USA > Pennsylvania > The Twenty-second Pennsylvania cavalry and the Ringgold battalion, 1861-1865; > Part 20
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The Army of the Potomac lay along the north bank of the Rapidan River from Fredericksburg westward by Culpepper. The Army of Northern Virginia, now as strong as when it fought at Gettysburg the previous summer, lay along the opposite or southern bank of the same river, strongly entrenched, and commanded by the ablest general in the Confederate Army.
There was but one other large Confederate Army in the field east of the Mississippi River, that of General Joseph E. John- ston, defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia; his main army, recruited up to the full, was stationed at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman, who was still at Chattanooga. Besides these main armies, the Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse from which they fed their armies, and also be- cause it commanded their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the army, because it would lay the North open to in- vasion and also expose our railroad communications over which troops were transported and supplies shipped to the armies in the field. The Confederate Partisan Rangers, who operated largely behind the Union lines, destroying railroads, burning bridges, cap-
190 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
turing trains, Forrest and Morgan in Tennessee and Moseby, Mc- Neil and others in Virginia, were a constant menace to our rail- road communications. The route by rail between Sherman's Army at Chattanooga and the Army of the Potomac on the Rapidan was at this time via Cincinnati, Parkersburg, Baltimore and Washing- ton. These lines of railroad through Tennessee and Kentucky, and also the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Parkers- burg on the Ohio River to Harper's Ferry on the Potomac, were exposed to raids from these roving bands, and to guard them re- quired a large number of soldiers. In the matter of railroad com- munication between their armies, the Confederates had a great advantage. The distance by rail between Johnson's Army at Dal- ton and Lee's Army on the Rapidan was less than five hundred miles as against one thousand miles by rail between the Union armies opposing them. Our armies had heretofore operated inde- pendently and rarely with any concerted action. When a great battle was imminent, or some strategic point in danger, the Con- federates would rush by railroad, one or more veteran corps from one army not being pressed, to reinforce the other, often thus turning a defeat into a victory ; when the crisis was passed, the re- inforcements would be returned to their own army within twenty- four hours. Grant determined to stop this by simultaneous move- ments of the different armies. He says: " I arranged for a simulta- neous movement all along the line; Sherman was to move from Chat- tanooga, Johnston's Army and Atlanta being his objective point. Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communi- cations, or see them destroyed, and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from invasion through that channel, as well while advancing as by remaining near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River, having Rich- mond and Petersburg as his objective. General Burnside, with the Ninth Army Corps. 20,000 strong, was rendezvoused at Annapolis. ready to reinforce the Army of the Potomac or the Army of the James.
" By the ?? th of April, spring had so far advanced as to justify
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191
THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.
me in fixing a day for the great move. On that day, the 27th, Burn- side left Annapolis to occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock, while Meade was directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. On the following day, Butier was notified of my intended advance on May 4th, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from there to the task given him. The same day, Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was ordered to move in conjunction with the others."
THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.
The surviving members of the Twenty-second Regiment, Penn- sylvania Cavalry, need no written description of the " Valley "; they have marched over almost every road; they have picketed the cross roads ; they have chased the enemy " up the Valley " and have been chased down again; they have fought the ground over again and again from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain, and from the Po- tomac to Staunton, but to their successors who read this book, a de- scription of this valley, the stage on which much of the bloody drama was enacted, will be necessary to a clearer understanding of the narrative. A careful study of the map will be very helpful.
A glance at the map will discover the Shenandoah Valley, formerly called the Valley of Virginia, extending northeast and southwest, and having for its southeastern boundary the single, regu- lar wall of the Blue Ridge, with its several gates or gaps; while twenty miles away, across the valley, are the "North Mountains " or lower ranges of the Alleghenies.
This valley is a continuation of the Cumberland Valley of Penn- sylvania and very similar to it in the character of its surface and soil. The Potomac in a tortuous course, crosses the valley almost at right angles, cutting its way through the Blue Ridge at Harper's Ferry. The streams of the valley, the Shenandoah River, Opequan Creek and Back Creek flow northeastwardly and empty into the Potomac. West of the Shenandoah Valley, between the different parallel ridges of mountains (see map) are the narrow mountain valleys of Sleepy Creek, Cacapon and Lost River, South Branch, Patterson Creek and New Creek, all leading in the same general direction to the Potomac. Along each of these mountain valleys was a good highway for travel and these became favorite routes for Confed- erate raiders, in their attacks on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.
