USA > Pennsylvania > The Twenty-second Pennsylvania cavalry and the Ringgold battalion, 1861-1865; > Part 33
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53
321
THE DISMOUNTED DETACHMENT.
where the horse stepped upon or in any way injured his sleeping master.
In battle in a cavalry command there is always a larger pro- portion of casualties among the horses than among the men. The horses head and shoulders will often receive the bullet that was intended for the rider's body ; and as we consider the swift motion of the man as the horse rears and jumps in battle it will at once be seen that he is a very uncertain mark for the enemy.
Wednesday, August 3rd, we drew our carbines, revolvers, sabers and other equipments and were ready for work.
322 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
CHAPTER XXIV.
THE ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH. GENERAL SHERI- DAN TAKES COMMAND AUGUST 6, 1864.
General Grant had concluded that it was impossible to operate successfully against the enemy in the Valley under the existing con- fusion of departments and com- manders. "There was the Depart- ment of West Virginia, including the State and Western Maryland ; that Department of the Susque- hanna, including Pennsylvania and three counties of Ohio; the De- partment of Washington, including that place and parts of Virginia and Maryland; and the Middle De- partment, including Delaware and part of Maryland." He desired to have all these consolidated into one department, and under one competent head. He said: "The Valley had been the cause of a great deal of trouble to us hereto- fore . .
Phil Ashondaw
partly because of the incompetency of some of the com- manders, but chiefly because of in- terference from Washington. It seemed to be the policy of Gen- eral Halleck and Secretary Stanton to keep any force sent there in pursuit of the invading enemy, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our Capitol; and generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. They ( the enemy) were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle and such provisions as they could carry away from Pennsylvania and Maryland. I had pre- viously asked to have General Sheridan assigned to that command, but Mr. Stanton objected on the ground that he was too young for so important a command. On the 1st of August, I sent the following orders :
323
SHERIDAN IN COMMAND.
Major-General Halleck.
I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty while the enemy is being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the en- emy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also. Once started up the Valley they ought to be fol- lowed until we get possession of the Virginia Central Railroad.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
" The President, in some way or other, got to see this dispatch of mine, and sent me the following characteristic dispatch :
" Lieutenant-General Grant :
" I have seen your dispatch in which you say, 'I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.' This, I think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please look over the dispatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of anyone here of 'putting our army south of the enemy' or of ' following him to the death' in any direction. I repeat to you it will never be done or attempted unless you watch it every day and hour, and force it.
" A. LINCOLN."
" I replied to this that I would start in two hours for Washing- ton, which I did, but went on through to Monocacy without stop- ping in Washington. I found General Hunter's Army encamped there, scattered over the fields and along the banks of the Monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and locomotives, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that point. I asked the general where the enemy was. He replied that he did not know. He said the fact was that he was so embarrassed with orders from Wash- ington, moving him first to the right and then to the left, that he had lost all trace of the enemy. I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry in the Shenandoah Valley. The cavalry and wagon-trains were to march, but all the troops that
324
TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
could be transported by the cars were to go that way. I knew that the Valley was of such importance to the enemy that no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short time be found in front of our troops moving south.
"I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. I told him that Sheridan was in Washington and still another division on the way; and suggested that he establish his headquarters of the depart- ment at any good point that would suit him best and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The general replied to this that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. He said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the posi- tion he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. He did not want in any way to embarrass the cause, thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the army. I told him. " very well then," and telegraphed Sheridan to come at once to Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there.
" Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off. I went to the station and remained there until he arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had been done and what I wanted him to do, giving him at the same time the written instructions that had been prepared for General Hunter.
" As I predicted, Early was soon found in front of Sheridan in the Valley, and Pennsylvania and Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of the Valley to the Confed- erates was so great that Lee reinforced Early, but not to the extent we thought and feared he would."
Sheridan says: "I arrived in Washington on the 4th of August, and the next day received instructions from General Hal- leck to report to General Grant at Monocacy Junction. In company with the Secretary of War, I called on the President before leaving Washington, and during a short conversation Mr. Lincoln candidly told me that Mr. Stanton had objected to my assignment to General Hunter's command because he thought me too young, and that he himself had concurred with the Secretary : but now since General Grant had 'ploughed round ' the difficulties of the situation by picking me out to command the 'boys in the field,' he felt satisfied with what had been done and hoped for the best. Mr. Stanton remained silent during these remarks, never once indicating whether he, too, had become reconciled to my selec- tion or not; and although, after we left the White House, he con- versed freely with me in regard to the campaign I was expected
-----------
325
SHERIDAN IN COMMAND.
to make, seeking to impress on me the necessity for success from the political as well as from the military standpoint, yet he utterly ignored the fact that he had taken any part in disapproving the recommendation of the general-in-chief.
