. had some official papers in his pocket for Colonel Thoburn, which he wanted to get through, so we took the Greenland Gap Road over to Mrs. Babb's, and then up the side of the mountain over a very bad road, and reached Petersburg after night." -- Donaldson.
Simultaneously with Fitz Lee's movement. General Early marched a strong force down the Valley almost to Winchester, with Imboden's division of cavalry working the Valley on his right. As a counter-movement, General Meade sent the Second Brigade of Gregg's cavalry (8th, 13th, 16th Pennsylvania and Ist Maine) through Chester Gap into the Luray Valley, reaching Front Royal on January 2nd.
RINGGOLD BATTALION, PETERSBURG, JAN., 1864. 151
undertones. Our force was immediately turned from the pike into a large field on the left, where the men remained quietly listening to the confusion in the enemy's camp. Our officers were pretty well satisfied from the amount of stir and " falling in " going on, that there were too many of them for us to attack.
Lieutenant McIlvaine, wishing to take positive information back to the Colonel as to the numbers of the enemy, called for volunteers to enter their lines and find out from citizens who lived nearby. W. H. H. ("Tip") Wickerham and T. J. Crago, of Company D, promptly offered their services. Leaving all their arms except their revolvers, which they carried in their hands ready for any emergency they partly by walking and partly by crawling, reached the farm- house, where they obtained the desired information and returned in safety to the command.
The enemy's appearance in such force within a few miles of New Creek, caused great anxiety about the forces at Petersburg, now cut off from communication, and supposed to be besieged by the enemy.
Next morning (January 4th) Colonel Thoburn anxious to get into communication with headquarters; ordered Captain Work in command of the Ringgold Battalion, to detail an intrepid, energetic officer with a small detachment of picked men, well mounted, to carry dispatches through the enemy's lines, if possible, and reach New Creek.
Captain Work immediately detailed Lieutenant C. J. McNulty as the officer for the hazardous undertaking, who, with fifteen men from his own company, was ordered to get through to New Creek with the dispatches and return with information, if possible, next day.
Colonel Thoburn was unable to obtain information from any source on the 4th. Next day, he was anxiously expecting a message, but the forenoon wore away and no word was received. At one o'clock P. M., he ordered Captain Work to take sixty men from the Ringgold Battalion, and, if possible, enter New Creek, unless he should meet McNulty returning, or get reliable information that it was impossible to get through the enemy's lines.
Work started at once and met McNulty at 9 P. M., fourteen miles above New Creek, with the report that the road was open, the enemy having gone off in the direction of Burlington. Work then turned about and returned to Petersburg with McNulty, arriving at one o'clock at night, where they found the camp torn up, wagons
152 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
loaded to move and commissary stores destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. The news brought by McNulty caused this order to be countermanded.
Next day (6th) Captain Work was ordered on a scout to Moor- field with sixty men. Saw some pickets and chased them, but found no force about there ; scouted down to the Greenland Road, but could find no force of the enemy in that vicinity. Returned to camp, ar- riving at 3 P. M., having ridden ninety miles in thirty-six hours with- out sleep.
The weather continued intensely cold. The troops at Peters- burg were put on two-thirds rations on account of the " wanton de- struction of stores on the night of the 5th." On this day, Joe Arm- strong and one of Chessrown's men were sent to Williamsport with dispatches and both were captured. It was not known yet what had become of Fitz Lee's force, so the cavalry were kept busy scouting toward Moorfield and down the creek valleys toward the Potomac.
On the 8th, scout out the Burlington Road ; 9th, scout of ninety men with Captain Chessrown and Lieutenants Denny and Speer was sent to Moorfield ; on arriving at the ford, could not cross on account ยท of the ice. Saw some Rebel cavalry and heard that 500 infantry came that morning.
Next day (10th) Lieutenants Denny and Spear with 100 men went to meet the wagon train, which came through unmolested.
On January 8th, Lieutenant Myers, in command of a special squad of scouts, telegraphed from Romney to General Kelley that the enemy, 1,500 cavalry, commanded by Fitzhugh Lee and Rosser, had gone out the Wardensville pike on their way to the Valley on the previous day.
On January 11th, all the cavalry except Captain Greenfield's company and the provost guards, were ordered to New Creek. Marched at 11 A. M. Camped over night near Williamsport. Very cold night. The men had to lie out and suffered severely. Marched at 8 A. M., on the 12th, and arrived at New Creek at 4 P. M. and camped on Reese's farm, six miles above the station. Moved on down to the station next day and camped north of Fort Fuller. Very badly off for tents and camp outfit.