192 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
The rich, limestone soil of the Shenandoah Valley, makes it one of the most fertile sections of the country, and specially adapted to the growing of wheat, grasses and fruit. Certainly no other section of the South of like area, would compare with it in the pro- duction of food crops, and thus this valley became a great source of supply for Lee's Army.
The valley is traversed by numerous macadam roads or " pikes " as they were called in " war times," the grades being almost level and the roadways, built by cheap slave labor, were of excellent broken limestone. The main pike of the valley extended from Martinsburg on the north to Staunton in the upper valley, a distance of more than a hundred miles. From Martinsburg, an excellent pike leads to Williamsport and another to Shepherdstown on the Potomac. From Winchester, a fine pike leads through Berryville to Harper's Ferry and another pike leads to Front Royal with branches to the different Gaps of the Blue Ridge. In fact no other section of the country at that time was so well supplied with excellent macadam roads. These roads facilitated the transportation of army supplies and artillery, and played an important part in the game of war dur- ing the four years.
The numerous gaps in the Blue Ridge formed gateways into the Valley through which an army corps could pass leisurely or a troop of cavalry could dash suddenly, make a capture and escape as sud- denly through another pass.
In the middle of the valley, some forty miles above Harper's Ferry, rising abruptly from the plain, is a high mountain ridge or ridges, some six or eight miles in width and extending southward almost to New Market, called the Massanutten Mountain. This mountain divides the main valley into two valleys, that of the east known as the Luray Valley and the other as the North or Shenan- doah Valley. Each of these valleys is drained by a branch of the Shenandoah River, the North Branch washing the northern base of Massanutten as it sweeps around to join its other half at Front Royal. The twin valleys grow narrow as they approach the north- ern end of Massanutten, naturally forming strong defensive posi- tions against attack from the north, of which strategic value, the Confederate generals were not slow to take advantage when hard pressed.
The people of the valley south of the immediate neighborhood of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, were, with few exceptions, rank Confederates, practically all the men subject to military duty
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193
THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.
MAP OF THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY
Hancock
Potomar
Cumberland
Williamsport
O
O. R. R.
S. AND O.
Hedgesvile
Springfields
Piedmont
0
Creek
30
Bunker
Harper's Ferry
Halltown
Smithfield
Atuarlestopi
Summit Point
Vilchost
Berryville:
Snickers Ferr
asnickers
Newtown
BLUE
Moc
Berm's
Ferry
vyAshby's Gap
Middletown
Paris
ašburs
PCedarville
Manassas Gap
Buckton
Posto Front
MANASSAS
tocks
"Chester Gap
Powr WH
Washington
Ecksony
Sheraton's Gap
Sperryy
Luray
Yo
Valley Turmike
Columbia
Bridge
Fisher's Gap
Dry RiverGapof
Culpeper CHI.
Barronburg
. Madison C.H.
Edgewater
Crawford
Ch RS
MossyCr. Mt Solon
· CrossKeys
Stayardsville
tribfing's Gap
LU
BL
Orange C.H.
Brown's Gap
Stawtion
Gordonsville
R.R
Rockfish Gap
VA. C.R R
Morinms River
Charlottesville
0. 8 A
MASSANUTTEN MI
Roval'
SHENANO
NORTH
Wrocks Gap
OrAT
TAIN:
PEAKED'
Fork
Conradi Store
Rappahanno
South
Swift Run Gab
Port Republi
ennings' Gap
R
viver
4.2
Big Cacapon River
Bath Clearspring
Frankfort
River
Martinsbur
Romney
RIDGE
MOUN
Shenando
densville
South Fork of South Branch
RANGE AND ALEXANDRIA' R. R
LITTLE
Kenzletown=
194 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
being in the Southern army. Winchester was as thoroughly South- ern as any city in the Cotton Belt, although there were several loyal families that were highly esteemed by the officers and soldiers of the Union army.