" August 6th I reported to General Grant at the Monocacy, and he there turned over to me the following instructions that he had prepared for General Hunter :
"' HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD.
"' Monocacy Bridge, Md., Aug. 5, 1864.
"' GENERAL : Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary.
"' Use in this connection the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following and attacking him wherever found; following him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south the main force, detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en-route from Washington via Rockville may be taken into account.
"' There are now on the way to join you, three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least 5,000 men and horses. These will be instructed in the absence of further orders, to join you on the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to- morrow.
"'In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as you will have to do first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage and stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as can not be consumed destroy ; it is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed-they should rather be protected ; but the people should be informed that so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.
"'Bear in mind. the object is to drive the enemy south ; and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes.
326 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
"' Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giv- ing regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march.
"' Very respectfully, " ' U. S. GRANT, "' Lieutenant-General.' "
The next day, General Hunter's unselfish request (to be re- lieved) was complied with and an order was issued by the Presi- dent, consolidating the Middle Department, the Department of Washington, the Department of the Susquehanna and the Depart- ment of West Virginia.
Under this order, these four geographical districts constituted the Middle Military Division, and General Sheridan was assigned to command it. As heretofore stated, General Hunter, in compliance with Grant's directions, ordered the concentration of all his available forces for the field service, at Halltown, four miles above Harper's Ferry, near the west bank of the Shenandoah River, and by the 6th of August, upon Sheridan's arrival at Harper's Ferry, most of these forces were already in the vicinity of Halltown, and the others were on the way, except Averill's command in pursuit of McCaus- land's force which had laid Chambersburg in ashes. As heretofore stated, Early's main force had lain at Bunker Hill from July 30th until August 4th, when he advanced North to the Potomac, and the next day, crossed into Maryland-the very day Grant arrived at Monocacy and set Hunter's troops in motion toward Halltown; the advance of the latter had scarcely reached that place until the enemy, on the 6th, true to General Grant's prediction, recrossed the Potomac from Maryland and hastened south to Bunker Hill in Sheridan's front, arriving there on the 7th.
Sheridan says : " At Harper's Ferry I made my headquarters in the second story of a small and very dilapidated hotel, and as soon as settled, sent for John M. Meigs, the chief engineer officer of the command to study with him the maps of my geographical division. It always came rather easy to me to learn geography of a new sec- tion, and its important topographical features as well; therefore, I found that with the aid of Meigs, who was most intelligent in his profession, the region in which I was to operate would soon be well fixed in my mind. Meigs was familiar with every important road and stream and with all points worthy of note west of the
327
SHERIDAN. ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH.
Blue Ridge, and was particularly well equipped with knowledge re- garding the Shenandoah Valley, even down to the farm-houses. He imparted with great readiness what he knew of this, clearly pointing out its configuration and indicating the strongest points for Confed- erate defense, at the same time illustrating scientifically and forci- bly the peculiar disadvantage under which the Union army had hitherto labored.
" I had opposing me an army largely composed of troops that had operated in this region hitherto under 'Stonewall ' Jackson, with marked success, inflicting defeat on the Union forces almost every time the two armies had come in contact. These men were now commanded by a veteran officer of the Confederacy, General Jubal A. Early, whose past services had so signalized his ability that General Lee specially selected him to take charge of the Valley district, and notwithstanding the misfortunes that befell him later, clung to him to the end of the war. The Confederate Army at this date was about 20,000 strong and consisted of Early's own corps, with Generals Rodes, Ramseur and Gordon commanding its divisions; the infantry of Breckenridge from Southwestern Virginia; three battalions of artillery, and the cavalry brigades of Vaughn, Johnson, McCausland and Imboden. This cavalry was a short time afterward organized into a division under command of General Lomax.
" When I took command of the Army of the Shenandoah, its infantry force comprised the 6th Corps, one division of the 19th Corps and two divisions from West Virginia. The 6th Corps was commanded by Major General Horatio G. Wright; its three divi- sions by Brigadier-Generals David A. Russell, George W. Getty and James B. Ricketts. The single division of the 19th Corps had for its immediate chief Brigadier-General William Dwight, the corps being commanded by Brigadier-General Wm. H. Emory. The troops from West Virginia were under Brigadier-General George Crook, with Colonel Joseph Thoburn and Isaac H. Duval as division commanders, and though in all, not more than one fair-sized division, they had been designated, on account of the department they belonged to as the Army of West Virginia. Gen- eral Torbert's division then arriving from the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, represented the mounted arm of the serv- ice and in the expectation that Averill would soon join me with his troopers, I assigned General Torbert as chief of cavalry, and
.