14th. Fifty men under Lieutenant McNulty detailed to escort train. Troops busy preparing quarters. At 8 P. M., fifty men or- dered to report to Major Farrabee ; sent in command of Lieutenant Gibson to reinforce train guard.
RINGGOLD BATTALION-NEW CREEK. JAN., 1864. 153
While the Ringgold Battalion, stationed at New Creek, were in the saddle almost continually, escorting trains. scouting, etc., Cap- tain Greenfield's Company at Petersburg, now the only cavalry at that post, were also on the go day and night. We find in the " War Records " the following :
HDORS. 2ND DIV., DEPT. W. VA., New Creek, W. Va., Jan'y 18, 1864.
Captain: Colonel Thoburn, commanding Second Brigade, re- ports that on the 15th instant. a small squad of the Washington Cav- alry (Captain Greenfield ) had a skirmish with McNeill's Company near the Moorfield Gap. The enemy were routed, losing one killed, one wounded and two captured. We also captured three of their horses and a full set of arms and accoutrements. Our loss was nothing. Faithfully,
JAMES A. MILLIGAN.
CAPT. T. MELVIN,
A. A. G.
Sergeant Armour Thompson, a brave, wiry, little Irishman, about five feet four inches and weighing 130 pounds, was the hero of this affair. McNeill's company of Partisan Rangers was con- cealed in a ravine, waiting for the little squad to pass. Thompson. in command of the squad. and always on the alert. saw them. As soon as discovered. the Rangers rushed out and Thompson re- treated; as our horses had been living mostly on hay, they were not in the most perfect condition. Thompson's horse was evidently the weakest. as. after retreating some distance, he fell behind his squad. One of the Rangers. called " California Joe" (Joe Rosser was his name) from the fact that he had resided in California. was riding a fast horse and got in advance of his command. Thomp- son, realizing that he would be overtaken and captured or shot from his horse while retreating. wheeled his horse quickly and met his foe face to face. They fired simultaneously. It was a duel between two brave men. At the third shot, the Ranger dropped dead from his horse, being shot in the forehead. Thompson leaped from his horse, took the arms from his foe, mounted the Ranger's horse and escaped. as the rest of the Confederates in close pur- suit were firing at him.
The death of their comrade seemed to paralyze the enemy, and they soon gave up the pursuit. Thompson's horse followed him
154 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
into camp. The Confederates considered Rosser one of their bravest and best soldiers ; he was an athlete and an expert horseman.
General Kelley was so well pleased with this brave act that he complimented Sergeant Thompson and presented him with the horse, arms and equipments. The horse was a fine, strong, blooded animal. The arms taken were a double-barrel shotgun, saber and revolver, the last being of French manufacture with a nine-bore cylinder and an extra barrel for shooting buckshot or slugs. It was on exhibition in Shan Margerum's store in Washington, Pa., for a number of years.
THE FOLLY OF AN OUTPOST AT PETERSBURG.
" For what purpose does General Kelley maintain an outpost at Petersburg?" The correct answer to this first question of the soldier catechism at that time and place was this: "General Kelley maintains an outpost at Petersburg for the purpose of supplying the Rebel army with animals, wagons and commissary stores."
The utter folly of maintaining this outpost, back in the moun- tains in the enemy's country, forty-two miles from a base of sup- plies, was patent to the most thoughtless soldier.
On the 17th of January, Colonel Thoburn in command of the post at Petersburg, wrote a letter addressed to the A. A. G. of the Second Division, commanded by Colonel Mulligan, advising the evacuation of that post, and sustaining his opinion by the most conclusive arguments. He says in part, "With the experience of the past five months in connection with our trains (evidently alluding to the trains captured on November 16th and January 3rd) and the prospect of bad roads at no distant day, I believe our stay here is at least precarious. The capture of trains at the present time from the 'Creek here, would leave us famishing before another could be sent to us, and the capture of another train is by no means an improbable event, and can not well be prevented on our part, for the enemy can easily bring a larger force to attack it than we can keep in continual guard with it."
Colonel Mulligan forwarded this letter to General Kelley with the following note :
" Respectfully submitted. This paper has been written by Colonel Thoburn without any knowledge on his part of my own (same) opinion in this matter, as expressed in a late conversation with the general commanding."