CHAPTER XVI.
THE GREAT SIMULTANEOUS ADVANCE.
The last week of April, 1864, saw great activity in all the camps of the Union armies. General Sherman was assembling and organizing into one great army the heretofore separate commands of Thomas, McPherson and Schofield, preparatory to moving for- . ward toward Atlanta. General Butler, in command of the forces about Fortress Monroe and Norfolk, had been joined by General Gilmore's forces from South Carolina and was preparing to move forward on the south side of the James River as a menace to Richmond.
The Ninth Corps, under command of General Burnside, had marched from Annapolis and joined the Army of the Potomac on the Rapidan.
General Sigel, in command of the Department of West Vir- ginia, was hustling troops forward to the Kanawha Valley, for Generals Crook and Averill in their expedition against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, and also assembling a force at Winchester to advance up the Valley under command of himself. The troops for this latter expedition had been gathering at New Creek, Cum- berland and other points along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as far east as Harper's Ferry ; these had been moving for- ward during this last week of April, going first to Martinsburg and from thence to Winchester.
At noon, April 2Sth, the mounted part of the 22nd Penn- sylvania Cavalry (the Old Battalion) marched from Cumber- land, Md., together with four companies of the Twentieth Pennsyl- vania Cavalry and part of a battery (two howitzers) all under com- mand of Colonel (Acting Brigadier General) Wyncoop, of the 20th Pennsylvania Cavalry. We marched down the river (North Branch Potomac) some ten miles, and forded the river at Pat- terson's Creek Station, the water being so high as to almost swim our horses; moved on and camped for the night on the Frankfort Road about two miles from the river. The next morning we marched early, going up Patterson's Creek to Frankfort and then across the
195
THE GREAT SIMULTANEOUS ADVANCE.
mountain to Springfield, arriving at two o'clock, where we met the 15th New York Cavalry. We waited here all afternoon to see if we could draw rations, as we were entirely out of bread and meat. Then we marched forward at dark, the New York Cavalry going with us ; crossed the river (South Branch Potomac) on a light wire bridge, single file, open order, and were a considerable time getting over.
We did not reach Romney until daybreak, eight miles during the night, a severe trial on the patience of our Ringgold boys who had ridden that same road in an hour many a time in the two years previous ; moved on to Frenchtown, reaching there at 10 o'clock, where we stopped, fed and took breakfast.
After a rest of two hours, we marched on to "Big Capon " Bridge, the 15th New York going via Bloomery Gap, and the rest of the command going through Blue's Gap. As the head of our line approached the gap, the officer in charge (not of the 22nd) ordered the advance guard to march with drawn sabers, the most foolish thing imaginable, for, had the Rebels held the gap, as we expected, they would have been where our cavalry could not reach them with sabers; if he had given the command " Advance carbine," our men could have done some execution, if necessary, but as there were no Johnnies in evidence, the blunder was harmless.
We camped over night at the "Bridge." Killed two beeves. Company C on picket. A scout sent to Winchester to-night.
May 1st. Lay here at Cacapon until two o'clock. Two scouts went out and brought in some prisoners ; Lieutenant Welch butchered a few hogs for our battalion. Marched at 2 P. M., going via. Pugh- town to. Winchester, arriving about 8 P. M. On the way, Lieutenant Welch pressed several head of cattle. Camped for the night on the farm and by the residence of Senator Mason, Confederate Ambassa- dor to Great Britain, who with Slidell, were taken off the British vessel "Trent " by Captain Wilkes, of the United States cruiser "San Jacinto " in 1862. He had a beautiful place here, a half- mile from the city.
May 2nd. There are three brigades of infantry, several regi- ments of cavalry and several batteries here, where General Sigel has established his headquarters. We were called out for review and inspection by General Stahel, Chief of Cavalry.
Next day, May 3rd. General Sigel's private wagon-train of eight army wagons, was captured on the way here from Martins- burg. Duty heavy, scouting, picketing, guarding train, etc. Each
196 TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
train of 100 wagons to and from Martinsburg is convoyed by not less than four hundred cavalry and two pieces of artillery.