328
TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
General Wesley Merritt succeeded to the command of Torbert's division.
"General Wright, the commander of the 6th Corps, was an officer of high standing in the Corps of Engineers, and had seen much active service during the preceding three years. He com- manded the Department of the Ohio throughout the very trying period of the summer and fall of 1862, and while in that position, he, with other prominent officers, recommended my appointment as Brigadier-General. In 1863 he rendered valuable service at the Battle of Gettysburg, following which he was assigned to the 6th Corps and commanded it at the capture of the Confederate works at Rappahannock Station and in the operations at Mine Run. He ranked me as a major-general of volunteers nearly a year in date of commission, but my assignment by the President to the command of the army in the Valley met with Wright's approbation, and so far as I know, he never questioned the propriety of the President's action. The 6th Corps division commanders, Getty, Russell and Ricketts, were all educated soldiers, whose records, beginning with the Mexican War, had already been illustrated in the War of the Rebellion by distinguished service in the Army of the Potomac.
" General Emory was a veteran having graduated at the Military Academy (West Point) the year I was born, 1831. In early life he had seen much service in the artillery, the topographical engineers and the cavalry, and in the War of the Rebellion had exhibited the most soldierly characteristics at Port Hudson and on the Red River campaign. At this time he had but one division of the 19th Corps present, which was well commanded by General Dwight, a volunteer officer, who had risen to the grade of brigadier-general through con- stant hard work.
" Crook was a classmate of mine-at least we entered the Mili- tary Academy the same year, though he graduated a year ahead of me. We had known each other as boys before we entered the army, and later as men, and I placed implicit faith in his experience and qualifications as a general.
" The transfer of Torbert to the position of chief of cavalry, leit Merritt in command of the 1st Cavalry Division. He had been tried in the place before, and from the day he was selected as one of a number of young men to be appointed general officers, with the object of giving life to the Cavalry Corps, he filled the measure of expecta- tion.
"Custer was one of these young men, too, and though as yet,
329
SHERIDAN. ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH.
commanding a brigade under Merritt, his gallant fight at Trevil- lian Station, as well as a dozen others during the summer, indicated that he would be equal to the work that would fall to him when in a few weeks he should succeed Wilson. But to go on down the scale of rank, describing the officers who commanded in the Army of the Shenandoah would carry me beyond all limit, so I refrain from the digression with regret that I can not pay to each his well- earned tribute.
" The force that I could take with me into the field at this time numbered about 26,000 men. Within the limits of the geographical division, there was a much greater number of troops than this. Baltimore, Washington, Harper's Ferry, Hagerstown, Frederick, Cumberland and a score of other points, besides the strong de- tachments that it took to keep the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad open through the mountains of West Virginia, and escorts for my trains, absorbed so many men that the column that could be made available for field operations was small when compared with the showing on paper. Indeed it was much less than it ought to have been, but for me, in the face of the opposition made by different interests involved, to detach troops from any of the points to which they had been dis- tributed before I took charge, was next to impossible.
" In a few days after my arrival, preparations were completed and I was ready to make the first move for the possession of the Shenandoah Valley. For the next five weeks the operations on my part consisted almost wholly of offensive and defensive maneuver- ing for certain advantages, the enemy confining himself, meanwhile, to measures intended to counteract my designs. . Upon the advent ยท of Torbert, Early immediately grew suspicious, and fell back twelve miles south of Martinsburg to Bunker Hill and vicinity, where his right flank would be less exposed, but from which position he could continue to maintain the break in the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and push reconnoitering parties through Smithfield to Charlestown. These reconnoitering parties exhibited considerable boldness at times, but since they had no purpose in view, save to discover whether or not we were moving, I did not contest any ground with them, except about our outposts. Indeed, I desired that Early might re- main at some point well to the north until I was fully prepared to throw my army on his right and rear, and force a battle, and hence I abstained from disturbing him by premature activity, for I thought that if I could beat him at Winchester, or north of it, there would be far greater chances of weighty results. I therefore determined
330
TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
to bring my troops, if possible, into such a position near that town as to oblige Early to fight. The sequel proved, however, that he was accurately informed of all my movements. To anticipate them, therefore, he began his retreat up the Valley the day that I moved out from Halltown, and consequently was able to place himself south of Winchester before I could get there."