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General Kelley made no reply and paid no attention to the com- munication.
The daily camp journal continues to report heavy details for train-guards, scouts and escorts. Every train had to be guarded by a battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry and a section of artillery, and it required four days to make the round trip.
To give an idea of the mid-winter work required here, we quote from Captain Work's diary, which runs along as follows :
" January 20, 1863. Left at 1 P. M. with ninety men to guard train to Petersburg. Camped at 7 P. M. half-mile above Burlington ; slept in a straw pile. Lieutenants Speer and Keys along. Major Farrabee in command.
"January 21. Train moved out early ; fed at 11 A. M. at creek three miles below Williamsport. At 6 P. M., camped at the junction of the Moorfield-Greenland Gap Road with the Petersburg Pike. Moorfield Road re-blocked this day.
" January 22. Reached Petersburg at 1 P. M.
" January 23. Left Petersburg for a scout to Moorfield. Col- onel Mulligan and staff accompanied scout. Major Farrabee in command of cavalry and two guns of Carlin's Battery. No Rebs seen. Camped six miles from the junction.
"January 27. Received a box of socks from Relief Society of Buffalo Village, Washington County, Pa. Distributed them according to orders.
"January 28. Ordered on a scout toward Moorfield. Rebs re- ported advancing in force ; went on to Ridgeville. Ordered to Will- iamsport ; arrived there at dark. No enemy and no word of any this side of the Shenandoah Valley. Got back to camp at ? A. M."
EARLY AND ROSSER INVADE HARDY AND HAMPSHIRE-1864.
General Early with his entire force remained in the Upper Valley about Harrisonburg and Staunton during January. Here his cav- alry-both men and horses-obtained a rest of several weeks after their strenuous service in the mountain counties, from December 12 to January 7. Early kept thoroughly informed of the situation in Hardy and Hampshire, and had observed that the Federal outpost was still maintained at Petersburg, and that the big wagon-trains loaded with commissary stores and drawn by hundreds of horses and mules, continued to traverse the forty odd miles of mountain roads to and fro. General Lee's Army was in great need of provi-
156 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
sions and teams, and it was time to make another levy on Uncle Sam.
* On the morning of January 28th, General Early moved from New Market with Rosser's Brigade, Thomas' Brigade, all the effective men of Gilmor's and McNeill's Partisan Rangers, and four pieces of McClanahan's Battery toward Moorfield. He arrived at Moorfield on the 29th, and early next morning, Rosser's Brigade, with the artillery, was sent forward to intercept a train on its way from New Creek to Petersburg, and get between the garrison at the latter place and the railroad.
Information of the enemy's intention to make this raid had been given to General Kelley by citizen refugees on the 28th, in con- sequence of which the supply train, which had started the previous day, was stopped at Burlington and turned back, and a precautionary message sent to Colonel Thoburn, ordering him to retire from Petersburg if menaced by the enemy in force.
On the next day (29th), hearing nothing further of the ap- proach of the enemy, General Kelley ordered Colonel Snider to proceed with the supply train to Petersburg. In obedience to this order, Colonel Snider, on the 29th, again started with the train, going into camp as night approached.
GREENFIELD IN ROSSER'S CAMP.
Greenfield's company had remained at Petersburg throughout the month of January in command of Lieutenant Dabinett, as Cap- tain Greenfield was away on business relative to the organization of the regiment, as hereinafter reported. Greenfield returned to Petersburg on the 29th. On the way up from New Creek, he had heard rumors of Early's advance from the Shenandoah Valley, and suggested to Colonel Thoburn that he be allowed to take a detach- ment of his cavalry to Moorfield and try and secure reliable informa- tion, to which Colonel Thoburn agreed and issued the order. Cap- tain Greenfield says :
" I left Petersburg at midnight of the 29th, with forty men of my company, intending to arrive at Moorfield before daylight on the 30th, hoping to take some prisoners, as it was a rare case when some Confederates were not at home or visiting friends in Moorfield. Before reaching the South Fork Road near Moorfield, I had to pass a farm-house that I had often passed before, where they kept a pack
" General Early's Report.