During this first week of May, General Sigel was rushing up supplies and getting things in readiness to move forward on schedule time and thus carry out his part of the " Great Simulta- neous Advance."
The time, May 5th, had now arrived; Crook and Averill had already started for the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The Army of the Potomac had crossed the Rapidan and begun the first day's Battle of the Wilderness. Sherman was pushing out, heading for Dalton, Georgia, where Johnson's Army was fortified. Butler was moving on the south side of the James, and it was time for the Army of the Valley to move up also. The enemy was not sitting idly by looking on, but was everywhere on the alert and ready to meet the advance. He already knew General Grant's plans; knew also the exact number of men he had in each part of the field and what troops. Now when Sigel was about to move forward from Winchester with his little army of 5,000 men, the enemy became very active in his rear.
As heretofore stated, many of the troops intended for the ex- peditions of Crook and Averill. and also for Sigel's advance up the valley, had congregated at New Creek, Cumberland, Martinsburg and other points along that 100-mile stretch of railroad. During the last days of April, these troops had been forwarded to their several destinations, leaving but small garrisons for the protection of that part of the railroad. Immediately thereafter, there were numerous depredations committed along this part of the road. These attacks were made during the night by small bands of the enemy, dressed in citizen's clothing, or when it suited better, wear- ing the United States uniform, many of them former citizens of the vicinity, aided and abetted in their operations by disloyal families living in the neighborhood. A train would be held up and robbed, the telegraph line would be destroyed, a bridge burned, and the marauders would disappear as mysteriously as they came. In a few nights the operations would be repeated at another point.
*"From the beginning of the war, a large majority of the people living in the Shenandoah Valley gave their allegiance to the Confederate Government. With but few exceptions, the men old enough to bear arms were either to be found in the army or else
Pond.
6
ID
197
THE PARTISAN RANGERS.
were secretly aiding and assisting the Confederate commander. Over the whole of Northern Virginia, ranged partisan commanders, with bands of men who, one day might be seen at work on their farms, following the plow or gathering their harvests, but who, twenty-four hours later, at the call of their chief, would be riding miles away to fall upon a wagon train loaded with supplies for the Union Army, capturing and shooting stragglers from the ranks, etc. They were familiar with every foot of ground, every path- way leading into the mountain dells and secluded nooks. They could ride rapidly, by night as well as by day, over oft-frequented roads. Their work accomplished, they disappeared as suddenly as they came. Their operations were approved by the people, who were ever ready to give information of the movements of the Union wagon-trains, or of small bodies of troops that might be safely attacked."
Moseby, over in Loudon County, whose lookouts on the " watch towers " of the Blue Ridge, signaled him of every transport up or down the valley, and whose resident spies in Martinsburg and else- where along the railroad kept him informed of the strength of the guard at all vulnerable points, was ever and again slipping through the mountain passes and destroying the railroad, capturing a bunch of the horses, stampeding a wagon-train and carrying off the horses and drivers, and ever on the watch for the paymaster.
McNeil, whose home was at Moorfield and whose command was largely composed of men from that vicinity, carried on a sim- ilar warfare, his principal objective being the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from New Creek eastward to the mouth of Big Cacapon. Moorfield is situated at the forks of the South Branch of the Potomac, a most advantageous location for such operations. A well-mounted command, by any one of a half-dozen different valleys, could reach this railroad within twenty-four hours, and owing to the lack of telegraph communication, the blow struck would be the first intimation that the enemy was on a raid, and he would then disappear and get beyond reach of his pursuers. The community around Moorfield was so intensely " Confederate " that when our pursuing forces did reach there, no enemy was in evi- dence, the very men in citizens' clothes to whom you talked were sometimes the very raiders you were seeking.
198
TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
A DIVERSION BY THE ENEMY.
At 10:30 o'clock in the forenoon of May 5th, President John W. Garrett, of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, telegraphed Sec- retary Stanton, "Our telegraph lines were cut at 7 o'clock this morning, west of Cumberland. Operator at the instant of cutting had commenced forwarding advice that the Confederates were marching on Piedmont in force." Five minutes later Garrett tele- graphed the same thing to Sigel at Winchester, adding, " I fear the number of troops for the defense of that part of the line is too limited to prevent great disaster." At 6:30 the same evening, Gar- rett again telegraphed Secretary Stanton, " The extensive machine and carpenter shops at Piedmont have been burned. The engine and cars of the eastbound mail train and two tonnage trains have also been destroyed; five other engines damaged. The force of the enemy was small and their success resulted from the entire exposure of so important a point as Piedmont."