SHERIDAN'S BASE. HALLTOWN.
* For the better understanding of the movements which follow it will be well for the reader to consult the map and note carefully the position taken at Halltown, which Sheridan later on declares is the only defensible position for a Union army in the lower Valley. Here the Army of the Shenandoah lay during the three days suc- ceeding Sheridan's arrival, the left of the line resting on the Shenan- doah River below Key's Ferry, and extending with a curved front around toward the north, through Halltown and across the Balti- more and Ohio Railroad, east of Duffields' Station, with pickets reaching to the Potomac-a river on each flank and covered to some extent by the fortifications on Maryland Heights. This base was advantageous not only for defense, but for aggressive movements as well. The enemy dared not venture north of Bunker Hill with his army without exposing his rear to attack, neither would he risk crossing the Potomac River south of Harper's Ferry for the same reason. The best and strongest position for the enemy was at Fisher's Hill near Strasburg, where he ever took refuge when hard pushed by our forces. In the movements which now follow, we will see either commander, when wishing to avoid battle, falling back to his stronghold. The game of war, here played, will remind the old soldier of the game of checkers at which he whiled away many an hour when in winter quarters, advancing when the enemy was caught at a disadvantage and falling back to the double corner of the king-row when hard pressed.
THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE 22ND PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEER CAVALRY.
Divided into three large detachments again, many miles separated we find the regiment, but the separation at this time is to be brief.
See Map, page 63.
@
331
SHERIDAN. ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH.
* The dismounted detachment of about 700 men, now well mounted and equipped, after one week's mounted drill at Pleasant Valley, marched from that camp on August 9th. They had enlisted as cav- alry, but had now been serving for five long months on foot carrying muskets, living from week to week on promises of being mounted, to be disappointed again and again, until hope long deferred made their hearts sick and many of them, like Job, cursed the day they had entered this miserable existence. But now they are happy. They forget their sorrows in the realization of their fondest hopes. They are burning with ambition to " ride down " the enemy. They march across the Potomac and out to the front of Sheridan's Army above Halltown to serve with a great army under a victorious commander.
The detachment at Hancock with General Duffee, marched from that place on the 11th, and reported to General Sheridan at Harper's Ferry, who ordered the division on to Halltown, from which they moved on the 13th to Newtown and operated with the army at the front.
The detachment under command of Major Work, with Averill in the pursuit and destruction of McCausland's forces that burned Chambersburg, is still with Averill's command. The men although much worn by the chase, are full of enthusiasm over their victory of the 7th, but their footsore, jaded horses are in pitiable condition, - and are being shipped by railroad to Martinsburg, or as near that point as the broken road can carry them. The command arrived at Martinsburg on the 14th, to rest a little before joining the coming fray. A few days later, we find them again in the saddle after the enemy.
General Torbert's three brigades had arrived at the Halltown base by the 9th. General Grant assured Sheridan that no troops
* On August 9th the newly mounted battalion of the 22nd Pennsylvania Cavalry, marched across the Potomac and out seven miles, going into camp one mile beyond Halltown, with orders to be ready at 2 A. M., next day.
Next morning, we were aroused at that early hour and got ready to march at once, but had to wait for quite a while. and when finally started, marched out past our old camp in the "Six Months'" service. through Charlestown and thence to Summit Point where we formed line of battle. Captain Hugh Keys of Company D, charged on a squad of Confederates and succeeded in capturing seventeen of them.
Our battalion was assigned to the Third Brigade of Merritt's Division, commanded by Colonel Charles R. Lowell, Jr., as gallant an officer as ever drew a sword. and withal, a perfect gentleman. The brigade was composed of First Maryland, 2nd Massa- chusetts. 22nd Pennsylvania and 25th New York. On the next morning, our regiment with the brigade, marched until 10 o'clock, when a halt was made. Companies G and K. moved on to the Martinsburg Pike. a mile north of Winchester, where we halted, threw out pickets and remained until ordered to rejoin the regiment; we then marched through Winchester and down the Berryville Pike to Opequan Creek, turned to the right and on to White Post where we camped for the night, after a march of thirty miles. - Gehrett.
.
332 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
had been withdrawn from Lee's Army to reinforce Early, so Sheri- dan determined to move at once and if possible, engage the enemy in battle near to Winchester.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.