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of dogs that always kept up a fearful barking while we were passing. This always gave the Confederates warning of our approach. To avoid this and get into Moorfield without giving alarm, I took to the fields and passed around the house, entering the road a short distance above the forks. As we moved down the road, we were halted by a picket. We replied, " Friends," and did not halt. Com- ing in their rear, he took us for Confederates and made no resist- ance. The picket proved to be a camp guard of Early's division of infantry and Rosser's cavalry. Rosser, with part of his com- mand, was in Moorfield. We were in their camp before we realized it. Many of the men were up and moving about the camp, although it was yet dark. I halted the command and rode into the woods on the right of the road, got a good view of the force, as we had not made any noise and they were not aware of our presence. We captured their picket and returned to camp to apprise Colonel Thoburn of the situation. I estimated their force at 3,000 infantry, cavalry and artillery, while our force at Petersburg was about 800. As we moved off, we passed the house where the barking dogs were, only a short distance from Early's camp. The family was all out- men, women, children and dogs-and greeted us as Confederates, evidently taking us for the advance of Early's Army marching to attack the Union forces at Petersburg. Colonel Thoburn, in his report, says :
"'On the morning of the 30th ult., Captain Greenfield, with a squad of forty men, ran into a camp of Rebel cavalry one or two miles south of Moorfield, and returned bringing with him a prisoner from whom we learned that Rosser's Brigade with some other de- tachments was there. I at once notified the commanding officer of the train then on its way from New Creek to Petersburg, of the threatened danger ; also the commanding officer of the 23rd Illinois Infantry, then engaged in blockading the road leading from Moor- field to Patterson Creek Valley.'"
ANOTHER WAGON-TRAIN CAPTURED.
The troops at New Creek had been paid off on the 28th and 29th. On the morning of the 30th, the paymaster, with a guard of sixty men of the Ringgoid Battalion, equal details from companies E and F, under Lieutenants Speer and Gibson, started for Peters- burgh to pay the troops at that post. The paymaster traveled in an ambulance with his satchel of greenbacks, accompanied by Hospital
158 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
Steward, William M. Hart of the First West Virginia Infantry. This escort overtook the wagon-train above Burlington about noon, and thereafter marched with the train in order to have the benefit of the additional protection afforded by the train guard while . traversing that ever-dangerous upper part of the journey.
During the forenoon of this same day, while the men of the 23rd Illinois were busily engaged in chopping and felling trees into the Moorfield road, and otherwise blockading it, they were attacked by Rosser's Brigade, and after a sharp skirmish, were driven back. Colonel Quirk had previously sent a messenger back to the train notifying Colonel Snider that the 23rd Illinois Infantry would meet him at Moorfield Junction and urging him to hasten his movements.
On reaching Medley, two and a half miles from the Junction, the advance of the train met Colonel Quirk falling back before the enemy, who had been detained for a time, clearing out the blockade in the roads to get his artillery through. Colonel Snider being the ranking officer, now took command of all the troops and formed a line of battle with his infantry in the center, and the cavalry on either flank, the detachment of the Ringgold Battalion under Speer and Gibson being on the right flank, together with several companies of the 4th West Virginia Cavalry.
Colonel Snider, in his report, says, " I had scarcely gotten my command in position when the enemy opened on us with two pieces of artillery, their infantry advancing at the same time, which was met by a galling fire from my front and caused them to fall back. Thrice they attempted the same thing with the same results." The enemy finding such resistance in their front, then began a flank move- ment, which jeopardized our train in the rear. Seeing this, Colonel Snider ordered the train to be turned and started back. "But to my great mortification." he says, " two of the train-masters had fled. and all the teamsters. with but few exceptions." Many of them had cut the horses and mules loose from the wagons and mounted them to escape. The train was thus immovable. Regarding his first position as now perilous, Colonel Snider gave the order to abandon the train and fall back to an elevated position some distance in the rear. The artillery practice of the enemy had begun to demoralize the train- guard proper, and when this movement was being executed, it was with difficulty the different commands could be held together-a condition the enemy was quick to observe and of which he was as quick to take advantage.
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EARLY AND ROSSER RAID.
Lieutenant Gibson, with thirty men of his own company (E), chose the rear-guard in this retreat as his opportunity for greatest usefulness. The enemy, now flushed with victory, assumed that there was but little fight left in the Yankees, and bodies of his cavalry, from time to time, would press our rear in an effort to create a stampede. Upon their approach within range, Gibson would turn about with his thirty Ringgolds, and pour well-aimed volleys from their carbines into the audacious pursuers until the Rebel bump of caution became perceptible in his keeping beyond carbine range.
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