The Confederate captain, John H. McNeil, with sixty picked men, well mounted, left Moorfield on the night of the 3rd; reached Bloomington on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad just at daybreak of the 5th; captured the first freight train going east, placed some of his men on the train, and ordered the engineer to move on down to Piedmont slowly, while his cavalry followed immediately in the wake of the train, thus hidden from observation until the whole outfit was right in the village, when the surprised, small garrison surrendered without resistance. The enemy captured the tele- graph office and cut the wires. When the mail train came in, they captured the mail, and 103 Union soldiers who were going for- ward to their commands, and whom they paroled. They then burned the train, and two other freight trains loaded with stores ; also the railroad shops and locomotives.
Colonel Rogers, in command at Martinsburg, and Colonel Wilkinson, in command at New Creek, had been reporting the weakness of their garrisons from day to day, Rogers especially making it emphatic that he had practically insufficient force to de- fend the place against an ordinary cavalry raid.
Governor Brough, of Ohio, had in camp some seventeen regi- ments of militia, "hundred-days" men, whom he was equipping as rapidly as possible for guard duty along exposed lines of rail- road, over which troops and stores were being transported, and for garrison duty wherever needed.
199
A DIVERSION BY THE ENEMY.
On the 3rd, Secretary Stanton telegraphed Governor Brough to send some of these regiments to report to General Sigel for guard duty along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and ten regi- ments for duty in the fortifications of Washington and Baltimore. The blankets and Enfield rifles, shipped for the equipment of these regiments, were delayed on the railroad for a day or two, or these men would have been on duty guarding the road when McNeil made his dash. The first of these regiments arrived at Cumber- land on the 6th. In all, fourteen regiments were furnished to guard the road from Parkersburg to Baltimore.
The main object of McNeil's raid was to cause Sigel to de- tach a part of his force to guard the railroad and delay his move- ment up the valley, while at the same time such a daring exploit would stimulate the disloyal party of the North to greater activity in opposing to the efforts of the Government to "put down the rebellion," and would also be heralded throughout the South as a great victory, and thus revive their spirits.
Sigel regarded the Piedmont affair as a matter of little conse- quence, as indeed it was, for arrangements had already been made for the protection of the railroad against such small bodies of raiders, while the general advance of our army, hard pressing the enemy, both in the valley and along the line of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, would so occupy him as to preclude his de- taching a large force for such expeditions. However, on the even- ing of May 6th, Sigel ordered a scout of 450 cavalry to Moor- field and Petersburg "to cut off the raiders!"
At 10:50 A. M. the morning of the attack on Piedmont on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Sigel received a telegram of the fact from Garrett ; more than thirty hours later the scout was or- dered. I have failed to find any reason for it; I can not think that Sigel expected any result from the expedition, and it may be that the " howling press " had been criticising his inactivity in failing to pursue the raiders and the scout was sent out to allay public clamor.
On the evening of May 6th, we got orders to saddle up and be ready to march at a moment's notice. We were kept in this position until 3:30 A. M. of the 7th, when we marched out in the direction of Moorfield. This scout consisted of 225 men from the " Old Battalion " of the 22nd Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Major Work, and a detachment of 220 men from the 15th New York
200
TWENTY-SECOND PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
Cavalry, in command of Lieutenant-Colonel Aug. J. Root,* with a train of twelve wagons, the whole being in command of Colonel Higgins, of the 22nd Pennsylvania Cavalry. Had this scout been ordered out in charge of either Major Work or Colonel Root, it would have moved out promptly a few minutes after the order had been issued, and there would have been no impediment of a wagon- train; and while the object of the expedition would, no doubt, have been a failure, it would have fulfilled its orders and returned promptly through Lost River Gap ; hours before Imboden's force, which left Woodstock on the afternoon of the 9th, could get there.
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